86 replies to this topic

[MichaelBully]

My view is that Britain would have sided with France and Russia in a conflict with Germany  regardless of the violation of Belgian neutrality. I am not saying that supporting Belgium when invaded by Germany was somehow  'wrong' .  And I am not going to justify Germany's invasion of Belgium, the destruction , the loss of civilian life, the looting, the taking of civilians to become forced labourers.

Neutrality was not an option for a country like Britain when such a major conflict was going on especially so geographically close. Whichever side won could feel strong enough to threaten British interests around the globe and take account of the fact that Britain had not sided with them.

Britain had to get on a war footing extremely quickly, and citing the invasion of Belgium was more likely  to mobilise the population swiftly.
Just thought, wasn't the first German violation of neutrality in 1914  the takeover of Luxembourg ?

[hazel clark]

You don't hear much about that do you?!!!
H.C.

MichaelBully, on 23 February 2012 - 08:01 PM, said:

My view is that Britain would have sided with France and Russia in a conflict with Germany  regardless of the violation of Belgian neutrality. I am not saying that supporting Belgium when invaded by Germany was somehow  'wrong' .  And I am not going to justify Germany's invasion of Belgium, the destruction , the loss of civilian life, the looting, the taking of civilians to become forced labourers.

Neutrality was not an option for a country like Britain when such a major conflict was going on especially so geographically close. Whichever side won could feel strong enough to threaten British interests around the globe and take account of the fact that Britain had not sided with them.

Britain had to get on a war footing extremely quickly, and citing the invasion of Belgium was more likely  to mobilise the population swiftly.
Just thought, wasn't the first German violation of neutrality in 1914  the takeover of Luxembourg ?

[MichaelBully]

Yes Hazel, would be curious to know if there were any treaty obligations to protect Luxembourg's neutrality in 1914. Michael Bully

hazel clark, on 23 February 2012 - 08:23 PM, said:

You don't hear much about that do you?!!!
H.C.

[truthergw]

I am being very foolish, answering a question off the top of my head. I think the move into Belgium was either at the same time or very soon after the move into Luxembourg. I am not sure if there was a treaty guaranteeing Luxembourg its sovereignty. I will have to check but I have a notion that Plan 17 included a French attack into the Duchy and there was no question of waiting for an invite. Like Michael and others, I believe that Britain was always going to go to war on the French side. We need to remember that a large part of the Liberal Party were anti-war and a large part of the Establishment were against ' foreign entanglement' . The very influential editor of the Manchester Guardian, C P Scott, back in the days when they still had a proofreader, remained steadfastly anti-war. Lloyd George himself did not decide which way to jump for 2 or 3 days. He had came to prominence by violently criticising the Boer War and kept himself in the public eye by strenuous efforts to reduce Naval and Military estimates in the decade before the war. Asquiith and Grey had to persuade the cabinet but the cabinet in turn had to convince the House and the voting public. Just as now, complex affairs, not all of which could be made public, were reduced to a headline in the party papers. Poor little Belgium. Hurry to join, you don't want to miss the fun.

[hazel clark]

I may be wrong, but my recollection is that the Germans were amassing their troops and munitions in Luxembourg for several days before marching into Belgium
H.C.

truthergw, on 23 February 2012 - 08:54 PM, said:

I am being very foolish, answering a question off the top of my head. I think the move into Belgium was either at the same time or very soon after the move into Luxembourg. I am not sure if there was a treaty guaranteeing Luxembourg its sovereignty. I will have to check but I have a notion that Plan 17 included a French attack into the Duchy and there was no question of waiting for an invite. Like Michael and others, I believe that Britain was always going to go to war on the French side. We need to remember that a large part of the Liberal Party were anti-war and a large part of the Establishment were against ' foreign entanglement' . The very influential editor of the Manchester Guardian, C P Scott, back in the days when they still had a proofreader, remained steadfastly anti-war. Lloyd George himself did not decide which way to jump for 2 or 3 days. He had came to prominence by violently criticising the Boer War and kept himself in the public eye by strenuous efforts to reduce Naval and Military estimates in the decade before the war. Asquiith and Grey had to persuade the cabinet but the cabinet in turn had to convince the House and the voting public. Just as now, complex affairs, not all of which could be made public, were reduced to a headline in the party papers. Poor little Belgium. Hurry to join, you don't want to miss the fun.

