There are very divergent views on the war on the Russian Front. Most of us probably think of Tannenberg. The Tsar's peasant soldiery, largely illiterate, sometimes starving, ragged and bewildered are crushingly defeated by a competent and modern german army. The high tech teuton overwhelms the archaic slav. The deficiencies of the russian armies are woeful : guns without shells, soldiers without rifles....and then there is inept and corrupt leadership, both military and political. This being the case, it's a wonder that it took three years before the outcome could be determined.
On the other hand, there is another image. Terrible defeats inflicted on the Austro -Hungarian Empire - and the Turks - along with german casualties that were sometimes remarkably heavy. A million and a half Austrian prisoners were in Russian hands after three years, and, up until the summer of 1916, the Russians are said to have captured more Germans than the Entente in the West. By 1916, mountains of shells were available to russian gunners, and the Brusilov Offensive achieved gains so spectacular as to rank it as one of the greatest victories of modern times, achieved through superb leadership and some effective high tech tactics.
Russian casualties are a matter of guesswork, since the chaos of defeat, revolution and civil war created neither the will nor the means to compile accurate statistics. AJP Taylor opined that Russia probably lost more dead than all the rest of the belligerents combined. John Keegan cited a modern estimate that indicated battle fatalities not very different from those suffered by the French.
Has there been too much caricature in the history of Russia's war ?
Phil
Full Version: Russian ordeal 1914-1917....
The news from Russia was managed successively by commanders in the field then the government censors on both sides before it was finally massaged by the British editors. The war was followed by years of civil war then the mutual antipathy between the Soviet and the British governments. Histories of the Great War in Russia are nothing more than propaganda exercises compiled several years after the war by both sides. I doubt very much whether there ever was the sort of objective data required to put together a meaningful account of the Russian war.
Unfortunatelly the germans were doing two kinds of figth:one on the Front and one in the "back".For instance during the "Battle of Marasesti" the Romanian Army had to make baraje of artillery fire to stop the germans spreading newspapers printed in Russian language ,in germany,in which they were making anty War propaganda ,telling the Russians to go home that land is given to their families.So I think is true to say that the germans have "pushed" the Russians into communism ,revolution etc.I think the germans realized they cannot defeat the Russians so they found another way around to take them out of the War.
Did Lenin came to Russia in a sealed train carriage from germany or was it Switzerland?
Andrei
Did Lenin came to Russia in a sealed train carriage from germany or was it Switzerland?
Andrei
We've all probably seen stories of Russian troops in the trenches, one man with a rifle and two more to take it if he gets hit. However if you look back in history you find the same story over and again about different armies going back to the Napoleonic. The Russians put out a similar story about the Persian army facing them (muskets not rifles of course) and the French (or possibly their German allies) did the same for the Russians (what goes around comes around).
Certainly the Russians did have material shortages but by 1917 were catching up and pushing back the KuK having effectively neutralised the Turks. Hence Germany's most cynical and world damaging move, taking Lenin and the other Bolsheviks from Switzerland and facilitating their return to Russia. This doomed the world to more than 70 years totalitarian communism. The goons in North Korea are a direct descendant of this move.
Certainly the Russians did have material shortages but by 1917 were catching up and pushing back the KuK having effectively neutralised the Turks. Hence Germany's most cynical and world damaging move, taking Lenin and the other Bolsheviks from Switzerland and facilitating their return to Russia. This doomed the world to more than 70 years totalitarian communism. The goons in North Korea are a direct descendant of this move.
QUOTE (centurion @ Oct 17 2009, 08:26 PM) 
Certainly the Russians did have material shortages but by 1917 were catching up and pushing back the KuK having effectively neutralised the Turks. Hence Germany's most cynical and world damaging move, taking Lenin and the other Bolsheviks from Switzerland and facilitating their return to Russia. This doomed the world to more than 70 years totalitarian communism. The goons in North Korea are a direct descendant of this move.
That's a very challenging statement, if I understand you correctly. Are you suggesting that this opportunistic act was the German reaction to a revival of Russian strength, rather than an exploitation of Russian defeat ?
The standard view, or so I was taught, was that it was defeat on the battlefields that engendered reform or revolution...the Crimea brought about the Emancipation of the Serfs, the Russo- Japanese War was followed by the upheavals of 1905 ( Bloody Sunday), and, of course, the catastrophes of the Great War were to bring about the Revolution of 1917.
It's a refreshing and interesting take on the story....the resurgence of Russia, rather than the decline, being the occasion of the sealed train episode.
Phil
So I think it would be just to say that the blood of the Russian Royal Family is on german hands.
Also after this war they made another which engulfed the rest of Europe in communism(which they created in the first place)
Could ,as such,they been also in Sarajevo assasinate too?
Andrei
Also after this war they made another which engulfed the rest of Europe in communism(which they created in the first place)
Could ,as such,they been also in Sarajevo assasinate too?
Andrei
truthergw stated some good points on how the information, disinformation and propaganda was produced and disseminated through the generations from the start of the war in August 1914 until today. If one views how Russians, Ukrainians view 1914 to 1917 from say 1990 to date one can see the politically correct version of giving due share to the suffering for the Motherland by modern writers, historians, journalists and film-makers. This in turn of course only adds somewhat to the myths. What are badly needed are fully fledged extremely comprehensively archivally research based academic histories of what we in the west have had for over 40 years (say arguably from the 50th anniversary approximately of 1914): solid, critically thought out and archivally based works on substantive aspects of the war: logistics, commanders, technologies used, adapted or invented, micro-social histories of communities and/or locally or regionally raised units (eg. Pals Battalions in UK), etc....
John
Toronto
John
Toronto
Considering how the Russian Royal Family thought and behaved, and I speak based upon my Finnish family history, their demise was on their own hands, and good riddance too.
"too much caricature" - of course - extreme political realities: rise and fall of war communism, collapse of empires, mass refugee crises, totalitarianism, mass executions, revolutionary movements, revolutions, anarchy, famines, mass fatality diseases (eg. typhus),... have to be caricuatured, stereotyped, mythologized in order for the masses of people directly involved alone to try to understand, make sense of their lives and tolerably accept such extreme events. Polarizations amongst historians and writers naturally follows. Thus history not only is abused willingly to serve politcal and sociological ends but is bastardized and grossly distorted compounding the innate extreme feelings that motivated the historians originally. Each side claims moral superiority (eg. communists versus capitalists, nationalists versus communists, Russians versus Little Russians (Ukrainians), European Russians versus Asiatic Russians, easterners versus westernizers, intelligentsia versus the masses of peasants, etc.... History becomes the conduit in these circumstances to narrow and grossly simplistic views espoused by demonizing mouthpieces of the black and white schools of history: good guys versus bad guys: US versus THEM!
John
Toronto
John
Toronto
QUOTE (PJA @ Oct 17 2009, 05:47 PM)
[...]
On the other hand, there is another image. Terrible defeats inflicted on the Austro -Hungarian Empire - and the Turks - along with german casualties that were sometimes remarkably heavy. [...]
On the other hand, there is another image. Terrible defeats inflicted on the Austro -Hungarian Empire - and the Turks - along with german casualties that were sometimes remarkably heavy. [...]
This might be true...however you cannot say that Russia possessed a strong and effective Army because it defeated Austria and the Ottoman Empire several times.
Austria-HUngary had to deal with difficulties almost as serious as that of the Russians, for example there was an effective Russian propaganda concerning desertion of slav people from Austria-Hungary (a great number of the k.u.k. forces consisted of the latter, and already in August 1914 there were troops held back from the front as they were considered not to be trusted). On the other hand Russia almost at any time of the war, even from the beginning, fielded more troops than Austria (look at the difference of strength in artillery pieces during the war).
On the side of the Ottoman Empire, one cannot ignore the poor performance of the latter during the last century, especially the Balkan Wars, there poor equipment, poor leadership, besides the fact that there were some Ottoman victories as well.
As far as I know, German casualties only peaked in summer of 1915, during the great offensive of the Central Powers. As it was in other theatres, the attacker most times suffered high casualties due to the art of war at the time (MGs, trenches etc.)
So I dont think that we can argue that there was "too much caricature" in Russias weakness, the question should be: Why wasnt Russia able to throw there much weaker main adversary, Austria-Hungary, out of the war?
Why Russia did not ultimately defeat AH especially extremest represented or "caricatured" has many reasons shared by many belligerents: lack of field command insight into what happens if you do achieve a major or huge breakthrough(eg. Brusilov offensive of summer 1916); huge logisitical problems of sheer distance and poor pre-1914 communications (eg. Galician poor roads and few rail lines with mountainous Carpathian Mountains); defensive technology such as gas, machine guns, barbed wire, searchlights, flares, concrete field fortifications which clearly gave the advantage to the defense rather than attackers, etc....Again the myth of the huge Russian steamroller simply or with some effort of course rolling over the AH units who couldn't understand one another in the same unit due to the sheer mulitiplicity of the soldiers' cultures and languages is brought to the fore here.
John
Toronto
John
Toronto
Well, I think you are focussing too much on the failed summer offensives of 1916. I think that we can agree that the war during 1914 and 1915 was much more "fluent" and without massive use of trenches, gas, etc, massive use of new weapons only began well after summer of 1915. The Germans and Austrian had their supply difficulties as well, and most of Galicia was in their hands for the most time of the war.
I never said that the Austrian regiments were helpless crowds which didnt even understand each other. The k.u.k Armies had fewer guns, were worse equipped overall, and outnumbered as well. This has nothing to do with "steamrolling" soldiers without a common language and culture.
I never said that the Austrian regiments were helpless crowds which didnt even understand each other. The k.u.k Armies had fewer guns, were worse equipped overall, and outnumbered as well. This has nothing to do with "steamrolling" soldiers without a common language and culture.
We are dealing with the thread originator's question about the caricature of the extreme stereotyping of Russia's military efforts during the war: helpless ineffectual giant or far more effective than hitherto recognized especially in facing and defeating her enemies in the field. The Russians overall were viewed popularilly as a "steamroller" with masses of peasants all well equipped, trained and led of course, to just swoop down on the terrified Germans and AH armies especially during the first year of the war August 1914 to August 1915. The capture of Warsaw though finally put a huge dent in that "steamroller myth." Technological innovations etc...were used almost from the start of the war : eg. Sikorsky 4 engined planes were bombing right from the start, Jan 1915 German attempted use of chemical weapons at Bolimow, Poland, Russian invention of early (1916) semi-automatic hand held sub-machine guns, etc....
John
John
QUOTE (John Gilinsky @ Oct 18 2009, 10:41 PM)
We are dealing with the thread originator's question about the caricature of the extreme stereotyping of Russia's military efforts during the war: helpless ineffectual giant or far more effective than hitherto recognized especially in facing and defeating her enemies in the field. John
Thank you, John...you capture the essence of my post.
There is a historiographical controversy implicit in the divergent views.
Sad to say, there has been a dearth of research into the Great War on the Russian Front. The most authoratitive book within the last 40 years is, apparently, Norman Stone's The Eastern Front 1914-1917 : I bought this book when it was published in 1975, and found it one of the hardest reads I've ever attempted. Stone does have this to say, however, about the German foray into Russia in the aftermath of Tannenberg, in the fighting of September 1914 "...by 25th September, the two Russian armies organised a counter offensive that drove back the Germans to their frontier, in the end even as far as the Angerapp lines. VIII Army [ German ] had captured 30,000 prisoners...But it had also lost heavily - 100,000 men, of 250,000 - and the battle...ended with a complicated stalemate."
