89 replies to this topic

[Simon J]

centurion, on 04 January 2012 - 04:01 PM, said:

So which aircraft could they have used? Who had been trained to make the observations.? How could the pilots have made the observations on their own? Unless you can answer this there isn't any definitely

cent,

I'm just going on what has been said. To quote your post above:

"The other aircraft with the necessary reliability and range was the Breguet Tractor Biplane (known in British service as 'the tin whistle'). However to get the necessary range this would also have to be flown as a single seater. Whilst the pilot's view was not as restricted as with the Bleriot it was not good. Moreover the Breguet was both slow and tiring to fly and with a cruising speed of under 50 mph long range recce flights would be well over 4 hours long. The reason for them being tiring was that the aircraft had to be 'flown' the entire time, any relaxation by the pilot would result in loosing control. This made it effectively impossible for him to make notes or sketches of what he saw."

To me that requires a pilot that can manage this aircraft for two-four hours and keep his eyes open? I don't think sketches or notes are required to report a million men covering 200 square miles on a map? I know this is simplification but does that not show it was entirely possible?

Cheers,
Simon

[SteveMarsdin]

Hi Simon,

The diaries of the various escadrilles are detailed on the French government site http://www.memoirede...p.php?article59, as are those of 5th Army. In the absence of someone with specific knowledge of Lanrezac's 5th Army in August 1914, you might, by cross reference, be able to identify which escadrilles were assigned to 5th Army and find out more about their operation.

[centurion]

Simon J, on 04 January 2012 - 04:12 PM, said:

cent,

I'm just going on what has been said. To quote your post above:

"The other aircraft with the necessary reliability and range was the Breguet Tractor Biplane (known in British service as 'the tin whistle'). However to get the necessary range this would also have to be flown as a single seater. Whilst the pilot's view was not as restricted as with the Bleriot it was not good. Moreover the Breguet was both slow and tiring to fly and with a cruising speed of under 50 mph long range recce flights would be well over 4 hours long. The reason for them being tiring was that the aircraft had to be 'flown' the entire time, any relaxation by the pilot would result in loosing control. This made it effectively impossible for him to make notes or sketches of what he saw."

To me that requires a pilot that can manage this aircraft for two-four hours and keep his eyes open? I don't think sketches or notes are required to report a million men covering 200 square miles on a map? I know this is simplification but does that not show it was entirely possible?

I feel you lack an appreciation on how difficult observation was and even less of the limitations of the aircraft of the day. Given the limited range of the aircraft available only the odd square mile of such would be covered in a single flight. Spotting men in field grey from say 4,000 feet even if you have a good view and are not having to control an aircraft was not easy. A lot more difficult than just keeping your eyes open. 200 square miles is a hell of a big area to cover and those 1 million men would not be evenly dispersed over it.

Flying a Breguet in a more than open cockpit given the idiosyncratic steering wheel control system for over four hours was very physically tiring indeed - it wasn't merely a matter of controlling your aircraft The Breguet had an all flying tail and the top wing was an entire moveable control surface. As a contemporary account makes clear "it required enormous strength to steer it"  The all flying cruciform tail meant that this had to be applied continuously. Another pilot reported that "It was an unwholesome beast" The Bleriot was easier to fly but subject to rudder jamming. Both types proved insufficiently robust for the demands put upon them.

Reporting that there are a lot of men in an undefined area would be fatuous, jotting down things like map references would be essential. A single pilot would have great difficulty in achieving this.

[Simon J]

centurion, on 04 January 2012 - 04:54 PM, said:

I feel you lack an appreciation on how difficult observation was and even less of the limitations of the aircraft of the day.

<snip>

Reporting that there are a lot of men in an undefined area would be fatuous, jotting down things like map references would be essential. A single pilot would have great difficulty in achieving this.

cent,

I have to agree with your first observation which is why I am asking here!  

As to the second...one million men in a 200sq mile area would be virtually shoulder-to-shoulder; it really isn't that big...that wasn't really my point, though. From what you've said, observing a huge mass of humanity where there shouldn't be one was not impossible. In fact it was distinctly possible with the means at disposal, though the pilot might get 'tired'. All they would then need to do is get back and report this 'huge blob somewhere out-east' to get support (or not!)? I would just like to know, from evidence, if step one was done. The fact is wasn't easy to achieve is no proof it didn't occur.

Cheers,
Simon

[munster]

I would imagine given the time of year they kicked up the odd puff of dust or two.john

[centurion]

Simon J, on 04 January 2012 - 05:17 PM, said:

one million men in a 200sq mile area would be virtually shoulder-to-shoulder;

Twaddle - do some basic arithmetic - evenly spread out that's less than one man per 600 square yards* (200 sq miles contains 619,520,000 square yards) . However they wouldn't be evenly spaced out and there would be places were there were very few. 




