61 replies to this topic

[Tom W.]

PJA, on 10 September 2011 - 01:04 PM, said:

I wonder how often prior to that action the Russians had encountered flame.

Only a handful of times. The flamethrower regiment had carried out two flame attacks, one being the massive assault at Skrobowa, November 9, 1916, and the other being at Aa on January 3. Pionier-Bataillon Nr. 11 and other line-pioneer formations deployed flamethrowers in 1915 and 1916, but the extent of the use is unknown.

This is a passage from the Russian "Report of the Commission for the Inspection of the Methods of Application by the Germans of Flamethrowers in Combat on November 9 in the region of the Skrobowa Stream":

Quote

On the night of October 26-27 [November 8-9] the troops were alerted that on the following day, October 27 [November 9], the Germans would attack with flamethrowers; in some sectors this warning was passed by word of mouth, and company commanders warned the lower ranks of the forthcoming attack with flamethrowers, explaining the device and its effects (according to information from newspapers and drawings from periodicals).  In one company of the 322nd Infantry Regiment some were even given supplies of water to extinguish large flames that arose, and the lower ranks were told to take off clothing lit by flamethrowers. In other parts of the company those occupying the first line knew nothing about the forthcoming attack and they did not have information about the flamethrowers. Since nobody saw to intelligently explaining flamethrowers and their actions, as well as measures to combat them, this warning on the whole was hardly beneficial, and likely somewhat increased the nervous state of the men.

[bob lembke]

Guys;

I could literally write 100 pages without a pause responding to the four responses to my statement. I will not do so, nor attempt to, but I will respond to the several interesting and perceptive point people posed.

PJA, on 10 September 2011 - 01:04 PM, said:

This sounds nightmarish. Who would not run ?  It does seem that there is a very basic instinct involved here, where troops that would fight bravely with bullets singing about their ears, but broke and ran in a flame attack, especially if the flame stream (actually a mix of flame, burning heavy oil, and (usually) thick black smoke actually reached and went over them. Many accounts of troops advancing over a field littered with various articles of burning uniform.     As a matter of interest, Bob, please tell us if you are aware of episodes when troops so attacked stood firm and gave a good account of themselves.  The attacks were very well planned, and, interestingly, the Flammenwerfer (FW) commander, who might be a NCO, had the right, granted under a written order from Hindenburg and Ludendorff, to refuse to follow a direct attack order from a, say, major general or lieutenant general (English ranks), if in the opinion of the NCO or lieutenant, the attack order was not well thought out. But of course there were all sorts of situations that played out on the ground, and failed attacks certainly occurred. Reddemann, a published scientist (although his doctorate was in law!), on the basis of criteria that I would love to know, rated 82% of the attacks as "successful". Every attack, however small, was studied, and a report written and presented to the Highest Army Command, the supreme command.    

Five years ago I visited the Hill of Vaucquois in the Argonne, where there was a memorial to the fist victims of flame attack : a French infantry company in the summer of 1915. The actual first attack was elsewhere, at Malancourt Woods. Reddemann at that time had 50 or possibly 70 men, there was a 2 minute barrage, to get the French heads down, and then the fledglings attacked with 12 FW, ten of which were wooden and hand-pumped. The French broke, infantry advanced, and the booty was 1911 POWs, 33 MGs, seven mortars, and 1.3 sq km of front was taken. The Flamm=Pioniere lost two men, but that was on the following day, so they must have been hit in a French barrage on the captured positions, hardly part of the actual attack. But I included those two in the total of 121 men lost for 50 attacks.

But the attacks (2-3?) at Vaucquois, which was some really nasty fighting, were some of the earliest attacks, but not as conclusive as at Malancourt Woods. I am not satisfied with the information I have already collected on that attack.

