142 replies to this topic

[Jonathan Saunders]

Hi Jon,

[quote name='Jon Miller' date='Mar 5 2007, 11:46 PM' post='638603']
You don't make it easy for Haig to gain a bit of credit with you, do you?  Now, you'll know this as opposed to me, but wasn't Haig in control of the BEF in the 100 Days in the same way as he was in 1916 and 1917?  You make it sound as if suddenly in 1918, lower ranks had more chance of improving their tactics and resulting successes, without having to pass on any credit to Haig, whereas he was definitely in control in the previous two years, and wasn't that awful?  Did Haig delegate to a greater degree in the last months of the war?  And if he did, and this was successful, shouldn't he be credited for it?
[/quote]

Its not that I am opposed to giving Haig credit, just that I want to ensure he deserves it.  I don’t think I will ever be firmly pro-Haig, for me there are some black marks in his locker which are irredeemable – but that doesn’t mean I don’t want to form a balanced opinion – what did he do well and what did he do badly.   Should Haig be credited for delegating from August 1918?  Possibly, then again, possibly not.  But I don’t think purely because he did delegate and it was successful that he should be widely acclaimed.  First I want to know what made Haig delegate?  You could say because of the availability of better and more experienced officers but were they really better than the officers that were killed at Loos, or on the Somme etc.    I don’t think Rawlinson was significantly better or significantly worse in August 1918 than he was in June 1916.  And I believe Haig meddled and muddled with Rawlinson’s Somme 1916 plan with detrimental and catastrophic results (Robert Dunlop would probably disagree with me).  If Haig was delegating because he had more confidence in, say, Rawlinson’s ability than his own and he knew not to interfere, perhaps we should give Haig some credit for recognising that, but personally in my retrospective outlook I would give him much more credit if he had realised that in June 1916.  Jon – its all about opinions and I am still trying to formulate some and fine-tune others … my membership of the GWF corresponds almost to the beginning of my substantial interest in the Great War.  I can get a bit opinionated and passionate about right and wrongs as I perceive them but I don’t think I know it all and I still regard myself just above the novice stage and I am trying hard to make sense of it all.  My disagreements are far ranging!  I recently disputed the adequacy of the new biography on Haig by Walter Reid.  It did not answer my questions but possibly it does for others.  As I said, its about opinions and looking for those answers.

[quote name='Jon Miller' date='Mar 5 2007, 11:46 PM' post='638603']
Yes, the BEF did have good reason for surrender on 21 March 1918.  That was the point I was trying to make, but possibly not clearly enough.  But also with regard to the Germans on 8 Aug, perhaps the surprise element that you mentioned, and the tanks that I mentioned were much more the reason for wholesale surrender than downright disillusionment?
[/quote]

Yes on reflection I think a combination of surprise and tanks was a significant contributory factor to the large number of prisoners taken on 8th August.  I am currently under the impression that large numbers of prisoners continued to be taken at certain times long after the tanks and the surprise had gone, hence in part, my original question, but I might be wrong and a significant quantum of the 27,500 prisoners may have been taken on 8th August.

[quote name='Jon Miller' date='Mar 5 2007, 11:46 PM' post='638603']
The idea of who had more relative success in 1918 is interesting.  Could you please expand on why you think the Germans deserve this accolade?  Then I'll try and return a couple of points!!
[/quote]

First of all whether the Germans were right or wrong to attack across the old Somme battlefields, what they achieved in late March 1918 was far beyond anything that had been achieved in the previous 3 years of fighting and it had the Allies wobbling.  They did this with innovative storm troops, without the tanks that we rightly agree made such an impact to the Allied offensive of 8th August 1918, and without control of the skies.  The concealment of troop movements leading up to 21st March I am led to believe was of the highest order of organisation and professionalism.  Also the momentum of their March offensive kept moving forward whereas by the end of the 9th August I believe cracks were forming in the British offensive (I am thinking III Corps) and we had to stop and take stock.  No doubt taking stock and reorganising was the correct thing to do but to my mind this was because the German command structure was strengthening, whilst at a corresponding stage in March, the British command structure IMHO was disorganised and in panic.   Just a point of note, my comment in the previous post referred to relative success in March 1918 compared with August 1918 and not 1918 as a whole.

