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Posted 01 September 2011 - 08:30 PM
Posted 01 September 2011 - 08:50 PM
Posted 01 September 2011 - 09:19 PM
Posted 01 September 2011 - 10:02 PM
Posted 02 September 2011 - 01:43 PM
Not in the case of the action I have refered to, John. This occurred a couple of months before the abdication : January, 1917, I think.
Posted 05 September 2011 - 08:39 AM
Posted 05 September 2011 - 07:05 PM
Posted 07 September 2011 - 07:45 AM
According to Nik Cornish, The Russian Army and the First World War (Spellmount, 2006), pp. 132-134, the offensive was to be carried out by the Russian Army's Southwestern Front. The Seventh and Eleventh Armies would attack Lemberg (Lvov) in Galicia; the Special Army and Third Army would attack Vladimir Volyinsk and Kovel. The Eighth Army would assist the right wing of the Romanian Army, which would advance out of the Carpathians.
I understand the Russian Army was planning to launch a big offensive in the Spring of 1917. However the February/March Revolution broke out, the Czar abdicated, and the Empire and Army disintagrated into chaos. Does anyone know when and where it was going to take place? Also does anyone know the forces involved and what might have happened if the Revolution had not happened or been crushed? I do know at the start of 1917 the Russian generals were confident of victory and where well supplied ect.
Posted 07 September 2011 - 07:24 PM
Unfortunately the book has no footnotes. He has a bibliography that includes several Russian-language books, but it's impossible to know where this specific information originated. According to Cornish, "The attack surprised Stavka as much as the Germans."
That is shocking, never heard of that an army level offensive could be launched without approve, what is Cornish's source?
Posted 07 September 2011 - 08:59 PM
At Riga we learned something of the fighting that had taken place southwest of the town in the month of January. The operations were in three phases:
( a ) A Russian offensive, January 5th-10th.
( b ) A German counter-offensive, January 22nd-25th.
( c ) A further German counter-offensive January 30th-31st.
On the night of January 4th-5th, the 2nd and 1st Lett Brigades, eight battalions strong, broke through the enemy lines without artillery preparation, the bomb throwers moving in advance to cut the enemy’s wire. The 3rd Siberian Division on the right of the Letts failed in its surprise attack, and further right the 4th Special Division refused to leave its trenches. The Letts were not properly supported, but the fighting up to the10th resulted in the Germans being forced back a few kilometers.
On the 22nd the enemy, by a severe bombardment, drove the Russians back to a line slightly in advance of that occupied previous to the original Russian attack. On January 31st, after some days’ rest, he launched strong infantry attacks, which were repulsed with the bayonet. On the 31st he subjected the Russian line to a severe bombardment.
Radko, who had been everywhere in the thickest of the fighting, encouraging his men, waxed enthusiastic at dinner on February 10th over the “success” of his surprise tactics. He said that if he had had three or four corps in reserve he would have gone far. He issued a triumphant order, with elaborate instructions for the carrying out of further surprise attacks by night without artillery preparation, the enemy’s wire to be cut by hand.
Some members of Radko’s staff were less enthusiastic. On the active front from the Gulf to the village of Sarkanaiz the Russians had never less than ninety-two battalions, while the enemy had only twenty-two to twenty-five battalions on January 5th, and his strength never increased beyond sixty-four to seventy-one battalions. There is no doubt that the enemy was completely surprised, but the reason for undertaking the operation was not clear, for the Russians had insufficient troops of good quality on the spot to develop a real success. As it was, the attempt was only a raid, and it failed in the primary object of a raid--the improvement of the raiders’ morale--for it cost in Russian life and morale before the end of the month at least six times the damage it caused the enemy.
Posted 07 September 2011 - 10:23 PM
Posted 07 September 2011 - 11:56 PM
I wish I could answer you. This is why I prefer books with footnotes.
According to Phil, this raid "It gained 4 miles, 8,000 prisoners and 36 guns in the first week", it would be an excellent result if only 3 Russian divisions involved, and 1 of the division refused to fight, But Cornish still would be wrong, since this was just a raid in an army's authority, how could "The attack surprised Stavka as much as the Germans."?
Posted 08 September 2011 - 01:32 AM
Soon after returning to to Mohileff I received a telegram from General Russky, that he had authorized General Radko-Dmitrieff, the commander of the 12th Army, to begin a local advance to the south of Lake Babith. Such a telegram very much astonished me. Generals Kembovsky and Loukomsky and I examined the protocols made at the conference of Commanders-in-Chief. They came to this, that local advances on our various fronts would only be undertaken in the event our Allies on their side opening up active war operations during January or February; and that such operations should be held back by us as much as possible.
Posted 08 September 2011 - 02:16 AM
Posted 08 September 2011 - 08:24 AM
The operation on the Aa was raid, not an army-level offensive. Jeff
Posted 08 September 2011 - 01:05 PM
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Posted 08 September 2011 - 05:16 PM