Those of us who have enjoyed Jack Sheldon's book The German Army on Vimy Ridge must remember the outlandish story of Otto Ludwig Dorr, who enlisted in the Canadian infantry under the pseudonym of George McDonald and deserted to the Germans in the months prior to the great attack of April 9 1917.

This is not something that crops up too often in the history of the British Army in the Great War. Desertion is one thing, but desertion to the enemy carries a disturbing image which is so at variance with the "established" view of the good record of morale that sustained Tommy Atkins in the trenches. This is especially difficult to reconcile with the fact of hunger and deprivation which afflicted the Germans in the war.

With this in mind, I was intrigued to read, in the Bourne/Liddle/Whitehead compendium The Great World War 1914-1945 : Lightning Strikes Twice, on page 345.....

" At the battle of the Ancre in 1916 conditions were so bad that for the only time in the war one senior officer had direct evidence that British troops deserted in considerable numbers to the enemy."

We would do well to remember that this phase of the Somme fighting was so awful that, as John Terraine reminds us, the British Official History abandoned its normally restrained tone and stated.....

" Our vocabulary is not adapted to describe such an existence, because it is outside experience for which words are normally required."

Perhaps the official historian, aware of this discomfiting evidence of desertion to the enemy, sought to re-assure himself and others that the uniquely horrible environment explained why such an uncharacteristic episode occurred.

Does anyone have any information about this ? What were the "considerable numbers", and did the germans ever allude to this in their accounts ?

Phil

It is a complex story. I suggest you try to get hold of "Somme - Boom Ravine" by Trevor Pidgeon, a paperback in the Pen & Sword "Battleground Europe" series. He devotes Chapter 11 ("the Inquest - Treachery") to a revew of this episode in mid-February 1917.

As a footnote to your question Phil, you also need to consider the 'taken prisoner' accounts as well. I've often felt that in some circumstances, including the Ancre, that some units and individuals were taken prisoner in a way which was nothing else but assisted desertion. The line between both became exceedingly thin.

Looking at Through German Eyes by Christopher Duffy there is a lot of information of POWs taken at the Somme but very little on deserters. Where any number are mentioned (the largest group referred to is ten) they appear to fall into the category of "allowing themselves to be captured" rather than deliberately leaving the British lines for the German. This members of a failed assault might lie doggo rather than retreat back to their own lines and then surrender. Where interrogations of deserters are mentioned the man often appears to have harboured some underlying grudge or character defect (often charged with drunkeness, never promoted for example) It would seem that desertion from Canadian or ANZAC troops was rare and possibly only when there was already a German connection. Interestingly he does suggest that desertion from the Indian Cavalry units was most likely when the men were Pathans with an Afghani connection.

That's the reference I was thinking of Centurion, and thanks to your prompting I've just re-read that account pp36-7 of the Phoenix 2006 edition. Even the German report seems to mix both terms 'prisoner' and 'deserter'. The common factor being that they were lying doggo in NML and going over at a suitably quiet time. Duffy gives a wide variety of units across the British Army.

Different cultures and regimes and at various times often took different attitudes as to what was desertion and what being captured. Thus Stalin in WW2 did not distinguish between the two so that Soviet POWs who escaped back to their own side could be sent off to the Gulags (one group who broke out of a death camp and stole a German Heinkel bomber still ended up in the camps). One wonders also as to what category a man who is a legitimate POW but cooperates enthusiastically with his captors falls into.

Can't answer your questions about British deserters, Phil, but here's something that may be of interest, and shows that such matters were in fact a two-way street.

British Intelligence prisoner interrogation report from fairly early in the war. Detailing the information given by a German deserter, a native of Lorraine, whose first language is French and states he has no German sympathies. The British officer who interrogated the prisoner and wrote the report went on to reach General officer status later in his career i.e. General J H Marshall-Cornwall, DSO, MC.


"Examination of German Deserter, Private Paul Sacksteder. Who gave himself up to the 3rd Division just east of ST ELOI on the night 10-11 April 1915.

1 Prisoner.
Is 23 years of age, and a recruit who was rejected on medical grounds on first inspection and then posted to the 145th Regiment (XVI Corps) at METZ and transferred to the Ersatz Battalion of 4th Bavarian Infantry Regiment. Prisoner is a native of METZ, and speaks French better then he does German.

2 METZ.
He remained at METZ with the Ersatz Battalion 4th Bavarian Regiment from 21 October until 7 March. He says that there are very few troops at METZ and that he does not think it so strong as is generally believed. METZ belongs to the Etappenabteilung VON STRANTZ. The forts have only small garrisons. The only fort that has been in action is FORT WAGNER near VERNY, which received a few shells. German GHQ is on the railway between SEDAN and MONTMEDY, but the name of the station is carefully obliterated. The gasometers at DIEDENHOFEN (THIONVILLE) have 'GOTT STRAFE ENGLAND' painted round them in enormous letters.