[quote name='Jon Miller' date='Mar 5 2007, 11:46 PM' post='638603']
I think it's going to be near enough impossible to clear up the debate of the possibly excessive casualties.
The only way I feel that you would get enough of an idea of why, is to find out how the casualties were caused, and that would mean reading a huge amount of War Diaries and histories.  But it would be absolutely fascinating to find out how the casualties were sustained.  Naturally, I would still stick with the idea of MGs doing the damage, until persuaded otherwise.

[/quote]

You might be right with MGs but that was not the point I was trying to make.  Why keep pressing forward?  Bring up the artillery, let them register their targets, use the heavy's to cut the wire, etc etc.  It’s the extent of the “duty of care” before sending the infantry forward that I was trying to highlight (and also find an answer too).  And I think after that initial thrust had burnt out, this scenario is much closer to how the offensive was conducted.  I'll try and find out some casualty figures relating to August, September, etc.


Regards,

Jon S

[Jon Miller]

First I want to know what made Haig delegate.......

Hi Jon


So, Haig did actually change his mode of command for the 100 Days as compared to the previous couple of years?

Jon.

[Jonathan Saunders]

First I want to know what made Haig delegate.......

So, Haig did actually change his mode of command for the 100 Days as compared to the previous couple of years?

Jon.

That’s what I am inclined to believe through my reading regarding battlefield operations, but you will note in an earlier post in this thread I asked Robert Dunlop for his views on this.  From my previous discussions I trust Robert to give me a considered opinion that he can back up with an impressive bibliography.

Regards,

Jon S

[Jon Miller]

Why keep pressing forward?  Bring up the artillery, let them register their targets, use the heavy's to cut the wire, etc etc.  It’s the extent of the “duty of care” before sending the infantry forward that I was trying to highlight (and also find an answer too).  And I think after that initial thrust had burnt out, this scenario is much closer to how the offensive was conducted.

Hi Jon

I'd be interested to hear you expand slightly on this - to what extent would you have the artillery pounded the same positions?  Are you proposing that you blast the enemy where they stand, and let them reinforce those positions, and blast them ad infinitum?  Thereby cutting out the need to send the infantry in?

You ask why they should keep pressing forward.  I'm not sure whether you mean in each individual instance or as the whole army as a whole.  Off the top of my head I would have thought constant movement of the enemy was desirable, giving him no time to construct impregnable defences, and secondly, the nearer Germany the action went, the more dispiriting for the enemy, and encouraging for the allies.

Now this is hardly going to back up the thought that movement was really important.  I mentioned previously, the Worcesters at Pigeon Trench.  You didn't take me up on that remark, and I have no idea if you know about what happened there or not.  So I will type out some extracts from the 'Worcestershires in the Great War.  It comes as a bit of a shock to me, maybe not you, that this was still possible after all that was supposed to have been learnt in the years before.

'‘the 100th Brigade, including the 2nd Worcs, were to attack down the Targelle valley towards Ossus.
That attack, as we have said, was subsidiary to the main operation, and could not be expected by itself to achieve any great success; consequently, since there were not enough tanks and artillery to assist adequately the whole front of attack, all the tanks and most of the available guns had to be concentrated behind the main attack further south, leaving only inadequate support on the front of the 33rd Division.  Also, the subsidiary attack was to be started earlier than the main attack in order to deceive the enemy and to engage the fire of the German guns.  That latter provision entailed an especial disadvantage for the 2nd Worcs; for the Battalion formed the extreme right flank of the subsidiary attack, and consequently the Worcs companies would have to advance with their right exposed to enfilade fire from Lark Spur until the subsequent movement of the 12th Division further to the right.
The task thus set to the 33rd Division was so formidable that the Brigadier of the 100th Brigade, Brig-Gen A W F Baird, reported officially that in his opinion success could not be expected unless the attack was assisted either by tanks or by more artillery, or unless the enemy’s machine-guns were effectively blinded by a heavy curtain of smoke. But his remonstrance was unavailing.  It was essential to secure the success of the decisive attack further south; and neither guns nor tanks were sufficiently numerous to be spared.  The orders must stand………….

Two footnotes at this stage…(1) The attack of the 33rd Division was supported only by the 33rd Divisional Field Artillery – two Field Brigades, without any addition of heavier pieces.  In contrast, the decisive attack on the right was supported by 44 Field Brigades and 21 Brigades of medium or heavy artillery, and was assisted by a strong force of tanks.  (2) The similar protest of General Cayley, at the Battle of Scimitar Hill.  In that case the timely representations of the Brigadier saved his Brigade from being sacrificed uselessly in an attack which could not have achieved any useful success, having no available fresh forces behind it; but Gen Baird’s attack formed an essential part of a definite plan to gain decisive success; and though the Brigade was sacrificed, the Army gained the victory which won the War.’

