So as a starter I have transcribed the report on the action by the Imperial Mounted Division included in its war diary. I should think that GOC 5th Div had an interview without coffee with the Major General.
Report on Operations of the Imperial Mounted Division 25th 26th 27th March 1917
Appendix 33
The Division concentrated on the NW of DEIR EL BELAH about 1930 on the night of 25th / 26th March.
Orders for the following days’ operation were issued by representatives of units at 2000. The Division bivouaced on the NW of DEIR EL BELAH and left the bivouac at 0300 via western outskirts of DEIR EL BELAH
Owing to the late arrival of the Division it was impossible to reconnoitre this route by daylight and some difficulty was experienced in getting clear of the cultivated enclosure in the vicinity of the village
The Division passed across the WADI GHUZZEE in rear of the A.&N.Z. Division and on reaching EL MENDUR about 0930 it passed though the main body of the I.C.C. Brigade.
From EL MENDUR the following disposition were ordered.
Four officers’ patrols were sent out as follows:
A. To
- reconnoitre the Turkish line about K. EL BAHA and if found unoccupied to work up as close to ABU MAREIRA and above it form the South. The patrol to remain in observation and return to Div. H.Q. by 1600 hrs
- B. To tour the KHURBET EL BAHA trench line from the North and to get as near as TEL ESH SHERIA as possible to observe the roads leading North and West from that place. To return to Div. H.Q. and report at 1600.
- C. A patrol to the railway about KH ZUHEILKA to observe any railway movements and destroying any telephone or telegraph lines he might come across. To report to Div. H.Q. at 1600.
- D. An officers
The first three patrols were all hung up by mounted troops supported by small bodies of infantry. The fourth patrol did excellent work and was in close touch with the enemy columns leaving HUJ from 13.10, 'til he withdrew behind the 6th Brigade in action at 1600.
After crossing the head of the WADI EL MENDUR, two squadrons of the 5th Mounted Brigade pushed out towards KHURBET EL BAHA, astride the GAZA – SABA road, and on squadron pushed up toward HUJ to gain contact with the right of the A & NZ Division. This regiment was in action with enemy mounted troops supported by small bodies of infantry throughout the day.
A successful little mounted action was carried out during the morning when one troop galloped a small Turkish post and captured 67 prisoners without loss. Of the 45 were unarmed.
G.O.C. 5th Mounted Brigade at 11.00 considered infantry before him were becoming more active, so bought his guns into action against the infantry on the KH EL JHINAY ridge. The infantry at this time showed no intention of advancing further. On the guns opening fire a large calibre gun firing at long range opened an accurate fire on the guns and led horses. The battery was forced to change its position, and a few casualties were inflicted on horses and men. The mistake of opening fire on a small target at this point was soon made apparent, as the enemy continued shelling the ridges where the 5th Brigade were operating throughout the day at regular intervals, and the movement of enemy troops was considerably more active. The role of observation, only, was impressed on all commanders at the Divisional Commander’s conference the previous evening, but did not appear to be appreciated by G.O.C. 5th Mtd Brigade.
At 1200 a deserter from GAZA gave himself up in our lines, and gave a considerable amount of information re the enemy troops there, including the fact that help had been [requested] for from JEMMANEH at 10.00
At 13.10 a message was received from the HUJ patrol, stating considerable enemy activity was apparent on the roads leading NORTH and EAST from TEL ES SHARIA. At this time 14.00 orders were received from the Desert Column for the A.& N.Z. Division to assist the infantry on the attack on GAZA, while the Imperial Mounted Division took over the covering screen, The I.C.C. Brigade move to its left to support the right of the Imperial Mounted Division.
The Imperial Mounted Division was then placed under the orders of the A.& N.Z. Division’s Commander.
At 1430 orders ere received form GOC ANZAC MTD DIV to take over the following posts
1 troop 2 miles E of BEIT DURDIS watching HUJ
1 Squadron watching NEJED
1 Squadron at DEIR SINEID
The 3rd ALH Bde were ordered to join the ANZC Mtd DIV
Orders were issued to G.O.C. 6th Mtd Brigade to send out the necessary detachments in relief of the above mentioned posts.
To the 5th Brigade to leave a protective detachment keeping in touch with the Camel Corps on his right and the 6th Brigade HUJ detachment on his left.
To the G.O.C. 3rd LH Bde to join the A. & N.Z. Mounted Division.
Divisional Hd. Qrs. moved to a ridge about ½ mile WEST of BEIT DURDIS
While the above detachment were proceeding between 14.45 and 15.15 to take up their positions and relieve the respective detachments from A.& N.Z. Division, messages were received from HUJ officers patrol reporting the presence of enemy columns advancing rapidly in the direction of GAZA. These messages had had to be sent in by mounted orderly it being impossible to send a signalling detachment with a small patrol, whose mission was observe without attracting attention, but the information and the manner in which the O.C. commanded his patrol is worthy of special notice.
While the relief of the A. & N.Z. Divisional Patrols were being effected the enemy advance from JEMMANEH became suddenly pronounced and before the detachments could be got into position they came in action with the advancing forces who were forcing back the A&NZ Division Posts from the crest of Hill 405 which they were holding.