[salesie]

SWorrall, on 23 February 2012 - 07:32 PM, said:

Given that the Cabinet spent the week from July 24th trying every justification for not getting involved, when it finally became inevitable then they had to have a reason to present to the people. The Treaty was the very thing that they could point to. The honour of Britain was at stake, something not taken too lightly back then. But they had spent the preceding period debating not whether an invasion of Belgium was a casus belli, but how much of Belgium would they stand being invaded before it became so. Henry Wilson and  many other experts thought that the Germans would stay east of the Meuse-Sambre. The Belgian army forts would fire a few shots to satisfy their honour, then stand back and let the Germans through. In that case the Cabinet would not, on the evidence available, have made a declaration. They would have repudiated the Treaty and their guarantee, if the Belgians had not determined to fight and asked for assistance. Thus the Treaty was not the reason, since they tried hard to find ways to avoid getting involved, even if Belgium had been invaded.

However Grey was determined from July 24th that Britain would stand with France, no matter what. He had tried to win his Cabinet colleagues around with little success. Aversion to war was as powerful within the Liberal party then as more recently. He had certainly contemplated tendering his resignation at a number of points thereafter in despair at the intransigence of his colleagues. As July ended, at Asquith's behest Churchill opened a dialogue with the Tories through F. E. Smith, where he received assurances from the Bonar Law and the party leaders that they would support a British declaration. If Liberal ministers had stuck to their principles and quit Asquith would have led a Coalition. He had that knowledge in his pocket, and made sure that the Cabinet knew it too.
It is not my contention that Asquith / Grey went to war to preserve their party unity. Or that the Germans helped to do that. Indeed they might well have torn it apart, as Lloyd George was later to do. Even late in the crisis L G might well have resigned on a declaration. He spoke openly of retiring to Criccieth for a period. But at a dinner with MacDonald, Simon and others on August 2nd it was clear that he was looking for a way to remain in Cabinet. He and others put the interests of power ahead of principle. Which meant his finding a reason to agree with a declaration. As many as 7-8 ministers were thought ready to resign on a declaration. The fact that only 3 actually did so shows how many found a way to perform a 'reverse ferret' at the last minute. It was not their principles they acted upon, but rather their love of being part of the Cabinet and the Government.

L G was speaking on that occasion after Mons, le Cateau and the Marne, when the immediate threat of an early loss was receding, the Germans were retreating to 1st Aisne, and Kitchener's preparations for a long war were starting to look prudent, rather than over-anxious. Almost everyone expected a short war, the Germans entire plan was based on that central idea. The British military observers, who had seen the French manoeuvres, were quietly in despair over the ability of the French army.
As for it being a modern myth, contemporary records support the 'over by Christmas' idea. The controlling minds behind the British declaration, Grey and Asquith, certainly believed it would be short, although Grey privately feared that they might have misjudged that. The Cabinet sent the BEF, after a last minute decision, to ensure that if the French drove the Germans back to the Rhine in 1914, Britain would have an important seat at the peace conference. Only Kitchener thought differently. His plan was to let the French and Russians bleed themselves and the Germans white. Then land the New Armies in 1917, finish the job and dictate the peace to all of them.

A fine speech - any evidence?


Cheers-salesie.

[SWorrall]

truthergw, on 23 February 2012 - 08:54 PM, said:

I am being very foolish, answering a question off the top of my head. I think the move into Belgium was either at the same time or very soon after the move into Luxembourg. I am not sure if there was a treaty guaranteeing Luxembourg its sovereignty. I will have to check but I have a notion that Plan 17 included a French attack into the Duchy and there was no question of waiting for an invite. Like Michael and others, I believe that Britain was always going to go to war on the French side. We need to remember that a large part of the Liberal Party were anti-war and a large part of the Establishment were against ' foreign entanglement' . The very influential editor of the Manchester Guardian, C P Scott, back in the days when they still had a proofreader, remained steadfastly anti-war. Lloyd George himself did not decide which way to jump for 2 or 3 days. He had came to prominence by violently criticising the Boer War and kept himself in the public eye by strenuous efforts to reduce Naval and Military estimates in the decade before the war. Asquiith and Grey had to persuade the cabinet but the cabinet in turn had to convince the House and the voting public. Just as now, complex affairs, not all of which could be made public, were reduced to a headline in the party papers. Poor little Belgium. Hurry to join, you don't want to miss the fun.

