I was watching a programme about the Somme which stated that the Germans made the attack on Verdun knowing it would draw the French who were commited to defending this important town.
It never explained why Verdun was deemed to be so important to France - does anyone have the answer?
Full Version: Importance of Verdun
Verdun was a citadel of immense national importance to France : it was a symbol, as well as an imposing fortified sector in its own right. It shared this symbolic importance with Metz and Toul ; Falkenhayn was correct in his belief that the French would defend it, cost what it might. The reason for this symbolic importance is attributable to its close proximity to the old Gallic - Teutonic frontiers, which had seen rivalry between the French and Germans for centuries. I think that Louis XIV had gained the citadel, and it was rather a jewel in the crown as far as France's national prestige was concerned. If I remember my history, it had played an imporant role in the Revolutionary War and again in the Franco-Prussian War. It had also proved a very effective defensive bastion in September 1914. Its capture by the Germans would have been calamitous for french morale.
Phil.
Phil.
As Phil says, a symbolic and historic importance. Lost and regained in the Revolutionary wars after the first victory for the revolutionary armies at Valmy. After the Franco Prussian war, the French built an impenetrable chain of defence along their common border with Germany. Verdun was the northernmost fortress of the chain. With Verdun gone, the road from Germany to Paris was wide open and the fortresses at Toul, Epinal and Belfort with their fortified camps at Nancy and elsewhere could be isolated and attacked from the rear. It was because of Verdun and her sister fortresses that Schlieffen had to go the long way round and into France through Belgium. In the end, as well as fixing the northern end of the East frontier, Verdun was the eastern end of the northern front. A pivotal point in fact as well as in importance.
Apart from that, one over the hills at Verdun it is a nice easy trot all the way to Paris.
The range of hills from the Moselle to the rgonne, backed by the Meuse is France's inner defence line.
The range of hills from the Moselle to the rgonne, backed by the Meuse is France's inner defence line.
Thanks everyone for the explanation. The programme implied that there was something specidfically important about Verdun, a big omission in their script not taking 20 seconds to explain it!
If you are interested in this point, and in the importance of Verdun, a very interesting vignette can be obtained by studing the story of a Commandant Driant, the commander of two battalions of French Chaussers at Verdun. It is surprising, given the psychological and real importance of Verdun, how ill-prepared the French were to defend the area. Driant (I am going to fly on memory here, but will generally have it correct, I think) was not only a French officer (I think the equivilant rank was lieutenant colonel), but also I think a member of the French Assembly, and/or a newspaperman. He was very worried late 1915 about the state of the defenses, and wrote a number of embarrassing letters. When the fighting started his two battalions were driven back again and again (there were earthworks, but not a fully developed trench line), partially by a series of flame-thrower attacks. One factor in his being forced back, on the second day, from position to position, finally being pushed back about 2-3 km., was a half battery of 77 mm field guns being rolled thru the French lines by a company of pioneers, finally one gun was abandoned, but one rolled forward about 2-3 km., sometimes ahead of the French line, or the German infantry. At one point Driant and his men were holding a strong point, and were receiving light shells from the rear, which they first thought were French shorts, but then they spotted this lone 77 mm gun on a road behind and to the side of them, pumping shells into their position. Driant ordered a MG crew to take their gun out of the position and set up and cut down the gun crew, they were dubious, but one of Driant's officers grabbed the MG and carried it out some meters toward the gun; the crew scrambled after and were setting up the MG, and the gun fired and a shell directly hit the MG, totalling the MG and crew. Driant once again had to fall back.
Some time later Driant was in a concrete pill-box, his most rearward position, and they again began to receive shells, it was the same gun! And his men saw a flame-thrower crew working their way around to the rear of the pill-box. Once again Driant and his staff had to run, this time across an open area towards a French fortified village to the rear, but the attacking troops were Jaegers, the German equivilant of Chaussers, men largely taken from forresters and hunting guides, generally crack shots, and in seconds Driant and his staff were cut down.
Very dramatic and interesting fighting, and, combined with Driant's activism, which did prompt better French preparedness, was an important microcosim (sp?) of the opening phase of this interesting battle.
Bob Lembke
PS My father fought at Verdun, was wounded twice there; I have a piece of his left arm bone knocked out by a French 75 shell splinter there.
Some time later Driant was in a concrete pill-box, his most rearward position, and they again began to receive shells, it was the same gun! And his men saw a flame-thrower crew working their way around to the rear of the pill-box. Once again Driant and his staff had to run, this time across an open area towards a French fortified village to the rear, but the attacking troops were Jaegers, the German equivilant of Chaussers, men largely taken from forresters and hunting guides, generally crack shots, and in seconds Driant and his staff were cut down.
Very dramatic and interesting fighting, and, combined with Driant's activism, which did prompt better French preparedness, was an important microcosim (sp?) of the opening phase of this interesting battle.
Bob Lembke
PS My father fought at Verdun, was wounded twice there; I have a piece of his left arm bone knocked out by a French 75 shell splinter there.
Col Driants grave in the Bois de Caures. The Verdun battlefield is indeed a remarkable place and well deserving of a visit.
More photos here:
http://www.flickr.com/photos/glosters/sets...57602057021756/
Norman
Edited to add:
This is where the Colonel fell and not his last resting place - see post 12
More photos here:
http://www.flickr.com/photos/glosters/sets...57602057021756/
Norman
Edited to add:
This is where the Colonel fell and not his last resting place - see post 12
All,
Forum pal Christina Holstein is a very good reference point regarding Verdun.
Christina gave me a personal recommendation to read The Price of Glory: Verdun, 1916 by Alaistair Horne. It is available from Amazon (link below). I can now personally recommend it as both a fascinating and informative read (thanks Christina).
All the best,
Ian.
http://www.amazon.co.uk/Price-Glory-Verdun...1344&sr=8-1
Forum pal Christina Holstein is a very good reference point regarding Verdun.
Christina gave me a personal recommendation to read The Price of Glory: Verdun, 1916 by Alaistair Horne. It is available from Amazon (link below). I can now personally recommend it as both a fascinating and informative read (thanks Christina).
All the best,
Ian.
http://www.amazon.co.uk/Price-Glory-Verdun...1344&sr=8-1
[quote name='bob lembke' date='Oct 4 2009, 06:55 PM' post='1277206']
the attacking troops were Jaegers, the German equivilant of Chaussers, men largely taken from forresters and hunting guides, generally crack shots, and in seconds Driant and his staff were cut down.
According to what I've read somewhere, only about 100 Germans actually left their trenches and attacked Driant's position : such was the reliance on artillery doing the work...this was what AJP Taylor wrote about the German tactical plan for Verdun "...Falkenhayn preached economy and the slaughter of Frenchmen by artillery fire."
Phil.
the attacking troops were Jaegers, the German equivilant of Chaussers, men largely taken from forresters and hunting guides, generally crack shots, and in seconds Driant and his staff were cut down.
According to what I've read somewhere, only about 100 Germans actually left their trenches and attacked Driant's position : such was the reliance on artillery doing the work...this was what AJP Taylor wrote about the German tactical plan for Verdun "...Falkenhayn preached economy and the slaughter of Frenchmen by artillery fire."
Phil.
The significance of Verdun was further underlined in the opening weeks of the war. Part of Crown Prince Wilhelm's army swung around the defensive line of forts and came down through the Argonne Forest. It then began attacking towards the base of the salient held by the forts. Despite intense pressure, the French held onto the salient. Eventually, Wilhelm had to withdraw to the north again, in conformance with the retreat started by von Beulow's Second Army and confirmed by Hentsch.
Falkenhayn also believed that a direct threat to Verdun would eventually trigger an Anglo-French response elsewhere to relieve that pressure, which the German defenders would destroy. He failed to recognise that the Battle of the Somme was that response until after it had been launched, by which time the French and British successes had created a very significant problem.
Robert
Falkenhayn also believed that a direct threat to Verdun would eventually trigger an Anglo-French response elsewhere to relieve that pressure, which the German defenders would destroy. He failed to recognise that the Battle of the Somme was that response until after it had been launched, by which time the French and British successes had created a very significant problem.
Robert
QUOTE (Robert Dunlop @ Oct 5 2009, 06:38 AM) 
The significance of Verdun was further underlined in the opening weeks of the war. Part of Crown Prince Wilhelm's army swung around the defensive line of forts and came down through the Argonne Forest. It then began attacking towards the base of the salient held by the forts. Despite intense pressure, the French held onto the salient. Eventually, Wilhelm had to withdraw to the north again, in conformance with the retreat started by von Beulow's Second Army and confirmed by Hentsch.