* About the population density of the Wirral

[SteveMarsdin]

Hi Simon,

This is the aviation diary for 5th Army in August 1914: http://www.memoirede...001/viewer.html

It only gives a summary of the reconnaissance, I think you would need to get the individual escadrille's diaries (if you could identify them) for more detailed information. When considering range, don't forget that Lanrezac's army only moved north-west in mid-August, with an expanded 4th Army filling the gap. Most of the aerial reconnaissance seems to be limited to southern Belgium (limited by range) where the mass of the right wing German Armies wasn't.

For Centurion's benefit the "hotch-potch" of aircraft available to  4th and 3rd Armies included: Voisin L and LA; Caudron C2; Dorand; Blériot XI; Maurice Farman 7; Henri Farman 20. The names mean little to me but I'm sure that you'll be more familiar with their capabilities.

[truthergw]

centurion, on 04 January 2012 - 06:15 PM, said:

Twaddle - do some basic arithmetic - evenly spread out that's less than one man per 600 square yards* (200 sq miles contains 619,520,000 square yards) . However they wouldn't be evenly spaced out and there would be places were there were very few.




* About the population density of the Wirral

An army would use a lot of roads and would usually march in columns of four, close order. Other times, the men would take to the fields and leave the roads for the wagons and guns. Their supply columns would cover a fair few miles of road. If a plane passed over the army when the ground was visible, it would be hard to miss them. That said, there would be wide areas where the armies weren't. The point is, planes would not be asked to search Belgium to see what they could see. They would be given specific sectors to cover. Those sectors chosen because they were where the staff expected to find the armies. That expectation would be based on the staff interpretation of previous intelligence and/or their analysis of the assumed German strategy. That is where I say that the analysis was wrong. Lanrezac would be sending planes more or less in the correct direction because a, he disagreed with the GQG strategy and b, he was getting intelligence on the ground which he accepted.

[Simon J]

centurion, on 04 January 2012 - 06:15 PM, said:

Twaddle - do some basic arithmetic - evenly spread out that's less than one man per 600 square yards* (200 sq miles contains 619,520,000 square yards) . However they wouldn't be evenly spaced out and there would be places were there were very few. 




* About the population density of the Wirral

cent,

I was talking metaphorically. Bottom line is, you won't miss an army if you fly over it in a small space 20 miles x 10 miles. A column of 15,000 infantry and support will take up one road many miles in length, even 20 miles. Still not my point, though. The question is, did French planes fly over it or not? Your point is they couldn't have. Based on your capability summary I disagree.

Cheers,
Simon

[Simon J]

truthergw, on 04 January 2012 - 07:12 PM, said:

<snip>

The point is, planes would not be asked to search Belgium to see what they could see. They would be given specific sectors to cover. Those sectors chosen because they were where the staff expected to find the armies. That expectation would be based on the staff interpretation of previous intelligence and/or their analysis of the assumed German strategy. That is where I say that the analysis was wrong. Lanrezac would be sending planes more or less in the correct direction because a, he disagreed with the GQG strategy and b, he was getting intelligence on the ground which he accepted.

Thanks Tom,

That all sounds reasonable, and sounds right, but it remains conjecture. Where is the evidence? Planes/Lanzerac/GQG/Intelligence would/could/should...what is that based on? What did they actually do? One would assume there is evidence somewhere. Steve has suggested aviation diaries. Is there anything in the army or GQG diaries? Any personal accounts? Is this the closest we can get?

Cheers,
Simon

[SteveMarsdin]

Hi Simon,

From the brief bit of the war diary in the posted link that I read, Lanrezac's aircraft were based at the same airfields later used by the aircraft ot the 4th Army (e.g Stenay, Montmedy etc) plus some based at his HQ whilst it was at Rethel, until they moved further north (or NW). From reading Centurion's posts I don't think his aircraft would have the range to penetrate much beyond the Bastogne - Houffalize area whilst they were based there. As they didn't move north until mid-August I think that intelligence on the ground had overtaken things by then. From what has been posted, the Aachen corridor wasn't in the range of aircraft flying from the Stenay area; would it have been in the range of more northern airstrips ? I don't know but suspect not.

The aerial reconnaissance did pick-up movements on 18/19/20 August but of the 4th and 5th German armies, largely in the Province of Luxembourg. This coincides with when those armies moved, i.e it wasn't that the aircraft operating missed a great movement of troops in the early part of August, its just that there weren't the movements there then, they happened at that time, out of range, further north.