News of the Luxembourg violation reached London on the 2nd August, during the Cabinet meeting at 18:30.
Belgium was invaded on the 4th.

The French were acutely aware of British sensibilities and did not enter Luxembourg.
They also held their forces 10 km inside their own border, so that everyone could be sure that Germany had invaded France and had not been provoked.

Simon.

[SWorrall]

salesie, on 23 February 2012 - 09:11 PM, said:

A fine speech - any evidence?

Cheers-salesie.

Happy to oblige;

Hinsley (ed.): British foreign policy under Sir Edward Grey : Cambridge 2008 (1st ed. 1977)
Strachan: The First World War: To Arms : Oxford 2001
Steiner & Neilson: Britain and the origins of the First World War : 2nd edition Palgrave Macmillan 2003
French: British economic and strategic planning : Allen & Unwin 1982
Ponting: Thirteen Days : Pimlico 2003
Wilson (ed.): The policy of the Entente : Cambridge 2009 (1st ed. 1985)
Evans & Pogge von Strandmann (eds.): The coming of the First World War : Clarendon 2001
Wilson (ed.): Decisions for war : Routledge 2006 (1st ed. 1995)
Fromkin: Europe's last summer : Vintage 2005
Williamson: The politics of grand strategy : Harvard Uni Press 1990 (1st ed 1969)
Howard: The continental commitment : Temple Smith 1972
Gooch: The plans of war : Routledge and Keegan Paul 1974
Stevenson: The First World War and international politics : Oxford 2001 (1st ed. 1988)
Stevenson: 1914 1918 The history of the First World War : Penguin 2005
Mulligan: The origins of the First World War : Cambridge 2010
Mombauer: The origins of the First World War - controversies and consensus : Longman 2002
Hamilton & Herwig: The origins of the First World War : Cambridge 2008
Joll: The origins of the First World War : Longman 2006 edition
Hamilton & Herwig: Decisions for war 1914-1917 abrigded : Cambridge 2004
Hamilton & Herwig: War planning 1914 : Cambridge 2009

and others like the C.P.Scott diaries, Fritz Fischer, Holger Herwig, Ian Beckett etc. for bits of background material.

Yes, I own them all. Yes, I've read them all recently, or the relevant parts of them.
My next piece of submitted work for my Masters degree is on the theme 'Why did Britain go to war in 1914'.
So I've been reading a lot about it recently.

Simon.

[truthergw]

Hi Simon. I agree that Joffre was instructed, much against his and his staff's inclination, to hold his forces 10Km back from the border posts but when he was given the go ahead, Plan 17 was set in motion. Joffre expected most of the German advance to be through Luxembourg and intended to strike back in the same area. This is not the place to get into a discussion of the French misreading of the German movements except to emphasise that the Germans were not expected to spill over from Luxembourg too deeply into Belgium.

[MichaelBully]

France was obviously aware of the growth of the German  navy. But not sure if France had many ships concentrated in the Channel ports or on the west coast. If that is the case, then were the French assuming that Britain would not tolerate a German fleet sailing through the Channel and/or bombarding the north and west coast of France if hostilities broke out-regardless of an invasion of Belgium ?
This is really speculation on my part, not claiming that I know the answer. Michael Bully

[SWorrall]

truthergw, on 23 February 2012 - 10:19 PM, said:

Hi Simon. I agree that Joffre was instructed, much against his and his staff's inclination, to hold his forces 10Km back from the border posts but when he was given the go ahead, Plan 17 was set in motion. Joffre expected most of the German advance to be through Luxembourg and intended to strike back in the same area. This is not the place to get into a discussion of the French misreading of the German movements except to emphasise that the Germans were not expected to spill over from Luxembourg too deeply into Belgium.

Absolutely Tom. Joffre wasn't happy, but accepted his political masters reasoning.

Simon.

