I posted some days ago with a query regarding the 'Ottoman 12 Division Machine Guns at 2nd Anafartalar' and judging by the response (nil!), I guess this was a bit specific.

I have a certain amount of evidence for where at least some of the Turkish machine guns were positioned in the Scimitar Hill area on 21 August from British war diaries and other accounts. What I am not so sure about is whether the Turkish machine guns were usually deployed individually, in pairs (which I have seen in contemporary photographs, though these may not necessarily have been taken in a combat context) or both.

Any guidance on this would be much appreciated.

John

John,

This is an area I am also interested in but sadly the information on the employment of machine guns in 1914 -1915 I have come across is fairly scarce and broad. The maxim was a heavy beast weighing some 69KG, with sled and water cooling equipment, making it more cumbersome than the lighter machine guns that followed. They were also relatively new in terms of doctrine. Nor were they an integral part of the infantry battalion, but were held under regimental control in a machine gun company (six guns in the German MG company and four in the Turkish MG company). These issues I think affected the way they were employed.

As the Turkish Army was trained by the Germans. I think it is fair to say that the Turks followed German doctrine. In After Clausewitz: German Military Theory Prior to the Great War Echevarria writes (p 160) that "Use of individual machine guns was "strictly forbidden" because of the weapon's mechanical unreliability" although this appears to relate to an earlier version of the gun. The Germans re-organised from four gun detachments into six gun Companies in 1907. In the notes to this chapter he cites M-W 127 (1910) pointed out that although machine guns were not to be used individually, it was not a good idea to mass them as artillery as this would not exploit the weapon's ability to cover a wide area while M-W 127 (1913) pointed out the need for flexible interpretation of that rule, as machine guns now served the role that regimental and battalion cannon had long held: close support of infantry. Whether this refers to the use of the guns individually or as massed artillery is not clear although it seems to refer to being used as massed artillery.

Hendo (green_acorn) points out in another thread that the Turkish MG Company had two range finders which tends to support the view the maxims were employed in pairs. Drop him a PM and he might be able to add more information.

Cheers
Chris

Chris

You might check out:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php...51e67ea3d76fcc3

The information here might assist you in furthering your understanding.

Cheers

Bill

Bill,

The information might be useful to Chris but there's probably not too much more that can 'further HIS understanding'.

Cheers,
Tim L.

Mate,

Most of those MG's I've seen appear all to be on there own.

There was a shortage of MG's in the Turkish Army so they couldn't be placed together and still cover the ground needed for a small MG Company of four guns.

At the landing (25 April) the MG Company covered the area from Fishermans hut to Ari Banu in single gum positions. Also in defencive positions on Baby 700 in Aug 1915 there were five MG's all in single gun positions.

This may have been an unusal case and may have not happened all the time as Jeff mentions it was the normal to group them in pairs.

S.B

Steve,

Have you the source for the information that the MG company deployed between the Fisherman's Hut and Ari Burnu in single gun positions? If so can please let me know where to find it or if you have a copy would you mind sending it to me? I am assuming this is the MG company of the 27th Regiment? It would be very useful to something I am working on at the moment.

Cheers
Chris

German MG companies went from 6 to 12 MGs per company mid-war, say 1916. I think that the MG company of German Jaeger battalions might have had 12 MGs per company from the beginning of the war. I am fairly certain that Turkish MG companies only had four guns per company.

Are we certain that the Turks had a MG company per regiment? Could it have been a MG company per division? I honestly do not know, but I think that I may have read the latter, per division. At any rate, they certainly did not have a lot of them. The Turkish Army lost a great deal of its equipment, such as it was, in the disasterous Balkan Wars only a couple of years before. For example, I believe that they lost all of their bridging equipment, and had not replaced it by the time WW I broke out.

Bob Lembke

Mate,

Yes its in the new book by Peter Williams called "The Battle of Anzac Ridge".

He gives the positions of four MG's from Fishermans hut to Gaba Tepe (map 5.1 page 71).

1 MG at Fishermans hut.

1 MG on Pugges

1 MG below Russels Top

1 MG at Gaba Tepe.

From what I can read these were not the four MG's from the MG Company 27th Regt as they were still with the two Bn's still in reserve. Account by LtCol Sefik Bey.