[Simon J]

SteveMarsdin, on 04 January 2012 - 09:10 PM, said:

Hi Simon,

From the brief bit of the war diary in the posted link that I read, Lanrezac's aircraft were based at the same airfields later used by the aircraft ot the 4th Army (e.g Stenay, Montmedy etc) plus some based at his HQ whilst it was at Rethel, until they moved further north (or NW). From reading Centurion's posts I don't think his aircraft would have the range to penetrate much beyond the Bastogne - Houffalize area whilst they were based there. As they didn't move north until mid-August I think that intelligence on the ground had overtaken things by then. From what has been posted, the Aachen corridor wasn't in the range of aircraft flying from the Stenay area; would it have been in the range of more northern airstrips ? I don't know but suspect not.

The aerial reconnaissance did pick-up movements on 18/19/20 August but of the 4th and 5th German armies, largely in the Province of Luxembourg. This coincides with when those armies moved, i.e it wasn't that the aircraft operating missed a great movement of troops in the early part of August, its just that there weren't the movements there then, they happened at that time, out of range, further north.

Steve,

Good stuff, indeed! Thank you for the info. Whose aerial reconnaissance picked up the movements on 18/19/20 August and when did Lanzerac's 5th Army aircraft move north (or north-west) do you know?

Cheers,
Simon

[SteveMarsdin]

Hi Simon,

Those troop movements were spotted by aircraft of 4th and 3rd French Armies but largely of the German 4th and 5th Armies.

Lanrezac's aircraft seemed to have moved 16/17/18 August (the diary extract specifically mentions one escadrille moving on18 August to Signy le Petit). It was flying sorties in the Namur area on the 19 August. It specifically mentions been hampered by fog in the morning but later identifying (if I'm reading it correctly):

• Noville - a strong column of all-arms
• Huppaye - an infantry regiment , 1km
• Jodoigne - column leaving Jodoigne to the west, could only see the head of the column, rest hidden in trees
• Hougarde - column moving westward through village, 2km
• Letruid - column of all-arms coming from Goosoncourt, 3 km
• Tirlemont - a squadron of cavalry

I would think that by now the reconnaissance at that range was mainly for tactical purposes.

Unless the French had had longer range reconnaissance aircraft earlier in August I don't think that such a new and untried arm could have done much more (and please refer to Tom's posts for the wider context)

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks for the efforts, Steve. I have been going through the online war diaries as well. Here is a map of one of the reconnaissance flights from Rethel. It was carried out on 13th August and lasted just over 3 hours.

 French Recon Flight.jpg   93.08K   2 downloads

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Steve, I have followed another line of investigation as well. General Sordet's Cavalry Corps was assigned at least one escadrille (no 4). "Historique du Corps de Cavalerie Sordet" provides some interesting snippets. Elements of Sordet's corps were operating towards Neufchâteau and came into contact with German cavalry on 11 August 1914. The next day, the history records that the French planes flew over the Neufchâteau area and found that the German forces had moved northwest between Tellin (~38 km NNW of Neufchâteau) and Rochefort (just north of Tellin). This would explain why a Vth Army recon flight would have been despatched towards the area on the 13th (see map above).

On the 15th August, "Special Instruction No. 10 to the IVth, and Vth Armies, and the Cavalry Corps noted that "the enemy's main effort seems to be developing on the right wing, north of Givet ..." It is not clear to what extent aerial reconnaissance contributed to this conclusion. However, on the 19th August "a plane reported at about 0830 hours a heavy column of [German] cavalry and artillery marching en route via Grand Rozières to Perwez and Orbais". The area is marked with the red "A" in the map below:

 French Recon Flight 19 August.jpg   91.25K   0 downloads

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Steve, the first record of a French Fifth Army aerial reconnaissance report that I have found is dated 9th August 1914. Once the German First Army swung towards the BEF, it was picked up by British Royal Flying Corps aerial reconnaissance. Not all days were suitable for spotting but by the night of August 22/23rd the RFC issued the following sketch map, which is reproduced from the war diary:

 GHQ RFC Reports 22 Aug 1914.jpg   39.23K   2 downloads

Robert

[Simon J]

All,

Thank you for your contributions to this thread so far. I am learning a great deal.

Cheers,
Simon

[truthergw]

Simon J, on 04 January 2012 - 08:28 PM, said:

Thanks Tom,

That all sounds reasonable, and sounds right, but it remains conjecture. Where is the evidence? Planes/Lanzerac/GQG/Intelligence would/could/should...what is that based on? What did they actually do? One would assume there is evidence somewhere. Steve has suggested aviation diaries. Is there anything in the army or GQG diaries? Any personal accounts? Is this the closest we can get?

