89 replies to this topic

[Simon J]

Hello all,

In a recent literature search I reminded myself of John Terraine's article "The Substance of the War" in Cecil and Liddle's Facing Armageddon: The First World War Experienced. In his essay JT makes a profound observation in stating

It is one of the wonders of history that the French Air Force in 1914, with some 136 operational aircraft, completely missed the mass of about a million men forming the right wing of the German Army, advancing through Belgium in accordance with the Schlieffen Plan. The German Air Force equally failed to spot the landing of the BEF and its advance to Mons where its presence came as a great surprise, and they also overlooked the formation of a whole new French Army, threatening their advancing right wing. (p.8)

Put like that, it does sound a little careless.

This is outside my sphere of experience; is it a fair point?


Cheers,
Simon

[centurion]

 There was almost no strategic reconnaissance. Numbers of aircraft does not equal availability of aircraft (some of the early types were unreliable) and ranges were limited. Army commanders used to send those able to perform missions to where they expected there to be something for them to see and report on. 

[truthergw]

As far as the French intelligence failure went, I believe it may have been a case of expectation trumping observation. Joffre et al had convinced themselves that no sizeable forces could be put in the field as far north as they were. Any reports to the contrary were brushed off. I also wonder whether the German  army was missed because no planes were sent to look at where it was, only where it was expected to be. To a great extent, intelligence is a matter of interpretation of scattered facts and that is strongly guided by what is expected to be seen. Early '14 was pre-photographic intelligence, I believe, so we would have a pilot's debriefing being forwarded to OHL and GQG to be further interpreted and integrated into the overall picture.

[munster]

Was it the case that the change of direction of the german advance before the marne was only spotted from the air by accident and even when spotted the report was not beleived? john

[Paul Hederer]

Well,

  In the age of super-technology and satellites a fellow named Hussein managed to catch the West with its pants down by massing an invasion force and invading Kuwait.  I'd give the fellows in 1914 a break.

  Paul

[SteveMarsdin]

truthergw, on 03 January 2012 - 12:13 PM, said:

As far as the French intelligence failure went, I believe it may have been a case of expectation trumping observation.

As Tom alludes to; it is much a failure of interpretation of reconnaissance as reconnaisance itself. Each of the French armies had its own air reconnaissance arm. Those of 3rd and 4th Armies flew many flights prior to 22 August 1914. They also had airships for reconnaissance as well. It can be difficult to identify the size and mass of forces from the air and it is even harder to specify exact units (active or reserve). When I get home I'l try and post some specific examples of what was seen.

Another example that Paul might have used is December 1944; nearly the same area in the Ardenne and the allies are taken by surprise.

[truthergw]

munster, on 03 January 2012 - 12:27 PM, said:

Was it the case that the change of direction of the german advance before the marne was only spotted from the air by accident and even when spotted the report was not beleived? john

It depends on whose memoirs one reads. Mind, an army is a very large organisation which would cover a large area and use many roads. Spotting a change of direction would require a few observations over a period. I believe both British and French fliers reported on the whereabouts and General Gallieni is generally credited with first realising that the army was in fact marching on a new heading and that it would leave itself open to a flank attack from Paris.

[centurion]

Paul Hederer, on 03 January 2012 - 04:13 PM, said:

Well,

  In the age of super-technology and satellites a fellow named Hussein managed to catch the West with its pants down by massing an invasion force and invading Kuwait.  I'd give the fellows in 1914 a break.

  Paul

Not really the same. The 'West' knew about the invasion force but thought he was just sabre rattling. This was the message being put out by the diplomatic staff in Baghdad (I was part of a British government trade mission some months before when the British ambassador solemnly briefed us [including a Cabinet Minister] that Saddam has no more stomach for foreign adventures but he was likely to put on bluster as a negotiating tactic  - and we didn't even get spoilt by being given any chocolates)  Unfortunately they were unaware of two things 1. Saddam was a nutter and 2. The Kuwaitis really were stealing oil from Iraqi reservoirs (using horizontal drilling techniques). The Kuwaitis actually had a big balloon on the border carnying an AWACS antenna set with all the analysis kit down below at the end of the cable. This was intended to be the final sentry post. Unfortunately the  Kuwaitis got into the habit of packing up and going home at the weekend so it was unmanned in the crucial pre invasion hours.
I was fortunate as I was supposed to be driving from Doha, up the Saheel, to Kuwait City on the day that the Iraqi army came down it but visa delays prevented this. I can tell you about the panic in Bahrain and the UAE (they thought he was sabre rattling too) as, to quote Max Boyce," I was there" but that's another story.
To get back to WW1 I would disagree with Truthergw (why discard a long established tradition?) that it was a failure of intelligence analysis. As I suggested in post 2 of this thread aviation assets were scarce so were only sent to where it was known there were things to observe. It's difficult to analyse non observations.