JON’S NOTE – So this has cleared up one of my long standing queries…. While the Canadians and Australians were being the fantastic strike forces that they undoubtedly were, what part did the Brits play in the taking of the Hindenburg Line?  They became the blood donors that enabled the attack to have every chance of success.  But you don’t get written into the history books for that.

Back to the History, what happened next?……..
‘At 5.30am, the guns behind the 33rd Division opened fire and the battle began.  Scrambling out of their trenches the Worcestershire platoons advanced as rapidly as possible through a storm of German shells;  but the rain of the previous days had converted the shattered ground into deep mud, and the laden troops could not keep up with the barrage.  The British shrapnel burst for a few minutes along the line of the sunken ‘Gloster Road’ and then moved on down the valley.  As soon as the shells ceased to burst over the road, the German M-Gs came into action one after another.  From the cutting in front and from the Cross-Roads to the right came the hard stammer of the their firing, and under the hail of their bullets the attack withered away.  Through the smoke of the shell-bursts, the platoons in rear saw their comrades in front collapse, but they pushed on in their turn only to meet a like fate.  All the platoons of the two leading companies had been shot down and the majority of the two support companies had fallen before the survivors came to a halt half-way to the road and took cover as best they could.
It was not possible to send a message back across that open ground swept by M-G fire, and it was not until after 10am that it cold definitely be reported that the attack had failed.  About that time a merciful mist drifted down and veiled the battlefield.  Under cover of that mist the survivors of the attack regained Limerick Trench.  German shells were still raining down all around, and a tremendous thunder of gunfire on the right flank told them that the main attack had been opened along the whole front of the Fourth Army.
Throughout the rest of that day shells and bullets struck around the trenches which the survivors of the Battalion were holding.  Orders for a further attack were followed by counter-orders; and the position was unchanged when darkness fell.
That night came cheering news.  The great attack on the right had been successful.  The Bellicourt defences had been stormed, the St Quentin Canal had been crossed, and the Hindenburg Line was broken.

The fall of the main defences further south entailed the retreat of the enemy in front.  Patrols were sent forward before the dawn.  They found the sunken road empty save for a few dead.  Cautiously, they made their way down the valley, reconnoitred ‘Pigeon Trench’ and found it deserted, then pushed on to the bank of the ground west of the canal had been evacuated.
Unopposed, Colonel Storney and the remnants of the Battalion advanced over the battle ground.  Between ‘Limerick Trench’ and ‘Gloster Road’ were lying the bodies of the brave officers and men who had made the attack.  They lay in little groups of crumpled forms, platoon after platoon stuck down by the hail of bullets.  None had crossed the sunken road.
On the left and closest to the road lay Lt R K Wright’s platoon of C Coy.  In front lay the subaltern, a bomb grasped tightly in his hand; behind him lay his men, all struck down in the moment of charging. ‘His leading’ recorded the Battalion War Diary, ‘must have been magnificent.’
To the right and but little further from the enemy position were found 2nd Lt G Lambert’s platoon.  They too had all been killed; and they lay, riddled with bullets but still in line facing forward, their dead subaltern a few yards in front.
Further to the right, the two leading platoons of D Coy had closed towards the Cross-Roads, and they lay strewn in a semi-circle as the machine-guns had caught them.  ‘Their position’ says the War Diary, ‘bore witness to the splendid effort they had made to reach their objectives.’
Of the four platoons which had led the attack every officer and man had been killed by the storm of bullets at close range.  The ground behind was littered with the dead and wounded of the other platoons who had followed them.  In all, 8 officers and 80 NCOs and men had been killed, 3 officers and 150 men wounded.

That sacrifice of brave men must at first have seemed useless to the survivors of the Battalion – who indeed wrote bitterly of the weakness and ineffectiveness of the supporting artillery fire; but the sacrifice had not been useless.  The attack had diverted much of the enemy’s artillery, and had drawn to the defences in front a fresh German Division, the 30th Division, from the enemy’s reserves. Thus weakened, the enemy’s line further south had given way before the attack of the Fourth Army; and the strongest bulwark of Germany was broken.  The officers and men of the 2nd Worcs who lay dead in the valley of the Targelle were part of the price, an inevitable part of the price of the decisive victory of the War, the greatest battle ever won by British arms.’