Falkenhayn also believed that a direct threat to Verdun would eventually trigger an Anglo-French response elsewhere to relieve that pressure, which the German defenders would destroy. He failed to recognise that the Battle of the Somme was that response until after it had been launched, by which time the French and British successes had created a very significant problem.
Robert
Falkenhayn also believed that a direct threat to Verdun would eventually trigger an Anglo-French response elsewhere to relieve that pressure, which the German defenders would destroy. He failed to recognise that the Battle of the Somme was that response until after it had been launched, by which time the French and British successes had created a very significant problem.
Robert
That's an interesting aspect, Robert....that Falkenhayn envisaged his Verdun endeavour as inducing the Entente to counter attack, so that the Germans could administer costly repulses. Attrition not only at the Verdun sector itself, but also along the entire front.
Phil.
Verdun was the most heavily fortified city in France in 1914 and it was also the fortress city closest to the Franco-German border. I believe that was why it was so important to the French. More money had been spent on fortifying Verdun than on any other fortified city in France and it had the most modern forts, particularly Fts Douaumont and Vaux, which were state of the art at the time. To lose any city after 15 months of war was unthinkable to the French government but to lose Verdun was absolutely out of the question. It was known the world over as impregnable. In 1914 the Germans tried to pinch it out rather than face the forts but by the end of 1915 the forts had been stripped and Verdun was just a shell. I can't believe the Germans didn't know that.
There is always the possibility that Joffre was baiting a trap by stripping Verdun in the way he did. Draw the Germans in there and let the waves break against the rock before the Allied counter-offensive of 1916. For the Germans to go from the defensive to the offensive at the beginning of 1916 was hard enough, without fighting uphill for months. Joffre may have gambled that the French would be successful in the end and that a battle there would tie up a lot of Germans, guns, etc, that couldn't be used elsewhere.
Seadog - your photo shows where Driant fell, not where he was buried. I'm sad to say that recent refurbishment of the site of his grave has given him a new, modern grave of the sort seen in any French cemetery and has completely removed all traces of the grave of Commandant Renouard, who was buried next to him.
Christina
There is always the possibility that Joffre was baiting a trap by stripping Verdun in the way he did. Draw the Germans in there and let the waves break against the rock before the Allied counter-offensive of 1916. For the Germans to go from the defensive to the offensive at the beginning of 1916 was hard enough, without fighting uphill for months. Joffre may have gambled that the French would be successful in the end and that a battle there would tie up a lot of Germans, guns, etc, that couldn't be used elsewhere.
Seadog - your photo shows where Driant fell, not where he was buried. I'm sad to say that recent refurbishment of the site of his grave has given him a new, modern grave of the sort seen in any French cemetery and has completely removed all traces of the grave of Commandant Renouard, who was buried next to him.
Christina
Thanks Christina, I will amend the description. There seems to be quite a few "renovations" taking place lately most of which appear to be worse than the originals. I do hope that this is not a trend for the future.
This is one:
http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...24998&st=25
Norman
This is one:
http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...24998&st=25
Norman
QUOTE (Christina Holstein @ Oct 5 2009, 10:27 PM)
There is always the possibility that Joffre was baiting a trap by stripping Verdun in the way he did. Draw the Germans in there and let the waves break against the rock before the Allied counter-offensive of 1916. For the Germans to go from the defensive to the offensive at the beginning of 1916 was hard enough, without fighting uphill for months. Joffre may have gambled that the French would be successful in the end and that a battle there would tie up a lot of Germans, guns, etc, that couldn't be used elsewhere.
Christina
Christina
What a controversial, exciting and interesting new take on this episode of the Great War, Christina !
Well...maybe it's not new : but I certainly haven't heard of it before. It's almost tantamount to a conspiracy theory, rather redolent of the suggestion that the Americans were encouraging the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor. It's rather hard to imagine, but it's terribly thought provoking !
An edit here, just thinking aloud...it's an awful thing to say, but the French were bitter about what they perceived as lack of effort by the British; they had borne too much of the brunt while Perfidious Albion held back. What better way of throwing the burden of the planned Somme offensive onto the British than being "otherwise engaged" at Verdun ? The reduction of the French contingent in the Picardy offensive from the envisaged number as planned at Chantilly to a mere five on the opening day was very drastic. Haig was being told by his French counterpart that the French army would "cease to exist" if the Mill on the Meuse continued to grind : in reality, the expenditure of France's lifeblood at Verdun was modest compared with the earlier ravages of 1914 and the vain offensives of 1915. An interesting argument in the making here....
Phil
Good morning All,
Interesting post Christina, I suppose we'll never know Joffre's real intent ? What may give further insight is where and exactly when the guns went ? (and If they were really needed elsewhere).
As you say Verdun was the strongest fortified city in France at the outset of WW1 but it's place in the French "psyche" was already important (it was the last fortress city to fall in the Franco-Prussian war, the citizens rode from Verdun to assist/complete the arrest of Marie-Antoinette at Varennes etc.). The French would certainly rally to its defence with or without its forts "gunned".
If Joffre's rationale was as you are perhaps suggesting, then both sides saw Verdun as a battle of attrition which would suck in enemy forces from elsewhere; on Joffre's part, to do so having deliberately denuded the fortresses of guns reflects again on his reputation (?)
Another thought:
If it is true, as I have read, that the French seemed to lose faith in fortress defences early in the conflict, the Germans seemed more in awe of their capabilities and devoted much resources to their capture/destruction (Longwy) or did their best to avoid them (Montmedy) in the early stages. Both were old smaller fortified towns not improved to the extent that Verdun was. (Almost paradoxically the French then built the Maginot Line and the Germans developed the "blitzkrieg")
Interesting post Christina, I suppose we'll never know Joffre's real intent ? What may give further insight is where and exactly when the guns went ? (and If they were really needed elsewhere).
As you say Verdun was the strongest fortified city in France at the outset of WW1 but it's place in the French "psyche" was already important (it was the last fortress city to fall in the Franco-Prussian war, the citizens rode from Verdun to assist/complete the arrest of Marie-Antoinette at Varennes etc.). The French would certainly rally to its defence with or without its forts "gunned".
If Joffre's rationale was as you are perhaps suggesting, then both sides saw Verdun as a battle of attrition which would suck in enemy forces from elsewhere; on Joffre's part, to do so having deliberately denuded the fortresses of guns reflects again on his reputation (?)
Another thought:
If it is true, as I have read, that the French seemed to lose faith in fortress defences early in the conflict, the Germans seemed more in awe of their capabilities and devoted much resources to their capture/destruction (Longwy) or did their best to avoid them (Montmedy) in the early stages. Both were old smaller fortified towns not improved to the extent that Verdun was. (Almost paradoxically the French then built the Maginot Line and the Germans developed the "blitzkrieg")
Of all German generals, I would have thought that Falkenhayn was the least likely to be lured into any kind of trap. That is just my impression : I can claim nothing but the sketchiest of knowledge about him, but he does come over as a substantially thoughtful and realisitc warrior, not given to impulse, and always very circumspect about anything that smacked of the grandiose.
Phil.
Phil.
Steve, I disagree with you on the importance of Verdun in the French psyche. I have personally never been taken with the idea that the French nation saw Verdun as important in any way other than as a frontier fortress. It had only been French since about 1648, being part of the Holy Roman Empire before then. I can't really believe that the man in the street in France cared about Charlemagne and the Treaty of Verdun in 800-and-something - any more than Brits would attach much importance to something that might have happened in, say, Mercia or Wessex at the same time. As regards cities besieged by the Germans after 1870, it is Belfort that plays a part in the national psyche rather than Verdun. Belfort is a name that everyone connects with the war of 1870 and the defence of it by Denfert-Rochereau is still regarded as a shining example of true French resistance to the enemy.
I don't think Joffre deliberately denuded the fortress cities, of which there were many - Verdun being the one nearest to the German border. By the middle of 1915 Joffre needed to get his hands urgently on more men, guns, equipment and general supplies, of which there were huge amounts tied up in the French fortress cities. The govenor of a fortress city (a 'Place Forte') had the right to dispose of them as he saw fit, without regard to the wishes of the C in C. The only way that Joffre could get his hands on those resources was by changing the status of the fortress cities - all of them, not just Verdun - and downgrading them from 'Places Fortes' to 'Régions Fortifiées', which he did by decree in August 1915. At the time Verdun had been 'quiet' for months and Joffre may have gambled that it would stay that way, as he expressed the view that, once stripped, the forts would have no interest for the Germans. But if they did choose to attack, that would tie them up and reduce the resources available to meet the Allied offensive of 1916. So in a sense he may have thought it was a Win-Win situation.
