27 replies to this topic

[stuartd]

I've just done a search for the Schlieffen Plan and uncovered lots of fascinating threads about why it failed and whether there was a Plan B and so forth which is all good stuff. However, I have just been talking about the Schlieffen Plan and I tend to consider that my knowledge of it is pretty sound at a 'more than most' but 'less than many' type way. As I was talking someone said 'so if the Germans had captured Paris what then what would have happened'? I have to say that I was pretty stumped. So much of the conversation about the SP revolves round why it did fail, but what if the Germans had taken Paris...would they have sued for peace from a position of strength? But what peace? To secure what? How would they control the city? What would stop a renewed French attack? And from where? What about the locals? So many questions that I'm not sure where to start!

[old-ted]

Hi.

My limited understanding is that the Germans believed that the capture of Paris would result in France capitulating ending the war on the western front and allowing the German army to turn East to tackle the Russians. Had they followed the plan who knows what may have happened.

Regards

John

[truthergw]

One of the weak points of the plan and a reason to doubt if it actually qualified as a plan, was that it was very open ended. The intent was to bypass Paris and catch the French Armies between their own Eastern defences and the oncoming German armies. There was no battle plan neither was there any plan for occupying Paris. These aspects would have been dealt with by OHL on an ' as and when' basis. Similarly, there was no plan for the transportation of the victorious Germans to the Eastern front prior to defeating the Russians. The alteration of the march line by von Kluck was symptomatic of this lack of firm plan. What we might call the Schlieffen-von Moltke plan was to invade Belgium by means of a surprise attack on Liege , launch the main assault on France from Belgium and play it by ear after the crossing of the Meuse and the Sambre. Looked at from the point of view of the original intention, the Battles of the Frontiers were a failure for the Germans. Certainly the French suffered heavy casualties and fell back all along the line but they were not caught between a hammer and an anvil and were, as we know, eventually able to reform and then not only halt the German advance, throw it back upon itself.

[stuartd]

So the Schlieffen Plan really did rest on a 'we'll see how we go' type basis? That's what it sounds like. As in the essence of a firm plan seems to have been there, but the details of what would happen if it were successful wereall a bit hazy. Also - were the Germans adamant that the Russians would be slow to mobilise or is this another one of the SP myths?

[Jim Smithson]

truthergw, on 20 February 2012 - 06:08 PM, said:

One of the weak points of the plan and a reason to doubt if it actually qualified as a plan, was that it was very open ended.

In that case Tom none of the Operational Plans found in war diaries are really plans as they never went beyond an initial phase and were thus 'open ended' .  In fact I am not sure any 'planning' went on at all under that premise throughout the War.  

I know what you mean Tom, better not to go down the very long road of the other thread all over again!!


Jim

[pmaasz]

Stuartd:  WHAT a good question!  I too have studied the "Plan" and what happened to cause it to fail, but never considered the question of what would happen if/when the Germans did get to Paris.  I look forward with great interest to subsequent input to your valuable post.

[truthergw]

stuartd, on 20 February 2012 - 06:32 PM, said:

So the Schlieffen Plan really did rest on a 'we'll see how we go' type basis? That's what it sounds like. As in the essence of a firm plan seems to have been there, but the details of what would happen if it were successful wereall a bit hazy. Also - were the Germans adamant that the Russians would be slow to mobilise or is this another one of the SP myths?

The Germans were not adamant about anything at Army level. That was the style of command and was also the style at high level in the British Army. We had an area to detrain in and from then on in, the man on the spot was expected to apply the principles that were taught in the military acadamies and staff colleges. Commanders were given a task and expected to get on with it. High commands were aware that it was not possible to plan for every eventuallity. Officers rehearsed at annual manoeuvres and staff rides. The biggest problem was supplying the troops and controlling traffic. Which army went down which road. Who marched, who travelled by train and so on. The best one could hope for was troops arriving at a pre-arranged spot with supplies and equipment to enable them to undertake whichever actions their commanders decided upon.  When the armies finally encountered each other, commanders were expected to put into practice the training with a mind to the doctrines they had been taught.

Jim, as Pmaasz said, it is a good question because it has not yet been answered to everyone's satisfaction. If the discussions get a bit heated and ramble about a bit, that simply reflects the complex nature of the question. I think it is worthwhile discussing just what a military plan is or should be. How detailed can they be and so on. I have tried to point out that plans for armies are mainly the business of supplies and transport. The plan for the battle cannot even begin to be made until the armies get there and take stock of the situation.

[salesie]

If the Germans had captured Paris in 1914, what would have happened afterwards?

