The prevailing fascination with conspiracy theories annoys me : and never more than when used to sell history books.

Yesterday, however, I heard something that took me aback, and it had the unsettling aura of authenticity about it.

It was suggested that Von Sanders & Co were determined to insist on a defence in depth at Gallipoli, with the specific intention of luring as many Allied troops as possible onto the peninsula.

Bearing in mind the immense damage that a small number of Turkish riflemen and machine gunners caused to British troops landing at Helles, it seems that a heavier defence mounted on the shore line would have been sufficient to prevent the landings altogether.

The Germans, it is alleged, were aware of this, but preferred to hold the Turks further back, so that the enemy could get ashore and would be encouraged to divert maximum force to the operation. With the heavy pressure they had to cope with on the Western Front, and especially in view of their grandiose plans against the Russians that year, the Germans would be gratified to witness such a huge diversion of Entente strength.

Far fetched or reasonable ?

Phil.

Is there any evidence to support this theory? It might sound feasible but without evidence it's a fairy tale.

Sounds like 20/20 hindsight to me.

Bearing in mind the immense damage that a small number of Turkish riflemen and machine gunners caused to British troops landing at Helles, it seems that a heavier defence mounted on the shore line would have been sufficient to prevent the landings altogether.

It would certainly have been hotter on the beaches if that had been LvS's only consideration,
but his immediate problem was that he could not be sure were the allies were going to land.

Liman von Sanders believed that the obvious place for the allies to land would be at the narrowest point on the peninsula, i.e. between the Gulf of Saros and the Sea of Marmara.

Hamilton also thought that this was an obvious point at which to land. So obvious in fact that he chose to land elsewhere, but to distract his enemy with a feint in that direction. Several naval ships and transports took the majority of the RND to the Gulf of Saros where on the night of the 24/25th April Freyberg of the Hood performed his amazing swim of several hours to light flares etc on the beaches.

Liman von Sanders bought this ruse and kept back most of two divisions to defend this area
"Considering a night landing in the Gulf of Saros (Xeros) still a possibility, I remained on the heights of Bulair until next morning. But the night remained quiet except for artillery fire; the ships frequently changed position. As the concentration of the hostile ships in the upper Saros Gulf was fully recognized as a demonstration by morning of April 26th, I ordered that forenoon that further units of the 5th and 7th Divisions should be transported to Maidos by boat during the next night and that the field artillery of the two divisions march to Maidos by land." [from his Five Years in Turkey]

These reinforcements therefore were only leaving the area of Bulair on the night of the 26th and would not reach the actual fighting fronts until sometime on the 27th at the earliest, but in the case of the artillery, very probably later. Also note that Liman was himself on the heights of Bulair at this time.

So Hamilton's ruse had not only kept back valuable enemy troops, but it had also taken the enemy commander away from where he was most needed.

For myself, I do not think that the opening theory holds any water

regards
Michael

Much to my embarrasment, Chris, I failed to enquire as to any evidence about this. It was at the Gallipoli Memorial Lecture at Whitehall, and there was an eminent speaker, and an impressive array of "men in suits" in the audience. I got chatting to one, and he imparted this suggestion, and I did not ask him about sources etc. It just made an impact on me, mainly because I had not considered it, and I thought it worthy of a pitch on the forum.

It would suit the Germans fine and dandy, to have virtually half a million enemy troops diverted to a desperate endeavour in the Straits of the Hellespont. The gentleman who spoke to me inferred that the Turks were keen to engage the bulk of their force on the beaches, but that the Germans insisted otherwise.

Phil.

Phil,


It was at the Gallipoli Memorial Lecture at Whitehall
I am interested to learn, was this event under the auspices of The Gallipoli Association?

It has reminded me of an earlier Gallipoli lecture. That on 23 April 1998 at Holy trinity Church, Eltham, given by Michael Sturmer [Professor of Medieval and Modern History at Friedrich-Alexander-Universitat, Erlangen-Nurnberg, & Director of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik at Ebenhausen]

He took as his title 'Strategies and Agonies in the Eastern Mediterranean'
It was a wide ranging talk, from Exodus and Moses to World War II and Erwin Rommel, but a couple of his points are particularly relevant here.

"It is strange that the German High Command did not immediately recognize the British Empire's Achilles heel (the Suez Canal) within easy reach of Turkish artillery. And it is equally strange that the British Navy, once it had chosen to attack the heart of the Turkish Empire, did not have the nerve to persevere. Strategic mistakes come in pairs and very often almost in symmetry, as if the generals followed, by hidden command, the same textbooks. While the Germans sent a detachment led by Major Kress von Kressenstein to the canal and allowed the Turkish troops to stage a weak advance, botch the surprise factor and be beaten by the British forces, the British recognized the vast consequences should these attacks have succeed… … … … "

And once the allies had landed on the peninsula

"The German Chancellor and the Foreign Office insisted more than ever before that, now or never, the Germans had to secure the supply lines through the Balkans. But owing to the treaty with Italy, Austria could not move in the Balkans: and the Austrian General Staff, probably correctly, saw a decision on the Russian front as the overriding priority. Serbia and Roumania were in the way. Bulgaria caught in a precarious neutrality.
While the Gallipoli landing threatened Turkey's centre, the Germans and the Austrians were unable, in military and diplomatic terms, to overcome Turkey's geographical isolation. In June 1915 it was evident that unless fresh munitions could come, that the Turks could not hold out. Turkey had to be saved through an offensive on Serbia – as the German Foreign Office insisted – or through those victories on the Eastern Front that would persuade Roumania to open its railways – as General Falkenhayn expected."