Note – The enemy who actually met the attack were Jager battalions of the Alpine Corps, a formation which had gained a high reputation.


While I have typed this out, I have felt in turn, sick and close to tears.  And it has now reminded me why I became so animated in entering this thread.  Jon, of course your original question was perfectly reasonable, but I can't abide the disparagement to  the 100 Days when mentioning the idea that the true defeat of the German Army was before 8 Aug, when I know about the likes of Pigeon Ravine. The sheer cheek of it being suggested that it was basically over before the last 100 Days is indigestable.  I'll have to live with it!

Jon.

[Jonathan Saunders]

I'd be interested to hear you expand slightly on this - to what extent would you have the artillery pounded the same positions?  Are you proposing that you blast the enemy where they stand, and let them reinforce those positions, and blast them ad infinitum?  Thereby cutting out the need to send the infantry in?

You ask why they should keep pressing forward.  I'm not sure whether you mean in each individual instance or as the whole army as a whole.  Off the top of my head I would have thought constant movement of the enemy was desirable, giving him no time to construct impregnable defences, and secondly, the nearer Germany the action went, the more dispiriting for the enemy, and encouraging for the allies.

Hi Jon

I do not pretend to be a student of military tactics or strategy but it seems to me if you have overwhelming resource available you use it, or equitable to the circumstances you wait until it is assembled and in place.  Recalling Prior & Wilson:  For the 8 August offensive Haig did intervene to extend the first phase objective by something like 15 miles (unless my memory is wrong and as my previous comments indicate, after 8 August, Haig was less inclined to intervene but I am happy to be proved wrong on this).  As a consequence of the extended objective the infantry were required to advance beyond the safety of their artillery (both as a creeping barrage and as a utility to subdue enemy artillery and strongpoints).  In my naivity and my retrospective consideration of the position that ensued, it is my opinion that such a decision could only result in sustaining more casualties than would otherwise be necessary.  

Whilst the Australian and Canadian Corps were pushing forward south of the Somme on 8/9 August and beyond, the Australian's on the left flank were sustaining casualties from enemy fire from north of the Somme.  The reason for this was the difficulties encountered by III Corps in subduing German resistance in the northern Somme sector.  Unless my memory is doing me a disservice this failure was in part because III Corps were caught up trying to get through in-tact German wire (ie lack of adeqaute preparation) and without any form of artillery or tank support in the offensive.  Hence my original comment in post 126 (and you appear to have further highlighted an inadequcy in the British command structure at the highest level by describing a similar scenario that was repeated at Pigeon Trench two months later).

While I have typed this out, I have felt in turn, sick and close to tears.  And it has now reminded me why I became so animated in entering this thread.  Jon, of course your original question was perfectly reasonable, but I can't abide the disparagement to  the 100 Days when mentioning the idea that the true defeat of the German Army was before 8 Aug, when I know about the likes of Pigeon Ravine. The sheer cheek of it being suggested that it was basically over before the last 100 Days is indigestable.  I'll have to live with it!

I think we may be talking at cross-purposes somewhere.  As this thread has evolved we have explored several avenues of discussion, in part I feel my viewpoint has focused on the necessity of the British army sustaining high casualties in achieving the Armistice.  It wasnt that the British (and I am thinking in terms of the British offensive and not the French offensive) should not have pushed forward, just the manner in how it was done.  The German army may not have been defeated in terms of the fighting, but Germany as a nation was defeated IMHO in every other way before 8 August.  It is my opinion that either the British advance had to be conducted in such a way that casualties were equitable to ending the war in 1918, or we waited until such time as the conditions were favourable.  Now you could argue that I have the benefit of retrospective knowledge but I doubt we know more now on a high level basis about the German position in 1918 as was known through the intelligence available at the time, and certainly the British command would have been aware of the German lack of manpower projected in 1919.  In contrast at this stage the Americans were shipping over in excess of a quarter of a million troops per month.  In that regard, the German army was as good as defeated.

What saddens me about Pigeon Trench is that this would not have been an isolated incident.  I am sure if we search through Divisional or Regimental histories we will identify several similar such circumstances, so I certainly agree with your comment how "was [this] still possible after all that was supposed to have been learnt in the years before".