Cheers,
Simon

I confess that I have not studied the primary sources, the daily reports from the forces in the field, the staff summaries of that intelligence etc.. I have however, read a few of the secondary sources and the prsonal memoirs of the commanders. If someone is to reject the accepted interpretation, it would be incumbent on that person to show why, that is, produce the counter evidence to refute the ' standard line'. We know where the German armies marched. We know where the French armies marched. We know where they met and fought. The interpretation I have put forward for these facts is fairly standard and not something which I discovered. If you reject the interpretation I put forward as being mere conjecture, I'd be very interested to see your interpretation and the facts on which it is based.

[SteveMarsdin]

Robert Dunlop, on 05 January 2012 - 12:52 AM, said:

Steve, the first record of a French Fifth Army aerial reconnaissance report that I have found is dated 9th August 1914.
Robert

Hi Robert,

Thank you for the added input, it's much clearer using maps !

Going back to Simon's original post,  my initial reaction was that John Terraine was been too harsh on the air reconnaissance which was very much in its infancy (particularly on the German side, as Jack has pointed out). I know very little about aircraft but get the impression that range would have been a major issue, in identifying the mass of the German right wing armies at the critical time in the first weeks of August.

[Robert Dunlop]

Terraine's comments must be treated very cautiously IMHO. At one level, his comment isn't really about air reconnaissance. Terraine was suggesting that the German First Army moved undetected through Belgium until it struck the British at Mons. This is not correct. Indeed it was GQG's appreciation of the German right wing that prompted the attack through the Ardennes by the French Third and Fourth Armies. The French air force played a role in determining where the German right wing was, though at a time when the German forces had not advanced that far into Belgium in any case (a point that you made very well). The full extent of French aerial reconnaissance efforts have yet to be defined IMHO. You have made a great start in respect of this thread. We should not be distracted by interpretations of how far planes could fly nor how well pilots/observers might or might not be able to observe and record, IMHO.

British aerial reconnaissance picked up substantial forces, both German First and Second Armies, several days before the Battle of Mons.

Jack has posted some information on German aerial reconnaissance assets. I will address their 'failures' in subsequent posts.

Robert

[Simon J]

truthergw, on 05 January 2012 - 10:35 AM, said:

I confess that I have not studied the primary sources, the daily reports from the forces in the field, the staff summaries of that intelligence etc.. I have however, read a few of the secondary sources and the prsonal memoirs of the commanders. If someone is to reject the accepted interpretation, it would be incumbent on that person to show why, that is, produce the counter evidence to refute the ' standard line'. We know where the German armies marched. We know where the French armies marched. We know where they met and fought. The interpretation I have put forward for these facts is fairly standard and not something which I discovered. If you reject the interpretation I put forward as being mere conjecture, I'd be very interested to see your interpretation and the facts on which it is based.

Hi Tom,

I didn't mean that to be as combative as it sounds. I was merely responding to your post which you have qualified above. From what was originally put forward I guess I am trying to get at where the standard line came from. If it comes from the sources you mention then that is well worth knowing.

Cheers,
Simon

[Simon J]

Robert Dunlop, on 05 January 2012 - 11:01 AM, said:

Terraine's comments must be treated very cautiously IMHO. <snip>

The full extent of French aerial reconnaissance efforts have yet to be defined IMHO. You have made a great start in respect of this thread. <snip>

British aerial reconnaissance picked up substantial forces, both German First and Second Armies, several days before the Battle of Mons.

Jack has posted some information on German aerial reconnaissance assets. I will address their 'failures' in subsequent posts.

Robert

Hi Robert,

I entirely agree on all counts. From a standing start (in  my case) I feel the topic has moved forward relatively smoothly! Having picked up a great deal, dare I say the contributors are advancing current knowledge in real time, particularly in the examination of primary French sources which, in most cases, remain a mystery to Anglophones.

On the subject of JT, I do detect a certain score-leveling in his comments promoting, as they do, the early efficacy of British reconnaissance at the expense of allies and enemy alike. I would expect that has to be dealt with in juxta-position to discussion on French and German efforts. I wish I could contribute more myself!

Cheers,
Simon

[truthergw]

A side issue here which might be worth mentioning. Terraine was an early revisionist and his work needs to be read with an eye on the historiography. No historian writes in a vacuum. His work will influence and be influenced by his forerunners and contemporaries.

Simon, I didn't think you were combative, I was rather hoping you had found some new evidence or interpretation.

