66 replies to this topic

[Will I Davies]

truthergw, on 13 April 2012 - 07:08 PM, said:

Not so, i'm afraid. Units were transferred to and fro on a schedule decided by GHQ . Commanders were allocated tasks and required to undertake them with the resources at hand. Particularly in crucial times, commanders did as best they could. I believe that if it were possible to order the different regiments in some sort of hierarchy, it would have been done long ago.
When the Germans wished to train stosstroopers, they transferred individuals from all parts of the infantry and gave them special training. This was contrasted with the British practice of improving the level of performance across the board. That implies to me that there were no superior units and the British took pains to keep it that way. It is also given as a reason for the failure of the Germans in 1918, their best and bravest individuals  were killed and captured, ours were scattered evenly through the armies. We did not have an elite but our average was higher than theirs.

From here begs the question, if the British army was to be balanced, then transferring by number which battalions where, would not be very astute generalship!! They must have known if a certain sector needed stiffening up, or conversly allowing weaker battalions to make up the numbers in a strongly defended sector.

Regards
Will

[chrissparrow]

I have to apologise at my baiting, but I did wonder if the kilts would be the first to take the worm!

Quite seriously though I do think it is worth considering the German perspective. We cannot be impartial and the question cannot be answered statistically. Therefore why not look at the less impartial view from the other side?

Chris

[dundeesown]

I stand corrected Chris  The Cameron Highlanders did slip my mind    Now the other Chris,no baiting necessary sir,the Kilts are always over the top first.
Gary

[IPT]

I wonder if some battalions/regiments were considered more expendable than others?

[truthergw]

Will I Davies, on 13 April 2012 - 08:58 PM, said:

From here begs the question, if the British army was to be balanced, then transferring by number which battalions where, would not be very astute generalship!! They must have known if a certain sector needed stiffening up, or conversly allowing weaker battalions to make up the numbers in a strongly defended sector.

Regards
Will

You are assuming that the general staff shared your belief that certain units were measurably ' better ' than others. Would that be better at defence, attack, trench raids, elastic defence, combined ops etc. etc. Units were moved according to whether they were rested, trained, up to strength. Armies were brought up to a required strength for the task planned. So many men to the yard. So many guns and crews, so many reserves for the calculated casualties. Fairly simple calculations and no need to take into account such intangibles as how good they were. Every unit was expected to be up to the accepted standard. If a unit failed, it was sent back for training and offcers left in no doubt as to what they needed to do.

[truthergw]

IPT, on 13 April 2012 - 09:23 PM, said:

I wonder if some battalions/regiments were considered more expendable than others?

Have you any evidence that that horrendous suggestion might be true? The nearest we get to that was the idea early in the war, notably Loos, that a division which had not seen action might be less sticky than one that had spent months in the trenches and been involved in the Early Battles. That was a notion that, according to some authors, was voiced by a very few unidentified officers but it is not heard of after the Somme as far as I am aware. I believe it reflected outmoded views of the sort of low level commanders brought back from retirement ( dugouts) and who never got to grips with modern warfare using large armies.The men who largely disappeared after Haig became CiC.

[truthergw]

4thGordons, on 13 April 2012 - 08:52 PM, said:

Ignoring Gary's obviously incorrect answer (ask Churchill who it was... you need to move North and East a bit!)
EDIT:...
What was the IWM's aim? (I am not familiar with that project although perhaps should be)
Chris

Ah, the Seaforths. My Granda's regiment. The project is mentioned in " British Fighting Methods in the Great War", Paddy Griffiths. According to a discussion on FB just a couple of weeks ago, it ran out of steam. Chris Baker or Pete Hart will know more.

[Blackblue]

The division rating thing has been done in depth here before a couple of times. I seem to recall it always became pretty heated and the only consensus reached was that it was an impossible task to properly rate Divisions again one another given the differences in the experiences of each.

I know its stated above that the best divisions were often entrusted with key roles after successes (Canadian and Australian through late 1917/1918 for example), but who is to say that another comparative Division in terms of experience would not have performed equally well in the same circumstances when given the same opportunities?

Rgds

Tim D

[hazel clark]

Holy bananas!  Is this just out of interest, or  is it part of a masters thesis?  I would have thought "effectiveness" very difficult to quantify because there are so many criteria to consider including the quality of the opposing troups.

Hazel C.

Will I Davies, on 13 April 2012 - 02:32 PM, said:

Hi Charles,

I was thinking of infantry battalions (and attached units) as the body under scrutiny. I take on board what you say about performance was affected by the larger army bodies they were attached too. However if we try and analyse performance in a standardised format we might be able to achieve the individuals units performance compared with other units.  