Just finally on the perceived "disparagement".  Those soldiers who were involved at the time were asking "why".  If you take Harry Patch as an example, then they are still asking "why" today.  Thats not a disparagement or a poor reflection on individual bravery (or fear) of those involved.  I am grateful they were there and they did what was asked of them and I respectfully remember.  But I dont think it disparaging to ask if what they were asked to do and what they had to endure, was equitable and reasonable, or whether, indeed, they were let down by those that ordered them into battle in disadvantageous circumstances without good reason.  On that point I am with your General A W F Baird.  It appears to me whether it was Haig or Rawlinson or someone else, there was someone at fault at the top.

Regards,

Jon S

[Borden Battery]

One should not forget the contribution of the Canadian Expeditionary Force in this discussion.  During the Last Hundred Days (Amiens to Mons) the CEF sustained approximately 25 percent of its TOTAL war casualties and was in near continious operation from 8 August 1918 until 10 November 1918.  Here are some documents which will add some insight into the role of the CEF at this time.

Borden Battery
=========================================


CANADIAN CORPS LOGISTICS DURING THE LAST HUNDRED DAYS, AUGUST-NOVEMBER 1918. Lieutenant-Colonel John D. Conrad, CD
http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents...vol8.2_10_e.pdf

The Last Hundred Days of the War - Sir Arthur Currie Speech
For those wishing to obtain more background on General Currie upon his return to Canada and just prior to the campaign by Sir Sam Hughes and others to discredit him;  here is the major speech presented to a joint meeting of the Empire Club of Canada and the Canadian Club in Massey Hall on 29 August 1919.  In addition, this site has over 100 other speeches on the Great War - most are somewhat bombastic but provide an indication of the thought and temperament of the time. [CEF Study Group - April 2005]
http://www.empireclubfoundation.com/detail...=417&FT=yes

Canada's Hundred Days - With the Canadian Corps from Amiens to Mons, Aug. 8 - Nov. 11, 1918. By J. F. B. Livesay
This is a remarkable on-line document - period.  I would recommend any student of the Canadian Corps download this pdf. reference document which can also be “key-word” searched for specific units and events.  While there are some dated patriotic comments and hyperbole at times, this 1919 document also contains some detailed and important information on the Canadian Corps' military activities during the Last Hundred Days and its interactions with both British and French army units.  Information on specific Battalions and heroic individuals is extensive.  This book also provides some significant insight into the detailed battle movements of specific units with some remarkable coordinations of attacking battalion movements with artillery which was far more sophisticated than just the “rolling barrage”.  There is also [perhaps the first] an outline of modern tank tactics which may pre-date the written theories of both Liddell-Hart and Major Fuller. Highly recommended. [marc leroux Recommendation][CEF Study Group - July 2006]
http://www.archive.org/details/canada100days00liveuoft

AMICUS No. 32119386
NAME(S): *Holden, Michael James, 1977-
TITLE(S):  Constantly shifting and constantly adapting [microform] : the tactical exploits of the Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades, 1914-1918
PUBLISHER:  Ottawa : Library and Archives Canada
SERIES:  Canadian theses = Thèses canadiennes.
NOTES:  Thesis (M.A.)--University of New Brunswick, 2003.

STUDENT ABSTRACT: The Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade has long been seen as one of the great innovations of the First World War, 1914-1918. Mounted in lightly armoured vehicles, the CMMG Brigades (the Motors) could quickly bring to bear the firepower of their machine guns in a number of locations. However, upon arrival in Belgium and France in 1915 rather than a battlefield suited to the movement of autocars, the brigade found a static battlefield characterized by miles of trenches and barbed wire. Accordingly, it has been held that the Motors were relatively ineffective until open fighting returned to the Western Front in 1918. The common view is that the 'golden time' of the CMMGB occurred when they helped stem the tide during the German offensives of spring 1918, but that the unit then failed to achieve a similar standard of effectiveness during the Allied offensives of the final months of the war. Recently historians have begun to examine 1918 in terms of effective Allied tactical learning and operational planning, and have accepted the idea that the Hundred Days Campaign of August to November 1918 represented something different from the attrition battles of 1916 and 1917. Indeed, it has been argued that the final British (and therefore Canadian) assaults of 1918 represented, the culmination of a long and effective learning process. Yet the same analysis has not been used with respect to the CMMGB. In fact, it has been suggested that the Motors never adapted to the more fluid offensives of the final phase of the war. The aim of this work is to study the development and adaptability of the Motor Machine Gun Brigade in the context of the entire war. Moreover, the thesis supports the 'revisionist' school by demonstrating that the Motors are a classic example of effective tactical development during the war, that they made the transition to open warfare during the Hundred Days Campaign, and were illustrative of the new style of war that the Allies used in 1918 to beat the Germans.