[SteveMarsdin]

Following on from my last post:

The two airships: Fleurus and Adjutant Réau flew reconnaissance missions over Germany (Saarluis and Trier for example) and were based at Verdun. They came under the control of GQG rather than the individual armies.

4th Army was originally the second line army and as such didn't have the best planes, although it did have some of the best pilots, including:Bares,Tulasne,Brindejonc de Moulinais (he was the pilot who later spotted the breach in the German line at the Marne, as Munster noted and had won many air races prior to the war) and Pujo (later, post-war, to be chief of the French Air Force). They had around 25 aircraft. 3rd Army had a similar number but better aircraft and included amongst their pilots the Bleriot test-pilot Pégoud.

First Sordet's then Abonneau's cavalry corps couldn't effectively penetrate the German cavalry screen to identify what movements were taking place; with the aviation, although at least one flight took off daily, the results were much the same as (as Centurion pointed out) the range of the aircraft was very limited. I am currently reading Jean-Claude Delhez'  "Le jour de deuil de l'armée française" which describes in some detail the reconnaissance efforts, including the 18th August  when the first significant sightings were made. For the first time the Dorands took to the air without observers, allowing them a greater range; Brindejonc de Moulinais was able to reach past the Bastogne-Wiltz area where he observed massed camps of all types of units. Other pilots observed columns in excess of 4kms on the march and large troop concentrations were also identified by other pilots and the pilots of 3rd Army.

I am sure that Lanrezac must have had a similar number of aircraft at his disposal as his 5th Army was the original "attack" army.

Cavalry and air reconnaissance was also backed up by a network of spies and informants but as Tom says, if you think something is "impossible" then your opinion can take some shifting !

[truthergw]

centurion, on 03 January 2012 - 06:48 PM, said:

Not really the same.
...
To get back to WW1 I would disagree with Truthergw (why discard a long established tradition?) that it was a failure of intelligence analysis. As I suggested in post 2 of this thread aviation assets were scarce so were only sent to where it was known there were things to observe. It's difficult to analyse non observations.

Getaway! That's not like you. The French had been failing in intelligence analysis for years before the war even started. For all too many reasons, they did not wish to believe that the Germans would field reserves alongside their active units. That mind set meant that no analysis would be free of bias. They did not look for the First to Fourth Armies in the proper place because their analysis of the concentration was wrong.

[Simon J]

Fascinating stuff. Thank you all for the contributions so far.

One thing that resonates with me is the range of aircraft of the day. I can buy that to a certain extent with the Germans missing the BEF (a stretch though?). Steve mentions columns of 4kms? Come on, a division would occupy more like 20+ kms of road and are we not talking one million men in total, in huge concentrations...?

Anecdotes of poor French intelligence efforts and analysis aside, is there specific evidence of these formations being reported and ignored?

Cheers,
Simon

[truthergw]

SteveMarsdin, on 03 January 2012 - 07:07 PM, said:

Following on from my last post:

The two airships: Fleurus and Adjutant Réau flew reconnaissance missions over Germany (Saarluis and Trier for example) and were based at Verdun. They came under the control of GQG rather than the individual armies.

...
I am sure that Lanrezac must have had a similar number of aircraft at his disposal as his 5th Army was the original "attack" army.

Cavalry and air reconnaissance was also backed up by a network of spies and informants but as Tom says, if you think something is "impossible" then your opinion can take some shifting !

I have mentioned in other threads that Lanrezac usually gets a bad press from British authors. He was suspicious of Joffre's Plan 17 and tried in vain to persuade GQG that large forces were moving west through Belgium, north of the Meuse. If reports from an Army commander in situ cannot persuade the general staff, a few sightings from an aeroplane are unlikely to do better. Here again, there was a ' history' between Joffre and Lanrezac. Intelligence is gathered by men and analysed by men and then interpreted by a man. None of that sequence is guaranteed to be bias free. All of it will be subject to human error.

[truthergw]

Simon J, on 03 January 2012 - 07:58 PM, said:

Fascinating stuff. Thank you all for the contributions so far.

One thing that resonates with me is the range of aircraft of the day. I can buy that to a certain extent with the Germans missing the BEF (a stretch though?). Steve mentions columns of 4kms? Come on, a division would occupy more like 20+ kms of road and are we not talking one million men in total, in huge concentrations...?