With regard to intelligence, it has always been a puzzle to me that GQG seem to have been unaware of the coup de main against Liege. Was this so or was it simply set aside as a diversion? That was a part explanation given for the reports by Lanrezac. Then of course, the infamous, " The more forces marching through Belgium, the better", of GQG indicates a determination to ignore anything which cast doubt on Plan 17. With that mind set, there would be no point in sending planes acrosse the Sambre and Meuse.

[George Armstrong Custer]

Robert Dunlop, on 05 January 2012 - 11:01 AM, said:

The full extent of French aerial reconnaissance efforts have yet to be defined IMHO.

Terence J Finnegan's Shooting The Front - Allied Aerial Reconnaissance in the First World War is an excellent place to start. He places aerial military reconnaissance in 1914 into the context of French Intelligence's deployment of other tools, notably radio interception and cryptological analysis. Note, too, the flying time available to a French Bleriot XI. Inter alia, Finnegan notes the following:

"Both the French and British military developed coherent aviation organisational structures. The French promoted homogenity of aircraft types for the various escadrilles to save on maintenance while promoting a diverse collection of craft primarily used in observation and reconnaissance missions. Along with infrastructure came development of a specific air doctrine for observation and reconnaissance missions. By 1913 Aviation Militaire comprised eight companies for aerostat (ballon/dirigible) work and ten sections for aviation work. (1) As for the RFC, aviation was organised into squadrons comprised of a mix of aeroplanes to support the British army. The Royal Navy deployed both aeroplanes and a dirigible fleet for naval missions. (2) French armees and aviation assets commenced mobilisation when the war started. 'At the time of mobilisation military aeronautics was still in its earliest infancy. We may say it was as the fighting went on that this science was evolved and developed.' (3) French aeronautic units were governed under Plan XVII (14 February 1914) comprising both aerostation and avistion. (4) The French aviation section now comprised 21 flights of six aeroplanes. Two BLC flights of four aeroplanes were added at the start of the war. The mainstay Bleriot XI was capable of flying for two hours at 1,500 feet, providing a mobile aerial platform that manoeuvred over the countryside and acquired vital glimpses of enemy forces. Immediately after mobilisation, new flights were created from aeroplanes delivered or salvaged behind the lines. Aviation personnel numbered about 3,500, including 480 officers and noncommissioned officers. (5) Increased awareness of the value of 'higher ground' reporting resulted in a support element to convey critical information. Each escadrille had a 'fast car' and a motorcyclist assigned to rapidly disseminate airborne acquired reports to the respective ground commander. (6)

French intelligence, known as the Zeme (Deuxieme) Bureau, actively monitored the advancing German forces with all the resources at its disposal. The fledgling radio intercept function was effective in view of the capabilities of the time. Established in 1909, the French radio intercept specialists were recognised as experts in this field. Zeme Bureau also conducted cryptological analysis that served the highest levels of the government. (7) The French had committed their intercept service in full, even before the begiunning of the war, and were following German Army traffic attentively. After a few days of combat, they possessed a perfectly clear picture of the operational structure of the German Army in the west as it marched through Belgium in the direction of Paris.(8)" *

* Terrence J. Finnegan, Shooting the Front - Allied Aerial Reconnaissance in the First World War, Spellmount, 2011, p. 24.

Jack is absolutely right to highlight the lack of an element of vorsprung durch technik in German military aviation in general, and reconnaissance work in particular, in August 1914. France and Britain undoubtedly had the edge, even if that was still in a state of on-the-job development which could be a bit of a hit or miss affair. Coincidentally, I have just made a note of the beginnings of the development of aerial reconnaissance by the British in a post on another thread, which may be of related interest in grasping what was, theoretically, possible in 1914: 1912 Manoeuvres.

George

(1) 'Report on Aeronautical Matters, 12, TNA, PRO: AIR 1/7/6/98/20.

(2) Charles Christienne and Pierre Lissarague, A History of French Military Aviation (Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press), 59.

(3) 'Aeronautics', June 1921, NARA, RG 120, Box 819, 1.

(4) Christienne and Lissarague, 59.

(5) Ibid, 58.

(6) Douglas Porch, The French Secret Services: From the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giraux, 1995), 56.

(7) Ibid, 56.

(8) Wilhelm F. Flicke, War Secrets in the Ether, ed. by Shiela Carlisle (2 vols, Laguna Hills, Ca: Aegean Park Press, 1977), 1, 23.

[Simon J]

George Armstrong Custer, on 05 January 2012 - 12:01 PM, said:

George

Who let you out of Bemersyde?!

Cheers,
Simon