Shortly after that the British had their literal baptism of fire at Hooge. Yes. Sometimes sources incorrectly cite Hooge as the first FW attack in the Great War. The attack was at 3 AM and was a success, if limited. The British command, who had already decided and stated, before their first taste of the weapon, that it was stupid and ineffective, were furious, and ordered the survivors to counter-attack over open ground into the captured positions, which the Germans had consolidated with wire and machine guns. The hopeless attack caused the vast majority of the British casualties for the day.

The episode we're discussing in the Aa fighting makes an interesting case study.  I wonder how often prior to that action the Russians had encountered flame.   Occasionally. The world's greatest flame attack was against the Russians, 154 FW, in late 1916. My father, in a letter to his father, which I have, said that Reddemann's telegram announcing the success had been posted at his flame company's HQ. Reddemann led the attack himself, from the air (by the use of observers in radio contact with him by radio, and dropping Reddemann's new orders to the attacking FW troops; possibly the first ground attack ever closely directed from the air?)  But one of the factors causing the great success of the weapon was the fact that FW attacks only occurred occasionally.

Phil (PJA)


Phil (PJA)

Bob

[PJA]

Riga, September 1917, comes to mind.  Here German tactics were pioneered that were to be used with great effect at Caporetto, Cambrai and St Quentin.  Bruchmuller's artillery programme, storm troopers etc.

Early in the war the Germans first tried chemical weapons at Bomilov.

We might be forgiven for assuming that the Russians were the victims of Germany's trial of weapons and novel tactics.

This flame attack....does it conform with that pattern ?  Certainly not the first use of flamethrowers, but might it have been the first use of such a multiple of light projectiles ?

Phil (PJA)

[PJA]

Bob - and Tom, too - thanks very much for your posts.

My question arrived just as you were posting such superb answers.

Much respect !

Phil (PJA)

[Tom W.]

PJA, on 10 September 2011 - 08:42 PM, said:

We might be forgiven for assuming that the Russians were the victims of Germany's trial of weapons and novel tactics.

This flame attack....does it conform with that pattern ?  Certainly not the first use of flamethrowers, but might it have been the first use of such a multiple of light projectiles ?

At Skrobowa the Germans invented a new flame assault called the Knife Tactic (Messertaktik), which entailed single-file shock columns hitting the enemy line perpendicularly to cut it into "quivering sections." Along with flamethrowers, the shock columns were armed with light machine guns, hand grenades, and automatic rifles. The tactic was imported to the western front after its success on the eastern.

[bob lembke]

marsyao, on 10 September 2011 - 02:35 PM, said:

I bet those 30-odd, 60-odd, or 100-odd flame-throwers did not attack alone, before their attack, there must be a heavy artillery firing, and they must be covered by machine gun and grenades from other stormtroops, and as soon as they "broke" a hole on the enemy defense line, the regular German troops must immediately followed, otherwise You know machine guns and rifles had a much farther effective range than the flame-thrower.I can not imagine a picture in which those 30-odd, 60-odd, or 100-odd flame-throwers calmly walked toward enemy line and enemy either ran away or throw down weapons before them, that would be a movie. Would be possible that those large number of prisoners were not captured by those pioneers alone?

There were many different FW attack schemes developed, but they could be broken into two groups; one, the massive attack, perhaps with a heavy barrage, long or short (remember the two minute barrage at Malancourt), then perhaps an initial flame attack by heavy, longer-range fixed FW, perhaps firing diagonally across the front with flame oil blended to provide dense black smoke, to provide cover for attacking light FW and storm infantry, and then a large number of light FW teams storming the positions, along with many grenadiers. (Almost half of the troops of a flame company were specially-trained dedicated grenadiers, armed in part with special storm stick grenades. - No, that is too many, but there were many grenadiers.)

Or, the second main class was one of a wide range of usually smaller, mostly sneaky tactics, almost all rather counter-intuitive. Very often these smaller attacks might be performed by flame troopers alone; they were reliable, they all knew the several tactics, and they were heavily armed with a variety of crew-served weapons, and generally carried few or no rifles, perhaps some NCOs carried a slung carbine.