For Joffre the Allied offensive was more important than any ongoing French offensive, however bloody. When Gen. Mangin asked in May 1916 for 6 Divisions for the attempt to retake Fort Douaumont, the answer he got from Joffre, shocking as it may seem, was 'And what would I have left for the Somme if I gave you so many divisions for a little local offensive like Verdun?'
As regards forts, there were two conflicting schools of thought in the French Army before 1914: one in favour of fortresses and one in favour of a war of movement and 'la furia francese'. Joffre was not in favour of forts. The Germans were surprised at how long Longwy held out (so am I), while the garrison at Montmedy was ordered by Joffre to withdraw after destroying their supplies, which allowed the Germans to take it unopposed. I think that it's not surprising that the French went into fortress development after WWI, seeing the way that their forts - even the old ones - held out against bombardment, and their dreadful losses in men. But of course the Germans didn't want to be stuck in a siege in another war and developed fast moving armour and aircraft.
I really think that Falkenhayn thought that he would break through at Verdun and that the French would collapse and it was the French collapse that he wanted. He knew that their losses had been very substantial and that their best and most productive agricultural land was in German hands, as well as most of their mines and industrial production. I'm sure he knew that the Verdun fortress sytem was just a shell and very weakly defended. It is difficult to see why he only launched the offensive on one side of the river but if he believed, as he did, that the French guns were too old and too few to resist his artillery and that their transport and supply system into the city was too weak to supply a major battle, he had no reason to suppose that they would hold out for long. He may have taken the view that (a) if they did hold out at first, he would inflict such heavy casualties that they would not be able to do it for long and (
that if they lost Verdun, the government would fall and that would be the end of the France in the war. Looked at like that, it was a Win-Win situation for him too. And indeed it almost was.
Whether the French would have collapsed if Verdun had been lost is another matter. After all, Napoleon III surrendered in 1870 but determined Frenchmen raised a nation in arms that kept the Germans fighting for another year. And the Armistice of 1940 didn't stop other Frenchmen carrying on the fight either.
We need new biographies of all these generals. They've all been pretty badly served by historians and knowledge of what they thought and said would help us all.
Christina
I don't think Joffre deliberately denuded the fortress cities, of which there were many - Verdun being the one nearest to the German border. By the middle of 1915 Joffre needed to get his hands urgently on more men, guns, equipment and general supplies, of which there were huge amounts tied up in the French fortress cities. The govenor of a fortress city (a 'Place Forte') had the right to dispose of them as he saw fit, without regard to the wishes of the C in C. The only way that Joffre could get his hands on those resources was by changing the status of the fortress cities - all of them, not just Verdun - and downgrading them from 'Places Fortes' to 'Régions Fortifiées', which he did by decree in August 1915. At the time Verdun had been 'quiet' for months and Joffre may have gambled that it would stay that way, as he expressed the view that, once stripped, the forts would have no interest for the Germans. But if they did choose to attack, that would tie them up and reduce the resources available to meet the Allied offensive of 1916. So in a sense he may have thought it was a Win-Win situation.
For Joffre the Allied offensive was more important than any ongoing French offensive, however bloody. When Gen. Mangin asked in May 1916 for 6 Divisions for the attempt to retake Fort Douaumont, the answer he got from Joffre, shocking as it may seem, was 'And what would I have left for the Somme if I gave you so many divisions for a little local offensive like Verdun?'
As regards forts, there were two conflicting schools of thought in the French Army before 1914: one in favour of fortresses and one in favour of a war of movement and 'la furia francese'. Joffre was not in favour of forts. The Germans were surprised at how long Longwy held out (so am I), while the garrison at Montmedy was ordered by Joffre to withdraw after destroying their supplies, which allowed the Germans to take it unopposed. I think that it's not surprising that the French went into fortress development after WWI, seeing the way that their forts - even the old ones - held out against bombardment, and their dreadful losses in men. But of course the Germans didn't want to be stuck in a siege in another war and developed fast moving armour and aircraft.
I really think that Falkenhayn thought that he would break through at Verdun and that the French would collapse and it was the French collapse that he wanted. He knew that their losses had been very substantial and that their best and most productive agricultural land was in German hands, as well as most of their mines and industrial production. I'm sure he knew that the Verdun fortress sytem was just a shell and very weakly defended. It is difficult to see why he only launched the offensive on one side of the river but if he believed, as he did, that the French guns were too old and too few to resist his artillery and that their transport and supply system into the city was too weak to supply a major battle, he had no reason to suppose that they would hold out for long. He may have taken the view that (a) if they did hold out at first, he would inflict such heavy casualties that they would not be able to do it for long and (
that if they lost Verdun, the government would fall and that would be the end of the France in the war. Looked at like that, it was a Win-Win situation for him too. And indeed it almost was.Whether the French would have collapsed if Verdun had been lost is another matter. After all, Napoleon III surrendered in 1870 but determined Frenchmen raised a nation in arms that kept the Germans fighting for another year. And the Armistice of 1940 didn't stop other Frenchmen carrying on the fight either.
We need new biographies of all these generals. They've all been pretty badly served by historians and knowledge of what they thought and said would help us all.
Christina
Sorry about the smiley. It should have been a (!
Seadog, you're right about unfortunate restoration. Strangely enough, the places that really need restoration, like Forts Douaumont and Vaux, don't get it. All a question of money, I suppose.
Christina
!Seadog, you're right about unfortunate restoration. Strangely enough, the places that really need restoration, like Forts Douaumont and Vaux, don't get it. All a question of money, I suppose.
Christina
QUOTE (Christina Holstein @ Oct 7 2009, 08:11 PM)
For Joffre the Allied offensive was more important than any ongoing French offensive, however bloody. When Gen. Mangin asked in May 1916 for 6 Divisions for the attempt to retake Fort Douaumont, the answer he got from Joffre, shocking as it may seem, was 'And what would I have left for the Somme if I gave you so many divisions for a little local offensive like Verdun?'
Christina
Christina
That's astonishing, considering that on July 1st 1916 the French deployment on the Somme was reduced to five divisions. There must have been some resentment felt by Fayolle ( and Foch ?) who, presumably, felt that their own endeavours were compromised by the resources sent to Verdun.
Phil.
Good morning Christina,
I have always held the view of Joffre and the fortress guns that you affirmed in your most recent post. I was just trying to develop the point you made in your first post (second paragraph) about the "possibility" of Joffre baiting a trap. As you conclude we perhaps need new insights into these generals' histories.
With that "devil's advocate" hint in your first post I had hoped we would stimulate more of a discussion amongst Forum members !
How important Verdun was (is) in the French "psyche" was secondary in importance to the fact that, as you stated, it was the most heavily fortified city in France and known as such; I raised the point only to support the fact that for the French to see what they perceived as their most heavily fortified city fall would be a severe blow (but I too suspect not fatal for France - again another issue worthy of more debate).
Your suggestion that Falkenhayn probably thought he would breakthrough quickly at Verdun contrasts with the "bleed France white" position that is often put forward as a reason for Verdun's selection as a battle. Phil says that Falkenhayn was unlikely to be drawn into a trap but a "trap" that offered a "win-win" situation as you suggest might have been an exception. Running with the "trap" theory, would Joffre have had the confidence to do this ? With hindsight we know the Germans were driven back but .....
If, as you suggest in your second post, Joffre rather saw Verdun in its weakened state of been little interest to the Germans but if they did attack, a draw on their resources at the time of the 1916 Allied offensive, is perhaps rather ironic given that Verdun itself is often sited for the timing of the Somme offensive (back to the initial post of this thread).
I look forward to reading more contributions.
I have always held the view of Joffre and the fortress guns that you affirmed in your most recent post. I was just trying to develop the point you made in your first post (second paragraph) about the "possibility" of Joffre baiting a trap. As you conclude we perhaps need new insights into these generals' histories.
With that "devil's advocate" hint in your first post I had hoped we would stimulate more of a discussion amongst Forum members !
How important Verdun was (is) in the French "psyche" was secondary in importance to the fact that, as you stated, it was the most heavily fortified city in France and known as such; I raised the point only to support the fact that for the French to see what they perceived as their most heavily fortified city fall would be a severe blow (but I too suspect not fatal for France - again another issue worthy of more debate).