This comes as a surprise to those who dwell on Tannenberg - the victorious Germans pushed their luck and ended up with a bloody nose themselves : we just don't hear much about it. Likewise the battles around Lodz a couple of months later, when the Germans, by their own admission, lost at least another 100,000 men, of whom 36,000 were killed....casualties that rivalled those they suffered at First Ypres at the same time, with its notorious "Kindermord" These two episodes might be cited as examples of "forgotten" Russian effectiveness, against the German Eigth and Ninth Armies, and should be set alongside the more widely publicised defeats.
Phil
QUOTE (John Gilinsky @ Oct 18 2009, 10:41 PM)
We are dealing with the thread originator's question about the caricature of the extreme stereotyping of Russia's military efforts during the war: helpless ineffectual giant or far more effective than hitherto recognized especially in facing and defeating her enemies in the field.
I was only contributing to exactly this fact, If i did not get it over correctly, I am sorry.
QUOTE (John Gilinsky @ Oct 18 2009, 10:41 PM)
The capture of Warsaw though finally put a huge dent in that "steamroller myth." Technological innovations etc...were used almost from the start of the war : eg. Sikorsky 4 engined planes were bombing right from the start, Jan 1915 German attempted use of chemical weapons at Bolimow, Poland, Russian invention of early (1916) semi-automatic hand held sub-machine guns, etc....
John
John
That was my point. An army which was able to mobilise so great numbers was not able to defeat the Austrians in their early campaign in september 1914, was during october already forced into the DEFENCE (apart from the fact that they were highly superior still).
Innovations were indeed used, but not on that great numbers that they would have made a difference. How many bombers were in the field on the Russian side?
Wikipedia says:
"In August 1914, the Ilya Muromets was adopted by the Imperial Russian Air Force. On 10 December 1914, the Russians formed their first ten-bomber squadron, slowly increasing the number to 20 by the summer of 1916."
Do you really think that they made any important difference, in that numbers, during that period? As well as any other of those "new" weapons; there were MG, gas etc in those early stages of the war, but they had no "decisive" role at that time.
Apart from this you said that Austria was not defeated because of this defensive technology...when Austria until 1916 was almost everytime the attacker, how could it have been to their advantage?
@PJA, concerning the battles against Germany:
I posted an online book about Germany's Eastern front performance on antoher thread here:
http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/?id=12&xid...dc5e082achap002
It gives the German casualties to about 8000 for that battle, according to the casualties reports from the Army command (German Verlustlisten). This number mets that of the German Sanitätsbericht. What do you think of these, compared to 100-250,000?
(The Lodz figures are smaller in both sources, too)
To sum it up, my intention was to say that generally, the war went not well for Russia, and German and Austrian successes against this huge Army contribute to the picture of the helpless giant.
How could Hindenburg dare to attempt his capture of Warsaw against 3 Armies which were massed there, leaving so few troops in East Prussia against the Russian Corps still there? What about Lodz, where almost the same happened and this time even succeded?
When Russian figures about there strength are true, the whole campaign of 1915 was fought against Russian superiority.
You are stating some examples for when the Russians had their successes, but they were few, didnt change the course of the war, and were, in my opinion, too much exaggerated.
I do not get ANY impression of Russia not being that helpless giant during the war.
Sir, all honour to you...you are obviously an authority on this aspect of the war... I wish I could read German !
Stone refers to the German 8th army losing 100,000 men from its total strength of 250,000 in September 1914, and it was the 9th army that, apparently, admitted to another 100,000 casualties in the Lodz battles, of whom 36,000 were dead.
Your final statement is hard to reconcile with the impact of the Brusilov Offensive.
Phil
Stone refers to the German 8th army losing 100,000 men from its total strength of 250,000 in September 1914, and it was the 9th army that, apparently, admitted to another 100,000 casualties in the Lodz battles, of whom 36,000 were dead.
Your final statement is hard to reconcile with the impact of the Brusilov Offensive.
Phil
QUOTE (razu @ Oct 18 2009, 02:23 AM)
So I think it would be just to say that the blood of the Russian Royal Family is on german hands.
Also after this war they made another which engulfed the rest of Europe in communism(which they created in the first place)
Could ,as such,they been also in Sarajevo assasinate too?
Andrei
Also after this war they made another which engulfed the rest of Europe in communism(which they created in the first place)
Could ,as such,they been also in Sarajevo assasinate too?
Andrei
Well if you want to go down that road, ultimately Serbia should carry the blame,
seeing it was Serbian Officers, members of the "Black Hand" who instigated the
assassination of Emperor Franz-Josef nephew in Sarajevo and ultimately the
start of World War one.
The Bolshevik mentality was born and kindled in Russia, due to the situation in that country
and the ill treatment of the Russian serfs and no way can the blame be laid
at the feet of Germany between the years 1914 - 1919.
Connaught Stranger.
When commenting on German attacks don't forget the very successful Riga campaign, when they pushed on towards the Russian Capital.
When the Russians where negotiating the Brest Litovsk peace treaty and they refused some conditions the Germans effectively said fine, we will restart hostilities against Petrograd, the Russians capitulated.
When the Russians where negotiating the Brest Litovsk peace treaty and they refused some conditions the Germans effectively said fine, we will restart hostilities against Petrograd, the Russians capitulated.
MartH: Citing the end of hostilities of late 1917 and early 1918 when the Russians no longer had a strong indeed even any central government except an untried revolutionary one as representative of Russian overall war weakness is to put it mildly very very unfair to the Russians who fought hard and well during 1914 to 1917.
The Russians used technological advances whenever they could. However the sheer sizes of their armies and the sheer distances to be covered in distribution alone (logistics) along with the wild undeveloped areas where the armies fought (Galicia, Carpathian Mountains, rural Poland) meant that even when the Russians did have sufficient standard type technologies such as machine guns or aeroplanes that they could not service, replace these or even apply them as we have in the West come to expect such technologies to be applied. This last point clearly raises the issue of ethnocentralist historiography. We see the entire Eastern Front through the Western Front prism which definitely distorts (caricaturizes) ALL the belligerents efforts: the outnumbered Germans on the NW Front fending off hordes of wild savage Siberians and Cossacks with the Germans superior technology; the weak disorganized and poorly led AH armies being routed by only moderate efforts by well led Russian armies (eg. Brusilov). Think of how the Russians fought from their perspective: a huge country with major political and economic reforms underway with significant discrepancies between what the country's potential was, what they could deliver and what their best planners (all round: military, econcomic, political) envisioned Russia to be in. The Russian General Staff told the Czar that by 1917 the Russian military would be ready to take on a major war beteen the Germans and the AH powers.
Per Sikorsky: Use the Russian internet and Russian email contacts and websites: these planes were being used in 1914 for military purposes effectively: as transports, reconnaisance(photo) and as bombers. The lack of language facilitation and/or primary sources is being largely diminished by the internet, digitization, online translation services, etc.... Russian field artillery was considered to be one of the finest organized, equipped trained and led in Europe and they acquitted themselves well in fighting throughout 1914 to 1917 but especially in the "fluid" phases of fighting including 1914-1915. Another "caricature" stereotype is that the Russians relied heavily initially on cavalry including Cossacks. With the West's rapid recognition of motor transport of all kinds the Russian's continuing reliance on horse transport and mounted offensive units seems both at the time and to us today somewhat anachronistic. Again the question of not recognizing that all armies on the Eastern Front crucially relied on horse and other animal transport is overlooked when focussing on the Russian's military efforts.
John
Toronto
The Russians used technological advances whenever they could. However the sheer sizes of their armies and the sheer distances to be covered in distribution alone (logistics) along with the wild undeveloped areas where the armies fought (Galicia, Carpathian Mountains, rural Poland) meant that even when the Russians did have sufficient standard type technologies such as machine guns or aeroplanes that they could not service, replace these or even apply them as we have in the West come to expect such technologies to be applied. This last point clearly raises the issue of ethnocentralist historiography. We see the entire Eastern Front through the Western Front prism which definitely distorts (caricaturizes) ALL the belligerents efforts: the outnumbered Germans on the NW Front fending off hordes of wild savage Siberians and Cossacks with the Germans superior technology; the weak disorganized and poorly led AH armies being routed by only moderate efforts by well led Russian armies (eg. Brusilov). Think of how the Russians fought from their perspective: a huge country with major political and economic reforms underway with significant discrepancies between what the country's potential was, what they could deliver and what their best planners (all round: military, econcomic, political) envisioned Russia to be in. The Russian General Staff told the Czar that by 1917 the Russian military would be ready to take on a major war beteen the Germans and the AH powers.
Per Sikorsky: Use the Russian internet and Russian email contacts and websites: these planes were being used in 1914 for military purposes effectively: as transports, reconnaisance(photo) and as bombers. The lack of language facilitation and/or primary sources is being largely diminished by the internet, digitization, online translation services, etc.... Russian field artillery was considered to be one of the finest organized, equipped trained and led in Europe and they acquitted themselves well in fighting throughout 1914 to 1917 but especially in the "fluid" phases of fighting including 1914-1915. Another "caricature" stereotype is that the Russians relied heavily initially on cavalry including Cossacks. With the West's rapid recognition of motor transport of all kinds the Russian's continuing reliance on horse transport and mounted offensive units seems both at the time and to us today somewhat anachronistic. Again the question of not recognizing that all armies on the Eastern Front crucially relied on horse and other animal transport is overlooked when focussing on the Russian's military efforts.
John
Toronto
John I am well aware how hard the Russians fought in 1914-1917, I'm lucky enough to have spoken in depth to several veterans of the 27th Jaeger Battalion, one of them being my Grandfather. Let me assure you that from that man who was engaged in active service against the Russian armies both Imperial and Bolshevik for a several years I am under no illusions about their fighting ability, or have romantic notions about them: I can well recall my grandfather desperate to get back to his flat on Independence Day, to light candles in the windows in memory of, amongst others of his dead school friends aged 10 cut in half in the Helsinki streets by the Russian Cavalry on the orders of the Tsar after school. My mother this September told me what her best birthday present was ever, her 21st, the Russian guns going silent which was the day after the 1944 peace treaty came into effect because the Russians had spent the whole of one day after the peace treaty started shelling the refugee columns from the areas to be evacuated, a day into the peace! These are just two examples, Please don't ever tell me I'm unfair to Russians,
QUOTE (Connaught Stranger @ Oct 19 2009, 08:51 AM)
Well if you want to go down that road, ultimately Serbia should carry the blame,
seeing it was Serbian Officers, members of the "Black Hand" who instigated the
assassination of Emperor Franz-Josef nephew in Sarajevo and ultimately the
start of World War one.
The Bolshevik mentality was born and kindled in Russia, due to the situation in that country
and the ill treatment of the Russian serfs and no way can the blame be laid
at the feet of Germany between the years 1914 - 1919.
Connaught Stranger.
seeing it was Serbian Officers, members of the "Black Hand" who instigated the
assassination of Emperor Franz-Josef nephew in Sarajevo and ultimately the
start of World War one.
The Bolshevik mentality was born and kindled in Russia, due to the situation in that country
and the ill treatment of the Russian serfs and no way can the blame be laid
at the feet of Germany between the years 1914 - 1919.
Connaught Stranger.
..alleged!
also qoute from "Batlle of Marasesti" Romanian History by Constantin Kiritescu:
"In the Eve of the Battle
The commanders of the enemy armies knew perfectly the material and moral situation of the Russian armies in front of them.They knew they combative value weakened by the revolutionary activities and by the german propaganda.They knew that some units were ready to commite supreme treason of their own country.To runthrough this decomposing army with the plough of the 12 austro-german divisions seemed like a simple game.The success of the great offensive was beyond doubt.Moldavia given to the Russians to guard will soon be at the feet of the conquerors."
