All



This is the continuation of a discussion which started here under EEF-places/The Citadel, Cairo, but which I think deserves its own heading. A couple of us are interested in the rivalry between the Murray camp and Maxwell’s team, and I have just come across the following sources, which I found helpful:



The Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East 1916-1920 by Bruce Westrate.



[quote]

For the British, the Middle East was an administrative morass that saddled officials with enormous but nebulously defined spheres of authority. Worse, political and military control within those spheres was so subdivided as to create much departmental duplication, inefficiency, and internecine rivalry. The resulting confusion bred ignorance, intrigue, and practical paralysis...



This “tangle” seemed more like a Gordian know. Eighteen individuals were empowered to advise on the content and direction of British policy in the Middle East...



Fissures often opened up between military and political authorities in both Mesopotamia and Egypt. Cox did not get on well with Lake, nor Clayton and Wingate with Murray. McMahon distrusted both Wingate and Murray – and they all were suspicious of Lake and the Indian viceroy, Lord Hardinge. ... Truly, as Sykes admitted, this was a system fated to stumble “from crisis to inertia, and from coma to panic, watching assets frittered away and opportunities missed.” [Chap 1, “Flawed Foundations”, pp. 22-25]

[end quote]



In fact all 27 pages of Chap 1 are about this split between the generals (and the resulting uncomfortable position of the Arab Bureau).

.

Another source of possible interest, though not so thorough on the issue as the above is British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign 1914-18 by Yigal Sheffy.



Grateful if anyone could add to these two sources. My own interest would be the disagreements over how to run the Sanusi front.



Regards,



Russell

Russsell

Thanks for this will look up ref's given and add thoughts over the next couple of days.

regards
Dave

Russell / Michael.

Sorry if I dropped off on this discussion. It fell off my recent posts list and I lost track of it.

Would like to pick up this again as I am still getting my head around the consolidation of the EEF from March 1916 and the relationships between the senior officers of the original Egyptian staff and those coming from Gallipoli. Still finding it difficult to understand Maxwells role after the disbandment of the Levant base, the effective disolvement of the "Force in Egypt" prior to his departure for the UK, and the transfer of the roles ultimately into the EEF. The running of the Levant base during its time I understand was a big part of later relationships between these two camps, the administrator vs soldier stand offs and the apparent dominance ultimately of the MEF.

The roles that some of the Egypt based officers involved in the Senussi and Oasis campaigns and their subsequent integration into the EEF of particular interest.

Regards
Dave

Dave,
I’ve worked on W Desert campaign but am weak on EEF. Please explain what you (and Archibald Murray in despatch of 1 June 1916) mean by the Levant Base...
Russell

Russell

The Levant Base was the centralised supply base at Alex. It ran from June 1915 until the creation of the EEF. Commanded initially by G. F. Ellison and then Lt.-Gen Edward A. Altham directly under the command of the War Office it was the central supply point for all operations in the mediteranean theatre. ie. there was a third independant command as well as the MEF and the "forces in Egypt". As you can imagine chaos reigned.

Strictly speaking the "Forces in Egypt" were also supposed to be supplied from the Levant Base however Gen. Sir John Maxwell and his staff actually purchased on behalf of the base. It was at its height during the Gallipoli campaign but its importance fell off rapidly after the evacuation. Hence any lack of supply, both material and men, felt at Gallipoli and criticism was frequently directed back to the Levant Base and ultimately to Sir John Maxwells staff.

Murray was given nominal command of the base on his appointment in December 1915. Altham moved from GOC Levant Base to IGC of the EEF but was not to last long and left for England when the IGC was merged with GHQ.

Regards
Dave

Dave,
Thanks for that very clear explanation of Levant Base.
Maxwell seems to have seen himself as a “lame duck” GOC immediately Gallipoli had been evacuated and the swarm of generals arrived in Egypt. Have you seen the correspondence between Maxwell and Kitchener for January 1916? (I can’t recall how much of it is in the bound WO telegrams -- WO 33/714, etc. I found some interesting letters in the Maxwell papers held at Princeton Library.) I assume you’ve seen this one to Kitchener of 8 Jan 1916?