If each member fills in a standard template evaluation form ( something along the lines of the attached-This was a first attempt and any suggestions on improving it would be most welcome) on their preferred unit then we can at least have a level playing field to work with. Duplications of units can also be accomodated and averaged to give a more rounded rating and these can then be statistically analysed to find out a little bit more about each units performance over time in the field.

I think the commanders must have known which units they preferred to use in crucial times to give the best possible chance of success. Lets see if we can actually see if this was true.

Regards
Will

[PMHart]

Well I think there is only one real answer: GHQ!

Pete

[nigelfe]

WW1 was a 'combined arms' war.  The French, of course too the view 'artillery conquers, infantry occuppies' although this is probably a little too simplistic it is not without a strong element of truth.  The fact is victory went to the side that developed the most effective artillery arm integrated in the combined arms battle.  One of the German weaknesses was a misapplication of their principle of 'unity of command' in that they gave their artillery a divisional focus.  Brtish forces were a lot more flexible than this.  Hence even comparing divisions is not a well grounded approach, comparing infantry battalions is meaningless.

The ground attack efforts of the RFC/RAF (mostly the latter) from 1917ish onwards were in general ineffective (dropping handfuls of 20lb bombs with less accuracy that artillery was delivering thousands of 100lb ones) and a bit of machingunning contributed next to nothing once the shock and novelty wore off - even the horses soon got used to low flying aircraft.  Tanks also had a novelty value but their low reliability meant that few actually got to the stage of shooting at Germans.

In 1918 the Canadians and Australians had the good fortune to be out of the way of the two German offensives against the BEF.  They and the British corps that had been similarly fortunate took the lead in the counter-offensive that led to victory.

[hazel clark]

Gordons or Seaforths?  The shrapnel can be felt across the Atlantic when such things are mentioned.
H.C.

4thGordons, on 13 April 2012 - 08:52 PM, said:

Ignoring Gary's obviously incorrect answer (ask Churchill who it was... you need to move North and East a bit!)

Wouldn't the measures you have applied so far mean you could only be successful in offensives? (Implied by Andy's comment above)
How about small units stopping attacking units cold against overwhelming odds? holding cucial positions at crucial times? etc

Things are presumably also going to be complicated by the evolution of tactics (so "bite and hold" is unlikely to rack up yardage gained at the battalion level as limited objectives/acheivable were set whereas previously more grandiose aims were specified - and not acheived)

I would also wonder what the purpose of such rank ordering of "effectiveness" might be? Is there a broader research interest in this or is it a general pondering?
What was the IWM's aim? (I am not familiar with that project although perhaps should be)
Chris

[Will I Davies]

Hi All,

I still believe that by using statistics applied on ratings (1 to 5) will give a rough and ready overall appraisal of each individual infantry battalions during WW1. What is needed is a comprehensive list of the major factors that may affect performance, then apply to each the grades. Then If each effective battalion is appraised at least 3 times by separate members and results averaged to give a mean value then we can apply statistical plots to these results. Then we can use the data to see if we can see any trends in the units concerned and maybe learn something more than the original scope of the survey. Obviously this will not be perfect, but it will show something and may possibly even dispel or agree with historical myths of the best British UK unit in WW1.

I hear people saying this will not work, however in WW2 statistical studies of the Bomber command squadron performances between 1939-1945 with the multitude of factors affecting such operations has been done and will continue to be done and does show many overall things not initially apparent from studying individual units.  

Regards
Will

[Steven Broomfield]

I'm always unconvinced about these things: makes me think of an England XI to face Mars (is Larwood better than Trueman? Would you have Hobbs and Sutcliffe or Trescothick and Strauss to open?). Although I see the effort to impart some objectivity into the process (though spelling theatre "theater" puts me off), I fear there will always be vested interests at work.

Additionally, what about changes of formation? if the 1st Loamshires transferred from the 100th Division to the 101st, what effect did that have? Change of formation commander, too, will have an effect.

Anyway, if I had to identify my "most successful" battalions, I'd vote for the following:

2nd King's
2nd Somerset Light Infantry
1st  Yorkshire Regiment
1st Duke's
1st Royal Sussex
1st South Lancs
2nd North Staffs
1st DLI

all of whom achieved every objective set, with minimal casualties.

[John Hartley]

Steven Broomfield, on 14 April 2012 - 08:46 AM, said:

Anyway, if I had to identify my "most successful" battalions, I'd vote for

On the other hand, my two battalions of special interest:

17th Manchester - 1 successful attack (Montauban); 1 partial (3rd Ypres); 4 failures (Trones Wood, Guillemont, Flers, Arras); 2 arguably reasonably OK defences (St Quentin & Lys)


6th Manchester - 1 successful attack, but then obliged to withdraw (3rd Krithia); 1 failure (Vineyard).