Sturmer also asserts that "There was no-one on Falkenhayn's staff who fully understood the strategic geography of the Greater Middle East and the decisive results it offered to a determined and well-oiled attack."

Yes they were thinking of the WF to the exclusion of all other possibilities, but no evidence that they saw Turkey as an sink hole for allied troops which otherwise might have been fed into the meat-grinder of F & F.

[Quotes from 'The Straits of War – Gallipoli Remembered,' Sutton Publishing, 2000, ISBN 0-7509-2408-X]

Best regards
Michael

As stated above, Liman von Sanders had to worry about possible landings along literally a few hundred miles of European and Asian coast, and the Allies put a lot of effort into several diversions and false landings. So it was necessary to disperse the troops and hold many back in reserve positions. It would have been very dangerous to allow a lot of Allied troops to land.

But I believe that some Turkish students of the campaign complain about the Germans holding back and not fiercely defending the coast.

I have read a lot of the German sources and memoirs of their leaders, not just Liman, and do not recall ever seeing anything that suggested this "lure them ashore" tactic. Liman v. Sanders could not have risked that.

I take considerable exception to some of the things that you report that Sturmer stated at that meeting. If you wish I will look at them more closely and comment. (It's a bit late here and I am fading.)

I would like to again recommend Klaus Wolf's recent book Gallipoli 1915, which is specifically on the German activity at Gallipoli, and which contains new material and sources, much from German and Turkish archives. I have engineered that a major university research library in the North-east of the US has added the book, plus the new reprint of the Schlachten des Weltkrieges volume on Gallipoli, to its collection, to make these books more accessible to US students thru inter-library loan.

Bob Lembke

Thank you, Bob and Michael. That section of yours, Bob, that I've selected here, gives an interesting slant on this. A conscious national grievance, or a histroriographical variance, or a bit of both ?

Michael, this lecture was held in the RUSI library, and was given by Sir Robert Fulton, erstwhile commandant of the Royal Marines and Governor of Gibraltar. It was, I beleive, a continuation of the tradition started by the Gallipoli Association, and Eltham was certainly mentioned in dispatches.

It was more about the geographical and strategic exigencies of maritime policy than it was about the campaign itself.

Phil.

The relationship between Turkey and Turks and Germany and Germans seems complex and of course varied. The opinions I saw expressed by one or two Turks seemed to me both unfair and also objectively incorrect, expressing that the Turks would have done much, much better in the Dardanelles without the activity of the Germans. The same person also raises what he felt was the error of not having the Turkish defenders massed at the shore. Of course, the question is: What shore?" But I do not think that the opinions expressed by the one or two people that I noticed is a "national greviance". I do not know this personally, I have only visited Turkey three times, in brief visits. As I have minimal Turkish, I often was able to use German to converse, since many Turks seem to speak it, mostly due to the great number of Turks working and living in Germany. I never noticed any adverse reaction to my use of German. (Once, in a really amusing incident, I was also able to use my fair but very rusty Serbo-Croatian; walking down a boulevard in Istanbul, I saw a cook making a Jugoslav dish (of Turkish origin), chivapchichi (spelled phonetically, the word requires a number of accents that I cannot conjure up here to write properly in Serb); not having had it in years, I rushed in, and attempted to talk to the cook in English and German, plus my microscopic Turkish, with no success. Finally, in despairation, I blurted its name out in Serbo-Croatian, and the cook laughed, and we started discussing it in Serb; he was a Bosnian refugee who have taken refuge from the fighting and ethnic cleansing in Turkey. The wife and I then obtained two plates of the delicious meat dish and retreated to a table to feast. I understand that there is a hotel in Istanbul where almost all staff and guests speak Serbo-Croatian.

Returning to 1915, it was vital that the Turks and Germans allow the Allies to take as little territory as possible when they landed. The situation was desperate. They did not have the luxury of letting many troops land so as to better kill more Allied troops. The exact opposite would have resulted; the more Allied troops landed the more Turkish troops who would have been killed. If the Allied troops had been able to advance only a few more miles the Straits would have been forced, with disasterous results for Turkey and the Central Powers. The idea is really preposperous.

Bob Lembke

Prebosphorus, even ...

Classic !

Phil.

The speaker at the lecture I went to was careful in his expression of opinion, but made it clear that, in his view, the operation to force the Dardanelles had a reasonably good chance of success. He contended that the same "ingredients", with a different "chef", might well have succeeded. He went on to say, however, that he was doubtful as to whether the successful operation at Gallipoli would have achieved the far reaching strategic results that its authors envisaged.

Phil.