Anecdotes of poor French intelligence efforts and analysis aside, is there specific evidence of these formations being reported and ignored?

Cheers,
Simon

Simon, Joffre himself admits that it took some time for GQG to realise what was actually happening. That is more than an anecdote. We know that Plan 17 was executed in spite of being grossly in error as to how big German forces were and where they were. How to explain that without positing bad analysis?  The French had fixed ideas of some years standing, as to how reserves coulod be employed. That coloured all of their analysis and interpretation of intelligence, it influenced what intelligence they set out to gather and where they would seek it. Intelligence is not gathered haphazardly. The staff has a theory based on doctrine and will set out to gather intelligence to support that theory and confirm how it is being made concrete in the field. It is only with the greatest reluctance that the theory and doctrine will be repudiated. The first weeks of the war in France are a classic example of that. It is to Joffre's great credit that he did realise what was happening and was able to rejig a plan on the hoof. The cover story however, should be viewed with extreme scepticism.

[centurion]

truthergw, on 03 January 2012 - 08:17 PM, said:

Simon, Joffre himself admits that it took some time for GQG to realise what was actually happening. That is more than an anecdote. We know that Plan 17 was executed in spite of being grossly in error as to how big German forces were and where they were. How to explain that without positing bad analysis?  The French had fixed ideas of some years standing, as to how reserves coulod be employed. That coloured all of their analysis and interpretation of intelligence, it influenced what intelligence they set out to gather and where they would seek it. Intelligence is not gathered haphazardly. The staff has a theory based on doctrine and will set out to gather intelligence to support that theory and confirm how it is being made concrete in the field. It is only with the greatest reluctance that the theory and doctrine will be repudiated. The first weeks of the war in France are a classic example of that. It is to Joffre's great credit that he did realise what was happening and was able to rejig a plan on the hoof. The cover story however, should be viewed with extreme scepticism.

So in effect preconceived ideas at senior levels were colouring and effecting where they used their scare assets to gather intelligence, which is what I am positing. That isn't a failure of intelligence analysis but what would today be called group think at a very senior level "they can't be there so there is no point sending pilots to look". It still happens today in other fields "no need to send inspectors to Grabbit and Run they're far too big a bank to get into difficulties"

[centurion]

Given the range of the typical French recce aircraft of the time anything much more than 100 miles from the airfield was effectively out of range and even then there would be very little loiter time. So if the pilot is told "go and look at Pont des Allamagne, we think something is happening there and its only 160 K away" this may work but "go and have a shufty around the Pays d'invasion just in case" may be more difficult. It would be the same for German aircraft of the time.

[keithfazzani]

An anecdote told me by my grandfather many years ago. He was sent out on a reconnaissance with another couple of men to establish exactly where the Germans were. They crawled across no man's land and heard German soldiers speaking. They crawled back to their own lines safely and reported to the officer as to where they had heard the Germans. "Nonsense" he said "our reports tell us that they are over there" pointing in another direction "go and have another look". So off my grandfather and the others went, finding a convenient shell hole they crawled in and had a smoke. They then went back to their own lines and reported to the officer saying "Our mistake sir, the Germans are exactly where you say they are". An anecdote I know, and it may even be apocryphal, yet I think it demonstrates a mind set.

[SteveMarsdin]

Simon J, on 03 January 2012 - 07:58 PM, said:

a division would occupy more like 20+ kms of road and are we not talking one million men in total, in huge concentrations...?
Simon

Hi Simon,

The specific examples I have are from 4th and 3rd French Army sectors and relate to the time after Joffre had acknowledged the presence of significant German forces across the Meuse (even though he may not have known their exact size). The 18th was the first date that those armies aerial reconnaissance flights observed any significant forces. Brindejonc de Moulinais flew the furthest (into the German border region (what is now part of eastern Belgium) where he observed not troops on the move but massing before the advance. Part of the problem was that to get to that range he flew without an observer and couldn't evaluate the number of troops below, just reporting lines of wagons and trucks of all sizes and the impression of an entire people massed for the attack. Not a very scientific report.

On the 20th there were reports of columns of a "brigade", of 14kms, of 7kms, of 8kms, of 8kms, of 12kms, 3 of 2.5kms, of 10kms, of 5kms and of 8kms in the Belgian Province of Luxembourg (and just to its north) and on that day Abonneau's cavalry had a divisional strength engagement with German all-arms at Hamipre/Longlier. This information and its interpretation/misinterpretation relates more to the German 4th and 5th Armies rather than the German right wing armies. The French thought the forces were moving NNW and were further away than they were but the German armies turned to meet the French and defeated them on 22 August. Had the French used their reconnaissance better and its impact on the battle is a matter for debate.