Shock Army of the British Empire - The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days
Shane B. Schreiber, Vanwell Publishing Ltd. (2004/1997)
A well written account by a current Canadian military officer [PPCLI] of the Canadian Corps and reasons for its sustained success breaking the Hindenburg Line during the last one hundred days of the Great War.

Schreiber, Shane ‘The Orchestra of Victory: Canadian Corps Operations in the Battles of the Hundred Days 8 August - 11 November 1918’, MA, RMC Kingston, Ontario, 1995

[Jonathan Saunders]

Hi Jon
Sorry I do not agree, Wetzell's idea was a fast transference, the Germans should have started to make their transference to Flanders soon after 23rd-24th March, once they had won the Somme line. They carried on the attack on this front for at lest five days too long, they should have been striking Lys Valley around the 3rd or 4th April at the latest, they not only wasted time by carrying on with the Somme front but wasted good men & materials for nothing. Ludendorff slowness was the major error.

Annette

Annette,

I have been trying to find out the German analysis behind their decision to attack the British across the old Somme battlefields and came across some interesting quotes involving Wetzell.  Basically Wetzell wanted a two prong attack against the French at Verdun (the idea was actually Schulenberg’s (he was Chief of Staff to German Crown Prince armies).  

In Wetzell’s final plan of attack outlining the hammer blows against Britain, he first writes, “I regard the double attack on Verdun from the Argonne Forest, with a view to reducing that Salient, as the most decisive one.  This attack, if successful, will result in the defeat of the one opponent, who, because of his strategic freedom would be most dangerous for us throughout the year”.  

It appears Wetzell only drew up his plan to attack the British after Ludendorff had dismissed an attack against the French at a meeting held 11/11/1917.  Ludendorff rejected Schulenberg’s plan against the French as he believed the British would abandon the French army thus forcing Germany to fight another offensive against the British.

Back to the Michael/Georgette offensive and I am trying to find out how many divisions they intended to move north, and how this could possibly unrail (terrible pun) their plan to launch a second major offensive against the British.

I thought the information that Wetzell favoured the Verdun plan may be of interest to you.

Regards,

Jon S

[Robert Dunlop]

When Ludendorff discussed the 'black day' of August 8th, 1918, he noted that 'the divisions in the line [between Albert and Moreuil] allowed themselves to be completely overwhelmed. Six or seven divisions that were quite fairly to be described as effective had been completely broken.' He went on to note that a thin defensive line was reconstituted in front of the British and Dominion contingents, and that a planned withdrawal was carried out when the French attacked again further south. 'Our losses in prisoners had been so heavy that General Headquarters was again faced with the necessity of breaking up more divisions to form reserves. Our reserves dwindled.'

Ludendorff sent a Staff Officer to investigate what had happened. The report noted deeds of great valour, as well as 'behaviour which, I openly confess, I should not have thought possible in the German Army; whole bodies of men had surrendered to single troopers or isolated squadrons [interesting reference to the cavalry here]. Retiring troops, meeting a fresh division going bravely into action, shouted out things like "Black-leg" and "You're prolonging the war" - expressions that were to be heard again later. The officers in many places had lost their influence and allowed themselves to be swept along with the rest.' Another report 'attributed this to the spirit of insubordination and the atmosphere which the men brought back with them from home.'

At first sight, it would seem that these comments, especially the last, support the idea that the blackness of August 8 stemmed from the effects of the naval blockade and the disintegration in German society and its morale. The last report came from 'a battalion commander from the front, who came out with a draft from home before August 8...', which lends further weight to this possibility. Ludendorff concluded, however, that while 'our fighting power had suffered... the great majority of divisions still fought heroically.' This is borne out by the fact that the Germans were able to quickly stablize the situation.

Furthermore, the wholesale surrender and decimation of German divisions was not unique to August 8th. When Mangin launched his counterattack near Soissons in the Second Battle of the Marne, Ludendorff noted that 'the losses through the battle had been so heavy that we were compelled to break up about ten divisions and use their infantry as reserves for others.' This is more than the 'six or seven' described for August 8th.