So who these four MG's belonged to I have no idea?

Cheers

S.B

Thanks Steve. I thought you might have had a primary source.

Cheers

Chris

With regards to the Nordenfeldt mechanical machine guns, I believe their importance may be getting overrated, they were over twenty years old and because of the mechanical operation and loose gravity feed not the most reliable of weapons as this extract of Hansard from the House of Commons debate of the 9th of March 1893 attests:

THE NORDENFELDT GUNS.
HC Deb 09 March 1893 vol 9 cc1428-9 1428

§ MR. ROBERT WALLACE (Edinburgh, E.)

I beg to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty if he can state how many Nordenfeldt guns have burst during operations connected with the Navy since the introduction of the weapon into the Service: and whether any, and how many, persons have been killed or wounded in such accidents?

THE SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (Sir U. KAY-SHUTTLEWORTH,) Lancashire, Clitheroe

None of the six-pounder Nordenfeldt guns have burst on service. But of the Nordenfeldt machine guns, from 1879 to the present time, two have blown off their muzzles, without injury to anyone. Twenty-two other accidents, principally due to hang-fire, have occurred, resulting in injuries to 15 persons. In 1879 one accident occurred, due to bad manipulation, and resulted in the death of one man and the injury of one other. No more Nordenfeldt machine guns are being made; the Maxim guns are the only machine guns now ordered.

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons...ordenfeldt-guns

Is there any evidence that they were actually deployed after 25 April 1915?


Cheers,
Hendo

Is there any evidence that they were actually deployed after 25 April 1915?

Yes Hendo, there is
please see the TGS' Brief History...... and its orgaization chart 12, which shows the Organization of the 5th Army (June 21, 1915)

regards
Michael

And Nordenfeldts were still in use in six weeks later
see Organization chart 13 showing The Oganization of the 5th Turkish Army at the Beginning of August 1915

regards
Michael

Michael

Any chance of scanning and posting the Organisation Chart 13 and (any more for August) for the benefit of those of us who try as we may cannot get access to a copy of this TGS publication?

John

Any chance of scanning and posting the Organisation Chart 13 and (any more for August) for the benefit of those of us who try as we may cannot get access to a copy of this TGS publication?
John



Alas, Alas; The gremlins have got the big box!
I was only able to access the disc via the lap-top
and as the latter is so, so new to this Neanderthal, I have not yet worked out how to get from one to the other with pics etc etc.
I do hope that another Pal will soon step forward and provide the necessary

regards
Michael

Isn't it wonderful what an old Boy Scout and a blunt screw driver can do!



This should help a little

This is probably the section of the chart which is of most interest

A further set of Nodenfeldts are shown under the Asya Grubu on the left of the chart [I was unable to find any under Anafarta, Tayfur or Saros]

Michaeldr and Crunchy,

I apologise for not thinking of the TGS study! These charts should also help crunchy as they indicate the total number of machine guns Fifth Army had, and was the document he was enquiring about. Looking through over 6,000 pages I have imaged over the last few months was giving me a mental blank!

Cheers,
Hendo

I am awaiting access to a few period books on the employment of Vickers and Maxim Machine Guns before I make anymore detailed comments, but can I add some practical thoughts, base on what we know from the period.

First. As Crunchy has found there was not confidence in the mechanical reliability of the guns, "After Clausewitz: German Military Theory Prior to the Great War Echevarria writes (p 160) that "Use of individual machine guns was "strictly forbidden" because of the weapon's mechanical unreliability" which is part of the reason a spare gun was meant to be carried in the companies cart.

Secondly we are attributing the Ottoman employment of the Maxim using modern principles, which really didn't come to fruition until very late in 1917 and much improved in WW2, and acting as though a Maxim MG is comparable to a L7 GPMG, a M60 GPMG, a Bren LMG or a F89 SAW, the Maxim was initially classed as a Heavy Machine Gun and was not allocated to the infantry, German practice was to deploy their MG Companies by section (two guns) in depth, ie: the 2nd or 3rd trench, from where they could provide the necessary support to the infantry in the trenches, which allowed the infantry to manoeuvre under the cover of fire and allowed the machine guns to redeploy independently of the infantry to meet their tasks.