Your suggestion that Falkenhayn probably thought he would breakthrough quickly at Verdun contrasts with the "bleed France white" position that is often put forward as a reason for Verdun's selection as a battle. Phil says that Falkenhayn was unlikely to be drawn into a trap but a "trap" that offered a "win-win" situation as you suggest might have been an exception. Running with the "trap" theory, would Joffre have had the confidence to do this ? With hindsight we know the Germans were driven back but .....
If, as you suggest in your second post, Joffre rather saw Verdun in its weakened state of been little interest to the Germans but if they did attack, a draw on their resources at the time of the 1916 Allied offensive, is perhaps rather ironic given that Verdun itself is often sited for the timing of the Somme offensive (back to the initial post of this thread).
I look forward to reading more contributions.
I believe that the fate of the Belgian fortresses had a strong effect on how Joffre viewed the French fortresses. The French were much dismayed at the speed with which the new and very secret super heavy guns forced capitulation at Liege. In conjunction with the school of thought that saw the French military genius as one of l'audace, toujours l'audace, it made sense to take the heavy artillery of which there was a shortage and put it into the line and get the majority of the garrisons out into fortified outworks where they would not be trapped or killed when the fort was demolished about their ears. Unfortunately, those who put their faith in the doctrine of the strong fortress securing a defensive line thought the process was taken too far. The fact is, French artillery prior to the war had leant too far towards the 75 and left the artillery short of heavies. What guns there were had to be used as best they could and the CiC decided that was in the line, not in a fortress. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. Verdun stood, the line held. The period of the Battles of the Frontiers saw Joffre left with no plans. Plan 17 had collapsed and he was forced to shift as best he could. He literally reformed the entire French defence on the hoof. Armies were formed, moved and moved again all the while defending as best they could against an advancing German force. This culminated in the successful Battle of the Marne but losses were dreadful and the war was still to be won. A war on an entirely unforeseen front must have helped to make the fortresses on the Eastern frontier lose almost all importance and the idea that precious heavy artillery and crews should be kept there seem a luxury Joffre could not afford. Let's hear it for Papa Joffre!
Good afternoon All,
So from Christine's and Tom's post did the Germans "shoot themselves in the foot" (I know it's the wrong analogy for this forum !) by making such a point of levelling Longwy. So early in the conflict it was a potent example of what their siege guns could do to a French fortified city - hardly a building was left standing. It may have been a deliberate ploy to undermine morale and stress German superiority but if in reality it only served to help make Joffre's mind up re the best use of the heavy guns, was it not ultimately counter-productive in helping restore the artillery balance elsewhere ?
So from Christine's and Tom's post did the Germans "shoot themselves in the foot" (I know it's the wrong analogy for this forum !) by making such a point of levelling Longwy. So early in the conflict it was a potent example of what their siege guns could do to a French fortified city - hardly a building was left standing. It may have been a deliberate ploy to undermine morale and stress German superiority but if in reality it only served to help make Joffre's mind up re the best use of the heavy guns, was it not ultimately counter-productive in helping restore the artillery balance elsewhere ?
It was not expected that the Belgian fortresses would withstand attack indefinitely but in the event, they fell very quickly. It was not realised that the Germans had such large siege guns which could be brought up as quickly as they were. If I remember correctly the armour and fortification was built to withstand 20 cm guns but the Germans were able to field 40 cms. That is almost certainly not correct but gives some idea of the problem.
There is no sense in having a weapon if it is not used. The Germans staked everything on a rapid movement through Belgium, intending to pin the French against their own fortified line from the rear. That was the Schlieffen plan. It required sudden attack and a rapid advance through Belgium. Using the guns was necessary, that is what they were for.
Once held, at the Marne, the Schlieffen plan had failed. It was necessary to make a new plan. The Germans decided to attack Verdun but with the intention of killing men, not occupying territory. They had to attack but it was in the hope of being able to inflict massive losses on the French when they counterattacked. The actual capture of Verdun was secondary. They underestimated the French capacity to absorb losses and to inflict losses on the Germans in return. They overestimated their own capabilities and were once again, held on a line.They very badly misjudged the response of the French nation to heavy losses. Far from causing them to lose the will to fight, it inspired a great desire for revenge.
Joffre had committed himself to a major attack in Picardy in summer. It was only very reluctantly that over the period, he had to re-assign resources from that attack to Verdun and reduce France's part in the Battle of the Somme from major partner to very much a minor partner.
There is no sense in having a weapon if it is not used. The Germans staked everything on a rapid movement through Belgium, intending to pin the French against their own fortified line from the rear. That was the Schlieffen plan. It required sudden attack and a rapid advance through Belgium. Using the guns was necessary, that is what they were for.
Once held, at the Marne, the Schlieffen plan had failed. It was necessary to make a new plan. The Germans decided to attack Verdun but with the intention of killing men, not occupying territory. They had to attack but it was in the hope of being able to inflict massive losses on the French when they counterattacked. The actual capture of Verdun was secondary. They underestimated the French capacity to absorb losses and to inflict losses on the Germans in return. They overestimated their own capabilities and were once again, held on a line.They very badly misjudged the response of the French nation to heavy losses. Far from causing them to lose the will to fight, it inspired a great desire for revenge.
Joffre had committed himself to a major attack in Picardy in summer. It was only very reluctantly that over the period, he had to re-assign resources from that attack to Verdun and reduce France's part in the Battle of the Somme from major partner to very much a minor partner.
Tom,
That has always been my understanding of the German viewpoint on Verdun: to suck in the French Army and inflict massive losses, rather than a breakthrough. Similarly I am a "traditionalist" when it comes to why the fortress was denuded of guns - agreeing with yours and Christina's reasoning ("better used elsewhere"). Christina, however, raised two possible "alternative" theories: (1) Joffre may have baited a trap and (2) Falkenhayn really thought he could breakthrough (causing a French collapse) ?
As you state the Schlieffen Plan called for a sudden attack and rapid movement through Belgium/Northern France. I am less convinced that laying siege to Longwy (and Maubege) was necessary and it certainly didn't contribute to the speed of the advance. The siege of Longwy commenced 2 days before the main encounters of the Battle of the Frontiers in southern Belgium but more importantly lasted 4/5 days beyond them. I would suggest that perhaps their preoccupation with the fortress didn't permit the Germans to take full advantage of the outstanding victories wrought on 22 August and contributed ultimately to the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, a lesson learnt by World War 2 (a point which I tried to make earlier and Christina put more clearly)
That has always been my understanding of the German viewpoint on Verdun: to suck in the French Army and inflict massive losses, rather than a breakthrough. Similarly I am a "traditionalist" when it comes to why the fortress was denuded of guns - agreeing with yours and Christina's reasoning ("better used elsewhere"). Christina, however, raised two possible "alternative" theories: (1) Joffre may have baited a trap and (2) Falkenhayn really thought he could breakthrough (causing a French collapse) ?
As you state the Schlieffen Plan called for a sudden attack and rapid movement through Belgium/Northern France. I am less convinced that laying siege to Longwy (and Maubege) was necessary and it certainly didn't contribute to the speed of the advance. The siege of Longwy commenced 2 days before the main encounters of the Battle of the Frontiers in southern Belgium but more importantly lasted 4/5 days beyond them. I would suggest that perhaps their preoccupation with the fortress didn't permit the Germans to take full advantage of the outstanding victories wrought on 22 August and contributed ultimately to the failure of the Schlieffen Plan, a lesson learnt by World War 2 (a point which I tried to make earlier and Christina put more clearly)
In the overall context of the Western Front, Longwy was a tiny tiny dot. The artillery forces needed by the Germans to reduce the likes of Longwy were not of the type that could easily accompany a war of movement. It seems highly unlikely that the efforts to take Longwy made the slightest difference in affecting the overall outcome of the Schlieffen Plan. The plan depended on the performance of the German right wing, pivoting around the centre based on Metz. If it had worked, then any potential effect that the fall of Longwy had on Joffre's thinking to move the fortress guns would have been totally irrelevant.
Joffre did concede territory in an effort to trap von Kluck. This did not constitute 'baiting' von Kluck. Some commentators have suggested that the Joffre launched his counter-offensive too soon, thereby failing to trap the First Army. Assuming this is true, just for the purposes of discussion, then it is difficult to know if the continued loss of territory to von Kluck's advance precipitated Joffre's decision. Subsequently, however, once the Western Front had stabilised then Joffre wanted to regain territory, not run the risk of loosing territory. This approach was very clear in Joffre's plans for 1916, as elucidated prior to the launch of the Verdun offensive.