Andrei
QUOTE (razu @ Oct 19 2009, 03:50 PM)
..alleged!
also qoute from "Batlle of Marasesti" Romanian History by Constantin Kiritescu:
"In the Eve of the Battle
The commanders of the enemy armies knew perfectly the material and moral situation of the Russian armies in front of them.They knew they combative value weakened by the revolutionary activities and by the german propaganda.They knew that some units were ready to commite supreme treason of their own country.To runthrough this decomposing army with the plough of the 12 austro-german divisions seemed loke a simple game.The success of the great offensive was beyond doubt.Moldavia given to the Russians to guard will soon be at the feet of the conquerors."
Andrei
also qoute from "Batlle of Marasesti" Romanian History by Constantin Kiritescu:
"In the Eve of the Battle
The commanders of the enemy armies knew perfectly the material and moral situation of the Russian armies in front of them.They knew they combative value weakened by the revolutionary activities and by the german propaganda.They knew that some units were ready to commite supreme treason of their own country.To runthrough this decomposing army with the plough of the 12 austro-german divisions seemed loke a simple game.The success of the great offensive was beyond doubt.Moldavia given to the Russians to guard will soon be at the feet of the conquerors."
Andrei
Hallo Andrei,
Actually documented facts, with regards the start of WW1 and history revisionism will not fit into this Forum.
Also fact, whereas most Romanian WW1 military history has been written post WW1,
(long after the Romanian Force early successes in 1916, have been subject to renovation for the want of a better word.)
and the Romanian forces were remorsefully pushed all the way back and up into Moldova, (there in some cases being protected by Russian forces,) and having had their capital city captured, by combined Austro-Hungarians, Prussians and other associated German States, Bulgarians & Turkish Forces.
Yes the Romanians won a few battles, and many sacrifices were made, but, the Romanian military of WW1 period were of a very poor quality, and poorly equipped and poorly trained to take on the combined forces from the aforementioned countries.
To try and suggest that Russian Communism and its rise are a result of Prussian Germany and her actions in WW1 is a joke.
Connaught Stranger.
QUOTE (Connaught Stranger @ Oct 19 2009, 02:25 PM)
To try and suggest that Russian Communism and its rise are a result of Prussian Germany and her actions in WW1 is a joke.
Connaught Stranger.
Connaught Stranger.
But it makes such a lovely story, Connaught !
Surely, german interests were well served by the aiding and abetting of revolution in Russia.
Churchill tells the story in his beautiful and dramatic way :
" In the middle of April the Germans took a sombre decision. Ludendorff
refers to it with bated breath. Full allowance must be made for the desperate stakes to which the German war leaders were already committed......Nevertheless it was with a sense of awe that they turned upon Russia the most grisly of all weapons. They transported Lenin in a sealed truck like a plague bacillus from Switzerland into Russia. "
I wonder....what do you think ? This sounds very much like a german conspiracy to nurture the downfall of the enemy by contamination.
Phil
....also who was organizing the bolsevics (as they were only simple men/women from the masses),paying them ,telling them what is the next move ,where to strike ,when to strike,who or what is the next target etc.A move like this takes a lot of organization.Only the newspapers printed by the germans in Russian language mus have cost a fortune.
Andrei
Andrei
Razu: you come close to repeating the White Russian version of that little Austrian corporal's view of the war not to mention Ludendorf's as well: the stab in the back. War weariness, Bolshevik propaganda (home grown variety NOT imported) and simple disgust (see the movie AGONY produced a couple years ago and the link given by me elsewhere) with the Imperial Family and the mismanagement of the war effort all contributed to the causes of the Russian revolutions in the spring and fall of 1917. To assert that regional and localized tactical moves to undermine the Czarist Imperial forces and later those of the Provisional Government were essentially or at least critically masterminded and controlled by the Germans is a gross overstatement.
John
Toronto
John
Toronto
QUOTE (razu @ Oct 19 2009, 10:11 PM)
....also who was organizing the bolsevics (as they were only simple men/women from the masses),paying them ,telling them what is the next move ,where to strike ,when to strike,who or what is the next target etc.A move like this takes a lot of organization.Only the newspapers printed by the germans in Russian language mus have cost a fortune.
Andrei
Andrei
Of course, and the final proof being that Karl Marx was a German
If you believe that only "simple men & women from the masses" were involved in the organizing
of the Bolsheviks, then you really need to do some more research and put aside, what ever revisionist propaganda
you have been reading.
It might come as a surprise that there were educated men and women in Russia, they even had schoolteachers and University's.
But try reading up on this for starters:-
The founder of Russian Marxism, Georgy Plekhanov, who was at first allied with Lenin and the Bolsheviks, parted ways with them by 1904. Leon Trotsky at first supported the Mensheviks, but left them in September 1904 over their insistence on an alliance with Russian liberals and their opposition to a reconciliation with Lenin and the Bolsheviks. He remained a self-described "non-factional social democrat" until August 1917 when he joined Lenin and the Bolsheviks as their positions converged and he came to believe that Lenin was right on the issue of the party.
The lines between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks hardened in April 1905 when the Bolsheviks held a Bolsheviks-only meeting in London, which they call the Third Party Congress. The Mensheviks organised a rival conference and the split was thus formalised.
The Bolsheviks played a relatively minor role in the 1905 Revolution, and were a minority in the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies led by Trotsky. The less significant Moscow Soviet, however, was dominated by the Bolsheviks. These soviets became the model for those formed in 1917.
As the Russian Revolution of 1905 progressed, Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and smaller non-Russian social democratic parties operating within the Russian Empire attempted to reunify at the Fourth (Unification) Congress of the RSDLP held at Folkets hus, Norra Bantorget in Stockholm, April 1906. With the Mensheviks ("The minority") striking an alliance with the Jewish Bund, the Bolsheviks found themselves in a minority.
However, all factions retained their respective factional structure and the Bolsheviks formed the Bolshevik Center, the de-facto governing body of the Bolshevik faction within the RSDLP. At the next, Fifth Congress held in London in May 1907, the Bolsheviks were in the majority, but the two factions continued functioning mostly independently of each other.
With the defeat of the revolution in mid-1907 and the adoption of a new, highly restrictive election law, the Bolsheviks began debating whether to boycott the new parliament known as the Third Duma. Lenin and his supporters Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev argued for participating in the Duma while Lenin's deputy philosopher Alexander Bogdanov, Anatoly Lunacharsky, Mikhail Pokrovsky and others argued that the social democratic faction in the Duma should be recalled. The latter became known as recallists ("otzovists" in Russian).
A smaller group within the Bolshevik faction demanded that the RSDLP central committee should give its sometimes unruly Duma faction an ultimatum, demanding complete subordination to all party decisions. This group became known as "ultimatists" and was generally allied with the recallists.
With a majority of Bolshevik leaders either supporting Bogdanov or undecided by mid-1908 when the differences became irreconcilable, Lenin concentrated on undermining Bogdanov's reputation as a philosopher. In 1909 he published a scathing book of criticism entitled Materialism and Empiriocriticism (1909), assaulting Bogdanov's position and accusing him of philosophical idealism. In June 1909, Bogdanov was defeated at a Bolshevik mini-conference in Paris organised by the editorial board of the Bolshevik magazine Proletary and expelled from the Bolshevik faction.
With both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks weakened by splits within their ranks and by Tsarist repression, they were tempted to try to re-unite the party. In January 1910, Leninists, recallists and various Menshevik factions held a meeting of the party's Central Committee in Paris.
Kamenev and Zinoviev were dubious about the idea, but were willing to give it a try under pressure from "conciliator" Bolsheviks like Victor Nogin. Lenin was adamantly opposed to any re-unification, but was outvoted within the Bolshevik leadership. The meeting reached a tentative agreement and one of its provisions made Trotsky's Vienna-based Pravda a party-financed 'central organ'. Kamenev, Trotsky's brother-in-law, was added to the editorial board from the Bolsheviks, but the unification attempts failed in August 1910 when Kamenev resigned from the board amid mutual recriminations.
The factions permanently broke off relations in January 1912 after the Bolsheviks organised a Bolsheviks-only Prague Party Conference and formally expelled Mensheviks and recallists from the party. As a result, they ceased to be a faction in the RSDLP and instead declared themselves an independent party, which they called RSDLP (Bolshevik).
Although the Bolshevik leadership decided to form a separate party, convincing pro-Bolshevik workers within Russia to follow suit proved difficult. When the first meeting of the Fourth Duma was convened in late 1912, only one out of six Bolshevik deputies, Matvei Muranov, (another one, Roman Malinovsky, was later exposed as a secret police agent) voted to break away from the Menshevik faction within the Duma on 15 December 1912. The Bolshevik leadership eventually prevailed and the Bolsheviks formed their own Duma faction in September 1913.
Connaught Stranger
Romanians in WW1 were figthing on 2 fronts :in Transilvania and Dobrogea 1916.They were figthing with the germans,the austrians ,the hungarians,the bulgarians ,the turks .
In 1917 the germans and their allies could not break the Romanian-Russian ,although the Russians were running away in many cases(being weakened by the german propaganda and by the revolution at which the germans were helpping to happen), Front in any place.And you think it was a poor army.
There have been 220 000 Romanian dead soldiers(for which controled official data exist) because in many cases there were figths between Romanian Infantry and german artillery.
Andrei
In 1917 the germans and their allies could not break the Romanian-Russian ,although the Russians were running away in many cases(being weakened by the german propaganda and by the revolution at which the germans were helpping to happen), Front in any place.And you think it was a poor army.
There have been 220 000 Romanian dead soldiers(for which controled official data exist) because in many cases there were figths between Romanian Infantry and german artillery.
Andrei
....also from Romanian History of WW1 by Constantin Kiritescu,from "Battle of Marasesti"
"-But wasn t the case that over the front which had to be attacked,there were the symptoms to make the germans expect the best to come?Wasn t established between the german army and the IV-th Russian army ,that kind of correspondence exchange ,in which the slickness of the germans had managed to seed the anarchy seeds in the columns of the Russian army? And of those wern’ t two russian Divissions,34th and 13th,which have obliged formally to 12th bavarian divission ,not to fight between them anymore and to propagate the same kind of movment to the neighbouring divissions,in the favour of ending hostilities ?It was not known however that the negotiations between the Russian infantry and the german delegation , had gone so far as to the point to which the russian infantry was firing on their own artillery(they were shooting their own artillery).,when the last one was maintaining a kind of discipline was by artillery baraj firing ,trying to stop the brothering of the two armies(german and russian).The negotiations went so far that at 1st of July that the germans had printed a project to end hostilities with the 34th Russian Division.”At article 2 of this convention ,russian infantry was employing to signal to the germans when the russian or romanian cannons will open fire ,so that the german response will be twice the number of projectiles(shells)”. At 19th of July the commander of the first reserve german Army Corps ,General von Morgen , was officialy enpowered by Ludendorff* “to end the suspension of hostilities with the 34th and 13th russian divisions ”.The great german headquarter preffered to begin the offensive in a russian sector .And it wasn’t chance ,neither the effect of some savant strategic combinations when the german commandment chose ,for beginning to break the enemy Front ,exactly the sector defended by the 34th russian division.