Nor was the widespread surrender of troops in a large offensive unique to the Germans. The same thing happened to the British Fifth Army in March 1918. If I recall, similar comments were made by British Tommies who were retreating to their colleagues who were moving forward. Neither occurrence could be said to have stemmed from the disintegration of British society in the face of starvation from the U-Boat menace (though there was was evidence of significant unrest in some quarters of Britain).

August 8th was not about the surrender of troops in that battle, nor about the incidents of abuse-hurling and similar. The Battle of Soissons barely gets a mention by comparison to the Battle of Amiens. Why? Because Ludendorff still felt he had the reserves to retain the initiative and he felt that the Entente forces must have suffered very severely, ie they were still vulnerable, though he admitted 'I had not succeeded in getting any clear idea of the enemy's losses since July 15...' Ludendorff called a brief halt to attacks after the Battle of Soissons. 'When the divisions that had taken part in the last attack had been rested, we should be able to make new plans [for attack]. A pause in the operations was nothing extraordinary; it had occurred after the cessation of the great offensive of March 21, and again after that of May 27.'

What the Battle of Amiens did was 'put the decline of [German] fighting power beyond all doubt, and in such a situation, as regards reserves, I had no hope of finding a strategic expedient whereby to turn the situation to our advantage. On the contrary, I became convinced that we were not without safe foundation for the plans of General Headquarters, on which I had hitherto been able to build, at least, so far as is this is possible in war.'

Most significant of all is the comment from Ludendorff that 'August 8 also opened the eyes of the Staff on both sides; mine were certainly opened...' Now it dawned on him that the cumulative losses over all the years, coupled with the failure of the Spring offensives to achieve decisive results, meant he had nothing left. It cannot be said that the breaking up of a few divisions or the evidence of unrest was the real reason for the 'black day'. It had taken years for the German army to be reduced to the point where the loss of a few divisions finally reached the tipping point.

Robert

[treetop]

Fascinating thread for me but I read little about the capitulation of the Russian army and its' effect in enabling so many troops to be redeployed on the western front. Did these bring a negative effect into the german army ? I also recall that Luddendorf had a junior planning officer (name escapes me) who was renowned for strategic attacks on the eastern front and wonder why he was not used on the western front.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Fascinating thread for me but I read little about the capitulation of the Russian army and its' effect in enabling so many troops to be redeployed on the western front. Did these bring a negative effect into the german army ? I also recall that Luddendorf had a junior planning officer (name escapes me) who was renowned for strategic attacks on the eastern front and wonder why he was not used on the western front.

I thought the junior planning officer was Wetzell?

Not sure the capitulation on the Eastern Front helped Germany at all.  My reading to date suggests that the troops from the East were not of a high quality.  Also Germany had over a million troops (of even less quality) retained in the East policing Ukraine, Lithuania etc.

Regards,

Jon S

[truthergw]

Fascinating thread for me but I read little about the capitulation of the Russian army and its' effect in enabling so many troops to be redeployed on the western front. Did these bring a negative effect into the german army ? I also recall that Luddendorf had a junior planning officer (name escapes me) who was renowned for strategic attacks on the eastern front and wonder why he was not used on the western front.

I have seen an opinion that because the treaty of Brest-Litovsk gave Germany so much extra territory to occupy, they were not able to release as many troops as they had hoped.

[Jonathan Saunders]

I have seen an opinion that because the treaty of Brest-Litovsk gave Germany so much extra territory to occupy, they were not able to release as many troops as they had hoped.

I think by this stage the conscription age in Germany was up to 60 years of age or thereabouts.  I think generally speaking the troops the Germans sent/left in the East were 40+ or otherwise unsuitable for fighting on the Western Front.  

But for those German troops that were transfered from East to West, then life on the Western Front was a completely different proposition and they were not experienced for it.  There are then the other issues concerning left-wing tendencies of these troops and the general poor morale, disillusionment and reluctance to fight that they bought with them.

Regards,

Jon S

[Borden Battery]

Much like the Battle of Kursk in the Second World War, the Battle of Amiens transferred all future initiative to the Allies and left the German forces in a reactive mode with depleted reserves.  The Battle of Amiens was not the end, but it was the true beginning of the end of the Great War in terms of manpower reserves and in the moral will for troops to enter into battle with the expectation of some victory from any sacrifice.

Borden Battery

[Robert Dunlop]

There are then the other issues concerning left-wing tendencies of these troops and the general poor morale, disillusionment and reluctance to fight that they bought with them.