Lieut Colonel Wigan DSO with two Squadrons and one Troop, Berks Yeo, then took command of the action on this point. It was impossible to relieve the detachments of the NZMR Bde at that time, so Colonel Wigan placed in own troops in the line and assisted in their delaying action at the same time sending back detailed information re the strength and line of advance of the enemy, who up to then had shown only infantry and mounted troops with machine guns.
Seeing the situation at this point was becoming critical, the GOC [6th Mtd Bde] ordered up the whole of the 6th Brigade including the Berks Battery. Unfortunately a good supply of water had just been discovered and the Brigade was watering. So there was some small delay in the start, and before they could come to Colonel Wigan's support, the enemy had pushed back his detachments over the crest of Hill 405. This was about 1715.
The action with the 6th Mounted Brigade developed very quickly and the GOC A.& N.Z. Div sent the 3rd L.H. Bde less 10th A.L.H. Regt back to operate on General Pitt's left between [Hill] 405 and the DEIR SINEID road.
The handling of this [3rd ALH] Brigade was notable for its quickness and also for the service in which the GOC seized on to the salient features of the country and utilised them to excellent advantage. There was no doubt that General Royston's quickness in grasping the value of the high hill NW of 405 enabled the 6th Bde to hold on to the line to which it was forced back and which would otherwise have been untenable. This movement brought the Notts Battery into action on the left of the 6th Brigade and the Berks Battery was in action in the centre. Both the Batteries did excellent work, the Notts being able to enfilade the infantry advancing directly against the 6th Brigade and doing considerable damage.
The situation became serious when more enemy guns, 6 were already in action, arrived and enfiladed the Berks Battery, whose position then became untenable and they were forced to withdraw.
It was however nearly dark (1830) so their withdrawal was not pursued by the enemy who made no attempt to push on, but retained Hill 405.
The 3rd LH Bde, less 10th ALH Regt, were on the left with the Notts Battery covering the DEIR SINEID - GAZA road. the 6TH Bde in a hollow in the centre about 1½ miles N. from BEIT DURDIS, the 5th Bde echeloned back on their right. This at the time was unknown to the Divisional Commander who had ordered back the 5th Bde to HQrs, leaving 3 squadrons out to link up with the ICC Brigade on the right of the 6th Brigade. This order was apparently not received
Unfortunately touch with the 5th Brigade was lost during the move of Div. Hd. Qrs. for KH EL RASEIM to BEIT DURDIS and was never regained 'til after 20.00
This loss of touch with the 5th Brigade and the withdrawal of the 3rd Brigade, together with the natural inclinations of all the protective detachments to meet the enemy’s main attack, left a considerable gap between the right of the 6th Brigade and the left of the 5th Brigade.
At 1800 when it was becoming dusk efforts were made by mounted orderlies and officers to reach the G.O.C. 5th Brigade which were however of no avail and an appeal was subsequently directed to G.O.C. A.& N.Z. Div. To allow the 3rd Regt of Gem Royston’s Bde, previously detached to the other Division, to rejoin the Imp Mtd Division in order to fill that gap, which was done, and much praise is due to the 10th ALH [Regt] for the manner in which they found the Div. Hd. Qrs. in the dark and also gained their place in the line in the dark in an unknown bit of country covered with deep and difficult wadi beds.
The Division was at this time about 2030 was ordered to hold its ground and to remain in its present position pending further orders.
The 6th Brigade however had to withdraw their line ½ a mile, though enemy activity had practically ceased and there were apparent signs that they were digging themselves in quite close to the Brigade. The new line was taken up without incident and the Brigade was then in a better position.
At 12.10 [00.20 on 27th March] news was received from the A. & N.Z. Mtd. Division that they were withdrawing and the order for the concentration of the 6th and 3rd Brigade were then ordered, messages and lamp signals being used. Cable connection being interrupted by the passage of troops over the wires.
The withdrawal of the 5th Brigade was ordered through the Brigade Major who came in to Div. Hd. Qrs. to ask for orders at 23.30. Touch had previously been regained with this Brigade and they had been allotted a position on our right flank protecting the return route of the Division, slightly south of KHURBET ER RESEIM.
Div. Hd. Qrs. moved off when it was ascertained that the 6th and 3rd Brigades had received and were carrying out their orders. The artillery and all spare transport and wheeled vehicles were sent off earlier in the night as soon as the orders for subsequent withdrawal were received.
The 6th and 3rd Brigade came under long distance artillery and rifle fire when crossing the WADI GHUZZEE but only 3 slight casualties were received during this part of the action, and the Division was intact at DEIR EL BELAH at 08.10 on the 27th.
The total casualties of the Division during the day were under 40 of all descriptions.
I would like to record my appreciation of work of the 6th Brigade, the Berks and Notts Batteries, and particularly the handling of his Brigade by Brig. Gen. ROYSTON, and the work of all units of the 3rd L.H. Brigade.
The communications of the Division were weak, but the Signal Squadron in an entirely new formation and the break down of intercommunication between the Hd. Qrs. and Brigades at various times can be accounted for by the sudden strain on this new unit.
Water was discovered in small quantities at various points. A separate report on which will be submitted. It was entirely surface water from recent rainfall.
I wish to bring to special notice 2/Lt J Edwards, Worcester Yeomanry whose handling of an officers patrol in the direction of HUJ was of the utmost value.
] Sgd HW Hodgson
Major General
Commanding Imp. Mtd. Div.
29th March 1917