Third is the nature of fire that would be applied by the MG sections and company, sustained frontal/partial enfilade fire of around 20 round bursts, alternating between guns in the section so there is no gap in the fire, sweeping left to right and back to the left on the designated Beaten Ground (think of it as a lenght of roadway in your distance orientated from your right to left that an enemy is about to cross, rather than the more modern concept of a beaten zone arcing out from your GPMG) through which the enemy are trying to attack, good gunners would catch the enemy in their designated Beaten Ground, as the Germans apparently did on the Somme on that frightful first day.

Cheers,
Hendo

I have largely kept out of this thread, as "I don't have much of a dog in this fight" (not that it has been a fight, but a rather gentlemanly discussion), but I read something. last night that I though I should post on this long-living thread.

I think that I noted someone recently posting on this thread that the Turks had one MG company per infantry regiment. I am reading a book by Major E. R. Prigge, who was Liman von Sanders' long-term Adjutant. He wrote, in the context of April 25th, in translation, page 36: "It should be now observed that a Turkish division, in contrast to a German (one), is only composed of three infantery regiments, one squadron of cavalry, one field artillery regiment, and one machine gun company." Der Kampf um die Dardanellen , von Major E. R. Prigge, 1916, Verlag Gustav Kiepenheuer, Weimar. He went on to say that at Kume Kale there was one company of Turkish infantry, and that the initial bombardmant killed the lieutenant commanding it and all "Unterfuehrer", an odd term to me, but suggesting all other lieutenants and probably also all NCOs. It also mentioned reenforcements being moved up and that a counterattack at Kume Kale captured some French, 200 Sengalese "Schuetzen" (prob. "riflemen"), and three MGs, and drove the allies out of the village. He stated that this capture kept these MGs from cutting down more of the brave men of the 3rd Division, but not that they were put into service against the allies.

I had thought that there was only one MG company (four guns) per Turkish division, when someone posted per regiment, but I did not have a good reference at hand at that time. (German MG companies had 6 or 12 MGs per company, but not the Turks.)

And I can't recall ever reading of independant Turkish MG companies, certainly not at that time. As von Sanders was trying to keep most of his forces off the beaches, and concentrated for counter-attacks, it seems unlikely that any of the division's four MGs were with the company at Kume Kale.

Bob Lembke

Bob,

Thank you for the post and translation from Major Prigge's work. Just to clarify the number of MG Company's in an Ottoman Division, officially there was meant to be one per Regiment, but as you have pointed out, not all Regiments had one and often only one Regiment had one. At this point in the war each of these companies was meant to have two Sections of two Maxim MG's, with a spare one carried as part of Company stores, but given the paucity of MG's that is in itself unlikely and the spare have probably been used to create other MG Company's.

As to the issue of the "independence" of the MG Company's, at this time, they were a seperate "branch" of the Ottoman Army wearing distinctive Green gorgette patches on their collar, rather than being infantry or artillery soldiers. The MG Company's were a seperate organisation within the Infantry Regiment, not subordinate to the infantry battalions, with their own command structure which answered to the Regiment Commander.

Cheers,
Hendo

Bob

Hendo,

This is a most valid point you have made and a mistake I think we all have made at some time. From my research the Maxim was employed quite differently than the way we employ LMG's today. You will recall the Old Vickers Gun platoons that were re-introduced into some battalions during our day - IIRC they were used differently to the section LMG as well. I am more and more convinced the guns were used in pairs.

Cheers
Chris

Chris,

8/9 RAR was the first battalion to reintroduce the SFMG Pl as they became known, they were indeed employed quite differently to Section MG's. The MG Pl usually deployed as a Pl, but fired by section, in a similar way to that employed by Mortar Pl's. Because of the amount of ammunition, stores and vehicles they had to deploy in depth from the forward company/ies. I was fortunate enough to go on the Pl's first live firing exercise, though it was only four guns, not the six or eight guns of its predecessors.