Of course, in a larger attack (or in any attack), there certainly were other infantry about, taking part or not taking part in the actual assault. Generally, on a WW I battlefield, if your position was overrun by the enemy's storm troopers, and you were still alive, probably the only good chance you had of surviving the day was to throw your weapon away, put up your arms, and run toward the enemy lines.  

Again, large amount of soldiers gave up must involve the moral issue, flame-throwers though powerful, could not be effectively used without suppress enemy fire first, and even after broke into enemy line, without immediate support from own troops, I failed to see why those breach could not be immediately seal by determine count-attack since I doubt usefulness of flame-throwers in the trench and how they re-charge these things?.
For example in the siege of the Petersburg in American Civil War, Union army blew apart Confederate defense line by a powerful mine, union troops poured into the breach, but Confederate line still held, there was no panic, both flank held, and the survivors of the mine attack did not run away or surrender, they count-attack, it won time for the arrive of the confederate infantry and artillery reserve, and Union attack was repulsed with heavy losses. In the most of time in the military history, moral is not everything, but moral matters a lot.

Again, many variations, but a smaller attack would generally just take the enemy front position. Larger attacks would invove other formations and might develop into a real break-through. There were many variations, but the typical flame company might deploy 32 FW (the company would have two or three different types of FW in their trucks, mostly light, and could decide on the spot the mix of devices to employ, due to the tactical situation), six light MGs, that could even be fired from the hip at the walk, and two especially light (20 kg) 76 mm Minenwerfer that could be carried on the back of one man. Many of the men were trained grenadiers. (My "almost half" above is too high.)  The light MGs in my father's company were captured French LMGs, so that ammunitions and even loaded magazines might be found in the captured trenches. The men were cross-trained on enemy weapons, including dropped rifles, and grenades that would be found in the hastily evacuated position. So this flame company could put up quite a fight holding a captured trench until infantry came in and took it over. The FW was generally a really poor defensive weapon by itself, and it was possible but usually impractical to refuel the device in a captured enemy trench. But each fire team usually carried two flame oil/propellant tank assemblies for each flame lance; the typical Trupp of about ten men might have two lances but four fuel back-packs. Each device could be fired repeatedly until out of fuel and the operators carried several igniters, which could be quickly changed.

But, do not think that the FW operators simply lined up in a row and walked across the no-man's-land until they got in range. Remember, they averaged one man killed or missing per attack, and in most attacks they did not lose a single man. They could not achieve this record if they did dumb, suicidal things on the battle-field. And I will make a strong argument that the flame regiment's casualty roll was uniqley accurate and complete, for the whole war and all combatants.

Bob

[bob lembke]

PJA, on 10 September 2011 - 08:42 PM, said:

Riga, September 1917, comes to mind.  Here German tactics were pioneered that were to be used with great effect at Caporetto, Cambrai and St Quentin.  Bruchmuller's artillery programme, storm troopers etc.

Early in the war the Germans first tried chemical weapons at Bomilov.

We might be forgiven for assuming that the Russians were the victims of Germany's trial of weapons and novel tactics.

This flame attack....does it conform with that pattern ?  Certainly not the first use of flamethrowers, but might it have been the first use of such a multiple of light projectiles ?

Phil (PJA)

There is a lot of mis-information that the storm trooper tactics were developed in the East for Riga and other attacks in 1917, and then exported West. (Bruchmueller's artillery innovations are an exception.) In fact Reddemann's flame units and Willy Rohr's experimental storm unit were developing these in the course of 1915, and the flame regiment and Sturm=Bataillon Rohr were training east front formations and even allies like the Bulgarians and the Turks in 1916 and early 1917, and occasionally sending formations to the East to carry out difficult attacks that the local units had not been able to carry out successfully, like the massive attack at Skrobowa that Tom and I mentioned. Should we believe that in late 1917 the eastern formations developed these tactics (which Reddemann and Rohr had largely developed in the course of 1915)  and then educated the western formations? Makes no sense. But it is often stated. The Eastern units were deficient in many ways and when brought west they either needed a lot of retraining and re-fitting, or were not considered suitable for an active role in combat againt the western sector allies. My father was almost killed in the area of Reims in late 1918 by dumb aid men recently arrived from Russia, who had never seen a real (as in French) artillery barrage.