*Order no. 2076 of 19th July 1917 of the great german headquarter17.-"
17 Birzotescu Laurentiu ,Colonel,"Contributiuni la istoria razboiului nostru";ofensiva germano-austriaca la nord de Focsani in Iulie 1917.Dupa lucrari germane ,in "Romania Militara",nr 6-10,1921
"-But wasn t the case that over the front which had to be attacked,there were the symptoms to make the germans expect the best to come?Wasn t established between the german army and the IV-th Russian army ,that kind of correspondence exchange ,in which the slickness of the germans had managed to seed the anarchy seeds in the columns of the Russian army? And of those wern’ t two russian Divissions,34th and 13th,which have obliged formally to 12th bavarian divission ,not to fight between them anymore and to propagate the same kind of movment to the neighbouring divissions,in the favour of ending hostilities ?It was not known however that the negotiations between the Russian infantry and the german delegation , had gone so far as to the point to which the russian infantry was firing on their own artillery(they were shooting their own artillery).,when the last one was maintaining a kind of discipline was by artillery baraj firing ,trying to stop the brothering of the two armies(german and russian).The negotiations went so far that at 1st of July that the germans had printed a project to end hostilities with the 34th Russian Division.”At article 2 of this convention ,russian infantry was employing to signal to the germans when the russian or romanian cannons will open fire ,so that the german response will be twice the number of projectiles(shells)”. At 19th of July the commander of the first reserve german Army Corps ,General von Morgen , was officialy enpowered by Ludendorff* “to end the suspension of hostilities with the 34th and 13th russian divisions ”.The great german headquarter preffered to begin the offensive in a russian sector .And it wasn’t chance ,neither the effect of some savant strategic combinations when the german commandment chose ,for beginning to break the enemy Front ,exactly the sector defended by the 34th russian division.
*Order no. 2076 of 19th July 1917 of the great german headquarter17.-"
17 Birzotescu Laurentiu ,Colonel,"Contributiuni la istoria razboiului nostru";ofensiva germano-austriaca la nord de Focsani in Iulie 1917.Dupa lucrari germane ,in "Romania Militara",nr 6-10,1921
QUOTE (razu @ Oct 21 2009, 10:58 PM)
Romanians in WW1 were figthing on 2 fronts :in Transilvania and Dobrogea 1916.They were figthing with the germans,the austrians ,the hungarians,the bulgarians ,the turks .
In 1917 the germans and their allies could not break the Romanian-Russian, although the Russians were running away in many cases(being weakened by the german propaganda and by the revolution at which the germans were helpping to happen), Front in any place. And you think it was a poor army.
There have been 255 000 Romanian dead soldiers(the counted ones) because in many cases there were figths between Romanian Infantry and German artillery.
Andrei
In 1917 the germans and their allies could not break the Romanian-Russian, although the Russians were running away in many cases(being weakened by the german propaganda and by the revolution at which the germans were helpping to happen), Front in any place. And you think it was a poor army.
There have been 255 000 Romanian dead soldiers(the counted ones) because in many cases there were figths between Romanian Infantry and German artillery.
Andrei
Strange, but I am not sure why you can manage to post the words Romanian-Russian
with the correct capital letters, but manage to omit to do so on the words German, Austrian, Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Turks.
Point 1.
Again you go on about German Propaganda, newspapers, etc..etc,
Germans organized the Bolshevik Revolution
but you present no evidence or sources to back your fantastic claims.
Point 2:-
Romanian Military, Poor uniforms, poor weapons, poor equipment, poor supplies, poor tactics, poor commanders,
etc..etc.. are well documented.
All of the above + prominent National Fighting spirit are NOT enough to win a war.
I know the average Romanian soldier tried there best, but were very badly let down by their superiors
and by the time Romania entered the war in 1916 the opposition forces had plenty of combat experience.
The opposition made their gains in 1917 - 1918 the capture of the whole country all the way over to the
Romanian Capital City Bucharest is proof of that. A victory here and there is not always enough to win a war.
Connaught Stranger.
QUOTE (razu @ Oct 21 2009, 11:27 PM)
....also from Romanian History of WW1 by Constantin Kiritescu,from "Battle of Marasesti"
"-But wasn t the case that over the front which had to be attacked,there were the symptoms to make the germans expect the best to come?Wasn t established between the german army and the IV-th Russian army ,that kind of correspondence exchange ,in which the slickness of the germans had managed to seed the anarchy seeds in the columns of the Russian army? And of those wern’ t two russian Divissions,34th and 13th,which have obliged formally to 12th bavarian divission ,not to fight between them anymore and to propagate the same kind of movment to the neighbouring divissions,in the favour of ending hostilities ?It was not known however that the negotiations between the Russian infantry and the german delegation , had gone so far as to the point to which the russian infantry was firing on their own artillery(they were shooting their own artillery).,when the last one was maintaining a kind of discipline was by artillery baraj firing ,trying to stop the brothering of the two armies(german and russian).The negotiations went so far that at 1st of July that the germans had printed a project to end hostilities with the 34th Russian Division.”At article 2 of this convention ,russian infantry was employing to signal to the germans when the russian or romanian cannons will open fire ,so that the german response will be twice the number of projectiles(shells)”. At 19th of July the commander of the first reserve german Army Corps ,General von Morgen , was officialy enpowered by Ludendorff* “[b]to end the suspension of hostilities with the 34th and 13th russian divisions ”.The great german headquarter preffered to begin the offensive in a russian sector .And it wasn’t chance ,neither the effect of some savant strategic combinations when the german commandment chose ,for beginning to break the enemy Front ,exactly the sector defended by the 34th russian division.[/b]
*Order no. 2076 of 19th July 1917 of the great german headquarter17.-"
"-But wasn t the case that over the front which had to be attacked,there were the symptoms to make the germans expect the best to come?Wasn t established between the german army and the IV-th Russian army ,that kind of correspondence exchange ,in which the slickness of the germans had managed to seed the anarchy seeds in the columns of the Russian army? And of those wern’ t two russian Divissions,34th and 13th,which have obliged formally to 12th bavarian divission ,not to fight between them anymore and to propagate the same kind of movment to the neighbouring divissions,in the favour of ending hostilities ?It was not known however that the negotiations between the Russian infantry and the german delegation , had gone so far as to the point to which the russian infantry was firing on their own artillery(they were shooting their own artillery).,when the last one was maintaining a kind of discipline was by artillery baraj firing ,trying to stop the brothering of the two armies(german and russian).The negotiations went so far that at 1st of July that the germans had printed a project to end hostilities with the 34th Russian Division.”At article 2 of this convention ,russian infantry was employing to signal to the germans when the russian or romanian cannons will open fire ,so that the german response will be twice the number of projectiles(shells)”. At 19th of July the commander of the first reserve german Army Corps ,General von Morgen , was officialy enpowered by Ludendorff* “[b]to end the suspension of hostilities with the 34th and 13th russian divisions ”.The great german headquarter preffered to begin the offensive in a russian sector .And it wasn’t chance ,neither the effect of some savant strategic combinations when the german commandment chose ,for beginning to break the enemy Front ,exactly the sector defended by the 34th russian division.[/b]
*Order no. 2076 of 19th July 1917 of the great german headquarter17.-"
In connection to bold in Black.
Pure conjecture on your part give us the source for your claims
In connection to bold in blue.
In my opinion the Germans were prepared to cease warfare with units that were pulling out of the fight due to the continued unrest in their homeland. Why waste men and material on an enemy force that has no stomach for a fight?
Connaught Stranger.
QUOTE (Connaught Stranger @ Oct 21 2009, 09:36 PM)
Strange, but I am not sure why you can manage to post the words Romanian-Russian
with the correct capital letters, but manage to omit to do so on the words German, Austrian, Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Turks.
Point 1.
Again you go on about German Propaganda, newspapers, etc..etc,
Germans organized the Bolshevik Revolution
but you present no evidence or sources to back your fantastic claims.
Point 2:-
Romanian Military, Poor uniforms, poor weapons, poor equipment, poor supplies, poor tactics, poor commanders,
etc..etc.. are well documented.
All of the above + prominent National Fighting spirit are NOT enough to win a war.
I know the average Romanian soldier tried there best, but were very badly let down by their superiors
and by the time Romania entered the war in 1916 the opposition forces had plenty of combat experience.
The opposition made their gains in 1917 - 1918 the capture of the whole country all the way over to the
Romanian Capital City Bucharest is proof of that. A victory here and there is not always enough to win a war.
Connaught Stranger.
with the correct capital letters, but manage to omit to do so on the words German, Austrian, Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Turks.
Point 1.
Again you go on about German Propaganda, newspapers, etc..etc,
Germans organized the Bolshevik Revolution
but you present no evidence or sources to back your fantastic claims.
Point 2:-
Romanian Military, Poor uniforms, poor weapons, poor equipment, poor supplies, poor tactics, poor commanders,
etc..etc.. are well documented.
All of the above + prominent National Fighting spirit are NOT enough to win a war.
I know the average Romanian soldier tried there best, but were very badly let down by their superiors
and by the time Romania entered the war in 1916 the opposition forces had plenty of combat experience.
The opposition made their gains in 1917 - 1918 the capture of the whole country all the way over to the
Romanian Capital City Bucharest is proof of that. A victory here and there is not always enough to win a war.
Connaught Stranger.
here is the source:
*Order no. 2076 of 19th July 1917 of the great german headquarter17.-"
17 Colonel Birzotescu Laurentiu "Contributiuni la istoria razboiului nostru"(Contributions to the history of our war);ofensiva germano-austriaca la nord de Focsani in Iulie 1917(the german austrian offensive at North of Focsani July 1917).Dupa lucrari germane(after german works) ,in "Romania Militara"(Military Romania),no 6-10,1921
I think "the germans are naturally the bad guys"
Andrei
Andrei
Perhaps you should post a Thread about your theories that the Prussian/Germans
were responsible for causing the Communist problem for the world over at the Romanian
Website:- http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum?
World War 1 and Regional War section.
http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showforum=11
I am sure there are people there like, Victor, Denes, Kepi, etc..etc.. who are more than able to show the flaws in your thinking.
If any of what you speculate was true about this matter, the Allies would have found evidence of it long long ago,
seeing they ultimately occupied Prussia after their victory in World War 1.
But it seems to me you are utter convinced of what you believe to be the truth of the matter, however I can see
no proof of what you claim, to me personally it falls into the Realms of history revision and conspiracy theories.
Connaught Stranger.
were responsible for causing the Communist problem for the world over at the Romanian
Website:- http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum?
World War 1 and Regional War section.
http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showforum=11
I am sure there are people there like, Victor, Denes, Kepi, etc..etc.. who are more than able to show the flaws in your thinking.
If any of what you speculate was true about this matter, the Allies would have found evidence of it long long ago,
seeing they ultimately occupied Prussia after their victory in World War 1.
But it seems to me you are utter convinced of what you believe to be the truth of the matter, however I can see
no proof of what you claim, to me personally it falls into the Realms of history revision and conspiracy theories.
Connaught Stranger.
I really wish I knew more about the Eastern Front. But just as we have seen such a wide difference of opinions mutating regarding our own military (Haig=useless butcher/Haig=war winner) - inspite of the vast literature that is available here, I can't help wondering if our interpretations of the Eastern Front are bound to be premature (90 +years later!) given the range of documentation available to us in Englsih.
I seem to recall that the German influence in Russian pre war was quite widespread in all manner of political, economic and military spheres. And wasn't it Latvians (Letts) who actually murdered the Tsar and his family?
At this point I beat a hasty retreat.
Edwin
I seem to recall that the German influence in Russian pre war was quite widespread in all manner of political, economic and military spheres. And wasn't it Latvians (Letts) who actually murdered the Tsar and his family?
At this point I beat a hasty retreat.
Edwin
I can't say I'm at all familiar with the themes being discussed here - but for the sake of the future of this thread, please can we ensure that everything is kept on topic, civil, polite and respectful of each other's views
Thanks in advance
Alan
Thanks in advance
Alan
Alan Curragh: I'll second that!
John
Toronto
John
Toronto
QUOTE (razu @ Oct 21 2009, 08:57 PM)
I think "the germans are naturally the bad guys"
Andrei
Andrei
As a German I am relly offended by this statement.
Unless there is any evidence for you to claim that the whole German people were "naturally the bad guys", I am asking you to stop talking that nonsense about our nation.
There were many German war crimes, not to think of the Holocaust and other crimes comitted during WWII, but not EVERY German was involved into it, there were a lot of people who resisted against and sometimes I have the impression that people always put our crimes in the foreground to hide their own's.
