33 replies to this topic

[wiking]

Does anyone have any resources on the number and type of artillery the Russians used in 1914, especially in Galicia?

[Gamburd]

It was probably the Putilov 76.2mm m/02 Field Gun:

http://www.landships...s/artillery.htm ://http://www.landships.freeservers.co.../artillery.htm ://http://www.landships.freeservers.co.../artillery.htm ://http://www.landships.freeservers.co.../artillery.htm



Al

[James A Pratt III]

In the Axis History Forum in the section "First World War" they have a recent posting dealing with WW I Russian artillery that you should find usefull.

[wiking]

In the Axis History Forum in the section "First World War" they have a recent posting dealing with WW I Russian artillery that you should find usefull.

That was me too.  Trying to get as much information from various resources as possible.

[Jasta72s]

Based on Hans Linnenkohl´s (+) book "Vom Einzelschuss zur Feuerwalze" (1996) I would expect the Russian standard guns in use, like:
- Russian field gun 76.2 mm model 1902 [called 76 mm polewaja puschka obr. 1902] and later modification(s) (e.g. 1903)
- some of the older 76.2 mm model 1900
- Russian 122 mm (light) field howitzer 1909 [called 48 Lin. polewaja gaubitza obr. 1909], originally built by Schneider-Creusot, later in Russia

The Russian Army had 512 of the latter available in 1914.

Furthermore there must have been some thousand field guns 76.2 mm. I have anywhere a photograph with ca 400 captured guns in 1914 - the Russian 76.2 mm were mostly re-worked for German Flak because of their superior performance (better ballistics compared to German standard field gun).

For the number of Russian guns in Galicia one should have the number of guns of the Russian Army in action there. Furthermore it makes surely a difference if one counts in August 1914 or in December 1914.

[Jasta72s]

Here two links which could be helpful:

The first gives numbers of Russian (4th) Army and its guns in the very first battle in Galicia.

http://en.wikipedia....tle_of_Kraśnik



The second link gives a more comprehensive picture with later battles.

http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Ea...nt_(World_War_I)

Replace the unwished Ea...nt (fault of this forum software?) nonsense by Eastern_Front and copy the whole correct link then, please!

[CGM]

The second link gives a more comprehensive picture with later battles.

http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Ea...nt_(World_War_I)

Replace the unwished Ea...nt (fault of this forum software?) nonsense by Eastern_Front and copy the whole correct link then, please!

Hello Jasta72s,
I've noticed a simpler way to make the link work. The close bracket at the very end (see above) is outside the underlined part, and therefore isn't picked up when clicking on the link. It's a simple matter to add it to the address bar, and re-send.

(I don't know how this happened, but I don't think the forum software caused this.)

Regards
CGM

[Jasta72s]

You are owning the eyes of a falcon!

Thank you for your help!

[SMSKaiser]

The total avaiable artillery on the Sothwestern Russian Front by September 11, 1914, when mobilisation neared its end, was 2,888 pieces.
I don not know wether the guns captured by the Austrians are included here, they would amount up to 100 (although the Austrians captured almost 150 guns in the battle of komarow, only about 40 of these were actually carried away when the IV. Army made its turn-around to Eastern Galicia).

@Jasta72s: The figures for the IV. Army are of not much worth considering that the Army by that time had only 3 Corps available, when further Corps arrived the number was much higher.
Artillery seems indeed to have caused the outcome in the Galician battles, as the Austrians had only about two thirds in artillery numbers (2,076).

The IV. Russian Army consisted of 610 guns by August 26, the II. and III. ones 1,214 guns.
Thus, already before the IX. Army and Asiatic Corps joined the battle, the Russians in overall had 2174 guns against 2076 Austrians.

[Jasta72s]

Hello SMSKaiser,

you quotated interesting numbers but I think it would be helpful for wiking if you can name your source(s).
To my knowledge the Tsarist Army has never had an opportunity to write a great history of her WWI fights. Soviet historians were most-likely always in a bad situation: On one hand you get problems if you report something good about Tsarist military (Are you Tsarist?) and on the other hand you get problems too if you are reporting too many weaknesses (You are not a patriot!). Furthermore I am not aware of any modern reliable Russian work about this period of history but this could be result of lacking information.

I do not doubt the Russians became stronger and stronger with every corps and battery moving to Galicia in late August, September etc. So one should not overestimate the importance of the numbers in the first link.

Nevertheless I think the numbers for the very first battle of Krasnik can not be that wrong - otherwise the Austrians could not have achieved a very short-timed success
350 Russian guns were quotated by the Austrian source and Austrians would not try to reduce the own victory by reducing the enemies strength.