[SWorrall]

MichaelBully, on 23 February 2012 - 10:21 PM, said:

France was obviously aware of the growth of the German  navy. But not sure if France had many ships concentrated in the Channel ports or on the west coast. If that is the case, then were the French assuming that Britain would not tolerate a German fleet sailing through the Channel and/or bombarding the north and west coast of France if hostilities broke out-regardless of an invasion of Belgium ?
This is really speculation on my part, not claiming that I know the answer. Michael Bully

The straight answer is Yes.

Britain settled a deal with Japan in 1902 which meant that the Japanese would assist in looking after British interests in the Pacific.
The same kind of deal was cut with the French in 1904 with regard to the Med.
That reduced the need for British warships in the far waters, meaning that they could be concentrated nearer to home.
The combination of the Atlantic Fleet based in Gibraltar with the Channel Fleet meant 75% of all British capital ships were able to face the Germans.

The 1912 Anglo-French naval agreement formalised the arrangement. France would be the largest Mediterranean navy, with a British flotilla beside it. The Royal Navy would, in turn, protect the northern coasts of France.
The British went to some lengths to point out to the French that this did not mean Britan would automatically declare war if France were threatened.

At the end of the July Crisis the French ambassador in London, Cambon, pointed out the naval agreement to the British Foreign Office and observed that France had denuded its Channel coasts of defences as a result.
Grey seized upon that and used it at Cabinet, without reminding his colleagues about the caveats that the British had given to the French in 1912. A deliberate error of omission.
It was during that Cabinet meeting on August 2nd that news broke of the invasion of Luxembourg.
LG hardened his heart and did an about face that evening. Most of the Liberal Radicals followed him. Grey gave a magnificent speech in the Commons on the following day which set the political mood.
The next day Germay invaded Belgium, and gave the British leadership the pretext / reason / excuse they needed for an ultimatum to Germany.

Simon.

[salesie]

SWorrall, on 23 February 2012 - 10:15 PM, said:

Happy to oblige;

Hinsley (ed.): British foreign policy under Sir Edward Grey : Cambridge 2008 (1st ed. 1977)
Strachan: The First World War: To Arms : Oxford 2001
Steiner & Neilson: Britain and the origins of the First World War : 2nd edition Palgrave Macmillan 2003
French: British economic and strategic planning : Allen & Unwin 1982
Ponting: Thirteen Days : Pimlico 2003
Wilson (ed.): The policy of the Entente : Cambridge 2009 (1st ed. 1985)
Evans & Pogge von Strandmann (eds.): The coming of the First World War : Clarendon 2001
Wilson (ed.): Decisions for war : Routledge 2006 (1st ed. 1995)
Fromkin: Europe's last summer : Vintage 2005
Williamson: The politics of grand strategy : Harvard Uni Press 1990 (1st ed 1969)
Howard: The continental commitment : Temple Smith 1972
Gooch: The plans of war : Routledge and Keegan Paul 1974
Stevenson: The First World War and international politics : Oxford 2001 (1st ed. 1988)
Stevenson: 1914 1918 The history of the First World War : Penguin 2005
Mulligan: The origins of the First World War : Cambridge 2010
Mombauer: The origins of the First World War - controversies and consensus : Longman 2002
Hamilton & Herwig: The origins of the First World War : Cambridge 2008
Joll: The origins of the First World War : Longman 2006 edition
Hamilton & Herwig: Decisions for war 1914-1917 abrigded : Cambridge 2004
Hamilton & Herwig: War planning 1914 : Cambridge 2009

and others like the C.P.Scott diaries, Fritz Fischer, Holger Herwig, Ian Beckett etc. for bits of background material.

Yes, I own them all. Yes, I've read them all recently, or the relevant parts of them.
My next piece of submitted work for my Masters degree is on the theme 'Why did Britain go to war in 1914'.
So I've been reading a lot about it recently.

Simon.

I ask you for a little evidence to back up your posts, posts that, in essence, have been nothing more than your own opinion, and you give me a bibliography? Perhaps, I should post a bibliography giving a counter view and see who offers the longest list?  

What I'm looking for from you is no great essay or thesis, I'm simply looking for some evidence to back up your opinion. For example:

1) The theory that almost everyone believed the war would be "Over by Christmas".