By the way I don not think that the common German soldier left his home to serve in the Imperial Army or the Wehrmacht to kill and destroy other countries.
My own great-grandfather fought in both wars. do you really think that when he was engaged in the siege of Budapest during 1944 he thought of risking his life to gain time for Hitler to do as much "bad guy's things" as possible until the nearing end? No.
In their own view just as in that of your people they went to defend their homeland, in WWII to annul the unjust of the outcome of WWI and later just another time to defend their own homeland.
There were those "bad guys" like Hitler and his consorts, there may have been some in the first world war, too that is not to be discussed here as we all can accept it as facts.
You made a lot of work with your translation of your WWI Romanian sources, but you should also accept the fact that they were written in a patriotic way to get Romania "into a bright light". I have a lot to do at the moment, but maybe by time I might translate some German sources on the same subject just to give an opposite view of the course of the war in Romania.
QUOTE (Connaught Stranger @ Oct 21 2009, 10:07 PM)
Perhaps you should post a Thread about your theories that the Prussian/Germans
were responsible for causing the Communist problem for the world over at the Romanian
Website:- http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum?
World War 1 and Regional War section.
http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showforum=11
I am sure there are people there like, Victor, Denes, Kepi, etc..etc.. who are more than able to show the flaws in your thinking.
If any of what you speculate was true about this matter, the Allies would have found evidence of it long long ago,
seeing they ultimately occupied Prussia after their victory in World War 1.
But it seems to me you are utter convinced of what you believe to be the truth of the matter, however I can see
no proof of what you claim, to me personally it falls into the Realms of history revision and conspiracy theories.
Connaught Stranger.
were responsible for causing the Communist problem for the world over at the Romanian
Website:- http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum?
World War 1 and Regional War section.
http://www.worldwar2.ro/forum/index.php?showforum=11
I am sure there are people there like, Victor, Denes, Kepi, etc..etc.. who are more than able to show the flaws in your thinking.
If any of what you speculate was true about this matter, the Allies would have found evidence of it long long ago,
seeing they ultimately occupied Prussia after their victory in World War 1.
But it seems to me you are utter convinced of what you believe to be the truth of the matter, however I can see
no proof of what you claim, to me personally it falls into the Realms of history revision and conspiracy theories.
Connaught Stranger.
I tried,but my post has been deleted ,when I said that Marshal Antonescu was a nazi(!?),I was told that the Romanian contribution at the Great War was not so important(!?) as it was the one of ww2(!?) and I was banned for a week or so.
Andrei
well at least we managed to take Transilvania back from the austro-hungarians.
p.s.is that the "romanian army" site?!So I let you try if you wish.
QUOTE (Connaught Stranger @ Oct 21 2009, 10:07 PM)
If any of what you speculate was true about this matter, the Allies would have found evidence of it long long ago,
seeing they ultimately occupied Prussia after their victory in World War 1.
Connaught Stranger.
seeing they ultimately occupied Prussia after their victory in World War 1.
Connaught Stranger.
Small point, but we occupied the Rhineland after the war. I would have thought that documentation would have been held at Berlin. Also, on a different tack, I wonder whether the Germans removed any material from the Rhine land before the allied occupation - or even whether the allies bothered much about seeking records - unlike the 2nd WW, when very active attempts were made to secure material.
Edwin
QUOTE (razu @ Oct 21 2009, 08:58 PM)
.
There have been 220 000 Romanian dead soldiers(for which controled official data exist) because in many cases there were figths between Romanian Infantry and german artillery.
Andrei
There have been 220 000 Romanian dead soldiers(for which controled official data exist) because in many cases there were figths between Romanian Infantry and german artillery.
Andrei
Were these 220,000 Romanian dead just victims of battle, or did they include the soldiers who died from disease ? How many soldiers were reported wounded, and how many as prisoners ? What was the total number of men who fought in the Romanian army, Andrei ?
Phil
Of all the nations that fought in the Great War, Romania apears to have suffered the most dramatic of defeats. The onslaught against her was sudden and catastrophic. The peace imposed was merciless. The human losses were frighful.
There is perhaps a moral here : if you're going to fight in a war, make up your mind and do it quickly : prevarication has fatal consequences.
Phil
There is perhaps a moral here : if you're going to fight in a war, make up your mind and do it quickly : prevarication has fatal consequences.
Phil
QUOTE (PJA @ Oct 23 2009, 05:33 AM)
Of all the nations that fought in the Great War, Romania apears to have suffered the most dramatic of defeats. The onslaught against her was sudden and catastrophic. The peace imposed was merciless. The human losses were frighful.
There is perhaps a moral here : if you're going to fight in a war, make up your mind and do it quickly : prevarication has fatal consequences.
Phil
There is perhaps a moral here : if you're going to fight in a war, make up your mind and do it quickly : prevarication has fatal consequences.
Phil
You mean to say:Of oll the Empires and nations that fougth the War.We have not lost the battles of 1917 against the germans austrians hungarians bulgarians turks ;they did not manage to break the Front line.Only after they took the Russians out of the equation we were forced to sign the peace,and also many Romanian troops died because they had to fiil the empty spaces left by the Russians ,taken out of the War by the revolution,triggered by the germans. .Also in 1916 we managed to delay the central powers as much as we could,also by making them to send on Romanian Front some of their best troops(when Battle of Verdun was taking place),some of them"never left",which I think is also a success.So I think it was a success,in the end.If you look of the map of Great Romania of 1919 it was clearly a success.
Not to mention the fact that when the Kaiser saw he is attacked by a Hohenzollern,H.M. King Ferdinand of Romania ;it was a powerful blow into the enemy's moral.
Just as Gallipoli was a success both by striking the enemy where he least expected,managing to take out of the figth many of their troops in a critical moment of the War ;thus a powerful blow to their moral and a bridghead in to the heart of the central powers territory.
As about the poorness of the Romanian Army and "bad officers";H.M. King Carol of Romania led the Russian Armies in the Ruusso-Turkish War of 1877.
Also my ggrandfather Gneral Aristide Razu has studied at Lieje University,Engineering and also made the Military Academy ;I wouldn't haste to call him a "poor officer".
Also at 6th of November we reentered the War ,and went all the way to Budapesta and also took back Bucovina.
Andrei
(Romanian soldier guarding the Chain Bridge in Budapest)
In 1917 Romania and Russia were a rather unimportant theatre for the Allied armies as it was in early 1916. The final strategic goal of our armies was to have the "back free" for their main adversaries in the west.
Many of the forces allocated to Romania by Germany and its allies were drawn away in 1917.
In numbers, for example Austria lost more than a million soldiers during 1916 on the Eastern front (about 500,000 of which recorded as sick, e.g. no combat casualties), compared to 570,000 in 1917 (of which 425,000 were recorded as sick).
As you can see there is a difference of 500,000 to 145,000 as real combat losses, and only a small amount of them ocurred on the Romanian front.
When you speak of the "success" of the peace treaty fpor Romania, you should not forget that the sole aim of thoses treaties was to annihilate Austria and Germany as major powers. Thus it was in British/French own interest to give such a huge territory to Romania.
It has not much to do with the countries performance in the war.
Well, apparently king Carol died during the war, and he was not the one to betray his Allies.
When the Romanian armies reentered the war, Austria-Hungary was nearing its final end, hundred-thousands of soldiers were captured in the final Italian offensive...who could have been there to defend the Bukowina?
Many of the forces allocated to Romania by Germany and its allies were drawn away in 1917.
In numbers, for example Austria lost more than a million soldiers during 1916 on the Eastern front (about 500,000 of which recorded as sick, e.g. no combat casualties), compared to 570,000 in 1917 (of which 425,000 were recorded as sick).
As you can see there is a difference of 500,000 to 145,000 as real combat losses, and only a small amount of them ocurred on the Romanian front.
When you speak of the "success" of the peace treaty fpor Romania, you should not forget that the sole aim of thoses treaties was to annihilate Austria and Germany as major powers. Thus it was in British/French own interest to give such a huge territory to Romania.
It has not much to do with the countries performance in the war.
Well, apparently king Carol died during the war, and he was not the one to betray his Allies.
When the Romanian armies reentered the war, Austria-Hungary was nearing its final end, hundred-thousands of soldiers were captured in the final Italian offensive...who could have been there to defend the Bukowina?
Some information with regards the Romanian Campaign for our members
Source:-
http://www.worldwar2.ro/primulrazboi/?article=116
Connaught Stranger.
Source:-
http://www.worldwar2.ro/primulrazboi/?article=116
QUOTE
The Battle of Marasti (July 1917)
The Romanian General Headquarters together with the Russian High Command on the Moldavian Front had drawn up an offensive plan, which called for a double strike: one in the Marasti area and the other on the lower part of the Sereth River, in the Namoloasa area. It was hoped that this way the German 9th Army would be encircled and destroyed and then the advance could continue towards Ramnicu Sarat.
The offensive in the Soveja Basin, which would later be known as teh battle of Marasti, was going to be carried out by the Romanian 2nd Army, commanded by lt. gen. Alexandru Averescu. He had at his disposal to corps, made up of four infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade. In total 56 infantry battalions and 14 cavalry squadrons supported by 228 artillery pieces (of which 52 heavy artillery) and 21 aircraft. The main strike was going to be concentrated on a 35 km wide area.
Opposite the Romanian forces was the Gerock Group, the right wing of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army, made up of 21 infantry battalions and 36 cavalry squadrons, supported by 142 artillery pieces (of which only 6 were heavy artillery). Although he was in numerical inferiority, the geographic position offered the Austro-Hungarian commander a lost of defensive solutions. Several strongpoints were organized, linked by trenches and positioned so that they could support each other. The main positions were on the Casin and Teius Hills, in the Incarcatoarea Meadow and the Marasti village.
After a thorough reconnaissance, general Averescu decided to brake the front on the left of the 2nd Army, on a 13 km wide area, between the Incarcatoarea Meadow and Marasti, because the terrain was more favorable there. This task was given to the 2nd Corps, commanded by maj. gen. Artur Vaitoianu, to which the 3rd Infantry Division and the 6th Infantry Division (minus one brigade) as well as the army's entire heavy artillery were subordinated. On the right wing, the 4th Corps of general Valeanu was made up of the brigade taken form the 6th Infantry Division and the 8th Infantry Division. It had the mission to pin down the Central Powers forces in front of it and if the 2nd Corps made any progress, it was also supposed to advance. The 1st Infantry Division, minus its artillery, which had been temporarily assigned to the 2nd Corps, was the army's reserve.
The artillery preparation began in the morning of 22 July 1917 and lasted until the evening of the following day. The bombardment had managed to disorganize the German fortifications and make 12 breaches in the barbwire nets, thus general Averescu decided to attack on 24 July.
At 0345 hours, the Romanian infantry had quietly advanced up t o150 m from the positions of the German 218th Infantry Division. After a 15 minute long artillery preparation, the 3rd Infantry Division of maj. gen. Alexandru Margineanu attacked.. The 24th Infantry Regiment Tecuci assaulted the Incarcatoarea Meadow and managed to occupy the first trenches, but a powerful counterattack in the evening pushed it back to its started positions. The 2nd Vanatori Regiment and the 4th Dorobanti Regiment Arges managed to take Marasti Hill, thus making the first breach in the front of the German 218th Infantry Division. They continued the advance and attacked the positions on Teius Hill and occupied it. The troops in the Incarcatoarea Meadow were threatened to be encircled and had to retreat. For this action, the two commanders: lt. col. Constantin Calotescu (4th Dorobanti Regiment) si lt. col. Mihail Butescu (2nd Vanatori Regiment) were awarded the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class.
The 22nd Infantry Regiment Dambovita received the mission to assault the Marasti village. The CO decided to pin down the German troops with two companies and with two battalions to attack from the heights north of the village. The maneuver was successful and forced the enemy to retreat. The 30th Dorobanti Regiment Muscel attempted to take the Manastioara Hill, but all its assaults failed. After the 22nd Regiment took Marasti, it continued the advance and arrived behind the German positions on the Manastioara Hill. The combined attack of the two regiments eventually led capture of the fortifications and of the garrison's remains. The company commanded by lt. Stefan Chiritescu, from 30th Dorobanti Regiment, infiltrated southwards and took 2 officers and 150 soldiers prisoners. Lt. Chiritescu received the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class.
In the first day of the offensive, the Romanian troops had created a 10 km wide breach in the front of the German 218th Infantry Division, taking 1,500 POWs. The Russian 15th Infantry Division (from the Russian 4th Army), deployed on the left flank of the 2nd Army, occupied Momaia Hill, where it captured 500 soldiers.
The defeat created a powerful impression in the Central Powers command, which decided to strengthen the 1st Austro-Hungarian Army. General Gerock organized a new defence line on the Tehereale HIll, Rachitasul Mare and Teius Hill, which offeed him a dominant position over the Vrancea Depression.
General Averescu wanted to exploit the intial success as much as he could, so he introduced in the first line the 1st Infantry Division of brig. gen. Dumitru Stratilescu and brought the cavalry brigade closer to the infantry, to make it easier to infiltrate behind enemy front, should there be such an occasion.
The following day, the 6th Infantry Division, commanded by brig. gen. Nicolae Anghirescu, attacked and took Incarcatoarea Meadow. On 26 July he continued the advance assaulting enemy positions on the Tehereale Hill, which capitulated after a combined action with the 8th Infantry Division.
The 1st Infantry Division had the task to take the Rachitasul Mare, a peak 927 m high. It had a powerful heavy artillery support and several small units infiltrated behind the front. These made it possible for general Stratilescu to fulfill his mission and occupy the heights.
The 3rd Infantry Division assaulted the Teius Hill. The 22nd Infantry Regiment was met by very stiff resistance, in some cases there were even hand�to-hand combat situations. Lt. col. Butescu managed to sneak with the 2nd Vanatori Regiment through an unguarded valley and arrived behind the German 218th Infantry Division. The Teius Hill was surrounded and eventually fell into Romanian hands. Thus the 2nd Army made a 30 km wide breach in the front of the Gerock Group, which started to fall back. The Romanian troops reoccupied Soveja and cut the retreat path of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Cavalry Division.
But the success of the Central Powers offensive in Galicia determined the Romanian General Headquarters to stop the advance of the 2nd Army. General Averescu requested to be allowed to at least reoccupy the entire Vrancea Depression. Thus, on 27 July, the attacked restarted along the entire front.
The 8th Infantry Division took the Arsita Mocanului Peak and the 6th Infantry Division pushed back the Austro-Hungarian 1st Cavalry Division and captured the Cocosila Peak. In the sector of the 1st Infantry Division, the 18th Dorobanti Regiment Gorj infiltrated between the German 218th Infantry Division and the Austro-Hungarian 1st Cavalry Division, threatening their flanks. These had to retreat towards Lepsa. The Romanians occupied the Roschila Peak. The 1st Vanatori Regiment reached the Putna River. The 3rd Infantry Division continued also the attack. The 22nd Infantry Regiment and 2nd Vanatori Regiment took the Topesti and Valea Sarii villages, pushing the Germans over the river.
The Gerock Group received reinforcements consisting of two infantry divisions (37th and 117th) and two cavalry divisions (7th and 8th) and, to the south, the German 9th Army strengthened its left wing with 3 divisions (76th, 212th and 216th Infantry).
On 28 July the 2nd Army however managed to fulfill its mission. The 3rd Infantry Division reached the Putna River, eliminating the last resistances on the left bank and created several bridgeheads over it. The 7th Vanatori Regiment from the 6th Infantry Division took the Zobina Neagra Peak. Only the 8th Infantry Division was stopped by the Austro-Hungarian 8th Mountain Brigade, in the Casin Hill sector. General Averescu asked for support from the Russian 9th Army, which had to infiltrate a assault battalion behind the Austro-Hungarian lines and to attack the hill from behind� General Patrascu, the Romanian division's commander, decided to pin down the enemy with a part of his forces and with the other, led by col. Liciu, to outflank the Austro-Hungarians on the right. The plan failed, as the mountain troops put up a serious fight. The Russian battalion did not attack as planned, but retreated, endangering the flank of te h8th Division. The fighting continued the following days and, on 30 July, col. Liciu managed to take Razboiului Peak, south of Casin hill.
On 1 August lt. gen. Alexandru Averescu decided to stop the offensive also in the sector of the 8th Infantry Division, because he thought the position it now occupied was satisfactory. Thus the battle of Marasti was over. The 2nd Army had managed to create a bulge 30 km wide and 20 km deep in the front of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army and determined the Central Powers to change their operations plan and bring reinforcements to the area. Over 2,000 POWs were taken and 70 artillery pieces were captured. The Romanian troops lost about 4,500 men (1,500 dead and 3,000 wounded). No less than 32 Mihai Viteazul Orders 3rd class were awarded to the Romanian officers and the flags of four regiments (5thm 18th and 30th Infantry and 2nd Vanatori), which had captured in total 1,637 POWs, also received the order. Lt. general Averescu got the Mihai Viteazul Order 2nd class.
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Author: Victor Nitu.
Sources:
Cupsa I. Marasti, Marasesti, Oituz, Editura Militara, 1967
Ichim E. Ordinul militar de razboi Mihai Viteazul, Editura Jertfa & Modelism, 2000
The Romanian General Headquarters together with the Russian High Command on the Moldavian Front had drawn up an offensive plan, which called for a double strike: one in the Marasti area and the other on the lower part of the Sereth River, in the Namoloasa area. It was hoped that this way the German 9th Army would be encircled and destroyed and then the advance could continue towards Ramnicu Sarat.
The offensive in the Soveja Basin, which would later be known as teh battle of Marasti, was going to be carried out by the Romanian 2nd Army, commanded by lt. gen. Alexandru Averescu. He had at his disposal to corps, made up of four infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade. In total 56 infantry battalions and 14 cavalry squadrons supported by 228 artillery pieces (of which 52 heavy artillery) and 21 aircraft. The main strike was going to be concentrated on a 35 km wide area.
Opposite the Romanian forces was the Gerock Group, the right wing of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army, made up of 21 infantry battalions and 36 cavalry squadrons, supported by 142 artillery pieces (of which only 6 were heavy artillery). Although he was in numerical inferiority, the geographic position offered the Austro-Hungarian commander a lost of defensive solutions. Several strongpoints were organized, linked by trenches and positioned so that they could support each other. The main positions were on the Casin and Teius Hills, in the Incarcatoarea Meadow and the Marasti village.
After a thorough reconnaissance, general Averescu decided to brake the front on the left of the 2nd Army, on a 13 km wide area, between the Incarcatoarea Meadow and Marasti, because the terrain was more favorable there. This task was given to the 2nd Corps, commanded by maj. gen. Artur Vaitoianu, to which the 3rd Infantry Division and the 6th Infantry Division (minus one brigade) as well as the army's entire heavy artillery were subordinated. On the right wing, the 4th Corps of general Valeanu was made up of the brigade taken form the 6th Infantry Division and the 8th Infantry Division. It had the mission to pin down the Central Powers forces in front of it and if the 2nd Corps made any progress, it was also supposed to advance. The 1st Infantry Division, minus its artillery, which had been temporarily assigned to the 2nd Corps, was the army's reserve.
The artillery preparation began in the morning of 22 July 1917 and lasted until the evening of the following day. The bombardment had managed to disorganize the German fortifications and make 12 breaches in the barbwire nets, thus general Averescu decided to attack on 24 July.
At 0345 hours, the Romanian infantry had quietly advanced up t o150 m from the positions of the German 218th Infantry Division. After a 15 minute long artillery preparation, the 3rd Infantry Division of maj. gen. Alexandru Margineanu attacked.. The 24th Infantry Regiment Tecuci assaulted the Incarcatoarea Meadow and managed to occupy the first trenches, but a powerful counterattack in the evening pushed it back to its started positions. The 2nd Vanatori Regiment and the 4th Dorobanti Regiment Arges managed to take Marasti Hill, thus making the first breach in the front of the German 218th Infantry Division. They continued the advance and attacked the positions on Teius Hill and occupied it. The troops in the Incarcatoarea Meadow were threatened to be encircled and had to retreat. For this action, the two commanders: lt. col. Constantin Calotescu (4th Dorobanti Regiment) si lt. col. Mihail Butescu (2nd Vanatori Regiment) were awarded the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class.
The 22nd Infantry Regiment Dambovita received the mission to assault the Marasti village. The CO decided to pin down the German troops with two companies and with two battalions to attack from the heights north of the village. The maneuver was successful and forced the enemy to retreat. The 30th Dorobanti Regiment Muscel attempted to take the Manastioara Hill, but all its assaults failed. After the 22nd Regiment took Marasti, it continued the advance and arrived behind the German positions on the Manastioara Hill. The combined attack of the two regiments eventually led capture of the fortifications and of the garrison's remains. The company commanded by lt. Stefan Chiritescu, from 30th Dorobanti Regiment, infiltrated southwards and took 2 officers and 150 soldiers prisoners. Lt. Chiritescu received the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class.
In the first day of the offensive, the Romanian troops had created a 10 km wide breach in the front of the German 218th Infantry Division, taking 1,500 POWs. The Russian 15th Infantry Division (from the Russian 4th Army), deployed on the left flank of the 2nd Army, occupied Momaia Hill, where it captured 500 soldiers.
The defeat created a powerful impression in the Central Powers command, which decided to strengthen the 1st Austro-Hungarian Army. General Gerock organized a new defence line on the Tehereale HIll, Rachitasul Mare and Teius Hill, which offeed him a dominant position over the Vrancea Depression.
General Averescu wanted to exploit the intial success as much as he could, so he introduced in the first line the 1st Infantry Division of brig. gen. Dumitru Stratilescu and brought the cavalry brigade closer to the infantry, to make it easier to infiltrate behind enemy front, should there be such an occasion.
The following day, the 6th Infantry Division, commanded by brig. gen. Nicolae Anghirescu, attacked and took Incarcatoarea Meadow. On 26 July he continued the advance assaulting enemy positions on the Tehereale Hill, which capitulated after a combined action with the 8th Infantry Division.
The 1st Infantry Division had the task to take the Rachitasul Mare, a peak 927 m high. It had a powerful heavy artillery support and several small units infiltrated behind the front. These made it possible for general Stratilescu to fulfill his mission and occupy the heights.
The 3rd Infantry Division assaulted the Teius Hill. The 22nd Infantry Regiment was met by very stiff resistance, in some cases there were even hand�to-hand combat situations. Lt. col. Butescu managed to sneak with the 2nd Vanatori Regiment through an unguarded valley and arrived behind the German 218th Infantry Division. The Teius Hill was surrounded and eventually fell into Romanian hands. Thus the 2nd Army made a 30 km wide breach in the front of the Gerock Group, which started to fall back. The Romanian troops reoccupied Soveja and cut the retreat path of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Cavalry Division.
But the success of the Central Powers offensive in Galicia determined the Romanian General Headquarters to stop the advance of the 2nd Army. General Averescu requested to be allowed to at least reoccupy the entire Vrancea Depression. Thus, on 27 July, the attacked restarted along the entire front.
The 8th Infantry Division took the Arsita Mocanului Peak and the 6th Infantry Division pushed back the Austro-Hungarian 1st Cavalry Division and captured the Cocosila Peak. In the sector of the 1st Infantry Division, the 18th Dorobanti Regiment Gorj infiltrated between the German 218th Infantry Division and the Austro-Hungarian 1st Cavalry Division, threatening their flanks. These had to retreat towards Lepsa. The Romanians occupied the Roschila Peak. The 1st Vanatori Regiment reached the Putna River. The 3rd Infantry Division continued also the attack. The 22nd Infantry Regiment and 2nd Vanatori Regiment took the Topesti and Valea Sarii villages, pushing the Germans over the river.
The Gerock Group received reinforcements consisting of two infantry divisions (37th and 117th) and two cavalry divisions (7th and 8th) and, to the south, the German 9th Army strengthened its left wing with 3 divisions (76th, 212th and 216th Infantry).
On 28 July the 2nd Army however managed to fulfill its mission. The 3rd Infantry Division reached the Putna River, eliminating the last resistances on the left bank and created several bridgeheads over it. The 7th Vanatori Regiment from the 6th Infantry Division took the Zobina Neagra Peak. Only the 8th Infantry Division was stopped by the Austro-Hungarian 8th Mountain Brigade, in the Casin Hill sector. General Averescu asked for support from the Russian 9th Army, which had to infiltrate a assault battalion behind the Austro-Hungarian lines and to attack the hill from behind� General Patrascu, the Romanian division's commander, decided to pin down the enemy with a part of his forces and with the other, led by col. Liciu, to outflank the Austro-Hungarians on the right. The plan failed, as the mountain troops put up a serious fight. The Russian battalion did not attack as planned, but retreated, endangering the flank of te h8th Division. The fighting continued the following days and, on 30 July, col. Liciu managed to take Razboiului Peak, south of Casin hill.
On 1 August lt. gen. Alexandru Averescu decided to stop the offensive also in the sector of the 8th Infantry Division, because he thought the position it now occupied was satisfactory. Thus the battle of Marasti was over. The 2nd Army had managed to create a bulge 30 km wide and 20 km deep in the front of the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army and determined the Central Powers to change their operations plan and bring reinforcements to the area. Over 2,000 POWs were taken and 70 artillery pieces were captured. The Romanian troops lost about 4,500 men (1,500 dead and 3,000 wounded). No less than 32 Mihai Viteazul Orders 3rd class were awarded to the Romanian officers and the flags of four regiments (5thm 18th and 30th Infantry and 2nd Vanatori), which had captured in total 1,637 POWs, also received the order. Lt. general Averescu got the Mihai Viteazul Order 2nd class.
.
Author: Victor Nitu.
Sources:
Cupsa I. Marasti, Marasesti, Oituz, Editura Militara, 1967
Ichim E. Ordinul militar de razboi Mihai Viteazul, Editura Jertfa & Modelism, 2000
QUOTE
Battle of Marasesti (August-September 1917)
The Romanian 2nd Army's success at Marasti forced the Central Powers to revise their plans. The offensive planned in the Namoloasa area was abandoned and the bulk of the forces were moved in the Focsani area. The new offensive was going to be launched west of the Siret River, on the Focsani � Marasesti � Adjud direction, with the German 9th Army (general Johannes von Eben) and on the Oituz Valley with the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army (Archduke Joseph). The objective was to encircle and destroy the 2nd Army.
On the other side, the Romanian General Headquarters decided to cancel its attack in the Namoloasa area. The Russian 4th Army had to be pulled out from the front in southern Moldavia and moved north, where it could threaten the flank of the Austro-German forces advancing in Galicia. The Romanian 1st Army was going to replace the Russian troops departing the area.
For the offensive, the German 9th Army was strengthened with units brought from the French (the Alpine Corps, which arrived on 6 August) or Italian fronts. General von Eben decided to deliver the main blow with the German 1st Corps (6 divisions), while to its left the German 18th Reserve Corps (3 divisions) had to pin down the Entente troops opposite it. The right wing of the 9th Army was manned by the Ramnic Group (2 divisions). The reserve was made up of one German and one Austro-Hungarian divisions and the Alpine Corps, which arrived in the area during the first day of the battle. The German forces in the attack sector were 102 infantry battalions, 10 cavalry squadrons, 24 pioneer companies, 2 armored cars, 1,135 machine-guns, 356 mortars, 223 field guns and 122 heavy guns and howitzers.
Opposite the German 1st Corps was the Russian 4th Army, which had in contact with the enemy only two corps: on the right the 8th (3 divisions) and on the left the 7th (2 divisions). The reserve was made up of one infantry and one cavalry divisions. These totaled 84 infantry battalions, 52 cavalry squadrons, 280 field guns and 36 heavy guns. The bulk of the Romanian 1st Army was at Tecuci and was getting to cross the Siret River and replace the Russians.
The German 9th Army's offensive was preceded by a powerful artillery preparation, which began at 0430 hours on 6 August 1917. At 0730 hours the 1st Corps (general Kurt von Morgen) started the attack, with the 12th Bavarian, 76th and 89th Infantry Divisions in the first line and with another two divisions in the second echelon. The front defended by the Russian 13th and 34th Infantry Divisions was broken and 10 km breach was created. The Russians started a disorderly retreat east of the Siret River. At the request of the Russian command, general Constantin Christescu, CO of the 1st Army, ordered maj. general Eremia Grigorescu, CO of the Romanian 6th Corps, to intervene west of the Siret with the 5th Infantry Division and with the 9th Infantry Division to defend the river's eastern bank. The 32nd Dorobanti Regiment Mircea and the 8th Dorobanti Regiment Buzau counterattacked and stopped the Central Powers offensive on the line Moara Alba � Doaga � Furceni.
Seeing that the chances to force the crossing over the river are minimal, in the morning of 7 August, the German command redirected the offensive to the north, with four divisions. The effort was concentrated against the Romanian 5th Infantry Division, but the assault was repulsed. However, a bulge was created at the junction with the Russian troops, but the situation was saved by the counterattack of two battalions from the division's reserve. At noon, after a short artillery preparation, the enemy renewed the attack enjoying a 3 to 1 numerical superiority. The 3rd Vanatori Regiment held out in the Doaga village against an entire German division. The same thing happened in the sector of the 32nd Dorobanti Regiment Mircea. The soldiers in this unit made several bayonet charges only in their shirts, because of the suffocating heat, managing to push back the Germans to their positions. In the evening, the 1st Corps attacked and broke through the front of the Russian division on the right flank of the Romanian 5th Division. Threatened with the encirclement, the 32nd Regiment retreated to the Cosmesti Bridge. To fill the gap created, the Romanian 9th Infantry Division was introduced west of the Siret River. It was continuously attacked. In the evening of 7 August, under the cover of darkness, a German group approached and assaulted the 9th Division's flank, engaging into hand-to-hand fights. The Romanians abandoned Doaga and retreated to the outskirts of the Prisaca Forest, where a new defensive line was established. That day the 5th Division lost 44 officers and 1,770 soldiers (dead, wounded and missing). The front moved back 2-3 km.
On 8 August, general von Eben changed the attack sector to the west, on the front held by Russian units. In the evening, during the second assault, they were forced to retreat. A Russian regiment was almost completely destroyed. The Romanian front was bombarded and the attack on the 5th and 9th Infantry Divisions resumed the following day. On 9 August 1917, the German effort was increased. The assault started at 1900 hours, after a powerful artillery preparation, which caused many casualties to the 9th Division. Its troops were only able to dig foxholes, because the ground was very dry and hard to dig. The Germans again took heavy casualties because of the Romanian and Russian artillery situated on the eastern bank of the Siret River, which was firing directing into the attackers' flank. However, the first line of the Romanian defense was pierced in several spots, but reserves intervened and repulsed them after some very violent fighting. The 34th Regiment, which faced the 12th Bavarian Division, held out against three consecutive assaults. Only the 2nd Battalion, under the command of Major Gheorghe Mihail, the future Chief of the General Staff in 1940 and 1944, remained in the first line. It counterattacked and captured 62 prisoners and two machine-guns. The unit's battle flag was decorated later with Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class. The same award was bestowed upon the regiment's CO, colonel Virgiliu Dumbrava, as well the 2nd Battalion's CO. But the casualties were heavy: 35 officers and 1,551 soldiers. The 36th Regiment lost 36 officers and 954 soldiers. Also, the 7th and 32nd Dorobanti Regiments suffered many casualties. During the night, at 0200 hours, another assault took place and the Germans managed to push back for several hundred meters the 9th Division and the right wing of the 5th Division. The neighboring Russian division was also forced to retreat, but the Russian 4th Army counterattacked and captured 2,500 prisoners and recovered the lost ground.
The last failures had weakened the German 9th Army. Thus, general von Eben strengthened the 1st Corps with a new division and the 18th Reserve Corps with the Alpine Corps.
On 10 August, it was the Entente's turn to attack. General Christescu and general Ragoza, the CO of the Russian 4th Army, decided to strike each with a corps of two divisions the bulge in the German line. During the morning, the 9th Army attacked the Russian sector, but gained little ground. At 1700 hours, the allied infantry started the assault, after a long artillery preparation. The 9th Infantry Division took the first German trenches, but because of the losses it had to abandon them. Reinforced with a regiment form the Romanian 13th Infantry Division, it resumed the attack, but again without success. The 5th Infantry Division and a regiment of the 14th Infantry Division managed to get inside the German positions, but could keep them. The 8th Dorobanti and 3rd Vanatori Regiments managed to enter the Doaga village, but were repulsed. The situation was similar in the sector of the Russian 4th Army. However the offensive had reduced the combat potential of the German 76th, 89th and 115th Infantry Divisions, which had suffered the brunt of the assault. These were already exhausted after several days of failed attacks. The report of general von Eben to the Army Group CO, marshal von Mackensen, mentions the fact that the 216th Infantry Division had suffered many casualties because of the flank bombardment of the Romanian artillery yon the eastern bank of the Siret.
For the following day, general Christescu imposed a limited objective to the 6th Corps: the Doaga � Susita Valley. The Russian 4th Army had decided to remain on the defensive. The Germans attacked in its sector at 1600 hours, after a three hour artillery preparation, and again forced the Russian troops to retreat. At 1630 hours, the Romanian 9th Infantry Division began the assault without knowing the situation in the neighboring sector. After the Russian retreat the flank was exposed. The division's CO sent a battalion to extend the line. The Germans were advancing on Marasesti and the situation became extremely dangerous for the Entente. The 9th Vanatori Regiment, which was in the division's reserve, was quickly brought in and set up positions in the factory north of the town. It managed to stop the German troops that were threatening to encircle the 9th Infantry Division. For this action, lt. col. Gheorghe Rasoviceanu, the regiment's CO, was awarded the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class. A regiment of the 13th Infantry Division, from the 6th Crops' reserve, established the link with the Russians. The 5th Infantry Division attacked in the Doaga area, but the 7th and 8th Dorobanti Regiments failed to enter the village. The same day, maj. general Eremia Grigorescu was named at the command of the 1st Army.
Noticing that the troops of the German 1st Corps were exhausted, general von Eben decided to assign the main strike to the 18th Reserve Corps of maj. gen. Kurt von Wenniger, which had suffered fewer losses and was less tired. Thus, on 12 August, the 9th German Army attacked with small forces the 5th Infantry Division, in order to pin it down, and concentrated its forces against the Russian 4th Army, taking Panciu. Following this failure, general Ragoza wanted to retreat the Russian-Romanian front north of Marasesti., but abandoned the idea at maj. gen. Eremia Grigorescu's pleas. Lt. gen. Constantin Prezan, the Chief of the General Staff, decided to replace the Russian 7th Corps with the Romanian 5th Corps (10th and 13th Infantry Divisions) and to put the Russian 8th Corps under the command of the Romanian 1st Army. The staff of the Russian 4th Army was retreated to Bacau from where it was reassigned to another front.