You can pick any theory you like or make up your own - the options are only limited by the human imagination. Anyone can pontificate any theory based on Whatif questions; from the sublime to the ridiculous can be openly spouted by the fantasist to the serious-minded to the extremist, all secure in the knowledge that anything they say, even the most wildest of theories,  can never be definitely disproved. Don't get me wrong, I'm not trying to stop this thread in its tracks, as a writer of fiction I'm all in favour of imaginative, creative thinking and story-telling - but when it comes to historical fiction, the kind of fiction that revolves around past, extremely important, world events then I believe that any story-telling should revolve around the known facts.

And as far as I can see, the know facts about this subject matter are simple, clear, and hard to ignore i.e.

1) In 1914, the Germans nearly captured Paris, but didn't - they were stopped a few miles short then pushed back some of the way they came, and were ultimately defeated several years later.

2) In 1918, the Germans nearly captured Paris, but didn't - they were stopped a few miles short then pushed back the way they came, and were ultimately defeated several months later.

3) In 1940, the Germans actually captured Paris - the war did not end (even after the whole of France fell several weeks later), and Germany was ultimately defeated several years later.

It seems to me that Germany and its Army (when involved in total-war, not the limited Franco-Prussian variety) had a knack of losing even when capturing Paris and the whole of France. So, I would argue that even if von Kluck and von Bulow had captured Paris in 1914 then Germany would still have lost the war.

Now, I do realise that there will be plenty of smart-alecs who will scream that's much too simple a premise e.g. if Paris had fallen in 1914 then this would have happened and that would happened bla, bla, bla and even more bla (there'll be a myriad of examples). But it will be impossible, no matter how much blather is offered, for them to disprove my premise (just as much as it will be impossible for me to actually prove it).


Cheers-salesie.


PS. No, I won't post on this thread again (no matter what cock-eyed theory is proffered) - historical Whatifs do my 'ead in.

[stuartd]

An interesting post there Salesie and the previous ones for that matter, but I guess what I am driving at here is whether there is any evidence which exists of any kind of plan as to what the Germans would have done if they had taken control of Paris from any source?

[PJA]

Hadn't the French government relocated to Bordeaux in September 1914 ?

There was presumably a decision to avoid the debacle of 1870, when the government had been isolated from the rest of the nation when Paris was beseiged.

If the French government was determined to continue the fight despite the fall of Paris, then - provided the will of the people could be sustained - German victory was not assured.

The more important question was, I suppose, whether the French armies were going to be destroyed.

Phil (PJA)

[centurion]

I think we have an example of the Napoleon fallacy "Capture the enemy's capital and it's all over". Worked with Berlin and Vienna but failed with Madrid and Moscow.

[truthergw]

stuartd, on 20 February 2012 - 08:10 PM, said:

An interesting post there Salesie and the previous ones for that matter, but I guess what I am driving at here is whether there is any evidence which exists of any kind of plan as to what the Germans would have done if they had taken control of Paris from any source?

As far as I am aware there is no record of such a plan. I have already pointed out that such plan as did exist was to bypass Paris and trap the French armies against the German armies along the Eastern frontier. Once the armies had been destroyed, the assumption was that the French could do nothing but submit to German demands. That is what happened to the Russians in 1917 when they ceased fighting and sued for terms although Moscow had not been captured.

[stuartd]

In that case once the Germans had trapped and defeated the French army the French, as you say, would have no choice but to submit to the demands of the Germans. Yet what would these demands have been? Do we know?

[salesie]

stuartd, on 21 February 2012 - 08:06 AM, said:

In that case once the Germans had trapped and defeated the French army the French, as you say, would have no choice but to submit to the demands of the Germans. Yet what would these demands have been? Do we know?

I've jumped back in, Stuart, because you seem to be moving away from pure Whatifs into much greyer territory (highly fertile ground for historical fiction).

I know Wicki's not usually a good source to use but, in this instance, http://en.wikipedia....ptemberprogramm will lead you to further research. This summary is of a draft-memorandum of German war aims that became highly controversial in the modern academic world - many claim they were never policy and that the memorandum found by Fischer is merely a discussion document.

However, this memorandum was drafted by the German Chancellor just before the set back on the Marne, a time when all Germany was convinced that its armies would bring a quick and glorious victory within weeks if not days - are we to believe that these "thoughts" had suddenly entered the German Chancellor's head just a mere three to four weeks after war broke out? Are we to believe that the set back on the Marne had nothing to do with the so-called internal opposition to these aims preventing them being adopted, and publicly proclaimed, as official German policy? If this was merely a discussion document with strong opposition inside Germany stopping these aims becoming policy then what happened to said strong opposition - they must have been "discussed" out of sight because the territorial demands over France and Belgium were almost as strong in the so-called German peace offer of 1916 i.e. the officially proclaimed peace offer demands of Germany?

I agree with Fischer, these were indeed the de facto German pre-war aims.


Cheers-salesie.

[PJA]

The Germans came close to winning, as it was.