As I said earlier, this topic has been debated at least three times on this forum and no concrete evidence has been produced so far to back-up this commonly held belief. No copies of Newspaper cuttings of the time (when the war was the main topic filling newsprint), no poetry from the period (when a myriad of poems were written about the war), no official documents or private diary entries from politicians or civil servants etc. Nothing but a few anecdotal snippets have ever been produced to back-up this claim - on a forum like this, such a dearth of solid evidence seems to speak volumes about such claims.

Then there is the logic of the situation; were the vast majority of Britons back then, from all levels of society, so stupid they thought that an army could be raised and trained, then sent to France to beat the Hun and be back home in time to kiss their wives and sweethearts under the mistletoe?

I will ask you, what concrete evidence do you have that almost everyone believed in Aug/Sept/Oct 1914 that the war will be over by Christmas?

2) You tell us that the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary along with several cabinet ministers put their own interests before the country's by agreeing to a declaration of war instead of resigning en-masse. Which means, by definition, that you believe that the country's best interest was not to go to war in 1914 under any circumstances. Now that is a valid opinion to hold, but there are many who have the counter opinion that it was definitely not in the country's interest to allow German control of the continent.

What concrete evidence do you have to show that the men you criticise acted as you claim i.e. "...found a way to perform a 'reverse ferret' at the last minute. It was not their principles they acted upon, but rather their love of being part of the Cabinet and the Government."

I'm afraid, that simply foisting your own opinion (that not going to war was in Britain's best interest) on these men is out of order. Give us just a little concrete evidence to show that the men you slag-off as unprincipled ferrets didn't change their opinions about what was in Britain's best interest once German actions brought home, in no uncertain terms, the dire threat to this country's vital strategic interests. Give us some concrete evidence to show that events hadn't changed the opinions of these men?

Show us that your masters thesis is not based on modern mythology and “ee-aw brigade” propaganda.  



Cheers-salesie.

[SWorrall]

salesie, on 23 February 2012 - 11:15 PM, said:

You tell us that the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary along with several cabinet ministers put their own interests before the country's by agreeing to a declaration of war and not resigning en-masse. Which means, by definition, that you believe that the country's best interest was not to go to war in 1914 under any circumstances. Now that is a valid opinion to hold, but there are many who have the counter opinion that it was definitely not in the country's interest to allow German control of the continent.

I wonder if you actually read any of what I wrote?
You said "Which means, by definition, that you believe that the country's best interest was not to go to war in 1914 under any circumstances".
That's not a logical conclusion to draw. I cannot imagine how you got that conclusion. As it happens I believe that they did the right thing in facing down their own Party comrades and getting a declaration of war.
Niall Ferguson (The pity of War) was the one who argued that we'd have been better staying out, I don't subscribe to that idea.

Nor am I an admirer of the "modern mythology". Very, very far from it. The revisionists are far more appealing intellectually.

You've inverted another piece of it as well.
Grey and Asquith along with others, who believed that war was inevitable, put the country's interests ahead of their own and those of their party. Not vice versa. Morally it was a very brave thing to stand up to their friends. It could have resulted in the wreck of the Liberals, and under the LG Coalition in 1916 it did exactly that.

But up to August 2nd 1914 their party colleagues of the Liberal Radical persuasion, from Lloyd George downwards, were vehemently anti-war. At the series of cabinet meetings after the news of the Serbian Ultimatum from Austro-Hungary was heard they would not see any cause for Britain to declare war. For them it was unthinkable under any circumstances. Simon, and the others who quit, stuck to that principle. I disagree with their views, but admire moral courage wherever it can be found.

Asquith told Samuel, in the afternoon of August 2nd "I shall stick by Grey in any event". Which meant that Grey drove Government policy. And Grey was of the definite opinion that war was inevitable.

The remainder took a view best summarised in a letter that H. Samuel sent to his wife later that day:

"Had the matter come to an issue, Asquith would have stood by Grey in any event, and three others would have remained. I think all the rest of us would have resigned. The consequence would have been either a Coalition Government or a Unionist Government, either of which would certainly have been a war ministry".

J. A. Pease sent a note to Burns which said "for the majority of the Cabinet to now leave meant a ministry which was a war one and that was the last thing (Burns) wanted".