If the Russian 4th Army was 610 artillery pieces strong by 26 August and the battle of Krasnik happened between 23rd and 25th August then I am wondering about the difference of 260 guns
I would assume many of these guns were not involved, came too late or had not enough ammunition available for the participation in the first fights.

IMHO the logistical and traffic problems did often influence the "numbers on paper" in a decisive way - and that seems to be especially true for Russia and the Tsarist Army in WWI.

By the way: Happy New Year!

[SMSKaiser]

All those numbers are from the official austrian general staff's work about the war:
Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg 1914-1918. (It is available online, the link is posted somewhere here as far as I can remember)

Well, the 350 guns from wiki are of course correct according to the source, I have been the one who added them there myself

After it's defeat the 4th Army was considerably reinforced by the IX. Army and parts of the V. Army by August 26.
This added I think about 2-3 additional Corps to the Army, thus almost doubling the strength. 610 guns should be correct.

[Jasta72s]

Yes, this seems to make sense! Thank you for your explanations.

I wonder about the quality of Austrian guns, especially the Skoda 76.5-mm-Feldkanone 1905!
A gun with a massive barrell made of bronce but better ballistical performance than the German 77-mm-Feldkanone neuer Art [new model] 1905?
The Russian field gun had a superior range but could the Russian artillery use this theoretical advantage in real combat in Galicia?

[SMSKaiser]

The main problem for the Austrian Armies was 1. their guns, and 2. their training, good as it was, however.

Not all guns were modern, and as we already came to, they were far to few to make a stand against the Russians.

The Austrian training was entirely offensive doctrine. They just attacked, again and again. Russian guns and MG had an easy game against this from the beginning. In most times they awaited the Austrians in their positions (they learned this from their war against Japan).

[wiking]

The main problem for the Austrian Armies was 1. their guns, and 2. their training, good as it was, however.

Not all guns were modern, and as we already came to, they were far to few to make a stand against the Russians.

The Austrian training was entirely offensive doctrine. They just attacked, again and again. Russian guns and MG had an easy game against this from the beginning. In most times they awaited the Austrians in their positions (they learned this from their war against Japan).

I've come to the conclusion that the Austrians were not entirely wrong if offensively attacking the Russian 4th and 5th armies.  In fact, they very nearly won and wiped out those two armies.  The problem came when the Austrian 3rd army and Koevess group attacked (the latter later on) instead of fighting a defensive campaign back to the Dniester river.  Had they not collapsed by attacking into Russian guns and the roughest terrain north of the Carpathians, they could have delayed (maybe) the Russian East wing long enough to allow the Austrians to complete their victory.  

In the fighting to the north artillery did not play nearly as decisive a role as it did in the East.  The early Austrian victories were ones of maneuver, nearly succeeding.

[SMSKaiser]

You are right about that, but the Russian strategy helped them to achieve that victories. Lets have a look at it:

The two Russian main thrusts were directed against East Prussia and Eastern Galicia, to clear the flanks. Later on, it was planned to push the centre in direction of Berlin.
Thus, the centre was weak in the first weeks (6 Corps only against 9 Austrian/German Landwehr), while the Russian flanks were indeed far more superior to their enemies.
But in my opinion, it was a race against time that Austria never had a chance to win, as all 3 Russian groups (East Prussia, Poland, Eastern Galicia) were gradually reinforced.

After his early successes at Krasnik and Lublin, General Dankl (I. Army) was halted by a much reinforced IV. Army, and was counterattacked by September 2.
On August 23, Dankl had 144.000 men against 104.000.
By sept. 5 Dankl had 225.000 men, the Russians already 264,000.

No chance of breaking through, in my opinion

[wiking]

You are right about that, but the Russian strategy helped them to achieve that victories. Lets have a look at it:

The two Russian main thrusts were directed against East Prussia and Eastern Galicia, to clear the flanks. Later on, it was planned to push the centre in direction of Berlin.
Thus, the centre was weak in the first weeks (6 Corps only against 9 Austrian/German Landwehr), while the Russian flanks were indeed far more superior to their enemies.
But in my opinion, it was a race against time that Austria never had a chance to win, as all 3 Russian groups (East Prussia, Poland, Eastern Galicia) were gradually reinforced.

After his early successes at Krasnik and Lublin, General Dankl (I. Army) was halted by a much reinforced IV. Army, and was counterattacked by September 2.
On August 23, Dankl had 144.000 men against 104.000.
By sept. 5 Dankl had 225.000 men, the Russians already 264,000.

No chance of breaking through, in my opinion

While I would heartily agree that a breakthrough was impossible, a more complete victory in the center was possible that would make the evacuation of Galicia unnecessary and would indeed preserve the prewar army to a much greater degree.  As it was, the destruction of the army was nearly completed by Conrad v. Hoetzendorff thanks to his flawed strategy and lack of focus on the destruction of enemy forces instead of capturing ground.  I was simply arguing that the Russians, while they had a decent plan, were mainly so successful due to Austro-Hungarian bungling.  The Russians simply had much more room for error and really made fewer that mattered.  Also, where did you find the figures for the Austrians and Russians on those dates?  I am always looking for more sources on the Eastern Front (including German language).