From what I recall the 8/9 MG Pl did not develop the same level of fire expertise that a WW1 MGC unit would have had in 1918. Though they fired nearly all of their shoots indirectly using the C2 site, I do not recall them using instruments like a clinometer for targets on reverse slopes, nor fire searching fire missions along renetrants, valleys and so forth. From discussions with my father who completed his 1950's national service as a Vickers No 1, that sort of knowledge appeared to die out in the 60's.

Cheers,
Hendo

I am currently reading Major E. Prigge's 1916 memoire on the Gallipoli campaign. Prigge was Liman von Sander's long-time Adjutant there, and therefore knew as well as anyone what went on on the Turkish/German side. I have just found two passages that should be of interest to anyone interested in the topic of Turkish MGs.

Two cautionaries. Although the text generally seems insightful and to my mind accurate, on matters that I am familiar with, it was published in 1916, and anything published during the war has to be used carefully. For example, without my checking against other sources, I think Prigge ascribed the sinking of one or two allied warships lost to sea mines to land-based artillery. He certainly knew what was going on there. He may have deliberately said that to attempt to conceal the effectiveness of the minefields, in order to surprise the allies if there was a further naval attempt on the Narrows. Generally his narrative seems accurate and truthful. I don't see any military reason for him to lie about MG matters.

Secondly, not everyone likes my German to English translations. People who do not know German sometimes find my translations a bit choppy or awkward. German is quite different than English, especially in grammar and especially word order, and I attempt to stay as close to the German, especially while the translation is still a working copy. If I was doing a final cut prior to publication, I might make a translation "smoother", or I might not, depending on the audience. Prigge also seems to have written some unusual word usage. I have only translated the second passage word-for-word.

Pages 68-69: Mention of the first detachment of the German Navy for the Gallipoli front, which was 32 men with 8 machine guns under the command of Oberleutnant zur See Boltz.

Pages 69-71: A 3 1/4 page statement from Oblt. z. S. Boltz on the activities of the first naval detachment over the next few days. He wrote that they, rushed from Constantinople, reached Kilia at 3 PM on May 3rd, and were immediately rushed to the South Group (Cape Helles area), reported to Colonel von Sodenstern, and split into two four gun detachments and deployed.

Page 76: The following seems to relate to the fruits of a Turkish counter-attack after a Brit-French attack of May 18-19. "The number of machine guns accumulated in the course of the week were so much, that it was managed to put together a steadily growing number of machine gun companies out of captured materiel, that partially with likewise captured English ammunition found employment against the enemy. Through replacement over the course of time the others were made suitable for Turkish ammunition." The second sentence is a bit cryptic to me. Previously Prigge had remarked on Captain Pieper's successful efforts to enhance Turkish ammunition production. Is Prigge remarking on Vickers being rechambered for Turkish ammunition? Elsewhere I have recently read that, the first naval detachment having lost most of their guns and half of their men in fierce fighting, being given 13 captured Vickers (I assume), which proved invaluable. Prigge never commented on the actual models of MGs he mentioned.

Bob Lembke

I am just reading the latest issue (#48) of the AWM's wonderful magazine Wartime and noted in the article "A Quiet Hero" by Peter Burness on the death of Captain EFR Bage, 3 Fd Coy, Australian Engineers, the circumstances of Captain Bages death.

"On 7 May Major General William Bridges, commanding the Australian division (sic), visited the front-line positions of the 11th Battalion near Lone Pine. The general decided that a trench needed to be dug further forward, and ordered an officer of engineers go out to establish the best spot and mark it with pegs so that digging could be done later under the cover of darkness. Captain Bage happened to be nearby. "Here's the man," exclaimed Bridges, promptly oredering him to do the job.

Bage and others could see that this work, and unprotected position well in front of the Australians' trench line, would be under the nose of five Turkish machine-guns."

Comment: This suggests that this Infantry Regiments' Machine Gun Company was operating as a single unit and that it was also using its "spare" machine gun, and that these machine guns were not deployed individually. I appreciate that this is a fortnight after the landing, but I would contend that if the Ottoman machine guns were to be deployed individually or even by section to support dispersed defended localities or a number of points of Key Terrain, by the 7th of May they would be so deployed, whereas this description suggests the contrary. Indeed I would suggest that deploying the machine guns individually by this date would have made even more sense than it would have on the 25th of April. Comment Ends.