[centurion]

SteveMarsdin, on 03 January 2012 - 11:13 PM, said:

Hi Simon,

The specific examples I have are from 4th and 3rd French Army sectors and relate to the time after Joffre had acknowledged the presence of significant German forces across the Meuse (even though he may not have known their exact size). The 18th was the first date that those armies aerial reconnaissance flights observed any significant forces. Brindejonc de Moulinais flew the furthest (into the German border region (what is now part of eastern Belgium) where he observed not troops on the move but massing before the advance. Part of the problem was that to get to that range he flew without an observer and couldn't evaluate the number of troops below, just reporting lines of wagons and trucks of all sizes and the impression of an entire people massed for the attack. Not a very scientific report.

There would be another problem. In those days the observer occupied the front seat where he would get the best view forward and downwards without the wings obscuring his view. Flying in the rear seat much of the pilot's view in that direction would be blocked by the wings so he would have problems seeing what was needed. Very few if any pilots would have been trained in aerial observation. With the exception of the British (much maligned) Be2 few if any observation aircraft were stable enough to allow the pilot to let go of the controls to take notes or make sketches. So "I saw some trucks and I think there may have been a lot of soldiers (don't ask me how many)" would probably the best you'd get.

[Simon J]

SteveMarsdin, on 03 January 2012 - 11:13 PM, said:

Hi Simon,

The specific examples I have are from 4th and 3rd French Army sectors...
<snip>

Had the French used their reconnaissance better and its impact on the battle is a matter for debate.

Thanks again Tom, cent etc

Hi Steve,

Thanks for the evidence and analysis. Are you aware of similar examples from aircraft supporting the French 5th Army? How many did Lanzerac's formation have in comparison to the 3rd and 4th Armies and where were they flying from?

What are opinions as to what could have happened if the 'right hook' had been detected and the evidence interpreted correctly? Forgive my innocence in this respect but, wasn't it exactly what was on the Schlieffen Plan tin?

Cheers,
Simon

[Jack Sheldon]

In 1914 there was no German air force as such, merely a small number of individual reconnaissance flights (33 in all, each with six aircraft). These assets were deployed on the scale of one per army and one per active corps. Thus reserve corps had no access to air reconnaisance and, even those formations which did, had only very limited capability. In addition, I know of no system at the time for coordinated tasking or sharing of results. It is, therefore, no surprise that the outcome was extremely variable and that there were gaps in the intelligence picture.
As far as reporting the BEF was concerned, it is important to bear in mind that IV Res Corps was acting as right (i.e. western) flank guard to First Army during those critical days before and after Mons, so neither Gronau (IV Res Corps), nor Kluck (First Army) ever received any information derived from air reconnaisance over a significant part of the army frontage.

Jack

[SteveMarsdin]

Simon J, on 04 January 2012 - 05:19 AM, said:

1. Are you aware of similar examples from aircraft supporting the French 5th Army? How many did Lanzerac's formation have in comparison to the 3rd and 4th Armies and where were they flying from?

2. What are opinions as to what could have happened if the 'right hook' had been detected and the evidence interpreted correctly?

3.Forgive my innocence in this respect but, wasn't it exactly what was on the Schlieffen Plan tin?

Simon

Hi Simon,

Please excuse me for breaking down your post but in response:

1. I have limited knowledge of the war in the air, drawing most of my comments from what I have read on the "Battle of the Frontiers". I do know that (and in confirming what Jack said) the French had more aircraft "on the books" than the Germans but even then only one or two of their aircraft flew each day and, particularly with 4th Army, it was quite a hotch-potch of types. It couldn't be considered "air-superiority" ! The aerial arm was in its infancy and wasn't fully developed for reconnaissance. Pégoud even brought his own Bleriot to fly. I do not know which airfields/airstrips Lanrezac's aircraft flew from or how many aircraft he had, I can only surmise that he would have had around the same number as 3rd and 4th Armies, particularly given that his was originally the largest army.

2. For now, I'll leave that one to those with greater overall knowledge !

3. The "tin" didn't specify the ingredients or exactly where they would be found.

[truthergw]

Simon J, on 04 January 2012 - 05:19 AM, said:

Thanks again Tom, cent etc

Hi Steve,

Thanks for the evidence and analysis. Are you aware of similar examples from aircraft supporting the French 5th Army? How many did Lanzerac's formation have in comparison to the 3rd and 4th Armies and where were they flying from?

What are opinions as to what could have happened if the 'right hook' had been detected and the evidence interpreted correctly? Forgive my innocence in this respect but, wasn't it exactly what was on the Schlieffen Plan tin?