3 Arrival at the Front.
On 7 March prisoner was posted to 22nd Bav. Regt., 3rd Division (II Bav. Corps) and entrained from METZ to LILLE (La Madeleine Station). From LILLE he marched on the 8th to COMINES (Headquarters of II Bav. Corps and 3rd Bav. Div.?). There he was given a rifle, but he had to give up his iron rations.

4 Enemy's distribution and defensive organization.
The 22nd Bav. Regt. was then on the extreme right of the II Bav. Corps, with its right resting on the Canal. North of the Canal is the 99th Regt., XV Corps (G.O.C. VON DEIMLING). The 22nd Regt. then extended from canal to near ST ELOI, with the 23rd on its left. About a week ago however the 22nd Regt. was withdrawn and sent elsewhere (said to be to ARRAS). Prisoner was transferred to 23rd Regt. which then took over the whole front occupied by 22nd and 23rd (i.e. from Canal to just S.W. of sx ELOI - Mound. Order of Regiments right to left 23 - 17 - 18. When the 23rd Regiment attacked ST ELOI on 14 March the 22nd merely demonstrated with rifle fire. They were told that the attack had succeeded 'without losses' but afterwards learned that there were 800 killed, wounded and missing. At that time he spent twelve days in the trenches, but the normal routine is three days in trenches, three days in support and three days in rest billets, though the periods are varied. His battalion (3rd) billets at BOUSBECQUE, the 1st and 2nd Battalions at WERVICQ. The trenches are in good condition, and also the communication trenches. They are floored with planks laid on piles. There are loop-holes every four or five yards, mostly oblique to the front, and no dummy loop-holes. Our wire is as good as theirs. They do not work in front of the trenches much, but throw out knife-rests made by the pioneers.

5 General.
The 22nd Regt. used to wear a cap cover which hid the red cap-band. Shoulder-straps are seldom worn now. They have no trench mortars in his battalion. Plenty of hand grenades, but very few men know how to use them. They are of two patterns, a spherical one thrown by pioneers, and one fastened to a stick which has a fuse which has to be lit first.

6 Artillery fire and targets.
British Artillery fire very good, especially the field gun shrapnel, which bursts just the right height above the trench, and splinters fly back. Many of the larger shell of 10 cm (4.5" Howr. ?) are blind, or the head merely blows off. Artillery waste ammunition by shelling second line trenches as these are unoccupied. The supports are in huts or dug-outs varying from 500 to 1500 metres behind the front line. The German artillery is very strictly limited as regards ammunition. There are no guns in HOLLEBEKE Chateau Park, they are further South behind a wood, probably near OOSTTAVERNE. The route taken by his battalion from the rest billets is BOUSBECQUE -WERVICQ - GODSHUIS - KORENTJE - HOUTHEM (Canal Bridge) - HOLLE-BEKE - then due West. There is a Pioneer Park on the N.E. side of the road about 300 yards N.E. of HOUTHEM, and the field cookers are kept at the Western exit of HOLLEBEKE Village.

7 Enemy's Distribution and Reserves.
The distribution of regiments is normally two battalions in front and one in rest-billets. Prisoner had seen no other troops about except Train, 2nd Pioneer Battn. a squadron of 3rd Bav. Chevaux-Legers (Divisional Cavalry who take their turn in the trenches and wear pink cap-bands), and the 47th Saxon Landwehr (47th Landwehr Brigade ?). The latter are in WERVICQ. He does not think Germans have any reserves near, and that an attack which went through the first line would have no further trouble. Commander of 23rd Regt. is STETTIN, other commanders' names unknown. The brigade formation is no longer adhered to.

8 Inhabitants.
No inhabitants remain in HOUTHEM or West of it. They are in a very miserable condition, and heavily taxed. They can only get bread on producing bread tickets. This is worse than the soldiers' and has no yeast, and is very heavy. It is bran and potato meal mixed.

9 German Morale.
The Germans are confident of ultimate victory, but trust that the decisive battle will be won on some other portion of the line. They seem to have no notion of attacking here. The Bavarians are very good soldiers, better than the Prussians, and very fond of fighting - 'c'est leur grand plaisir'. Their discipline however depends on fear of their officers who treat them badly. They have great contempt for their officers who have little experience or ability, mostly promoted 'Einjahriger'. Their food is very poor and scanty. Beans and coffee, very little meat and bread. The 'Iron Cross' is despised by the fighting troops, it is given to fawning deadheads on the lines of communication, regimental serjeant majors, etc. who never hear the sound of a bullet; 30,000 were distributed even before the fall of LIEGE. The Kaiser and Hindenburg are popular heroes, but the Crown Prince has lost caste through his propensity for looting chateaux.

