This study covers the leadership qualities of General Von Sanders in Gallipoli leading the Turkish Army in successful defensive operations on the coast.
Then on the second topic:This study discusses the defensive plans as conceived and as executed in Gallipoli by General Von Sanders.
Joe
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.e...ilename=471.pdf
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.e...ilename=399.pdf
Ed Erickson criticises Sanders for his inflexibilty in 1918 regarding the Palestine Front.He never evolved as a commander and wasn't up to date with German defensive tactics on the Western Front from 1916 onwards--defence in depth,flexible response,counterattacks etc i.e not to hold the ground at all costs.
Recent research by Robin Prior suggests the Turkish dispositions at Gallipoli in April 1915 were formulated by Turkish officers and he only rubber stamped them.
Recent research by Robin Prior suggests the Turkish dispositions at Gallipoli in April 1915 were formulated by Turkish officers and he only rubber stamped them.
The problem with personalizing the operations of an Army is that the study of fellow at the top masks all the unknown people surrounding the leader who are actually responsible for both the planning and implementation of a strategy. That relies upon understanding the decision making processes, the training and resources at hand. The reality is that when rubber meets road, all plans fall apart and the reliance is left to the skills and initiative of the people on the spot. That is all tied up with the underlying cultural and skill mind sets of the those people. Critiquing von Sanders may be an interesting piece of gossip but it fails to shed light upon the underlying conditions which put the Ottoman Army into the field and sustained it.
Cheers
Bill
Cheers
Bill
One critique I've seen of Sanders career states he was a mildly comptetent division commander that was bounced off to head the Military Mission in Turkey after it was decided he was not Corps commander material and had reached the peak of his career.
In captivity in Malta after the war he stated that Enver tried to poison him in mid 1915 due to disputes over command issues.This would infer that either he was upsetting the Turks or he was not regarded as indispensable or both.
In captivity in Malta after the war he stated that Enver tried to poison him in mid 1915 due to disputes over command issues.This would infer that either he was upsetting the Turks or he was not regarded as indispensable or both.
QUOTE (PeterH @ Jul 23 2009, 10:18 PM) 
Ed Erickson criticises Sanders for his inflexibilty in 1918 regarding the Palestine Front.He never evolved as a commander and wasn't up to date with German defensive tactics on the Western Front from 1916 onwards--defence in depth,flexible response,counterattacks etc i.e not to hold the ground at all costs.
I don't think that he ever got a chance to see how tactics were evolving on the Western Front; I think that von Sanders was in Turkey right thru from 1913 to 1918, Hence the title of his memoirs, My Five Years in Turkey. It is also questionable if the infrastructure, training, etc. of most of the Turkish infantry units could successfully apply some of the latest tactics evolving on the Western Front. (The Germans were training some Turkish storm units in Galicia in the latest tactics and equipment, and at least one fought on the Palestine Front, however.)
Recent research by Robin Prior suggests the Turkish dispositions at Gallipoli in April 1915 were formulated by Turkish officers and he only rubber stamped them.
The officers in von Sander's command were a mix of Turkish and German officers, numerically mostly Turkish. I have before myself a photo of his staff in command of his 5th Army. (Klaus Wolf's Gallipoli 1915, page 99.) Von Sanders' Chief of Staff was Kazim Bey, a Turkish officer, but his Adjutant was Rittmeister Prigge, a Prussian officer. In the German scheme of command the commanding general's chief of staff normally drew up operational orders. (Tonight my wife is bringing me one of Prigge's books.)
I thought that when von Sanders took over the command of 5th Army at Gallipoli he changed the dispositions that had been made by the Turks, drawing back many troops that had been lining the shoreline and establishing larger mobile reserves to strike wherever the Allies landed. I recently saw, on this forum, a Turkish student of the war strongly argue that the original dispostions were better that von Sanders. Isn't this true? Doesn't this suggest that the dispositions were his? Or at least those of his Turkish staff officers, changing the prior Turkish dispositions?
I don't think that he ever got a chance to see how tactics were evolving on the Western Front; I think that von Sanders was in Turkey right thru from 1913 to 1918, Hence the title of his memoirs, My Five Years in Turkey. It is also questionable if the infrastructure, training, etc. of most of the Turkish infantry units could successfully apply some of the latest tactics evolving on the Western Front. (The Germans were training some Turkish storm units in Galicia in the latest tactics and equipment, and at least one fought on the Palestine Front, however.)
Recent research by Robin Prior suggests the Turkish dispositions at Gallipoli in April 1915 were formulated by Turkish officers and he only rubber stamped them.
The officers in von Sander's command were a mix of Turkish and German officers, numerically mostly Turkish. I have before myself a photo of his staff in command of his 5th Army. (Klaus Wolf's Gallipoli 1915, page 99.) Von Sanders' Chief of Staff was Kazim Bey, a Turkish officer, but his Adjutant was Rittmeister Prigge, a Prussian officer. In the German scheme of command the commanding general's chief of staff normally drew up operational orders. (Tonight my wife is bringing me one of Prigge's books.)
I thought that when von Sanders took over the command of 5th Army at Gallipoli he changed the dispositions that had been made by the Turks, drawing back many troops that had been lining the shoreline and establishing larger mobile reserves to strike wherever the Allies landed. I recently saw, on this forum, a Turkish student of the war strongly argue that the original dispostions were better that von Sanders. Isn't this true? Doesn't this suggest that the dispositions were his? Or at least those of his Turkish staff officers, changing the prior Turkish dispositions?
I read a lot about von Sanders, but he is not a focus of my study. I do have the impression that he was only an average flag-grade German officer, but that he put a lot of things to right in the very troubled Turkish Army. German General Staff officers and generals were extremely professional and well-schooled in staff work, and I feel that that sort of assistance to Turkey, with its many serious problems, was more important than providing a few brilliant combat command officers, if they did at all. Turkey had many able and brave combat officers.
Seemingly von Sanders was a very difficult officer to work for, and there are several odd personal stories from the period.
Bob Lembke
Bob
Appears the widowed Sanders thought himself a ladies man.When he first arrived in Constantinople he had his daughter in tow though.He certainly seems to be enjoying himself here with Souchon of the navy and an unidentified female.
After Gallipoli Sanders took up a command at Smyrna.
According to Paradise Lost,Giles Milton:
Peter
Appears the widowed Sanders thought himself a ladies man.When he first arrived in Constantinople he had his daughter in tow though.He certainly seems to be enjoying himself here with Souchon of the navy and an unidentified female.
After Gallipoli Sanders took up a command at Smyrna.
According to Paradise Lost,Giles Milton:
QUOTE
.."His Excellency wished only to refresh from his labour by talking to young girls..There was a pert young Levantine miss with whom he fell hoplessly in love and he took rooms on a narrow street directly opposite her house.Here he installed himself at a window and gazed across the way hour after hour".
It was to no avail,as their relationship remained a platonic one.The girl had no desire to get entangled with a man old enough to be her father.
It was to no avail,as their relationship remained a platonic one.The girl had no desire to get entangled with a man old enough to be her father.
Peter
I think that I read that he once thought that some shop-keeper had cheated his daughter, and he supposedly burst into the store with a drawn handgun. I personally have found Turkish merchants especially honest, but in some situations some back and forth is considered good form. I once bargained for an hour or more with an ethnic Turk in a bazaar in Skopjie, Macedonija for a $2 "Greek" bag; the foolish couple I was bargaining for stupidly informed our advisary/friend that we were Americans, putting the negotiations back almost an hour.
Bob
Bob
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