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Lieutenant General Sir Richard Haking is surely one the most reviled British Generals of the Great War. This stems from the fact that he presided over several of the war's most bitter actions, in which tens of thousands of British and Commonwealth soldiers were killed or wounded, with little apparent point and precious little gain. The nightmare that was the attack at Aubers on 9 May 1915; the near destruction of the 21st and 24th Divisions, rushed too late into the Battle of Loos on 25/26 September 1915; the slaughter of the Royal Sussex battalions at the Boar's Head at Richebourg on 30 June 1916; and perhaps most disastrously for Haking's reputation, the appalling show that was Fromelles on 19/20 July 1916. To make matters worse, Haking blamed his troops for these failures on several occasions. A title page in this work gives a quote from Lieutenant General Sir Richard Haking: "All I care about is doing my duty". Little wonder that he has been described by many in negative terms: he is seen as the very model of the blundering, uncaring chateau General.
Michael Senior's work is the first to examine the life and work of Haking, and draws upon a wide range of contemporary material. The research and writing is of the thoroughness and quality one would expect from an author whose PhD was a study of Haking's command, XI Corps. There appears to be relatively little evidence of Haking's childhood and youth, and the story really picks up from his entry to Sandhurst in 1880.
Much of this work examines Haking through context rather than direct evidence of the man himself. The reasons for, conduct and effect of the operations in which Haking played a significant part are examined in detail. As such we gain a good impression of what he did or did not do, but little of the soul of the man. The relatively few insights into his personality and interaction with others hint of a rather unappealing character. Haking's career hinged to some extent on patronage by Sir Douglas Haig, first as a Corps, then as Army commander, then as Commander-in-Chief. Haking was one of those "thrusting" types that Haig liked and supported: positive, offensively-minded, out to win. To some extent it was these very characteristics that caused so much trouble in the battles mentioned above, for Haking's positive outlook spilled over into over-optimism, over-stretch and a dismissive attitude to those he saw as having failed. Yet he continued to be highly regarded by the War Office and the army, and was given some "plum" appointments after the war.
Senior's summary is that revulsion of Haking has been overdone, and that credit should be given where it is due. It is a balanced and objective summary, pulling no punches when it comes to Haking's failures but also highlighting his successes. The context shows that without doubt, his influence over matters (notably as a Corps commander) was limited; he did not choose to launch the 1915-16 offensives. His Corps HQ was at times little more than a means of transmitting the wishes of GHQ and Army command down to the Divisions. On the one occasion when he did have to do something truly important he did it well and no doubt saved men's lives in doing so. This was on 9 April 1918, when his swift recognition that a German bombardment signalled an imminent attack and he ordered his reserves early into position.
This is a book well worth reading for its scholarship and insight into how the army worked. Personally while I agree with the author that things are not black and white and there are aspects of Haking's work that were positive and that should be recognised as such, the blood-soaked ground of Aubers, Fromelles and Richebourg brings me back. Had for example Plumer been at XI Corps for these actions, would they have been as ill conceived, ill planned and ill executed? Even with the benefit of Michael Senior's excellent work on Haking, I doubt it.
Remembered Today:
