This thesis explores the roles of airpower in the Mesopotamian Campaign, and what affect airpower had on military operations. The thesis also looks at the missions of the Royal Flying Corps in Mesopotamia, how they evolved during the course of the conflict, and what impact they had on post-war Royal Air Force development. The study concludes by determining airpower in the Mesopotamian Campaign influenced the policy of air control in the post-war British Empire, and positively influenced the perception of ground commanders to the value of airpower to ground maneuver.
Joe
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.e...2mesopotamia%22

Very interesting!
My grandfather was in the L.A.M.B and they worked closely with the RFC. He was involved in the rescue of Tennant.
One of the L.A.M.B important duties as a mobile force being to rescue downed pilots.
Interestingly the same armoured cars were turned over to the RAF after the war.

Glad you liked it David.
Cheers
Joe

Your thesis on the use of air power in Mesopotamia is most instructive, if somewhat selective. Lt. General Cobbe Commanding 1st Indian Corps in his report on Operations from1 October to 10 N0vember 1918 states that " During every phase of the operations the work of the Royal Air Force both in reconnaissance and contact patrols and bombing was unceasing and invaluable. The hours of flying totalled 556, while 46 reconnaissances, 22 artillery shoots with aeroplane observation and 51 contact patrols ( in which 5 machines were severely damaged by machine gun and rifle fire) were carried out. The number of machines in action daily being 15. Three and a half tons of bombs were dropped on the enemy whose prisoners stated that our bombing inflicted heavy and demoralising casualties. All ranks of No 63 Squadron R.A.F., Pilots , Observers and mechanics alike , were unspairing in their efforts to make the cooperation of our aeroplanes as effective as possible."

However to say that the control of the ground was exercised by air in Somaliland by Z Force in 1920, or at any other time would be incorrect. Z Force was able to deny ground but it was the cooperation of both air and ground forces that eventually defeated Mohamed bin Abdullah Hassan, the "Mad Mullah." Cooperation is the controlling factor

Hello uzbashi, a little correction needs to be done here. This not my thesis, it is a thesis written in 2003, by a Major Peter J.Lambert of the USAF. Even though he seems to have good credentials, perhaps this subject was a little foreign for him to understand completely......and come to same conclusions as you did.
As for views on this subject, well you probably know and understand a lot more about it than me.
Thanks and Cheers
Joe

My apologies. I agree with most of Lambert's work on Mesopotamia but there is a great difference between the use of air power in a major war environment and the use of air power in undeveloped countries. Trenchard had experience in military operations in West Africa but little or no knowledge of the Somalis when he persuaded the British Government to mount an air strike on the "Mad Mullah." Ismay was serving throughout WW1 in Somaliland and was with the local Camel Corps when the operation by Z Force RAF was mounted. His "Memoirs" are worth reading for a view on the necessity for ground/air cooperation.

Thanks uzbashi. Comments appreciated.
Cheers
Joe