10 English Prisoners.
The English prisoners are very proud and obstinate. They refuse to work at all and so are kept strictly guarded in camps though not actually ill-treated. They will not resign themselves like the French and Russians who are mostly working in fields, factories and mines. English prisoners are not allowed to work in the fields as the Germans fear they might make an organized attempt to escape. English prisoners always refuse to salute German officers.
A well known English officer is said to have escaped from the Camp at WAHN; it is officially reported that he has been shot, but he is generally believed to have made good his escape.

11 Credibility of evidence.
SACKSTEDER is a native of LORRAINE and his native language is French, which he speaks better than German. He is a well educated man and he appeared to be telling the truth. He has no German sympathies.

2nd Corps. 11 March 1915
J. H. M. Cornwall Captain, GS"


Cheers-salesie.

We've heard of this guy on the forum before. Many of the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine regarded themselves as French despite a programme of Germanification since 1871. It must have put the Germans in a cleft stick, don't put them in the army and they would effectively be saying 'these guys aren't really German after all' but if you did put them in there would be a tendency to desert. I understand that after Germany re annexed Alsace Lorraine in 1940 they had the same dilemma.

Thanks for the post, salesie. As for it being a two way street, I admit that I'd only conceived of Germans deserting to the British, and not vica versa : the deprivation of food in the German army was sufficiently notorious - I would have thought - to have discouraged British soldiers from deserting to the enemy. The mention of considerable numbers going over suprised me ... although, of course, this reflects the plight of random isolation in NML, rather than concerted, planned action, doesn't it ?

Phil

We tend to forget that even in WW1 Germany was not fully united. Not all states were happy at the leading role taken by Prussia. There was even a Hanoverian independence party that regularly won seats in the Riechstag (until the Nazis abolished it). There are accounts of Saxon troops holding up signs in the trenches indicating an anti Prussian bias. It would not be surprising therefore if there were some disgruntled types ready to desert or at best not unhappy at the idea of being taken POW.

Don't forget Joseph Lipmann & the others taken prisoner just before 1st. july, 16 on the Somme.

Colin.

Lipmann definitely deserted. His interrogation report is quite firm on that point. For the story, see my German Army on the Somme p 132.

Jack

I suppose it all depends on the precise numbers that "considerable" refers to, Phil? Also, "deserting to the enemy" is a decidedly ambiguous phrase - it can conjure up images of changing sides - and, although there are records of some sixty-odd British prisoners of war from Irish regiments being recruited in 1915 from German POW camps for Sir Roger Casement's German funded Irish Brigade (to fight in Ireland not in the German army itself), I find it hard to believe that, in the main, ethnic British and German troops would desert in order to change sides. As for the food issue - I suppose that if trapped in no-man's-land and giving yourself up to the enemy seemed a much safer option than working your way back to your own lines then many of those so trapped would opt for the "safer" route? After all, food would be the least of your problems; a relative feast is no good if you're dead?

That said, I know very little about such things, and would be interested to see any precise details.


Cheers-salesie.

To put things into perspective the British army figures for all forms of desertion (not necessarily to the enemy) in WW1 are as follows:

1914-5 2.07 %
1916 0.92%
1917 0.74%
1918 0.74%
1919 0.80%

Interestingly as conscription arrives desertions bottom out.

Is this for all theatres, including the UK ? Any comparable Franco- German statistics ?

Phil

AFAIK all theatres - average. No no figures for anyone else

Salesie

I do not know of a single source for the German army which specifically addresses absentees - which does not mean that one does not exist. Where documents survive, they can be trawled of course. Absentees (or deserters) were certainly listed in places such a Corps Routine Orders, together with descriptions, but since most say somehing like, 'last seen wearing field uniform and cap', they cannot have been a great help in rounding men up. As far as Allied deserters are concerned, where files of prisoner interrogations exist, there is never any doubt about the matter, because the circumstances are always described and, usually, there is more than one report because such men were 'debriefed in detail', rather than just interrogated. Dorr, referred to above, was questioned at least three times - on one occasion by a gas officer about British anti gas arrangements - and lengthy reports exist. It would never be possible to obtain detailed figures this way of course. So far I have come across more cases of French, rather than British, soldiers deserting and my overall impression is that very few provable cases occurred.