Robert
Joffre did concede territory in an effort to trap von Kluck. This did not constitute 'baiting' von Kluck. Some commentators have suggested that the Joffre launched his counter-offensive too soon, thereby failing to trap the First Army. Assuming this is true, just for the purposes of discussion, then it is difficult to know if the continued loss of territory to von Kluck's advance precipitated Joffre's decision. Subsequently, however, once the Western Front had stabilised then Joffre wanted to regain territory, not run the risk of loosing territory. This approach was very clear in Joffre's plans for 1916, as elucidated prior to the launch of the Verdun offensive.
Robert
During a discussion about Verdun that I enjoyed about a year ago, I learnt something that hadn't previously occurred to me.
Apparently, Falkenhayn was intent on trying a formula that he believed would defeat France through attrition of manpower and morale. This formula entailed the use of massive firepower and limited manpower on small sectors. Verdun was selected becasue of its symbolic importance. It was, however, envisaged by Falkenhayn to be but one episode in a series of attritional battles that could be unleashed at different times and places along the Western Front. In view of this, manpower was held back, and the offensive contained, initially, to one side of the Meuse. The formula depended on the willingness and ability of the Germans to transfer offensives to other sectors, administer sharp local defeats, inflict terrible losses, and cock a thumb at the Entente by demonstrating that German methods would prevail.
This formulaic approach was to be demonstrated at Verdun, a sector that the French were bound to fight hard for. It was, however, the formula rather than the locality that was of paramount significance.
Phil
Apparently, Falkenhayn was intent on trying a formula that he believed would defeat France through attrition of manpower and morale. This formula entailed the use of massive firepower and limited manpower on small sectors. Verdun was selected becasue of its symbolic importance. It was, however, envisaged by Falkenhayn to be but one episode in a series of attritional battles that could be unleashed at different times and places along the Western Front. In view of this, manpower was held back, and the offensive contained, initially, to one side of the Meuse. The formula depended on the willingness and ability of the Germans to transfer offensives to other sectors, administer sharp local defeats, inflict terrible losses, and cock a thumb at the Entente by demonstrating that German methods would prevail.
This formulaic approach was to be demonstrated at Verdun, a sector that the French were bound to fight hard for. It was, however, the formula rather than the locality that was of paramount significance.
Phil
I have had a look at the relevant section of Falkenhayn's memoirs. Some doubt has been cast over his published analysis of Germany's 1916 war aims, which explicitly link the Verdun operation to a policy of attrition, rather than breakthrough but, leaving that aside, this is a summary of his arguments regarding attacking on the east bank of the Meuse only:
1. There were only 17 or 18 divisions available for the assault. Nine were needed for the initial attack and others had to be earmarked for relief or subsequent operations. By not committing troops to an attack on the west bank, flexibility was retained.
2. Geography played a large role in the decision:
a. 'The sharp salient formed by the enemy's front north east...of Douaumont offered from the outset encircling
possibilities such as are rarely found in a war of position.'
b. The risk of coming under heavy artillery fire from the west bank as operations on the east progressed was
recognised but, there was a lack of troops and it was doubtful if an operation there against a 'strong, well-constructed
position, occupied by an enemy in superior strength' would have been successful.
c. '...the lie of the land was in no way favourable to operations on the west bank.'
3. If the attack failed on the west bank there was the risk that the vulnerability of the flank on the east bank would become permanent because there were insufficient troops to go on repeating the attack.
4. A western attack might enjoy greater success if it followed an eastern attack, because the French could well be forced to withdraw troops on the west bank to check progress on the east, which would in turn weaken it.
5. There seemed to be a possiblity, even with a relatively modest advance on the east, of effectively outflanking the French lines west of the river. 'This was calculated to make the attack on the west of the river much easier.'
He goes on to say 'The Chief of the General Staff decided for that reason [i.e. 5 above] to let the western attack start later than the main attack.' A cynic would say that this was an example of 'Situating the Appreciation', rather than 'Appreciating' it correctly in advance or, more likely, an ex post facto attempt to justify a major decision reached for other reasons. Falkenhayn's command methods, as exemplified by his decisions regarding the use of the Fourth and Sixth Armies during First Ypres and here again at Verdun, involved huge gambles and relied on the enemy reacting and operations developing in a particular way. He was severely slated for this at the time by other commanders, very noticeably Rupprecht, who dismissed him as a dangerous adventurer. When he was later removed from command, the flawed thinking behind these two operations appeared high up on the 'charge sheet.'
Jack
1. There were only 17 or 18 divisions available for the assault. Nine were needed for the initial attack and others had to be earmarked for relief or subsequent operations. By not committing troops to an attack on the west bank, flexibility was retained.
2. Geography played a large role in the decision:
a. 'The sharp salient formed by the enemy's front north east...of Douaumont offered from the outset encircling
possibilities such as are rarely found in a war of position.'
b. The risk of coming under heavy artillery fire from the west bank as operations on the east progressed was
recognised but, there was a lack of troops and it was doubtful if an operation there against a 'strong, well-constructed
position, occupied by an enemy in superior strength' would have been successful.
c. '...the lie of the land was in no way favourable to operations on the west bank.'
3. If the attack failed on the west bank there was the risk that the vulnerability of the flank on the east bank would become permanent because there were insufficient troops to go on repeating the attack.
4. A western attack might enjoy greater success if it followed an eastern attack, because the French could well be forced to withdraw troops on the west bank to check progress on the east, which would in turn weaken it.
5. There seemed to be a possiblity, even with a relatively modest advance on the east, of effectively outflanking the French lines west of the river. 'This was calculated to make the attack on the west of the river much easier.'
He goes on to say 'The Chief of the General Staff decided for that reason [i.e. 5 above] to let the western attack start later than the main attack.' A cynic would say that this was an example of 'Situating the Appreciation', rather than 'Appreciating' it correctly in advance or, more likely, an ex post facto attempt to justify a major decision reached for other reasons. Falkenhayn's command methods, as exemplified by his decisions regarding the use of the Fourth and Sixth Armies during First Ypres and here again at Verdun, involved huge gambles and relied on the enemy reacting and operations developing in a particular way. He was severely slated for this at the time by other commanders, very noticeably Rupprecht, who dismissed him as a dangerous adventurer. When he was later removed from command, the flawed thinking behind these two operations appeared high up on the 'charge sheet.'
Jack
Thank you, Jack. You give me more than a pause for thought regarding my perception of Falkenhayn. I certainly had not associated him with " huge gambles". I can't wait for your next book on First Ypres !
Phil
Phil
Jack,
A wonderful phrase "situating the appreciation" !, it is always difficult interpreting (the true value of) memoirs. As Christina said in her initial post, we perhaps need new histories of these generals, reflecting on and analysing all these alternative viewpoints.
Robert,
I appreciate that the siege artillery wasn't much use in a war of movement, I was suggesting that the German preoccupation with the fortress/fortresses in Northern France; a "mindset" as much as anything else, perhaps helped contribute to slowing the enaction of the Schlieffen Plan after their astounding successes of 22 August.
A wonderful phrase "situating the appreciation" !, it is always difficult interpreting (the true value of) memoirs. As Christina said in her initial post, we perhaps need new histories of these generals, reflecting on and analysing all these alternative viewpoints.
Robert,
I appreciate that the siege artillery wasn't much use in a war of movement, I was suggesting that the German preoccupation with the fortress/fortresses in Northern France; a "mindset" as much as anything else, perhaps helped contribute to slowing the enaction of the Schlieffen Plan after their astounding successes of 22 August.
Phil
Since you come to mention it, all is progressing smoothly, but it will be some time before anything actually appears. Falkenhayn himself admitted post-war that operations on the Allied left flank in late autumn 1914 were a gamble. In his 1919 book General Headquarters 1914 - 1916 and its Critical Decisions p 28, he summarises the German approach in Flanders thus: 'The prize to be won was worth the stake.' Enough said...
Jack
Since you come to mention it, all is progressing smoothly, but it will be some time before anything actually appears. Falkenhayn himself admitted post-war that operations on the Allied left flank in late autumn 1914 were a gamble. In his 1919 book General Headquarters 1914 - 1916 and its Critical Decisions p 28, he summarises the German approach in Flanders thus: 'The prize to be won was worth the stake.' Enough said...