Pease to his wife "The P.M. is anxious that we should see this thing through as a party and says he wants as many of his colleagues to stay with himas he can get, so as not to go outside the Party". Here is revealed the implication that Asquith might form a Coalition if the Radicals deserted him.

Simon to C. Addison (a Liberal M.P.) "an important consideration with (Simon) was that ... if a block were to leave the Government at this juncture, their action would necessitate a Coalition Government which would assuredly be the grave of Liberalism"

The Liberals in Cabinet whose gut instincts had always been anti-war were complicit in allowing British involvement in that very war to come about purely in order to prevent a Coalition or a Unionist Government.
They may well have done the right thing, which is my opinion, but they did it for purely party political ends, to keep the Unionists out of power.

The best single chapter about the political turmoil leading to the maintenance of Liberal Government and the declaration of war is probably Ch.8 of 'The policy of the Entente'.

That's not my opinion. It's historical, documented fact. The references for sources about these quotes are all drawn from that chapter.
I'm not going to list them here, as you have an aversion to lists of sources. Go and buy or borrow a copy and check them out yourself.

Simon.

[salesie]

Well, Simon - your latest post could almost be described as a "reverse ferret" in and of itself when compared to your earlier ones, but I won't labour that particular point.

What interests me more is this "Over by Christmas" notion - this is what I referred to when saying "modern mythology" (it seems to be a self-perpetuating urban-myth that everyone accepts as "fact", and regularly repeat, despite the almost complete lack of evidence). Do you have any solid evidence at all to show that the vast majority of Britons believed this to be the case in the first few months of the war?


Cheers-salesie.

[skipman]

" No copies of Newspaper cuttings of the time (when the war was the main topic filling newsprint), "

Hi salesie. I managed to find (only 2 references to 'War over by Christmas) in PapersPast

WAR OVER BY CHRISTMAS.

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume XLI, Issue 13494, 24 September 1914, Page 4

The State Governor of West Australia (Sir Harry Barron), speaking about the war said that though he was not a betting man, he would like to bet that the war would be over by Christmas. He might be entirely wrong but he had seen a great deal of the world, and he read the newspapers. He was absolutely certain, as he had been all through, that we should come out on top.

Also Click (1917)

Mike

Edit 6:49 AM Another interesting one from Lord Curzon

[truthergw]

MichaelBully, on 23 February 2012 - 10:21 PM, said:

France was obviously aware of the growth of the German  navy. But not sure if France had many ships concentrated in the Channel ports or on the west coast. If that is the case, then were the French assuming that Britain would not tolerate a German fleet sailing through the Channel and/or bombarding the north and west coast of France if hostilities broke out-regardless of an invasion of Belgium ?
This is really speculation on my part, not claiming that I know the answer. Michael Bully

The conversations which arranged for the BEF moving to France also involved naval staff. Their agreement left the French navy to look after West. Med, protecting troop movements from North Africa and the Royal Navy to take care of North Sea and the Channel.

[SWorrall]

salesie, on 24 February 2012 - 06:36 AM, said:

Well, Simon - your latest post could almost be described as a "reverse ferret" in and of itself when compared to your earlier ones, but I won't labour that particular point.

What interests me more is this "Over by Christmas" notion - this is what I referred to when saying "modern mythology" (it seems to be a self-perpetuating urban-myth that everyone accepts as "fact", and regularly repeat, despite the almost complete lack of evidence). Do you have any solid evidence at all to show that the vast majority of Britons believed this to be the case in the first few months of the war?

Cheers-salesie.

My posts are entirely consistent.
Stuart said, in post #3 "I'm not sure that they thought the war would be over quickly", meaning the politicians who decided upon entering the war. Not the populace generally.

I replied in post #17 "The politicians certainly expected a short, sharp war". I did not say anywhere 'Over by Christmas'.

We've established the leading role played by Grey, in persuading the Cabinet and Parliament that Britain had to go to war. Grey later went on record as saying that "I believedthat the war would be over before a million men could be trained and equipped". This Foreign Secretary did not assign any definite expectation to the duration of the war, but he did not expect a long one.