Jon, some of these issues may have been true in a few individual cases. This is not my impression overall. I will post some details anon but just to note that some divisions arrived from the Eastern Front and were pitched straight into desperate battles, such as Cambrai for example. For other divisions, intensive training was provided in the lead up to Operation Michael. In some cases, the younger fitter men were combed from divisions that remained in the East and transferred into other units on the Western Front. It would not, IMHO, be the correct impression if people thought that an unruly, miserable, agitating, militarily-incompetent rabble had arrived on the Western Front from late 1917 onwards.

Robert

[AndyHollinger]

This thread is, perhaps, what this board is about.  

I would remind everyone - there are no easy answers or simplistic answers ... actually, I find merit in almost every argument presented.  IF the German Army troops were so left wing and revolutionary, these same troops found their political conservatism a short while later in Freicorp ...

I think the real question for me is: We know that Luddendorf thought he was defeated, the Navy thought they were defeated, we know Army morale was low but from all available history in my reading ... the Army and the German people didn't think they were defeated, just losing.  This would explain 1919 better than anything else.

(He says trying to both summarize and bring back to the original post)

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jon, some of these issues may have been true in a few individual cases. This is not my impression overall. I will post some details anon but just to note that some divisions arrived from the Eastern Front and were pitched straight into desperate battles, such as Cambrai for example. For other divisions, intensive training was provided in the lead up to Operation Michael. In some cases, the younger fitter men were combed from divisions that remained in the East and transferred into other units on the Western Front. It would not, IMHO, be the correct impression if people thought that an unruly, miserable, agitating, militarily-incompetent rabble had arrived on the Western Front from late 1917 onwards.

Robert

Robert - I think you are right concerning the troops that were amongst the first "batches" to be transferred.  In many cases these battalions were keen to prove themselves on the Western Front.  

However by the end of 1917 I think there were fundamental problems with transporting troops from East to West; such as Eastern battalions already having been reduced significantly in total complement (so their best troops were already on the Western Front), amongst the more "capable" troops in the East were the Alsacians and Lorrainianes, whom for obvious reasons of identity Germany wanted to avoid placing on the Western Front.  Also by this stage half of the men left in the battalions in the East were aged 40+ or had recently joined the battalions from depots (ie. were young (as young as 16/17?) and inexperienced).

I am sure there were many exceptions but that these issues prove how difficult it was for the Germans to draw on the resources of their Eastern army by the end of 1917.  

I know the Germans were also trying to entice the Austrians in sending men to the Western Front.  Did any Austrian divisions ever get sent to the West?  (I believe not but I cant recall for sure).

Regards,

Jon S

[Jonathan Saunders]

IF the German Army troops were so left wing and revolutionary, these same troops found their political conservatism a short while later in Freicorp ...

Interesting as I thought there were at best equal numbers amongst the communist groups and the right wing political parties.  My understanding has always been that it was more likely in teh very early 1920s that Germany (or at least parts of it) would have become another Soviet had America, Britain and France not intervened to support the right wing faction.  These countries fearing and acting to avoid a second and even closer Soviet forming in Europe.

Regards,

Jon S

[Robert Dunlop]

I am sure there were many exceptions but that these issues prove how difficult it was for the Germans to draw on the resources of their Eastern army by the end of 1917.

Jon, I agree that it was very difficult, though Ludendorff notes that 'more than forty divisions were transferred'. The concern about agitators, at least from OHL's perspective, was with some elements the Class of 1919, the new recruits, not the men who transferred from the Eastern Front:

'When the 1919 class reached the recruit depots, we began to receive complaints about its general quality and spirit. Moreover, many recruits seemed to have a lot of money, which must have greatly embittered the older men, who had been a long time in the field.'

Ludendorff was trying to make a (recurring) general point here with respect to the lack of government control over rising wages in the armaments factories, etc. I don't recall reading about such a reaction in the anecdotal accounts written by long-serving 'older men', though no doubt there were examples.

I know the Germans were also trying to entice the Austrians in sending men to the Western Front.  Did any Austrian divisions ever get sent to the West?  (I believe not but I cant recall for sure).

Artillery was supplied 'but, unfortunately, with so small an amount of ammunition that the actual reinforcement did not amount to much'. The Germans withdrew some of their men from Romania and Italy, which placed a greater responsibility on the Austro-Hungarians. Ludendorff had hoped for Turkish reinforcements as well, but these were not forthcoming either. Some German forces were also withdrawn from Macedonia as well, placing further strain on the Bulgarians.

Robert