Jack

Thanks for that, Jack - this aspect of the war never actually occurred to me before reading Phil's opening post. I was aware of non-ethnic Germans, such as Sacksteder, deserting when given the opportunity rather than fight against their ethnic homeland, and of Casement's rather dismal attempts to recruit an Irish Brigade from ethnic Irish POWs (only sixty-odd joined him out of the many hundreds he tried to persuade, the vast majority giving him a verbal rough ride for his efforts, and, of course, he was hanged for treason back in Britain after being captured in Ireland in 1916). But I always considered these men to be a tiny minority of the total who fought; a natural consequence of the respective political situations.

Now, however, Phil's mention of "considerable numbers" and "proof" has got the old grey-matter churning over: How many is considerable - do the authors of the book Phil cites give sources? Who was the senior officer with direct evidence, and what was it?

Also, the phrase "deserting to the enemy" is a phrase I strongly dislike; surely any soldier who surrenders is technically guilty of "deserting to the enemy"? But, equally surely, the circumstances leading up to their surrender is of paramount importance when judging if desertion or not? For example; in my opinion, men trapped in no-man's-land, with no, or very little, hope of returning to their own lines would not be deserting if surrendering. Equally, men ordered to surrender by superiors cannot be guilty of "desertion to the enemy" - though, technically, the superior who ordered such action could be - but, again, it would all depend on the circumstances wouldn't it?

Whoever wrote, "At the battle of the Ancre in 1916 conditions were so bad that for the only time in the war one senior officer had direct evidence that British troops deserted in considerable numbers to the enemy." needs to provide, as you did, Jack, when writing about Otto Ludwig Dorr, much more than a single sentence, which in itself, without evidential back-up, is nothing more than a technique us fiction writers use when implanting a mere hint of atmosphere and/or circumstance in readers minds.

Are the authors Phil cites guilty of deserting non-fiction for fiction?




Cheers-salesie.

I must take issue with your statement that any soldier who surrenders is guilty of deserting to the enemy. I don't think you could defend that statement. A moment's thought throws up several important distinctions.

I do not want to put words into Salesie's mouth and, goodness knows, he is more than capable of defending himself, but I suppose he may be hinting at the fact that certain cultures regard the surrender of unwounded soldiers, irrespective of the circumstances, as a military disgrace and 'desertion' in that narrow sense. Japanese attitudes post-Singapore, say, spring straight to mind, but I have also noticed a disapproving tone in some German writing where they note the surrender of unwounded men in particular circumstances.

Jack

Somewhere I've seen a statement to the effect that it is a soldier's duty resist or to evade capture, unless ordered otherwise, as long as it is reasonably possible but that surrender is permissible when circumstances offer no other choice. Given this I'd agree with Truthergw that to describe all surrender as desertion is arrant nonsense. [It was however the attitude taken by the Soviets under Stalin in WW2 and was even applied to pilots who were shot down and woke up in a German hospital. However the approach taken by a homicidal megalomaniac should not be taken as standard.]

Had British soldiers been deserting in droves one would expect to see much made of it in German propaganda. Has anyone seen any?

Germany had a problem with deserters seeking sanctuary in the Netherlands and some Dutch accounts refer to special camps being created for them. Given that Germany did not recognise the concept of the conscientious objector at all (much simpler - no need for any panels etc) and threatened any one not answering to their call up with a death sentence (they seem in fact to have jailed them or sent them to insane asylums), this is hardly surprising.

Tom, if my use of language is as misleading as that awful phrase itself, I apologise - but it seems to me that my meaning was clear enough, given the way I structured the whole of that particular paragraph; I was actually condemning the use of that particular phrase by the authors of the book Phil cites.

I did say that I strongly dislike the phrase "deserting to the enemy", and then used the word "technically" to qualify my next point, and then qualified that point even further by giving two "important distinctions" (from several). And, therefore, it still seems clear to me, in the context of this thread, that I'm correct when saying, "surely any soldier who surrenders is technically guilty of "deserting to the enemy"? But, equally surely, the circumstances leading up to their surrender is of paramount importance when judging if desertion or not? For example; in my opinion, men trapped in no-man's-land, with no, or very little, hope of returning to their own lines would not be deserting if surrendering. Equally, men ordered to surrender by superiors cannot be guilty of "desertion to the enemy" - though, technically, the superior who ordered such action could be - but, again, it would all depend on the circumstances wouldn't it?"

Please note, Tom, the three sentence qualification which begins with, But, equally surely,... In other words, I'm accusing the authors that Phil cites, when using such a catch-all phrase, as being disingenuous in their use of language, accusing them of attempting to lead the reader away from the actualities, away from the several "important distinctions" you mention (two of which I actually highlighted).