Cheers,
Simon

The Schlieffen Plan ( Pace Dr Zuber) was a strategy and would have required reaction at a strategic level, planned before the war. That in turn would have required an acute re-orientation by the French staff with regard to reserves, how and where to use them. If General Michel had been a better general and if he had managed to put through his programmes, the Germans might have been faced with a combined French army of reserves and active troops, standing on a strong defensive line on the Franco Belgian border. That is rather a lot of ' ifs'. Von Schlieffen's tin carried a picture of a victorious march through Belgium and a battle of annihalation somewhere on France's eastern borders. An intact French army which fell back in good order and based itself on the Verdun - Toul line might well have trounced the travel weary Germans when they got there. Politically that would have been suicidal. Even to suggest a retreat right across France would have been the end of any politician or general's career.

[centurion]

SteveMarsdin, on 04 January 2012 - 10:02 AM, said:

1. I have limited knowledge of the war in the air, drawing most of my comments from what I have read on the "Battle of the Frontiers". I do know that (and in confirming what Jack said) the French had more aircraft "on the books" than the Germans but even then only one or two of their aircraft flew each day and, particularly with 4th Army, it was quite a hotch-potch of types. It couldn't be considered "air-superiority" ! The aerial arm was in its infancy and wasn't fully developed for reconnaissance. Pégoud even brought his own Bleriot to fly. I do not know which airfields/airstrips Lanrezac's aircraft flew from or how many aircraft he had, I can only surmise that he would have had around the same number as 3rd and 4th Armies, particularly given that his was originally the largest army.

The main type available was the Bleriot monoplane, particularly the XI. Bleriots had been chosen in 1910 as the first standard type for French military aviation and had since established a track record with the Italians in Libya, with the Serbs in the Balkan Wars and to a limited extent with the French in Morocco and Algeria. It had the best range from the aircraft available to the French and was deemed reliable (one had recently been used in the first trans North Sea flight). However to achieve the necessary range it needed to be flown without an observer. The broad wings of the Bleriot posed a problem for ground observation. The observer sitting just behind the leading edge had a good view forward and downwards but the pilot positioned just ahead of the trailing edge had his view restricted by the wings. He did have a limited view forward and almost directly down through a cut out on either side but this was mainly to aid landing. His main view was downward and sideways slightly to the rear which meant that when anything worth observing came into view he was already passing it at about 60mph. The other aircraft with the necessary reliability and range was the Breguet Tractor Biplane (known in British service as 'the tin whistle'). However to get the necessary range this would also have to be flown as a single seater. Whilst the pilot's view was not as restricted as with the Bleriot it was not good. Moreover the Breguet was both slow and tiring to fly and with a cruising speed of under 50 mph long range recce flights would be well over 4 hours long. The reason for them being tiring was that the aircraft had to be 'flown' the entire time, any relaxation by the pilot would result in loosing control. This made it effectively impossible for him to make notes or sketches of what he saw.


Other French aircraft such as the Maurice Farman MF 07 (Shorthorn) whilst reliable, easier to fly and offering good visibility lacked the range and were better suited for tactical battlefield observation. Some like the Deperdussin TT were deemed too fragile and unreliable.

French airships were only used very briefly for recce as one was shot down by French troops (on the assumption that any airship must be a Zeppelin).

Ultimately the answer must be that the  French simply did not have the requisite assets for effective strategic reconnaissance,.

[Simon J]

centurion, on 04 January 2012 - 12:15 PM, said:

<snip>

Ultimately the answer must be that the  French simply did not have the requisite assets for effective strategic reconnaissance,.

I don't think we're quite there yet, cent. Purely from what I have seen in this thread the French most definitely possessed the ability to make the required observations; it doesn't appear to have been a simple task, but the assets and skills were present. I still haven't seen any evidence that such flights were or were not carried out in the case of the French 5th Army, or that data from any such flights were ignored or misinterpreted. Until that has been demonstrated I don't think dogmatic ignorance, a failure in analysis or mitigation through lack of resource can be successfully asserted? What did Joffre say about it, precisely?

Does anyone have knowledge of pre-war writing on air reconnaissance in any of the belligerent countries?

Cheers,
Simon

[centurion]

Simon J, on 04 January 2012 - 03:29 PM, said:

I don't think we're quite there yet, cent. Purely from what I have seen in this thread the French most definitely possessed the ability to make the required observations; it doesn't appear to have been a simple task, but the assets and skills were present.

So which aircraft could they have used? Who had been trained to make the observations.? How could the pilots have made the observations on their own? Unless you can answer this there isn't any definitely