Now how much you would ascribe success or failure to the Battalion or to other issues is the exact problem with this sort of comparison exercise. And why, frankly, it is a pointless one in any sensible discussion about the war.

[bootneck]

Just my own opinion; but looking at the effectiveness of the various divisions over time is probably a better indicator than trying to rank that of the various regiments and their various battalions. For instance, how would you compare the various regiments over the war whose battalions might perform variably over different theatres?

Having read the WFA article mentioned earlier I see that even just looking at divisions the SMHL project appears to have collapsed under the sheer weight of data. Can anybody give any examples of any books or articles published using material gathered by this project? I am assuming that Peter Simkin's article on British Divisions during the 100 days in the Paddy Giffith's book mentioned earlier is an example.

If you were trying to rate the effectiveness of particular regiments and their various battalions, would you not also have to factor in individual unit's morale and disciplinary records?

Bootneck

[Steven Broomfield]

And I think cavalry should be included, too, so I'd vote for the 21st Lancers. Never put a hoof wrong.

[bill24chev]

I cant see how you can realy decide which battalion is/was best or better than another.

its already been mentioned that "the Worst" Bn could be more effective than the "best" if their support from the gunners was bette.

Another factor is the effectivness of the enemy in any specific battle.

there is also the factor of casualties/replacements from previous battles and if the Bn. had spent more or less time in the trenches.

The Canadian and ANZAC troops had a formidable reputation but they generally spent less time in the line suffering the dy to day sttrition of the trenches.

The effectivness of a unit could change over time, forb example the Bns of the 55th Division were over run quite easily in the German counter attack at CAmbrai but a few months later on the Lys could not be moved.

[truthergw]

nigelfe, on 14 April 2012 - 02:37 AM, said:

WW1 was a 'combined arms' war.  The French, of course too the view 'artillery conquers, infantry occuppies' although this is probably a little too simplistic it is not without a strong element of truth.  The fact is victory went to the side that developed the most effective artillery arm integrated in the combined arms battle.  One of the German weaknesses was a misapplication of their principle of 'unity of command' in that they gave their artillery a divisional focus.  Brtish forces were a lot more flexible than this.  Hence even comparing divisions is not a well grounded approach, comparing infantry battalions is meaningless.

The ground attack efforts of the RFC/RAF (mostly the latter) from 1917ish onwards were in general ineffective (dropping handfuls of 20lb bombs with less accuracy that artillery was delivering thousands of 100lb ones) and a bit of machingunning contributed next to nothing once the shock and novelty wore off - even the horses soon got used to low flying aircraft.  Tanks also had a novelty value but their low reliability meant that few actually got to the stage of shooting at Germans.

In 1918 the Canadians and Australians had the good fortune to be out of the way of the two German offensives against the BEF.  They and the British corps that had been similarly fortunate took the lead in the counter-offensive that led to victory.

You do not believe then that a low flying aircraft beating up a column or a trench would have been a bloody scary thing? I reckon clean trousers would have been in short supply.

[Charles Fair]

bootneck, on 14 April 2012 - 10:42 AM, said:

Having read the WFA article mentioned earlier I see that even just looking at divisions the SMHL project appears to have collapsed under the sheer weight of data. Can anybody give any examples of any books or articles published using material gathered by this project? I am assuming that Peter Simkin's article on British Divisions during the 100 days in the Paddy Griffith's book mentioned earlier is an example.

If you were trying to rate the effectiveness of particular regiments and their various battalions, would you not also have to factor in individual unit's morale and disciplinary records?

I was involved with SHLM and collected data for a small number of actions involving the 23rd and 39th Divisions. This was back in the early 1990s before the internet had really taken off and before the amount of data that we have today in digital format was around.  It would have been much easier with the OH on CD-Rom.

The problem is that there are a huge number of variables that can influence the outcome of an action, as well as several measures of the outcome itself, so there is a lot of data that needs to be collected. For SHLM we had a two forms - one each for attack and defence.  The attack form ran to 7 pages and over 100 variables measuring both inputs and outcomes.  The approach was based on the Operational Analysis approach used by Colonel Trevor Dupuy, albeit simplified with fewer variables.  See here for more: The Dupuy Institute.  For the analysis I did of 23rd Div at Contalmaison on 10 July 1916 I went through the divisional fireplan and calculated how many 18 pdr and 4.5" howitzer shells would have been fired (as per the plan - though in reality it might have been more or less) in order to assess the weight of fire per yard of trench.