Dear Lord Kitchener,
I feel rather “mazloum” [aggrieved] at the way the WO have treated me over this appointment of Murray. I do not question the facts, but it is the way they have behaved to me. Sir Charles Monro, Sir Henry McMahon, and Altham – all are communicated with and I am ignored.
Personal matters and feelings do not count, but I feel so strongly that it is unfair on the Service, and on everyone here, to attempt to run independent commands. It can’t be done without creating impossible situations, and an “impasse”. Therefore, as all the indications that have been vouchsafed me show that Sir A Murray is to be independent, I feel that I will be in the way, and therefore think that I ought to be recalled.
I cannot understand why I have been so ignored! It has put me in a very ridiculous position, and retarded progress here as, until Murray arrives, I must hold up many things at a time when minutes matter.
Egypt can only be run by one head: I think you will agree in this; there are already too many sideshows, what with high Commissioners, Ministers, Advisers, Under Secretaried, Allied consul Generals, and Sirdar, that if there are two independent Military Commands, and an Octopus such as the GOC Lines of Communication, and Levant Base acting independently, there can be nothing else than Mudros over again, only worse!! As I do not think this sort of thing will assist in “ending the war”, I sent the telegram I did after careful thought, and I see no other modus vivendi than that either Murray or I should be Supreme Commander here.... Murray is junior to me in rank; ordinarily that stands for nothing in war time, but it does matter here.

And this one of 19 January marked “Private”:

Dear Lord Kitchener,
I was greatly relieved at your telegram, and I appreciate what you have been able to do. Please do not think that I hankered after enhanced rank. I was quite happy as I was, and Murray and I had come to a working agreement when this was disturbed by his being made a temporary General, thus of course altering everything. I think myself this was quite unnecessary here, and might have been deferred until he moved off with his army either to France, or elsewhere, more especially now, as Serrail is made C-inC, Salonika and Gallipoli cease to exist as a Command.
I hate making difficulties, but you will understand that, with another General senior to me exercising command in Egypt, my position became not only impossible, but ridiculous, and in the eyes of everyone here I was discredited and superseded. So I am glad this will be put right.
The situation is difficult enough, and anomalous enough as it is, for the tentacles of the Octopus Levbase, and the L of C Medforce, permeate my command, and though I have no fear that Murray, myself, and the senior Staff Officers will work harmoniously for the common good, there must be overlapping, and a certain amount of friction amongst the Junior Staff and Reg’tal Officers. They all look upon Medforce as the fighting force, and therefore, as is the habit of British Officers, all want to belong to it, and not to the shelved force in Egypt: these add to one’s difficulties. Murray himself told me that the question was discussed at home, and that the decision was, that if he were promoted, I would be too. Therefore, the shock was great when I learned the he was, and I was not! ...

You’ve probably seen all this, but I offer it just in case you haven’t.
Russell

Russell

Thanks for this.

Upto this point the first ref I had for requests on a single command come from Altham's communication with Robertson in December and January. Here the request was made by Altham and Robertson declared difficulty in consolidating the commands before informing him of Murrays appointment. It does tie in with Maxwell's complaint about being left in the dark. I had read Maxwell's wife's letter to Kitchener on the way her husband was treated which is in much the same vein. I dont have the ref with me but will try to dig it out when I get home this weekend.

The reference in Maxell's telegrams does support what I had re. the running of the Levant Base. Should be interesting to see how the LOC staff integration into the EEF panned out. Will update as I find more.

Regards
Dave

Thanks, Dave. Yes, would be grateful for that reference (the wife's letter) if you can find it...
Regards,
Russell

Russell

You can download it here

http://libweb5.princeton.edu/visual_materi...lc_v_51_n_2.pdf

It is captured in an article from the Princeton Chronicle.

Regards
Dave

Dave,

Many thanks for the reference. A great letter -- that was some lady!!!

Russell