Professor Sir Michael Howard explains, in Evans & von Strandmann, how most politicians and senior military men (and not just in the UK) believed in the 'Short War' hypothesis, not in terms of 'Over by Christmas' but of the order of months rather than years. Schlieffen, for example, wrote in 1909 that a protracted war of attrition was impossible because the scale of expenditure required for an army of millions was not possible to sustain for more than a few months. Despite the published views of the civilian Bloch, that any future war would be a war of attrition, the professional military men could not agree with him. (How could they agree? What he was saying was that the next war would beone which rendered all of their training about a war of movement invalid)And the politicians deferred to the beliefs of the generals.



You said "What interests me more is this "Over by Christmas" notion …. Do you have any solid evidence at all to show that the vast majority of Britons believed this to be the case in the first few months of the war?"

Firstly: I never mentioned anything about 'Over by Christmas'. Secondly; Nor did I mention anything about "the vast majority of Britons". You did!  So I have nothing to answer on that count. Do not put words in my mouth and then use that to start making wild assertions.

My responses were strictly limited to the attitudes of the tiny number of men who decided that Britain and the Empire must declare war in support of France. Essentially Grey, supported by four other members of Cabinet, with the reluctant acquiescence of the remainder.

Simon.

[truthergw]

salesie, on 24 February 2012 - 06:36 AM, said:

Well, Simon - your latest post could almost be described as a "reverse ferret" in and of itself when compared to your earlier ones, but I won't labour that particular point.

What interests me more is this "Over by Christmas" notion - this is what I referred to when saying "modern mythology" (it seems to be a self-perpetuating urban-myth that everyone accepts as "fact", and regularly repeat, despite the almost complete lack of evidence). Do you have any solid evidence at all to show that the vast majority of Britons believed this to be the case in the first few months of the war?


Cheers-salesie.

Robert Doughty is adamant that the French believed that the war would be short. Have a read in his Pyrrhic Victory. There are plenty of indications that many people in all the countries concerned, thought the same way. There is also evidence that that view was not held unanimously. Once the war had gone a year, the home by christmas guys were busy covering their tracks and talking of the need to buckle down for the long haul. The same people who by 1917 were planning for a great push in 1919. None of them were anxious to raise monuments to that either. I could list a few other authors but I notice that you reject a list of authors of relevant works as evidence for a point of view. Considering that our subject is historical, might I ask when a book or a reference from a book ceased to be acceptable?

[truthergw]

While reading Robert Doughty's " Pyrrhic Victory" to get a date for the entry of the Germans into Belgium, I was struck by his mention that the French government had twice refused Joffre permission to plan for a move into Belgium before the Germans had done so. One of the reasons given was the effect on Britain which we have mentioned but another was the fear that the Belgians might react by joining with the Germans. There had been some hope on the German side that Belgium would stand aside and allow the Germans free passage. How strong was the pro German faction in Belgium at the start of the war?

[SWorrall]

truthergw, on 24 February 2012 - 11:32 AM, said:

While reading Robert Doughty's " Pyrrhic Victory" to get a date for the entry of the Germans into Belgium, I was struck by his mention that the French government had twice refused Joffre permission to plan for a move into Belgium before the Germans had done so. One of the reasons given was the effect on Britain which we have mentioned but another was the fear that the Belgians might react by joining with the Germans. There had been some hope on the German side that Belgium would stand aside and allow the Germans free passage. How strong was the pro German faction in Belgium at the start of the war?

Jean Stengers records, in Wilson (ed.) 'Decisions for war';
that the Belgian diplomatic and political circles were decidely pro-German.
that the press were vehemently anti-British
the political director of the Foreign Minstry recommended, in the event of the Germans not breaching the Meuse/Sambre line that the rest of Belgium should stay neutral

The French ambassador in Brussels, Klobukowski, was convinced on the night of August 2nd / 3rd that the Belgian response to the German demands would be to yield to them.

Simon.

[salesie]

SWorrall, on 24 February 2012 - 11:10 AM, said:

I did not say anywhere 'Over by Christmas'.

Firstly: I never mentioned anything about 'Over by Christmas'. My responses were strictly limited to the attitudes of the tiny number of men who decided that Britain and the Empire must declare war in support of France. Essentially Grey, supported by four other members of Cabinet, with the reluctant acquiescence of the remainder.

Simon.