Reddemann's men had carried out over 150 flame attacks in the west (from memory; the number might be much higher) before they ever went east.

Bob

[James A Pratt III]

Thanks for the information. The battle of the Aa shows what i understand was a major problem in the Russian Army in WW I. Command was decentralized too much at the Front level. Note the Chief of Staff Gen Alexeiev was ill and in the Crimea recuporating. the Tsar Nicholas II was at Tsarskoe Selo listening to a steady stream of visitors asking/begging him to do something or there will be a revolution ect. The 94 men of 3 regiments executed sounds high. I thought only the Red Army did such things in the Russian Civil War or the GPW/WW II. However, "The Russian Revolution" R Pipes and "Nicholas and Alexandra" R Massie both mention breakdowns in disicpline in the Russian Army. Sadly, thing are about to get a whole lot worse for both Russia and Nicholas II and family. "The last days of the Romanovs" by Helen Rappaport tells what happens in some detail to the soon to be ex-Tsar and his family.

[apple]

James A Pratt III, on 16 September 2011 - 06:14 PM, said:

The 94 men of 3 regiments executed sounds high. I thought only the Red Army did such things in the Russian Civil War or the GPW/WW II.

While, you'll start getting into "chicken and egg" territory, pretty quickly, when looking at Russian revolutionary, and counter revolutionary, violence, it would fair to say that during the 1905 Russian Revolution the Czarist state had displayed a great potential for using violent brutality. 94 men doesn't sound high compared to what happened in 1905, and (unfortunately) pales into insignifance when compared to what happened from 1918 onwards.

[bob lembke]

apple, on 17 September 2011 - 07:30 PM, said:

While, you'll start getting into "chicken and egg" territory, pretty quickly, when looking at Russian revolutionary, and counter revolutionary, violence, it would fair to say that during the 1905 Russian Revolution the Czarist state had displayed a great potential for using violent brutality. 94 men doesn't sound high compared to what happened in 1905, and (unfortunately) pales into insignifance when compared to what happened from 1918 onwards.

I believe that in 1905 a column of people marched bearing petitions to the Czar, singing hymns praising the Czar, and the Cossacks fell on them and killed 5000 in one spot in St. Petersberg.

Szolzinysn (misspelled), the first scholar of the Gulag, estimated that the Soviet state killed 82,000,000 residents, and I have seen higher estimates. In the Terror Famine the Soviets killed 6-7 million Ukranians in one year; in the Settling of Accounts, as previously named and promised by the Soviets, they killed 5,000,000 families or 20,000,000 individuals of the mujiks, the prosperous peasants; in the Purges, the state killed about 3,000,000 leaders, Old Revolutionaries, generals, and lots of Jews in 1-2 years in the mid-late 1930's. Plus the "ordinary" death rate in the camps was about 4,000,000 a year, at their peak, when their population might have been 24,000,000 people at any one time.

Yet I recently saw people list on-line the 100 most important people of the 20th Century (including monsters), and no one nominated Stalin. Amazing.

94 dead does not seem astonishing.

[James A Pratt III]

In "The Russian Revolution" by Richard Pipes has around 200 killed and 800 wounded as a result of Bloody Sunday. He also states the soldiers opened fire without orders.

[James A Pratt III]

Bob
The reason Stalin is not on the list of the most important people of the 20th century could be the people that were polled could only give 1 or 2 nominations, or the people who were polled were stupid, or the people who were doing this poll were PC and putting Stalin on the list would be unPC and bring back bad memories so they deleated him.