The article goes onto describe the circumstance of Bage's tragic and wasteful death.



Cheers,
Hendo

Hendo,

The machine gun disposition with both sides is a question that has me intrigued for quite some time now, although I must admit I have been looking at this from May 1915 onwards.

With the 3rd Light Horse Brigade up on Russel's top there is now enough evidence to suggest that the various machine gun posts along Monash Gully and then across to the 9thL.H. MG section's two guns at Turk's Point, that the guns were set up in either pairs or singularly.
Lt Col Noel Brazier of the 10th L.H. has depicted the number of guns at each post on his sketch map of Russell's Top. He specifically notes one or two Maxims at the various posts.

Tpr Hill of the 8th L.H MG Section has a number of entries in his diary where mentions being on duty with either No. 1 or No. 2 gun. Here it would seem that he is referring to the same MG post each time. His two rough sketches of the distance and direction to specific targets above Pope's Hill and Quinn's Post would also seem to indicate the fire of an individual gun. The second sketch is for a different MG post, most probably positioned to the left of the Bullybeef Sap. Here this sketch shows much further range and scope to the fire of this gun, the furthest target being across Monash Valley ranged onto the Pimple 1700 yards away.
On the 27th June he noted: “On gun, (machine gun) heavy shell fire about sunrise. We fired about two belts through gun."

The famous photograph of the 9th L.H. gun in action at Turk's Point would again suggest that only one gun of a two gun position, was fired at a time. This may have been a different case when subject to a Turkish attack. An exception was between 3.45 a.m. and 4.30 a.m. 7th August the two guns at Turk's Point put down intensive fire across onto the Turkish trenches at the Nek, firing around 10,000 rounds.

For the positioning of the Turkish machine guns, as I noted in the other post the "Operational Orders No. 1" is quite specific with the intelligence reports to suspected positions of machine guns, these are most often referred to as "one gun".
"There are supposed to be machine guns in E8, E6, C6a, and most probably at Y and Z” (Nek objectives map, ANZAC TRENCH DIAGRAM No. III. AWM "Mapping Gallipoli")

In the report submitted to 3rd L.H. Bde HQ of the advance up Monash Gully by the 8th Battalion Royal Welch Fusiliers around 5.20 a.m. 7th August, by the commanding officer Lt Col Hay, he makes this mention of the Turkish machine guns at the head of Monash Gully: -
"My intention was that “B” Coy should proceed to the head of the Gully & work along C6a, while “A”
Coy was to get the trench at the junction of C6a & C6b & work along to the right.
I proceeded with “A” Company & almost as soon as the leading party of 10 men had commenced to
move bombs were thrown at them over the top of the parapet & the muzzles of 2 machine guns could
be clearly seen."

The photograph that C.E.W. Bean took of the fully covered machine gun position back up on Baby 700 in 1919, clearly shows the loop hole that could have been only used by one machine gun.

As I said at the beginning, all of this is for later in the campaign, but it does indicate that both; guns were positioned singularly or in pairs by both sides, and guns were positioned either singularly, or in pairs to best advantage.
The major problem has been, and continues to be, to find accurate information, and on the whole, to find any information at all to the operation and positioning of machine guns of both sides. The numbers of guns involved, the number of men to each gun, and how they were sighted (positioned) and targeted.

Jeff

Guys;

I don't want to argue with you about who thought what where, who said what in which diary, etc., I don't know those details. I read a few diaries and memoires from ANZAC participants, but I concentrate on the Turkish/German side, and I read the memoirs of a number of German and Austrian staff officers (who did not always see eye to eye), and have read an analysis of this topic from the position of an economic historian, and have studied the German/Prussian military assistance to Turkey going back to the early 19th Century and even earlier, and have read about the Turkish purchase of weapons in the years leading up to the Great War, and all of this points to the Turks having very few MGs on April 25th. 32 German sailors with 8 Maxims arrived in early May, were inserted on the southern beachhead, and within days lost half their men and most of their guns, but then the survivors were provided with some captured Vickers and were able to continue. Probably in June the Turks were able to form a few new MG companies with captured MGs.