Jack
Steve, I understand but would respectfully submit that the delays in execution of the plan were not due to the issues around fortresses. Zuber's work might suggest this, but one of the problems with his book is that it only concentrates on a few days in the Ardennes and mostly from the German perspective. Leaving aside the fact that the Ardennes was only one piece (bigger than a dot for sure but still only a fraction of the whole line) of what was happening, the French rearguard actions were very significant in slowing the German exploitation, not just in terms of time but also in draining German manpower too. Zuber only hints at this.
Robert
Robert
Thanks Robert,
I wasn't trying to denigrate the French rearguard actions, I was suggesting only that the "preoccupation" was a contribution. I am well aware of Zuber's perspective and try only ever use his work as a "counterpoint" or "counterbalance". Forgive me for concentrating on the Ardennes but forum discussions seldom venture here (and going off-topic), but to emphasise the point you make about Zuber being selective. He headlined his book "Battle of the Ardennes" but only covered that successful weekend over a front that extended south of the actual Ardennes. The French Cemetery at Noyers-Pont-Maugis, near Sedan, displays a narrative board also entitled "The Battle of the Ardennes" and details some of the effective rearguard actions that you highlight.
I wasn't trying to denigrate the French rearguard actions, I was suggesting only that the "preoccupation" was a contribution. I am well aware of Zuber's perspective and try only ever use his work as a "counterpoint" or "counterbalance". Forgive me for concentrating on the Ardennes but forum discussions seldom venture here (and going off-topic), but to emphasise the point you make about Zuber being selective. He headlined his book "Battle of the Ardennes" but only covered that successful weekend over a front that extended south of the actual Ardennes. The French Cemetery at Noyers-Pont-Maugis, near Sedan, displays a narrative board also entitled "The Battle of the Ardennes" and details some of the effective rearguard actions that you highlight.
I know from previous posts that you understand the French perspective far more than most. So I did not assume that you were denigrating the rearguard actions. It is all about a sense of perspective (and I don't meant that mine is the right one either 
). 'Preoccupation' implies a major degree of focus, but the relative numbers involved were far from 'major' in the overall scheme of things. Could the resources that were tied up in 'sieges' have been used elsewhere? More importantly, if they had been used elsewhere would they have made a decisive difference? No, IMHO.
Robert
). 'Preoccupation' implies a major degree of focus, but the relative numbers involved were far from 'major' in the overall scheme of things. Could the resources that were tied up in 'sieges' have been used elsewhere? More importantly, if they had been used elsewhere would they have made a decisive difference? No, IMHO.Robert
Jack - thanks for summarising Falkenhayn's arguments. I have always been doubtful about the value of memoirs written by someone who lost his job but perhaps I'm being cynical. However, it must also be remembered that Falkenhayn was not popular among many of the other Generals and certainly not in the Reichsarchiv, so he got a bad press after the war.
I would agree with Falkenhayn's point 2a but absolutely disagree with his argument in 2b if by that he means that the west bank consisted of a 'strong, well-constructed position, occupied by an enemy in superior strength'. The East Bank was much more heavily fortified than the West Bank. Similarly, I don't agree at all with his statement that '...the lie of the land was in no way favourable to operations on the west bank.' The three ridges on the West Bank are lower and more open than the narrow, steep ridges on the eastern side and the forts were mostly older and weaker (with exceptions, of course).
All the war games concerning Verdun played by the Germans before the war had involved an attack on both sides of the river simultaneously. Falkenhayn's 5th Army commanders in the field protested vehemently against an attack on only one side of the river but he resisted. Interestingly General von Zwehl wrote in his memoirs that he believed that an attack against the more lightly fortified West Bank was more likely to have been successful because the northernmost ridge (Mort-Homme and Hill 304) was not fortified and that the forts on the the next ridge south were weaker than those on the East Bank. Von Zwehl took the view that an attack on the West Bank alone with sufficient troops had the possibility of bringing them to the second ridge, i.e. the ridge with the weaker forts, within a short time and that from there the Germans would have been within sight of Verdun city. The operative words are, of course, 'had the possibility of'
I would agree with Falkenhayn on the fact that geography played a part in the decision. I think that the advantages to the Germans of attacking there are almost always overlooked. The German lines were only about 7 miles north of Verdun city and about 14 miles south of their main Western Front supply line. In 1914 they had captured Luxembourg,Longwy and Briey, all of which had huge coal and iron deposits, coal mines and steel mills in full production and an extensive rail network. At the same time they captured all the main stations on the Luxembourg/Franco-Belgian border - Metz, Longwy, Longuyon, Montmedy, Sedan, Luxembourg, Esch-sur-Alzette, Etain and scores of 'minor' stations which even today have 500 yard platforms and 8-10 main lines running through them. From the main railway line, which ran through Metz, Longwy and Sedan to Charleville-Mezieres and points north, hundreds and hundreds of spur lines ran south to supply the whole of the Verdun sector. The forests to the north of Verdun offered extensive camouflage for camps, workshops, hospitals, stables, canteens, cafes, cinemas, butchers shops, mineral water plants, sawmills and anything else you might need. There was NOWHERE on the Western Front closer to the German arsenals than Verdun and nowhere that he could supply so easily.
The French, on the other hand, were dependent for reliable supply into their main fortress city on a single narrow gauge railway line with two locomotives and one road which was partly unsurfaced. To make matters worse, they were holding a salient cut by a river with few crossing points. In choosing where to launch an operation to bring the war to an end in 1916, Falkenhayn looked not only for an objective that the French would defend at all costs but one which was close to German lines and which he could supply easily. Verdun was the place that fitted the bill.
Christina
I would agree with Falkenhayn's point 2a but absolutely disagree with his argument in 2b if by that he means that the west bank consisted of a 'strong, well-constructed position, occupied by an enemy in superior strength'. The East Bank was much more heavily fortified than the West Bank. Similarly, I don't agree at all with his statement that '...the lie of the land was in no way favourable to operations on the west bank.' The three ridges on the West Bank are lower and more open than the narrow, steep ridges on the eastern side and the forts were mostly older and weaker (with exceptions, of course).
All the war games concerning Verdun played by the Germans before the war had involved an attack on both sides of the river simultaneously. Falkenhayn's 5th Army commanders in the field protested vehemently against an attack on only one side of the river but he resisted. Interestingly General von Zwehl wrote in his memoirs that he believed that an attack against the more lightly fortified West Bank was more likely to have been successful because the northernmost ridge (Mort-Homme and Hill 304) was not fortified and that the forts on the the next ridge south were weaker than those on the East Bank. Von Zwehl took the view that an attack on the West Bank alone with sufficient troops had the possibility of bringing them to the second ridge, i.e. the ridge with the weaker forts, within a short time and that from there the Germans would have been within sight of Verdun city. The operative words are, of course, 'had the possibility of'
I would agree with Falkenhayn on the fact that geography played a part in the decision. I think that the advantages to the Germans of attacking there are almost always overlooked. The German lines were only about 7 miles north of Verdun city and about 14 miles south of their main Western Front supply line. In 1914 they had captured Luxembourg,Longwy and Briey, all of which had huge coal and iron deposits, coal mines and steel mills in full production and an extensive rail network. At the same time they captured all the main stations on the Luxembourg/Franco-Belgian border - Metz, Longwy, Longuyon, Montmedy, Sedan, Luxembourg, Esch-sur-Alzette, Etain and scores of 'minor' stations which even today have 500 yard platforms and 8-10 main lines running through them. From the main railway line, which ran through Metz, Longwy and Sedan to Charleville-Mezieres and points north, hundreds and hundreds of spur lines ran south to supply the whole of the Verdun sector. The forests to the north of Verdun offered extensive camouflage for camps, workshops, hospitals, stables, canteens, cafes, cinemas, butchers shops, mineral water plants, sawmills and anything else you might need. There was NOWHERE on the Western Front closer to the German arsenals than Verdun and nowhere that he could supply so easily.
The French, on the other hand, were dependent for reliable supply into their main fortress city on a single narrow gauge railway line with two locomotives and one road which was partly unsurfaced. To make matters worse, they were holding a salient cut by a river with few crossing points. In choosing where to launch an operation to bring the war to an end in 1916, Falkenhayn looked not only for an objective that the French would defend at all costs but one which was close to German lines and which he could supply easily. Verdun was the place that fitted the bill.