I repeat, I strongly dislike the phrase in question, because, like you, I can see the highly misleading and insulting nature of such a phrase in the context it was used in that single quoted sentence, which is why I asked if there was any other text/sources to back it up. Now, back to my point, and the question I asked - are the authors Phil cites guilty of deserting non-fiction for fiction?



Cheers-salesie.

I wasn't thinking about the Japanese, Jack - I was simply pointing out, given that the deliberate casting away of arms in the face of the enemy was a capital offence in the British Army, and seeing as any soldier must cast away his arms in order to surrender, then, technically, under military law, any fit soldier surrendering is guilty of such an offence until the circumstances are known - otherwise how could such a law operate in time of war? Bearing in mind, that some circumstances would be blatantly obvious, and others not so - and judgements, sometimes snap judgements, had to be made, and that British military law, even in WW1, recognised the problem of technicality versus actuality.

But my main point was to highlight the ridiculous nature of the catch-all phrase, "deserting to the enemy".


Cheers-salesie.

Weren't all British officer POWs interviewed on return to account for the circumstances of their capture/surrender - with those cleared through that process then being placed on an Exonerated Officers List?

Whilst it is anecdotal and comes from a Soldiers memoirs it does relate to the period in question.
"The Christmas of 1916 was a miserable one in the wood of St Vaast.
"There I was with the jars of rum and three bloomin' Jerries all in white togs.You could have knocked me down with a feather when one says,'Rotten night ,Jock,we are Saxons.'"
"Havin' heard the Saxons were not a bad mob.I gives them a Woodbine apiece and says, 'What's the game,anyhow?'"
"One Bloke says,'We are fed up and slipped off.We knew the Jocks were opposite and I have comrades among them-I was a barber in Edinburgh before the war.'"
George

The meaning and context of the statement seem clear enough to me but if you say I am misinterpreting what you say, I accept that. I would like to point out that desertion could range from being sent on leave and not coming back to leaving your appointed position without permission. None of that would include deserting to the enemy which is a decidedly different action. Now, a personal digression. My grandfather and a lot of his comrades, after being wounded, were made comfortable in a German trench and left in the care of a first aid man when the able bodied tried to return to their own lines. This was 1st day of Loos at Hohenzollern. He died in a German hospital without regaining consciousness. He had been surrendered to the Germans who had retaken the trench. According to you in your explanation, he must have cast away his arms. Again, this is a specific charge and was a capital offence if found guilty at court martial. To confuse surrendering with deserting to the enemy or casting away arms is to display a profound ignorance of what these charges mean. I suggest a bit of study.

First of all, Tom, any reference I made was strictly in the context of the quote offered in this thread, so going away on leave and not returning, or leaving a position without permission, are not actions which fall within that context, and therefore are irrelevant to this discussion.

As for your grandfather, until the exact circumstances of his capture were known then how could any judgement be made as to whether he deliberately threw away his arms to surrender or not? So, given the fact that an unconscious man cannot deliberately throw away his arms and surrender willingly, then your grandfather would clearly be not guilty of "deserting to the enemy" and therefore, had he survived, no charges would have been brought when the circumstances became clear. You know the circumstances of his capture now, and judgement can clearly be made, but how could such a judgement be possible until those circumstances were known? Military law does not have a crystal-ball, if it did then no interviews, no enquiries, no investigations, no written/verbal reports, no war diaries, would be needed to look into such things - if everything was obvious to everyone at the precise moment it happened then what an easier time everyone would have had; those guilty of such an offence (and the innocent) would have been instantly known.

As for partaking in further study? My whole point was that circumstances do make a difference between surrendering and "deserting to the enemy", I actually pointed out that there are instances which makes a catch-all phrase like "deserting to the enemy" a ridiculous phrase to use - I'm actually agreeing with you, and, in that respect, I have to say that I'm not the one who appears to be confused (in the context of this thread).


Cheers-salesie.

Salesie is a careful writer which makes his posts interesting to read. I thought his point was clear. Desertion is a meaningless term unless qualified by the underlying facts. You have to consider the circumstances under which a soldier ended up in enemy hands.

What I find frustrating is the account which refers to "direct evidence" and then fails to cite what that direct evidence is. It's either lazy or flippant writing or it's a questionable conclusion drawn on evidence the writer is not confident enough to cite.

That sounds a bit grouchy so I apologize--having a root canal tomorrow

cheers,

peter

Sorry, Mick, I missed your post earlier. You're quite right, and a repatriated officer's medal index card would be marked "Exonerated Officers List" after being de-briefed by the War Office and "cleared" of any offence regarding his surrender/capture - which shows that when it came to such matters there was no automatic benefit of the doubt under military law. It would be interesting to see if any officer was not "exonerated" and what his punishment was - anyone have any information?