Sorry, Simon, my mistake - when you said in post #25, "As for it being a modern myth, contemporary records support the 'over by Christmas' idea." I thought that you meant it. I thought that you were able to point us in the direction of the "contemporary records" you referred to; obviously not.


Cheers-salesie.

[SWorrall]

salesie, on 24 February 2012 - 12:37 PM, said:

Sorry, Simon, my mistake - when you said in post #25, "As for it being a modern myth, contemporary records support the 'over by Christmas' idea." I thought that you meant it. I thought that you were able to point us in the direction of the "contemporary records" you referred to; obviously not.

Cheers-salesie.

I enclosed the words in quotes, which indicates to a reader that you should not read them literally, but as a thematic concept. Which you promptly chose to take literally anyway, for reasons best known to yourself?

You also expanded the list of candidates to include "the vast majority of Britons", which was your own decision, not mine. I have no idea where that came from, perhaps you can explain?

I've explained whom I was referring to, the men who took the decision for war, and demonstrated the belief that they had in a short war, however of non-specific duration.
I have given you contemporary quotations from the key participants, some references, some sources and a list of publications where you can find these ideas cited.
If that's not good enough for you, then what would be? I'm not going to produce a long list of academic references and citations, because you've already said that you don't accept them.
Tom has already posed the question as to why you deem a substantial list of relevant academic sources to be unacceptable as evidence. I note that you have not answered him.

My participation with you on this thread is at an end. Have the last word if you must.

Simon.

[cdr]

Progerman attitudes in Belgium are an interesting topic.

just some points :

the Belgian gouvernement, the diplomatic corps and a large part of the press (the catholic pro governement press) were favourably to Germany (largest tradepartner and in control of the port of Antwerp. The more Liberal parts of the press, a large part of the officers corps were pro french (altough some generals including a fieldcommander during the war were in favour of an alliance with Germany). The general consensus was that either France or Germany would invade (with France as a bit more likely). Interesting herefore is the position of the Belgian divisions (fieldarmy) on 31/07/14, 2 divisions were directed towards France, 1 towards Germany and 1 to the coast (against an English landing. Even at the Crown Council which gave the answer to the German ultimatum voices (Woeste , the head of the large catholic party and Baron Greindl former ambassdor to Berlin) were heard against resistance. (one of the participants (Greindl) even thought the council was called in response to an English invasion).


There was a large amount of distrust of British intentions (this is related to Belgian control over the Congo which was only formally recognised by Great Britain in 1913) French and German views on Belgian military capacities were pretty similar

Hope this is  of some use



Carl

[MichaelBully]

That's great Simon, thank you. So Is your understanding that Britain was effectively stating that, if war came between France and Germany, Britain would not accept the German navy bombarding the north and west coasts of France?  By 'protecting the north coast of France',  would that also extend to preventing the German navy blockading French ports.?
Regards, Michael Bully  

SWorrall, on 23 February 2012 - 11:02 PM, said:

The straight answer is Yes.

Britain settled a deal with Japan in 1902 which meant that the Japanese would assist in looking after British interests in the Pacific.
The same kind of deal was cut with the French in 1904 with regard to the Med.
That reduced the need for British warships in the far waters, meaning that they could be concentrated nearer to home.
The combination of the Atlantic Fleet based in Gibraltar with the Channel Fleet meant 75% of all British capital ships were able to face the Germans.

The 1912 Anglo-French naval agreement formalised the arrangement. France would be the largest Mediterranean navy, with a British flotilla beside it. The Royal Navy would, in turn, protect the northern coasts of France.
The British went to some lengths to point out to the French that this did not mean Britan would automatically declare war if France were threatened.

At the end of the July Crisis the French ambassador in London, Cambon, pointed out the naval agreement to the British Foreign Office and observed that France had denuded its Channel coasts of defences as a result.
Grey seized upon that and used it at Cabinet, without reminding his colleagues about the caveats that the British had given to the French in 1912. A deliberate error of omission.
It was during that Cabinet meeting on August 2nd that news broke of the invasion of Luxembourg.
LG hardened his heart and did an about face that evening. Most of the Liberal Radicals followed him. Grey gave a magnificent speech in the Commons on the following day which set the political mood.
The next day Germay invaded Belgium, and gave the British leadership the pretext / reason / excuse they needed for an ultimatum to Germany.

Simon.