Christina
I have a small popular pamphlet ( 25 pfg) about Verdun and the Somme. Printed Berlin in 1916 and mentioning dates in November. I have not read it carefully but a quick look seems to suggest that Verdun was a road into Germany as well as a road into France. It does not seem to mention attrition. I will take the time to read it over the next couple of days and see if it is worth quoting here.
Good evening All,
Robert mentioned in his one of his earlier posts that Crown Prince Wilhelm had attacked through the Argonnes/West Bank in the earlier stages of the War and was repulsed. Although I seem to recall General Gouraud been involved, I know little of this battle. How far did he manage to advance down the Argonnes ? and would his repulse have had any bearing on Falkenhayn's reasoning that Jack mentions and Christina comments on ?
Robert mentioned in his one of his earlier posts that Crown Prince Wilhelm had attacked through the Argonnes/West Bank in the earlier stages of the War and was repulsed. Although I seem to recall General Gouraud been involved, I know little of this battle. How far did he manage to advance down the Argonnes ? and would his repulse have had any bearing on Falkenhayn's reasoning that Jack mentions and Christina comments on ?
Christina
Of course you are absolutely right to be sceptical of personal memoirs. Caution is always the watchword with historical sources and, as you say, this is all the more so when someone is seeking to justify his actions later. Your interesting points about the accessibility of Verdun for the Germans was clearly a primary factor in the decision to attack there (F stated as much in his Dec 15 memorandum to the Kaiser) and I suspect strongly that the Germans entirely underestimated both the ability of the French to improvise their supply along the Voie Sacree and the extraordinary collective courage of those French formations thrown into holding the line during the early stages of the battle, having been told that they had been placed there to have the honour of dying for La Patrie.
I am quite sure that this error led on to the suggestion that the defence of one bank would have to be weakened to strengthen the other. If I am right it is easy to see this as another example of my earlier point that everything was a gamble dependent on events unfurling precisely as envisaged. To describe this approach as naive is to understate the bankruptcy of F's approach to the offensive. Plans never survive first contact with the enemy, as he should have known.
The fact that his arguments do not stack up for those like you who have an intimate knowledge of the ground simply lends more weight to my overall point.
Jack
Of course you are absolutely right to be sceptical of personal memoirs. Caution is always the watchword with historical sources and, as you say, this is all the more so when someone is seeking to justify his actions later. Your interesting points about the accessibility of Verdun for the Germans was clearly a primary factor in the decision to attack there (F stated as much in his Dec 15 memorandum to the Kaiser) and I suspect strongly that the Germans entirely underestimated both the ability of the French to improvise their supply along the Voie Sacree and the extraordinary collective courage of those French formations thrown into holding the line during the early stages of the battle, having been told that they had been placed there to have the honour of dying for La Patrie.
I am quite sure that this error led on to the suggestion that the defence of one bank would have to be weakened to strengthen the other. If I am right it is easy to see this as another example of my earlier point that everything was a gamble dependent on events unfurling precisely as envisaged. To describe this approach as naive is to understate the bankruptcy of F's approach to the offensive. Plans never survive first contact with the enemy, as he should have known.
The fact that his arguments do not stack up for those like you who have an intimate knowledge of the ground simply lends more weight to my overall point.
Jack
Verdun stands on the main road from Paris to the eastern border of France and the Rhine, so it was both a road into France and a road into Germany.
In 1914 the Germans managed to push down each side of Verdun for a considerable way. On the west side, they managed to push right down through the Argonne forest and well down towards Bar-le-Duc, almost meeting up with the troops pressing down on the east. The fighting in the area at the time is not well known but when ordered to withdraw following the Battle of the Marne, the gap between the two armies was only 14km.
The Verdun forts were fully armed in 1914 and the Falkenhayn chose not to face the guns there. By the end of 1915 the forts were disarmed. I am sure that Falkenhayn would have been fully aware of that and that it was a factor in his reasoning.
Jack - I certainly think that Falkenhayn gambled that the French were too weak to withstand or to supply a major offensive but did he have any choice? He wanted to strike a blow to bring the war to an end before the Allies struck a similar blow in 1916. There was nowhere else he could launch an offensive so easily or with such hopes of success. All the talk of Belfort, lost in the mountains with very poor communications as it was, was a red herring.
From his point of view it probably looked both good and simple: he had multiple strong supply lines and all the resources he needed while the enemy was weak, with few resources and poor supply lines. If he had kept reserves available, so that he had them to throw in when Ft. Douaumont fell and the French were shocked and falling back, he might have brought about the evacuation of Verdun although that would still have left the West Bank in French hands. He certainly underestimated the collective and individual courage of the French troops and I am sure he could never have imagined that they would get supply lines organised as they did. That was an extraordinary feat.
Christina
In 1914 the Germans managed to push down each side of Verdun for a considerable way. On the west side, they managed to push right down through the Argonne forest and well down towards Bar-le-Duc, almost meeting up with the troops pressing down on the east. The fighting in the area at the time is not well known but when ordered to withdraw following the Battle of the Marne, the gap between the two armies was only 14km.
The Verdun forts were fully armed in 1914 and the Falkenhayn chose not to face the guns there. By the end of 1915 the forts were disarmed. I am sure that Falkenhayn would have been fully aware of that and that it was a factor in his reasoning.
Jack - I certainly think that Falkenhayn gambled that the French were too weak to withstand or to supply a major offensive but did he have any choice? He wanted to strike a blow to bring the war to an end before the Allies struck a similar blow in 1916. There was nowhere else he could launch an offensive so easily or with such hopes of success. All the talk of Belfort, lost in the mountains with very poor communications as it was, was a red herring.
From his point of view it probably looked both good and simple: he had multiple strong supply lines and all the resources he needed while the enemy was weak, with few resources and poor supply lines. If he had kept reserves available, so that he had them to throw in when Ft. Douaumont fell and the French were shocked and falling back, he might have brought about the evacuation of Verdun although that would still have left the West Bank in French hands. He certainly underestimated the collective and individual courage of the French troops and I am sure he could never have imagined that they would get supply lines organised as they did. That was an extraordinary feat.
Christina
QUOTE (SteveMarsdin @ Oct 9 2009, 09:13 PM)
...Crown Prince Wilhelm had attacked through the Argonnes/West Bank in the earlier stages of the War and was repulsed.
Christina has detailed how far Crown Prince Wilhelm's Army penetrated. His forces were not repulsed. They were forced to retreat to comply with the new line of defence created on the Aisne. Wilhelm was none too happy with the decision because he knew that the Verdun salient was potentially about to be cut off.Robert
QUOTE (Robert Dunlop @ Oct 10 2009, 10:46 PM)
Christina has detailed how far Crown Prince Wilhelm's Army penetrated. His forces were not repulsed. They were forced to retreat to comply with the new line of defence created on the Aisne. Wilhelm was none too happy with the decision because he knew that the Verdun salient was potentially about to be cut off.
Robert
Robert
John Mosier writes of the September 1914 fighting... " The Fifth and Sixth German Armies had a simple aim : pinch off Verdun and its forts....The resulting battle, properly speaking, should be called First Verdun. But in the aftermath, the French were not anxious to call attention to just how close the Germans had been in those early days in September to pinching off the entire fortified position....The only thing keeping the Germans from pinching off Verdun was the string of forts along the river....and the German infantry attacking Troyon on the eigth was decimated by the French heavy weapons. Troyon was one of the few places where the Germans were massacred as they had been slaughtering the French....the beseiging Germans, who felt themselves to be right on the verge of success, were told to pull back to positions north of Verdun..."
It had come close in September 1914 : a more prudent and economic approach, availed of massive firepower support and husbandry of manpower, augured well eighteen months later.
Phil
Thank you, Christina, I'd no idea the Germans had penetrated south of Verdun on the west bank in 1914. It is of great interest and an area I must read up on more (so as not to continue making mis-assumptions like the one Robert pointed out !). The amount of knowledge on this Forum continues to impress and I would like to ask 2 more questions ?
1). Phil raises the action at Fort Troyon which stopped the envelopment from the east flank (?). This summer at the village brocante in Jamoigne I got talking to a Frenchman from Verdun. He recommended visiting 2 forts, close to each other, south of Verdun, of similar design: one in ruins and one intact. Unfortunately I've got a memory like a sieve and didn't make a note of the names. Troyon sounds familiar, if this was one fort what would the other be ?
2). Are there any books (English or French) which detail this part of the conflict (around Verdun) in 1914 ? Phil mentions John Mosier.