[SMSKaiser]

I do not think that Hötzendorff's strategy was that bad. Turn-around of the 5th Army to the Eastern group was brilliant, and it did indeed stop the Russian advance there. The reason for Austrian retreat by mid-september was that Dankl could not resist 2 and a half armies any longer.
There were some minor tactical mistakes, for example the almost destruction of the 15th Division during the battle of Komarow.
(while that battle was won by Austria, both sides suffered eqqual casualties of about 40,000 men each)

Furthermore, Hötzendorff hoped to get German help by the 6th week of the war, but the retreat at the Marne made that help impossible.

The major source for the Eastern front is "Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg 1914-1918" (Sadly one of the few detailed accounts).
Those numbers do, however, not include casualties, which were around 60,000 Austrian and 50,000 Russian
(those numbers are my own estimate from average daily casualties, so they might be far from the truth).

[wiking]

I do not think that Hötzendorff's strategy was that bad. Turn-around of the 5th Army to the Eastern group was brilliant, and it did indeed stop the Russian advance there. The reason for Austrian retreat by mid-september was that Dankl could not resist 2 and a half armies any longer.
There were some minor tactical mistakes, for example the almost destruction of the 15th Division during the battle of Komarow.
(while that battle was won by Austria, both sides suffered eqqual casualties of about 40,000 men each)

I thought that Auffenberg had managed to inflict significantly more than he received.  Was that also in the Austrian official history of the war? I do possess the digital scan, but sadly the last volume is missing.  Do you know where to find it online?  What about the Beilage and Skizzen?

Also, have you read the English language biography for Conrad?  FCvH: Architect of the Apocalypse paints and interesting picture of a man more concerned about seducing a married woman than fighting a war.  He honestly seemed to believe that individuals played no role in the cosmic drama unfolding during the war.  This meant that instead of doing important staff work, he spent hours writing love letters to this woman.  Sadly the Austro-Hungarian army went to war with a love-lorn tactician rather than a general staff trained strategist.  Disturbingly enough, the most important reason he was interested in winning the war was so that he could win over Gina, his love interest!

[SMSKaiser]

I do not think that you can get that last volume online.
I personally have most of the Beilagen and Skizzen from the first two volumes (but not the great maps), if you are interested in any particular one, feel free to ask for it.

I do not have that biography, but it sounds interesting, I may have a look at it.

[bob lembke]

I have been reading the German series Die Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918 , volumes for late 1914 and early 1915, and they have a lot of detail on Russian and Austrian operations as well as German, including tables of artillery units, numbers of guns, etc. But no technical details on models of guns. Just completing Band VII which, for example, covers the breakthrough battle at Gorlice. My grand-father was in Russia at that time, in the Generalkommando of III. Reservekorps, 9. Armee.

These volumes should be widely available. Each volume has many pages of tables at the rear with detailed orders of battle, including artillery integral or detailed to the various units. Less details on the other armies'artillery than on the German artillery, though.

Bob Lembke

[Ladislav Krejča]

Hello!

Me interest japanese guns on east front. What you know about this guns. Do you know model this guns

With regard Ladislav

[John Gilinsky]

To all of the above:  irrespective of official and clearly out of date numbers of guns with individual armies, fronts and the like is the absolutely critical aspect of ammunition.  Practically speaking Russia NEVER had enough shells and ordereed hundreds of millions of dollars worth abroad much of which despite being completed and even shipped due to the internal war time generated decay in the Russian etappe or rear areas never got even near the actual guns hungry for such shells.  
John

[Ladislav Krejča]

Hi John!

  Me interest import guns and ammunitions to Russia especialy from Japan and USA. Have you more information or you know sources?

With regard Ladislav

[John Gilinsky]

Yes I do have good information on North Ameircan munitions companies and even good detailed diagrams of Russian shells made here in North America.  A Montreal based Canadian company even had a massive order for well over $80,000,000 US dollars worth to amke Russian shrapnel shells which they subcontracted extensively to both Canadian and American firms.  Locomotives, machine tooling machines/lathes, small arms, small arms ammunition, autombobiles, saddlery and leather equipments, railway cars, rail steel lines, bayonets were just some of the major exports from North America to Russia from the late fall of 1914 onwards.  
John

[Pete1052]

John Gilinsky, on 16 November 2010 - 03:11 AM, said:

... never got even near the actual guns hungry for such shells.

If the Tsarina hadn't said "Let them eat cake" they probably wouldn't have had that unfortunate revolution.