It seems that other ranks had no such process to go through when repatriated, but I should imagine that if a report existed, regarding any detrimental conduct at the time of his capture, then an investigation would be instigated and disciplinary action taken if appropriate - again, any information to this end would also be interesting to see?


Cheers-salesie.

Conner, I take it that the root canal you refer to is not a trip to Venice? Good luck tomorrow, and remember that it doesn't hurt when the pain's gone.

You're right, if the sentence quoted in the opening post is a standalone reference then the standard of the tome it comes from is definitely questionable if purporting to be non-fiction - as I said earlier, such techniques are used regularly by fiction writers.


Cheers-salesie.

Coming back to the facts of the case for a minute, the only episodes of this happening on the Somme that I've come across are in the 2nd Division and 18th (Eastern) Division, during operations on the Ancre Heights in February 1917, not in 1916 as the original source quotes. The 2nd Division is referred to in their divisional HQ diaries and the 18th (Eastern) Div episode is mentioned in the divisional history. Does the book mentioned in the first post have any references to source material.

Jack - have you come across anything aside from the 1917 incidents?

There has been a conspicuous failure on my part to elaborate on the source of the notorious sentence. Let me remedy that.

The reference was made in the chapter written by Professor Nick Bosanquet and Dr. Ian Whitehead, which is titled Casualties and British medical services. Here is the paragraph :


The sickness rate rose with fatigues and inactivity, particularly in bad weather. At the battle of the Ancre in 1916 conditions were so bad that for the only time in the war one senior officer had direct evidence that British troops deserted in considerable numbers to the enemy. This was due to the " low nervous condition produced by the appalling surroundings to the battle".

This passage is numbered for reference to the notes at the back of the chapter, where the author is identified as none other than J.F.C. Fuller, evidence in Report of the War Office Committee of Enquiry into "Shell Shock" ( London: HMSO, 1922).


Phil

Picking up Paul Reed's point in his post, I have a copy of the divisional history of the 2nd Division, annotated by an officer of the 17th Middlesex; the conditions he describes in the lead-up to the November offensive were appalling, so I am unsurprised morale took a hit in the later winter period.

As an aside, is there any correlation with courts martial for the period in the 2nd and 18th Divisions? Was there an upswing in cases tried for desertion, absence, etc, in those two divisions at that period?

Paul

I have had a good look at this. The German defence, throughout Feb 17, including the battle for Boom Ravine was conducted by 17th Infantry Division. I have three of the histories of this division; those of Grenadier Regt 89 and Fusilier Regt 75 (Junger's Regt), being very detailed and high quality. It would seem that FR 75 was most involved in anything which might be described as desertion. It states, 'The regimental outposts were pushed forward to the southern edge of Irles on 25 February and there weak enemy attacks were launched on 27 and 28 February. These were beaten off, leaving 2 officers and 27 OR in our hands. These prisoners [my emphasis] belonged to 18th Division (55 Brigade).

There is also a personal account of a further incident (though may have been included in the above figures) by Oberleutnant von Beckedorf, FAR 60, Artillery Liaison Officer to FusR 75. In part it states, 'On morning of 27 February... a British patrol was captured about 150 metres to our front in the old Below-Stellung.... [now follows a description of the nuts and bolts of the action]... 'The [German] machine gun chattered away for all it was worth, and soon the first of the hand grenades was going off. In no time the battle was won. The British officer attempted to escape, together with some of his men; most of them surrendered. At that instant a battery opened up defensive fire. The devil only knows who ordered that and we were stuck right in the middle of our own fire which crashed down [around us]. The infantry officer demanded that I had the fire stopped at once while he undertook the pursuit of the Ausreiser' [Interesting to note Ausreiser is an alternative to Ueberlaufer, meaning deserter but, before we get too excited, the context makes it plain that the writer intends us to read this as 'would-be escapers'] ...At a range of 200 metres he shot the lieutenant and captured his men, who had not wanted to leave him... important papers fell into our hands.'

That is it as far as I can see. Gren R 89 only refers to the capture of the odd prisoner during this period. It does not appear to me, therefore, that from the German perspective it could be said that the occurrences in February 1917 were seen as more than a readiness to surrender rather easily.

Jack

Thanks Jack, and Steven. An interesting thread - a shame most of the records on the British side are incomplete, as - to pick up on Steven's point - I don't know if specific CM records relating to 2nd and 18th Divisions survive?

Just to keep the pot boiling.
This is from the War Diary of the 17th (Football) Middlesex Bn, as quoted in Riddoch and Kemp, WHEN THE WHISTLE BLOWS (2008), pp.143-4, re 9 August 1916, at Guillemont.