1). Phil raises the action at Fort Troyon which stopped the envelopment from the east flank (?). This summer at the village brocante in Jamoigne I got talking to a Frenchman from Verdun. He recommended visiting 2 forts, close to each other, south of Verdun, of similar design: one in ruins and one intact. Unfortunately I've got a memory like a sieve and didn't make a note of the names. Troyon sounds familiar, if this was one fort what would the other be ?
2). Are there any books (English or French) which detail this part of the conflict (around Verdun) in 1914 ? Phil mentions John Mosier.
Steve, At the risk of spoiling the party, I feel compelled to state that John Mosier's book is not one that I could recommend to get a balanced view of the Great War. It's a terribly distorted account. But, like many such works, it's a very compelling read.
Phil
Phil
As a sidelight on Verdun, I thought this might be of interest. It is from a small pamphlet published in Berlin 1916. It has internal dates of November so was published right at the end of the year. Price 25 pfg in paper covers it is obviously for popular consumption.
Entitled " War Report from The Great Headquarters. No. 21. The Battle for Verdun. The Battle on the Somme. ". Published by German Publishing Institute. Stuttgart & Berlin.
In an opening paragraph, the anonymous author points out that Verdun stands on the road to Germany and the valuable iron ore resources of the Saarland. It describes Verdun as the French sallyport into Germany. The content of the pamphlet is typical of the few I have read. Although printed at the end of the year, the two maps show the situation at Verdun and on the Somme in July. No hint of the German losses but a reasonable estimate of combined casualties for the French and British of 600,000. Certainly no hint in the pamphlet that Verdun was to be a meat grinder. That information presumably being reserved to OHL.
Entitled " War Report from The Great Headquarters. No. 21. The Battle for Verdun. The Battle on the Somme. ". Published by German Publishing Institute. Stuttgart & Berlin.
In an opening paragraph, the anonymous author points out that Verdun stands on the road to Germany and the valuable iron ore resources of the Saarland. It describes Verdun as the French sallyport into Germany. The content of the pamphlet is typical of the few I have read. Although printed at the end of the year, the two maps show the situation at Verdun and on the Somme in July. No hint of the German losses but a reasonable estimate of combined casualties for the French and British of 600,000. Certainly no hint in the pamphlet that Verdun was to be a meat grinder. That information presumably being reserved to OHL.
QUOTE (truthergw @ Oct 11 2009, 08:49 PM)
No hint of the German losses but a reasonable estimate of combined casualties for the French and British of 600,000. Certainly no hint in the pamphlet that Verdun was to be a meat grinder. That information presumably being reserved to OHL.
Thanks, Tom...the estimate of 600,000 Franco British casualties is astonishingly low, considering the propensity of the belligerents to exagerrate enemy losses, and the reality being that the combined Allied totals in the two battles was actually in the order of a million.
Phil
QUOTE (SteveMarsdin @ Oct 11 2009, 07:31 PM)
2). Are there any books (English or French) which detail this part of the conflict (around Verdun) in 1914 ?
Steve, you can get hold of Kronprinz Wilhelm's memoirs in English. There were two books that were translated. 'My War Experiences' is the one that you want. Get a copy that has the original maps. Obviously, as with Zuber's book, it is a one-sided view. I haven't found anything in English that describes the French perspective in great detail.Nice looking copy here.
Robert
When I take people to Verdun I always try to get them to go to St Mihiel as well as if the Germans had not managed to cross the river there in 1914 the battle would have been very different. The French would have had a main line railway AND the canal to take up supplies and bring back casualties.
Even if they had come under fire (and probably would not have) even just a train a day or a few barges would have made an enormous difference
Even if they had come under fire (and probably would not have) even just a train a day or a few barges would have made an enormous difference
Thanks Robert,
I think I'll buy it.
Christina said that the Germans nearly got as far as Bar-le-Duc on the west bank 1914 offensive. All the maps and diagrams I have don't show the west flank south of Verdun. I can identify the east flank in the Fort Troyon locality (as highlighted most recently by "healdav") but can somebody give me some place names at the most souther extent reached on the west flank so I can better "picture" it ?
I think I'll buy it.
Christina said that the Germans nearly got as far as Bar-le-Duc on the west bank 1914 offensive. All the maps and diagrams I have don't show the west flank south of Verdun. I can identify the east flank in the Fort Troyon locality (as highlighted most recently by "healdav") but can somebody give me some place names at the most souther extent reached on the west flank so I can better "picture" it ?
The thing that kept the Germans from pinching off Verdun was the order to withdraw after that Battle of the Marne. In my opinion Troyon would have fallen if the Germans hadn't withdrawn. It wasn't strong enough to hold out for weeks.
There are a number of ruined forts below Verdun but only Troyon and Liouville are open to the public. They are both worth a visit. Steve, I think that the undamaged fort mentioned was probably Genicourt but I can't recommend that you try visiting it. It is not open to the public and these days it is regularly patrolled by both police and the army. If you want to see an undamaged Meuse fort, Jouy and Gironville are both open from time to time although Gironville is in private hands.
These sites will give you some idea about the various forts. Jouy: http://www.commercy.org/telech_Fort_Jouy.pdf
for Gironville: http://www.fortiffsere.fr/verdun/index_fichiers/Page6986.htm
for Liouville: http://fortdeliouville.fr/
and for Troyon: http://pagesperso-orange.fr/jmpicquart/Troyon.htm
On the west flank the Germans reached Vitry-le-Francois and almost reached Revigny, which is a few miles NW of Bar-le-Duc. Their front then turned northeast to the River Aire via Vaubécourt and Beauzée-sur-Aire, then swung back northwest to Clermont-en-Argonne.
Finding any information in English about the fighting east, west and south of Verdun in 1914 is extremely difficult. There is some information to be found in the Michelin Guide to the Marne 1914, part III, La Trouée de Revigny. There are accounts of fighting south of Verdun and towards the Vosges in 1914 in 'Verdun to the Vosges', a recently published facsimile book by Gerald Campbell, the Times correspondent, first published in 1916. I have never found anything in English about the very last battle in the area, at a place called Vaux-Marie, which the Germans won but still had to withdraw. There are lots of cemeteries in the area and it's worth a visit.
Joffre's perspective is to be found in his memoirs but whether they were every translated, I don't know.
I wouldn't both with Mosier's book, which I found anything but compelling.
Christina
There are a number of ruined forts below Verdun but only Troyon and Liouville are open to the public. They are both worth a visit. Steve, I think that the undamaged fort mentioned was probably Genicourt but I can't recommend that you try visiting it. It is not open to the public and these days it is regularly patrolled by both police and the army. If you want to see an undamaged Meuse fort, Jouy and Gironville are both open from time to time although Gironville is in private hands.
These sites will give you some idea about the various forts. Jouy: http://www.commercy.org/telech_Fort_Jouy.pdf
for Gironville: http://www.fortiffsere.fr/verdun/index_fichiers/Page6986.htm
for Liouville: http://fortdeliouville.fr/
and for Troyon: http://pagesperso-orange.fr/jmpicquart/Troyon.htm
On the west flank the Germans reached Vitry-le-Francois and almost reached Revigny, which is a few miles NW of Bar-le-Duc. Their front then turned northeast to the River Aire via Vaubécourt and Beauzée-sur-Aire, then swung back northwest to Clermont-en-Argonne.
Finding any information in English about the fighting east, west and south of Verdun in 1914 is extremely difficult. There is some information to be found in the Michelin Guide to the Marne 1914, part III, La Trouée de Revigny. There are accounts of fighting south of Verdun and towards the Vosges in 1914 in 'Verdun to the Vosges', a recently published facsimile book by Gerald Campbell, the Times correspondent, first published in 1916. I have never found anything in English about the very last battle in the area, at a place called Vaux-Marie, which the Germans won but still had to withdraw. There are lots of cemeteries in the area and it's worth a visit.
Joffre's perspective is to be found in his memoirs but whether they were every translated, I don't know.
I wouldn't both with Mosier's book, which I found anything but compelling.
Christina
Christina, Joffre's memoirs were translated into English. They were published as a two volume set. It is still possible to get copies second-hand.
Robert
Robert
Robert, that's interesting. However, I wouldn't buy a set just to find out what Joffre thought of the fighting south of the Meuse. Cheaper to obtain them through Inter-Library loan, if possible.
Christina
Christina
This is a "lo-fi" version of our main content. To view the full version with more information, formatting and images, please click here.