If you read 20 or 30 or 40 diaries, and every time someone mentions "MG fire" you plot another MG or several, or "see the snouts of MGs" and take it for granted, you are going to come up with a whole lot of MGs. As far as seeing the snouts of MGs, unless you mean for a few seconds, or during an attack, you are kidding yourself, I think. Exposing real MGs to view of the enemy, given the Allied fire support capacity, would be foolish. The German officers rated the Turks as masters of the terrain and concealment. Let me also mention what was going on on the Asiatic side. The Turks built multiple firing positions for each gun that they had, and were constantly moving the few guns they had from position to position, sometimes with teams of water buffalo. But they also had teams of men going about with lengths of stovepipe (some of the multiple firing positions were covered, and a protruding stovepipe would resenble a barrel), and when an airplane or other spotting opportunity occurred, the small crew would ignite about two pounds of black powder in the "barrel", creating a puff of smoke and a spotting of a "firing gun", and perhaps drawing fire to the largely vacant site. Stating that a given position was "under five MGs" seems not reasonable. Seeing an exposed "snout of a MG" and assuming that it is a real MG is also not reasonable.

I will temper my comments to the extent that perhaps a bit later in the fighting more MGs may have been deployed; captured, perhaps obtained from other Turkish units elsewhere, or obtained from the Germans, who might have had a total of a couple of dozen at Constantinople at this time, which they doled out, mostly to naval detachments. The first train from Austria was run thru in February 1916. They simply had no easy way to obtain more, and they must have lost some to shell-fire. (As I said, the first naval MG detachment lost most of their guns in about three days.) But there is a lot of presumption about MGs meeting the landing forces on April 25th, when, due to the extreme shortage of MGs at that time, and Liman von Sanders' strategy of posts along the shore-line, while keeping major resources at central inland positions, until the real landing situation became apparent, makes it unlikely that there were any MGs at all positioned to fire on landing troops.

Not trying to start WW III here (I'll try that elsewhere!), but just urging caution about reports of numbers of Turkish MGs, especially facing the landing troops. They simply had very few. Reading dozens of accounts and compiling all reports, suspicions, sightings in them to a master compelation will vastly overestimate the actual number. Anyone have a good source for the assumption of one MG company per infantry regiment, even if only on paper?

Bob Lembke

Jeff,

That is excellent research there. I can't disagree with what you have found and your conclusions. Though acknowledging the Ottoman's machine gun shortage, there are factors which would strongly support the Ottoman's moving to paired and sometimes single deployment once the landing had occurred and the front had stabilised - Trench warfare, they simply knew where everything was; the Key Terrain and specifically their Vital Ground; where the enemy (the MEF/Anzac's) saw their priority; where the concentration of enemy forces was; the terrain, specifically the dead ground and so on.

Once the war became one of movement and manoeuvre, like the time of the landing, with the limited number of machine guns and the uncertainty of the enemy's battle plans and inability to very quickly communicate with dispersed guns, it once again becomes more practical to brigade the machine guns to make the most effective use of them at the regimental commanders call.

It would be excellent to see what you have found marked up on a small scale map as it would add much to everyone's understanding.


Regards,
Hendo

Mate,

I have to agree its more then likely, MG's are as shown in Turkish maps either as a single or in pairs.

I can't believe that any Turkish commander would place five MG's in any one position.

What he could mean by the diary statement that five MG's covered that ground, which as we did, used MG's from other units to cover areas of ground.


All part of the interlocking fire plan.

S,B

Bob,

Thank you for your excellent contributions on this subject, it has been enlightening to read from the German viewpoint. I personally don't disagree with what you have written, the Ottoman's did have very few machine guns and we do need to be careful in overestimating the number of machine guns, just as the Turks do with our own number of MG. The source of one MG Company per Regiment is the British Turkish Army Handbook (ISBN 0-89839-249-7, Battery press reprint), that was updated about once a month in early 1915. The handbook also ackowledged the shortage of machine guns and indicated that not all regiments had their allocation.