At 4pm, when Major Carter heard that a group of British soldiers was beginning to surrender:

"I at once gave orders for as many machine guns, Lewis guns and rifles to open rapid fire on the right and left ... The 'Rally' was sounded on several whistles and the party surrendering turned around and acknowledged it. Immediately after the signal I personally saw the whole of the party put up their hands. They then commenced to move off ... As the escort passed an open space they were shot down by an officer of the 17th Middlesex. At this time five of the party made a rush [back to the British lines]. The Germans opened fire with rifles and two of these were seen to fall. The remaining three went on and dropped into shell holes .. Shortly afterwards one man was seen to get into the British trench. In my opinion 40% of the surrendering party could have got back had they rushed, but they seemed to have no leader."

According to Riddoch/Kemp, these were men of 1st King's Liverpool and 1/8th King's Liverpool.

Were they under orders to return (having acknowledged the whistles) and thus they 'deserted'? Or, having once surrendered, were they duty bound in honour to ignore the order? Riddoch and Kemp exonerate them, as they had surrendered after running out of ammunition and water, having been surrounded. I think they are right.

Guillemont was defended by 27th Inf Div at the time in question. All the regiments wrote up their histories, as did the div commander and there is also a divisional history, so a great deal of information is available. I am sure that the Germans would not accept the primacy of the 9 August date at Guillemont, though 2nd Coy IR 124 did take 120 men prisoner at Guillemont Station and capture three machine guns that day. The German accounts are unanimous that 8 August was far more significant. That day there was a major breakthrough between IRs 123 and 124. To cut a long story short, the gap was sealed and, of the forces which broke in, large numbers were killed or wounded and, between them, those two regiments took 8 officers and 352 men prisoner in circumstances that suggest more than a touch of the headless chicken syndrome, because it was achieved easily with relatively few defenders involved. Major Landbeck, Kampftruppenkommandeur of IR 123 (a cavalry officer), together with a scratch group of signallers and runners, for example, shouted to individuals and groups of British soldiers, who seemed unsure what to do, to come forward and surrender to him: over 200 did so. Altogether that day 27th Division captured thirteen officers and 560 OR.

In addition to the published accounts, I have documents from the Hauptstaatsarchiv in Stuttgart which back up the main threads of the story and there can be no doubt that large numbers did surrender. The photo shows them being marched to the rear. It appears in the Div Commander's memoirs. I would not use the word 'desertion' to describe any of this. The British assaults on Guillemont from the direction of Trones Wood were repetitive, steroetyped and badly organised. 27th Div beat them all off for no less than 25 days of incessant battle. On 8 August the British army was outfought - simple as that.

Jack

Click to view attachment

Interesting the photo: in fours, and in step. Is that the mark of deserters, or of blokes who've done their best but surrendered because they can do no more?

Absolutely nothing to do with desertion, as I have already remarked. These things happen. Some groups clearly fought harder than others but they were at a serious disadvantage and surrender was probably the only sensible course left open to them.

Jack

Thanks for this information, Jack - all in all this was no picnic for either side.

Phil, it seems strange that Fuller would be cited as the author of a medical based enquiry - so, do you think that Fuller was the senior officer with the direct evidence of desertion as per your opening post, or do you think he headed the enquiry and saw/heard that evidence?


Cheers-salesie.

It's my guess that he headed the enquiry, and maybe, in a presidential kind of role, he heard evidence : like you, I reckon his CV does not fit the bill of instigating such an enquiry.

Phil

Phil
I would read that as Fuller giving evidence at the committee of enquiry (and probably giving hearsay evidence, as he was on the staff during the war and did not command units in battle). For what it's worth, Brian Holden Reid's biography of Fuller in the ODNB does not mention him as having any role in the committee of enquiry, which was meeting while he was in charge of army training.

Mike

It's occurred to me that the date of this report - 1922 - coincides with the publication of the Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire, one of the principal sources of information that was released. I daresay that, in order to rationalise time and expense, the government of the day commissioned as many research committees as possible with the aim of getting it "all over and done with". In this context, the contribution of "Boney Fuller" might be better understood.

Phil

Fuller was involved in conducting at least one post Somme enquiry - See Keegan The Face of Battle p 241 where he talks about possible accusations of drunkenness on 1 Jul 16 and cites Fuller.