Without capturing the capital, they inflicted terrific damage and things trembled in the balance.  It wasn't called " The Miracle of the Marne" for nothing.


Imagine how amplified this peril was bound to be if Paris fell....it would also be accompanied, I suspect, by an even greater amount of loss inflcited on the French armies, which is, after all, the crucial thing.

The destruction of the French armies was the goal ; capturing Paris a secondary, though important, one.

Phil (PJA)

[stuartd]

It seems that the question then is really very difficult to answer as to what the Germans would have done if Paris was captured. Impose military rule on it? Surely then there was the risk that all occupying armies face of constant attacks by anti-German French citizens. And what would they have done with France? Made it part of Germany? Run it as a colony?

[edwin astill]

And, of course, the one occasion the Germans did "win the war" 1870, they did not capture Paris before the French admitted defeat.

Edwin

[bob lembke]

Didn't I post in this thread about a day ago? I know that I can be (occassionally) annoying, possibly even mildly offensive, but I thought that I was on my best behavior, and even mildly informative. Was my post flushed by the moderators? Or perhaps I screwed up my post technically, although it was not my first.

I (thought that I) posted on the work of Prof. Terrance Zuber, a US scholar who has written several books on and about the Schlieffen Plan (if there was such a thing).  

Bob Lembke

[stuartd]

Hi Bob - I'm afraid I haven't seen any posting from you on this thread though I will look up the works of the historian that you mention. Any contribution from you would be most appreciated.

[PJA]

So much depends, I suppose, on the nature of support that France might have expected from her allies, especially Britain.
And that would be determined very largely by the predicament of the BEF at the time. What might we infer from the decision made in 1940, when Gort made the escape and evacuation of his army the number one priority ?

More generally, it would be interesting to speculate on how committed to mutual support the Entente was in 1914 compared with its 1940 counterpart.

The anecdote that comes to mind is the commander of the BEF, John French, bursting into tears and succumbing to Joffre's plea that the honour of England was at stake in 1914. A similar plea in 1940 did not evince the same reaction.

Are these accounts true ?

The fall of Belgrade did not eliminate Serbia from the war : the degree of support from the Allies was crucial.

The way in which the Germans might have exploited their advantage after capturing Paris is best guaged by how they treated Russia and Romania in 1918.  Harshness in war, punitive and without mercy in imposing the terms of Teutonic peace.

Edit : You can almost hear it, can't you ?  "....We let them off too  lightly, in the settlement of 1871. We should have realised they'd be out for trouble again !  Well, this time no more Mr Nice Guy !"

The thought of it makes me shudder.



Phil(PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

The Germans captured several major cities in France and the capital of Belgium. These serve as indicators of what would have happened with Paris. The cities were placed under immediate military rule, which tightened as the war went on. There have been several books published about the consequences, which were not pleasant for the inhabitants to say the least. Based on the French guerilla insurgency during the latter phases of the Franco-Prussian War (for which the Germans used the term der Volkskrieg), the German army was not prepared to tolerate any uprisings at all. The slightest hint of trouble led to severe reprisals.

The capture of Paris was not the major objective of the German army in 1914. It was the defeat of the French army in battle, either by complete destruction or forcing it to the point where the French capitulated. Time and again the German army demonstrated that major centres of resistance, such as Maubeuge, were simply bypassed and invested by lesser quality troops.

Robert

[PJA]

It might be instructive to consider how the capture of Warsaw impinged on Germany's war against Russia, too.

Although, of course, Warsaw was not on Russian soil proper, its loss must have been very damaging to Tsarist prestige, especially at a time when the Russian armies were retreating and yielding perhaps a milion prisoners in a single campaign..

And yet the Russians were storming back very effectively one year later.

Destruction of the enemy's armies  proved an elusive goal, although I daresay we can think of one or two examples.

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

Looming large in German minds (and French) was Sedan, though this did not bring about the end of the Franco-Prussian War. One doesn't need to cast around for other examples in respect of the thinking behind German war planning, though Cannae would also feature high on the list if one did. Cannae did not end the Punic Wars either.

Robert

[Phil_B]

I think the primary object of an initial (possibly preemptive) strike in any engagement would be to inflict maximum damage, morally and materially, upon the enemy and not to worry too much about the minutiae. The planning is/was done by military minds and shock and awe aren`t modern inventions! The theory seems to be that if you get the enemy sufficiently onto the back foot, he never recovers. But, the best laid plans.....

[truthergw]

The doctrine that the military goal in a war is the destruction of the enemy's forces is due to Clausewitz. The man who stated that war was the extension of policy by other means. Accepting his thesis meant that a country whose army had been left incapable of action was itself left with no means to impose or extend policy. That country would be forced to accede to the victor's demands. It is probably unnecessary to state that Clausewitz was a Prussian.