The other thread that discussed this is "TURKISH MACHINE GUNS AT GALLIPOLI: Was the Turkish Army equipped with MGs?". I think much of the problem in both threads is not specifying a date and place, which allows suppositions to creep in and for confusion as slightly different events and places are discussed generically, though in this case most of the threads have been about Anzac Cove.


Regards,
Hendo

Steve,

Can you show me some of these maps, I would be exceptionally keen to see them. The ones I have seen show a MG Company symbol.

Interlocking fire plan, I would be careful in ascribing such carefully preplanned command and staff work concepts and actions to this time, I personally have never seen one for 1915, and indeed much more recently they weren't that common at this level.


Cheers,
Hendo

Mate,

Go to the Axis History Forum webb site and under the Ottoman section you will find a number of maps by some Turkish and British blokes which show these.

I tried to put some of these here but I am unsure how to doi it without an attachment icon.

S.B

Bob

This is from the Classification of Turkish Artilley Thread. http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...p;#entry1245596

QUOTE (stevebecker @ Aug 16 2009, 09:46 AM)
Mates,

Jeff is correct all four Regts of the 19th Div had a MG Company.

The Bean map page 609 Vol 2 AOWH has markings of five MG s known to be in the area of Baby 700 and the Nek.

All are shown as single MG's and not in pairs or are they?

Two are shown at the Nek and two in the Baby 700 area while one is shown on the Chess board.

Now were these all from the 18th Regt and 72nd Regt?

Where were the four guns of the 27th Regt?

Where were the four guns of the 57th Regt?

S.B



Steve,

Thank you for that. I believe Bean has marked individual machine guns on that map. The problem with interpreting the Ottoman maps is that the symbol .l. represents the MG Coy, in the case of MAJ Sefik Bey's map from the morning of the landing he has represented the two sections of the company each with their own symbol. As I have said in a previous post, maneouvre, mobility and the uncertainty that applied on the day of the landing no longer apply, once the realities of trench warfare applied I have no doubt machine guns were placed where they could best provide support to the Ottoman infantry, it would have been pointelss massing them at that point and having runners going to and from passing requests for fire support back to them.

However with my own experience working with a Sustained Fire MG Platoon (Vickers) and talking to my father who served as a No#1 in a Vickers PL leads me to believe they Ottomans probably had one of the companies in depth, in a defilade position firiing enfilade onto a number of targets from distances over 1200ms.

I would suspect the same issues for locating ANZAC Vickers and Maxim's would apply, no one would put a valuable MG up in say Quinns Post, but a MG or MG's placed of to a flank could provide exceptional enfilade fire to support the guys in the post, from a distance.


Cheers,
Hendo

Mate,

If Jeff can post it as I can't, there is two maps in the war diary of the Anzac Corps showing the MG positions in the Number 3 and number 4 sections of the front at Gallipoli.

These are Number 3 section (Quinns to Popes) and Number 4 section (Walkers ridge).

These show all MG positions of the Anzac forces in detail with arcs of fire into the Turkish Trenches.

for example at Popes Post there were six MGs (two each from the 1st, 2nd and 3rd LHR's) of which five were placed in single positions to cover the front with one gun in Reserve.

Of these five guns three covered the front of Popes while two covered the area of Bloody Anlge and Quinns, Inter locking with guns on Quinns.

Quinns had two Guns from the Wellington Bn

Counrtneys had eight guns with two each from the 16Bn AIF, and 14Bn AIF and two each from the Otago and Auckland Bn's.

IN Reserve (inner defences) with four guns, two each from 13Bn AIF and Canterbury Bn.

So yes we did keep MGs in the front trenches if in fact the MG posts were back from the first trench line. Most guns were tied in with interlocking fire from another post while many just covered a piece of ground in front of the post.

Guns were placed both as pairs and single guns depending on the ground.

Cheers

S,B

Steve,

Points taken. I note you qualfiy the Anzac MG location by saying they were in secondary trenches, which is the point I was trying to make, they needed to be in some depth to provide the necessary protection and maximise the field of fire, plus they attracted trouble, so no one really wanted them in the most forward trenches. Now if we can find the Ottoman records of their MG disposition. I imagine by this point they would have deployed similarly, with fixed Range Cards there was no longer the need to operate by Section with their Range Finder.


Cheers,
Hendo