Jack

Fuller was indeed a witness to the Committee, which was chaired by Lord Southborough. The relevant part of his evidence is:

"If a crowd of men are reduced to a low nervous condition 'shell shock,' so-called, becomes contagious. This was noticeable at the Battle of the Ancre, 1916, the only battle in which I had direct evidence that British troops deserted in considerable numbers to the enemy. I believe that this was due to the low nervous condition produced by the appalling surroundings of the battle. I have only witnesses one panic, namely, that which took place on the 30th November, 1917. I have little experience of this condition but consider that panic or crowd 'shell shock' is normally a temporary condition, It constitutes a moral stampede and when once stopped a little rest will soon set the men up again."

He did not state what his "direct evidence" was. The rest of his evidence consisted of his replies to questions on his definition of shell shock. He seemed to be talking about a temporary condition affecting a group of men rather than what we might understand as shell shock. The passage quoted appears on pp. 28-9 and his evidence on pp. 29-30.

The report's reference was Cmd. 1734; it should be available in academic libraries.

Thank you, Martin : that is of great help. It still leaves me wondering what form this desertion took. It beggars belief that a group of british soldiers would have made a collective decision to "go over to the other side" : but incredible things did happen. Disaffected Indian or Irish contingents, or some appalling grievance or outrage felt over some episode....maybe .....but still hard to contemplate.

Phil

A work on the British Army as it was at the end of the war remarks that figures show that disaffection amongst Irish regiments had been extremely low. This is supported by Casements great difficulty in recruiting in the POW camps. It would have been seen as dishonourable. Indeed the last major changing of sides by an Irish regiment during a war would appear to have been well over a hundred years before when a battalion of Dillons regiment left the French service in the West Indies to join the British Army
"Through German Eyes" suggests that desertion amongst Indian army cavalry was chiefly amongst those men originally recruited from the 'tribal areas' and Afghanistan and after their initial capture. Such men were traditionally mercenaries and the mercenary code in India was that one's contract (and implied loyalty) ended when ones pay did (which in their case would be after capture) when was free to seek other employment without incurring any dishonour. It would have been dishonourable to do so whilst still being paid.

I'd tend to extend centurion's thesis: in his book The Martial Races of India (1930), Lt Gen Sir George Macmunn makes an interesting point about men from the tribal areas.

A footnote to page 245 following this comment: The Pathan soldier ... deserted, especially the trans-frontier man, far too freely, the Afridi more than any other, both in France and in Mesopotamia:

"It may be said on their behalf that neither constitutional faithlessness nor 'cold feet' was the main cause. The inter-tribal balance of power was an important factor. If a company of Malik Din Afridis were wiped out, and the Kukis and Kambars did not suffer equally, the Malik Din could neither hold their grazing grounds, nor maintain their water rights."

The mutiny of the 15th Lancers (Cureton's Multanis) in Basra in 1917 (as noted elsewhere on the Forum) was caused mainly by a refusal to fight fellow Muslims in the Holy Lands; this mutiny was (apparently) disapproved-of by their comrades in other regiments. But Multan is in the tribal areas, and the men had their reasons.

Desertions by Indian units had potentially very different causes to desertions by British (or Irish) ones: remember that the number of British officers was quite low - particularly in cavalry regiments - loss of much-loved officers was taken hard (witness the comments quoted in Bryn Hammond's book on Cambrai by a jawan of Gardner's Horse after the death of an adored CO, Col Turner); the policy of keeping men in class companies/squadrons also contributed - heavy casualties in the Sikh Squadron, say, might be particularly difficult to replace, casuing more disruption for survivors.

Recruitment was also based often on family ties - brothers, cousins, second cousins, and so on. Death and wounding was particularly problematic (compare, for example, to Pals battalions).

Finally, Indian soldiers could not understand the policy of returning recovered wounded to the Front. Assumption was that a wounded man had done his bit, so being shipped back to France was not expected - or liked.

An interesting article in the current Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, by one Philip Stigger, poses the question of loyalty of Muslim soldiers in the Indian Army in the GW. I would take issue with some of the author's conclusions (most Muslims were PMs - Punjabi Mussulmans - who were seldom affected), but it is an interesting read.

There is a lot to be done on desertions in Indian units: as a starter, I'm aiming to get to kew next week to start some elementary research, so let's hope it leads to something.

Personally, I never cease to be amazed how few Indian soldiers were not true to their salt, in both world wars. By any standard, the Indian Army of 1914-18 and 1939-45 was a special thing.

Surely that would imply they deserted after capture: is that desertion? It might be defection, and a man might transfer to a foreign power (Germany, Turkey), but the surrender under those circumstances is not, therefore, desertion, per se.

The Germans in WW2 weren't especially successful in recruiting from captured Indian troops, and the Indian National Army under the Japs was spectacularly ineffective, so I suspect there is an issue here - men may have surrendered more easily (or deserted) when disaffected for any reason, but defections were fairly limited and not especially effective.