The intention would have have been to collect the data - for every divisional action carried out by the BEF on the Western Front - and run some statistical analysis (i.e. multiple regressions, Structured Equation Modelling) to see which inputs were most important, and the relationships between the inputs and the outcomes.  [Sorry... I do a lot of stats in my day job.] Given enough data of good quality, we would have been able to generate some good models.  Bryn Hammond is on the GWF so hopefully can chip in.

Gary Sheffield's book on the Somme used some of the findings from SHLM.  Peter Simkins has written some papers on the BEF in the 100 days using the data.  A chap called George Karger did an MA paper at King's having done the SHLM data collection for the 47th Division, but I don't think it has been published.

Assessing battalion performance is harder, simply because so much of a battalion's performance would be determined by the parent formation.  For example, artillery, machine guns, trench mortars were brigade or divisional assets, yet could have a huge impact on how an individual battalion performed in action.  Divisional performance itself could vary for a given division during the course of the war.

In my opinion, the only sensible approach to assessing the performance of individual battalions would be first to get an assessment at the divisional level (i.e. as per SHLM).  Once one has that, one can then collect battalion level data.  One needs to be able to control for formation effectiveness so as to be able to get to a fair assessment of a good battalion in a poor division, or vice versa.

It could be done, but it won't be easy and it won't be quick.

Charles

[nigelfe]

truthergw, on 14 April 2012 - 07:00 PM, said:

You do not believe then that a low flying aircraft beating up a column or a trench would have been a bloody scary thing? I reckon clean trousers would have been in short supply.

To inexperienced troops, possibly, to the rest no.  One aircraft chugging along at a few dozen mph (slower than some game birds) with one or two MGs. Not really an effective weapon system in anybody's language.  It had been thought that low flying aircraft would cause mass panic among horses, in the event it didn't.  Airpower has been persistently overrated.

[nigelfe]

If you want to gauge inf bns then the place to do it is when they are in the line.  I've always said you can gauge a unit by its sentries, being a sentry is the most responsible job ever given to a private soldier because he has to act on his own judgement without an NCO telling him what to do.  Good sentries reflect a well trained and well led unit.  Such units would probably be avoided by German patrols which gives a measure.  Well trained and well led units maintain their cohesion, which reflects strong morale and in the end this is what wins or loses wars.  This is the very good reason why UK places 'maintenance of morale' as the pre-eminent principle of war as enumerated by JFC Fuller in the early 1920s in his revision of Field Service Regulations.  Forget Dupuy, mathamatactics is irrelevant.

[Lachlan]

Well, working on the premise that there are "lies, damned lies and statistics", I would tend to agree with the poster above who considers it was a case of what the Germans thought as being most valid, after all, Fritz was on the receiving end.

I would also tend to believe that it would be gauged more on divisional lines than individual battalions.

I've seen reference to the Germans' "Most Feared List", distributed among HQ's to give a heads-up on who to be most wary of in the trenches opposite or known to be in the sector. . I've not read it but would love to see a transcription of it.

I understand the Canadians and ANZACS are high on it, as are the 51st Highland Division and the 18th Eastern is high up too. Just looking at the hard graft of the 9th Scottish who also had an excellent reputation (but I don't know if they were on the list), they did at least as much as the 51st during the war, if not more, yet in Scotland they are entirely forgotten.

Probably because they were disbanded after WW1 whilst the 51st entered into folk-legend, raised further by their exploits in WW2, whilst the 9th was a second-line division, to be picked clean for the new 51st in 1940.

[Chris_Baker]

I would have thought that the enemy would have most feared the Royal Artillery.

[Will I Davies]

Chris_Baker, on 15 April 2012 - 07:20 AM, said:

I would have thought that the enemy would have most feared the Royal Artillery.

Nice one Chris,

Let me go back to basics and say this, Chris has a made very true statement in a way, because in static trench warfare conditions artillery is the biggest enemy to all. In this case the best and the worst Bttns would suffer according to their geographical location and the enemies artillery deployment. Discipline and cohesion under shell fire then becomes paramount.

This leaves us to analyse the occasions when attack and defence took the fore where the units themselves had a small impact on events. (moden warfare quote, bombing does not win wars). I know statiistics are hated by a few, but mostly in real life they are used well to evaluate perfomances of combatants and nobody bats an eyelid. Football, rugby, cricket and the list goes on. Why can't we apply retrospectively impartial sensibly rated factors to each Bttns performances be it good, bad or indifferent in the British army during WW1. A list of all factors involved would be critical in this before any stats are applied. You can even throw in the commanders and brigades or divisions fought under too.

Thanks
Will