On 13 August, the 18th Reserve Corps attacked the Russian troops north of Panciu, but failed to make any breakthrough. The following day, general von Eben ordered the 1st Corps to eliminate the Romanian bulge in the area of the Prisaca Forest and take the bridge over the Siret River at Cozmesti. In the same time, the 18th Reserve Corps had to attack on the Zabraut Valley. After powerful artillery preparation commenced the assault on the Russian 8th Corps' positions. Brig. gen. Henri Cihoski, CO of the 10th Infantry Division, sent the 10th Vanatori Regiment as help. It surprised the Alpine Corps and caused it important casualties, some in vicious hand-to-hand combat. The vanatori managed to take Hill 334, but were forced to retreat following a powerful artillery bombardment. The 38th Infantry Regiment Neagoe Basarab also intervened and its CO, col. Gheorghe Cornescu, received the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class for the counterattack that stopped the German offensive, which threatened to penetrate in the Susita Valley, behind the Romanian 2nd Army. The Russian 8th Corps was forced to pull back north of Iresti and Straoani.
The 5th Infantry Division, at the other end of the front, had been reduced to one third of its initial size during the last days of fighting. The positions in the Prisaca Forest were heavily bombarded by German artillery. At 1700 hours the assault began with two divisions and forced the Romanian troops to retreat. The division's reserves, as well as a regiment form the 14th Infantry Division, in the army's reserve, intervened and stopped the German advance north of the Prisaca Forest. The bridge at Cozmesti was blown up, as the Romanian engineers had built another two to the north. The exhausted 5th Infantry Division was pulled out of the first line.
On 15 August, the 18th Reserve Corps continued the offensive and managed to create a breach at the junction between the 10th Infantry Division and the Russian division to its right. The 10th Vanatori Regiment, supported by 10 Romanian and 3 Russian batteries, counterattacked and reestablished the situation. However, with its left wing, the 18th Corps took Muncel, forcing theRussians to pull back. Thus the link between the two Romanian armies was threatened. The 2ndArmy attacked with the "Colonel Alexiu" Detachment made up of 2 vanatori battalions, 2 infantry battalions and 3 artillery batteries, which, together with a Russian cavalry division, retook control of the village. The following day, the Germans occupiued half of Muncel, but were again forced to retreat after the assault of col. Alexandru Alexiu's men.
The days of 17 and 18 August were calm. The losses suffered by both sides, forced the commanders to reorganize their units. Maj. gen. Eremia Grigorescu replaced the 14th Infantry Division, which was deployed east of the Siret River, with the 1st and 6th Rosiori Brigades and the hard pressed 5th Infantry Division with the 2nd Cavalry Division. The latter and the two brigades formed the Cavalry Corps. The 14th Infantry Division was moved on the northern bank of the Siret River in the Cozmestii de Vale area. Also, the army's heavy artillery was redeployed so that it could better cover the sector of the 5th Corps (10th, 13th and 9th Infantry Divisions). The 1st Army's reserve was made up of the 15th Infantry Division and of the 5th Infantry Division, under reorganization. On the other side, at the intervention of marshal von Mackensen, general von Eben grouped 7 infantry divisions under the command of the German 1st Corps and subordinated almost all the heavy artillery of the 9th Army to it. These forces totalized 55 battalions and 95 batteries.
On 19 August, the Germans resumed the offensive, attacking with the 1st Corps towards Marasesti and with 18th Reserve Corps on the Panciu-Muncel direction. The main effort was concentrated in the sector between Marasesti and the Razoare Forest, defended by the Romanian 9th and 13th Infantry Divisions, the latter being assaulted by three enemy divisions. The artillery preparation started at 0630 hours in the area of the trenches of the 47/72nd, 51/52nd and 50/64th Infantry Regiments, from the first line of the 13th Infantry Division, and at the western outskirts of Marasesti, where the 9th Vanatori Regiment of the 9th Infantry Division was located. It lasted for two hours and was the most violent artillery bombardment of the entire battle. At 0900 hours the first assaults small scale began and were easily repulsed. After 1100 hours a very powerful attack started. The main blow was delivered north of the Razoare Forest, at the junction of the 13th and 10th Infantry Divisions. The 10th Infantry Division was attacked by the 13th Austro-Hungarian Division, which failed to breakthrough the Romanian lines.
The 13th Infantry Division, commanded by brig. gen. Ioan Popescu, was the Romanian unit that saw the most action that day. It occupied a front 6 km wide, with the 47/72nd Infantry Regiment at the south-western edge of the Razoare Forest, the 50/64th Infantry Regiment in the Negroponte Vineyards and the 51/52nd Infantry Regiment in the middle. The reserve was made up of one battalion of the 50/64th Regiment and the 48/49th Regiment. 15 Romanian and 15 Russian batteries provided artillery support.
The attack started at 0900 hours. In the sector of the 47/72nd Infantry Regiment, the German assaults failed one after another. The 1st Battalion was situated on the left wing, south of the Razoare Forest. It was attacked by the 28th Bavarian Infantry Regiment (from the 12th Bavarian Division) and by units of the German 89th and 115th Divisions. The 2nd Battalion, on the right wing, was assaulted by the Austro-Hungarian 13th Infantry Division. The 3rd Battalion was kept in reserve. The regiment's CO, lt. col. Radu Rosetti, the former chief of the Operations Bureau of the General Staff in 1916, was wounded at a leg during the fighting. At the center, the 51/52nd Regiment was situated in an open position ands was also powerfully attacked. It had to pull back. The Germans tried to use the momentum and infiltrate behind the positions of the two regiments on the flanks of the Romanian 13th Infantry Division. The 3rd Battalion/47/72nd Infantry Regiment, under the command of maj. Draganescu counterattacked and stopped their advance. The reserves of the 51/52nd Regiment joined the fight directed by the unit's CO, lt. col. Ioan Cristofor, buying time for the reinforcements sent by the division to arrive. The 1st Machine-gun Company commanded by cpt. Grigore Ignat, stubbornly held its position, being almost totally destroyed. Its CO was posthumously awarded the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class. However, the Germans advanced towards Hill 100, behind which the allied artillery was situated. The 50/64th Regiment had to pull back its right wing, because of the enemy advance in the sector of the 51/52nd Regiment. Lt. col. Diamandi Genuneanu, the 50/64th Regiment's CO, organized the defense south of Hill 100 and managed to hold out against two Bavarian regiments for two hours.
General Popescu organized the counterattack against the German forces closing in on Hill 100. The 2 battalions in reserve, together with the 3rd Battalion/47/72nd Regiment and other units attacked from several different directions the German 115th Infantry Division, which had infiltrated between the Razoare Forest and the Negroponte Vineyards. The artillery of the 10th Infantry Division also intervened in the fighting at that moment, at the orders of the army's CO. The 1st Battalion/50/64th Regiment, commanded by cpt. Nicolae Miclescu, emerged from the Negroponte Vineyards and surprised the German infantry in the area and pushed it back to towards the Razoare Forest. Cpt. Miclescu was wounded during the action. He was later awarded the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class. The 3rd Battalion/47/72nd Infantry Regiment and the 2nd Battalion/48/49th Infantry Regiment joined the battle. The resistance at the edge of the Razoare Forest was broken following a violent bayonet charge. The Germans started a disorderly retreat. The entire 47/72nd Infantry Regiment started a counterattack, followed soon by the 39th Infantry Regiment (from 10th Infantry Division). The German troops retreated towards the Susita Valley, dragging along the units of the Austro-Hungarian 13th Division. The Romanians captured the first line of the enemy positions, but the advanced was stopped by maj. general Eremia Grigorescu, because von Eben had already started to deploy his reserves.
The 10th Division and, especially, the 13th Division had achieved a great victory. The commanders of the two divisions, as well as the commanders of the 47/72nd, 50/64th and 51/52nd Regiments were awarded the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class. Another 7 officers received this high distinction for the fighting on 19 August. The 39th Infantry Regiment Petru Rares captured 376 POWs and 7 machine-guns and advanced 500 m on a 4 km wide front. The 47/72nd Infantry Regiment took 209 POWs and 4 machine-guns. But the losses were high. The same regiment lost 880 men (99 killed, 300 wounded and 481 missing). The regiment's flag, as well as those of the other hard pressed units on 19 August were also decorated with the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class.
The same day, the Germans attacked the sector of the 9th Infantry Division, situated south of the 13th Division. It had been reduced to 4,500 men in the previous days of hard fighting. In the first line were the 9th Vanatori Regiment on the right wing and the 40th Infantry Regiment Calugareni on the left wing. After a powerful artillery preparation, two German infantry divisions started their attack. Following some heavy fighting in the ruins of the factory north of Marasesti, the 9th Vanatori Regiment was forced to fall back towards the city. The 40th Infantry Regiment also abandoned its first positions. The 9th Division reformed the front on the line south Negroponte Vineyards � Marasesti Railroad Station � south Marasesti, which it held against the enemy assaults, with the help of the artillery of the 14th Infantry Division from the eastern bank of the Siret River, firing directly in the German flank.
Because of the failure of its army to take the objectives on 19 August, general von Eben decided that the continuation of the offensive was no longer possible. A week of pause followed, which both sides used for reorganizing. The 9th Army again changed the attack sector. The 18th Reserve Corps was strengthened with 3 divisions and the entire heavy artillery at the army's disposal. The Romanian 1st Army received the 11th Infantry Divison. Maj. general Eremia Grigorescu redeployed his forces. Thus, the Russian 8th Corps formed the army's right wing in the Muncelul area. It had two divisions in the first line and another two reforming in the back. The Romanian 5th Corps (10th and 15th Infantry Divisions) held the front all the way to Marasesti Railroad Station, where it linked up with the 3rd Corps (14th Infantry Division), situated between Marasesti and the Siret River. East of the river was the Cavalry Corps (1st and 6th Rosiori Brigades, 2nd Cavalry Division and one brigade of the 5th Infantry Division). The army's reserve was made up of the 9th, 11th and 13th Infantry Divisions and the other brigade of the 5th Division.
The offensive of the 18th Corps started in the sector of the Russian 8th Corps on 28 August. At 0900 hours the German troops infiltrated between the two Russian divisions and forced them to retreat. Two regiments of the Romanian 3rd Infantry Division from the 2nd Army intervened and managed to stop the German advance together with the Russian reserves. The following day, general Grigorescu prepared an attack in the Muncelul area, aimed at eliminating the bulge created by the Germans. He put at the disposal of the Russian 8th Corps another Russian division, as well as the Romanian 9th Infantry Division, a regiment from the 13th and another from the 15th Division. The two regiments from the 2nd Army were also supposed to participate in this action.
The assault started at 0800 hours, from the north and west, but found the Germans ready for an attack of their own and it was repulsed. The second one, around 1700 hours, was also repulsed. The Germans forced the right wing of the Russian 124th Division to pull back. Two battalions from the 2nd Army intervened and managed to stop the enemy advance during the night. The 11th and 13th Infantry Divisions were brought behind the threatened areas. The 5th Division crossed to on the western bank of the Siret River. On 30 August, the German 18th Reserve Corps resumed the attack and its troops managed to get between the 18th Dorobanti Regiment Gorj and the 2nd Vanatori Regiment of the 2nd Army. The 34th Infantry Regiment Constanta, belonging to the 9th Division from the 1st Army, counterattacked and plucked in the breach.
The Russian 8th Corps was strengthened with the 13th Infantry Division on 31 August, when, because of the weather, there was no fighting. General Eremia Grigorescu subordinated the 9th Infantry Division and a Russian division to the CO of the 13th Division, brig. general Ioan Popescu. This group attacked on 1 September. The artillery preparation started at 0600 hours, with all the artillery available to the group, as well as with the artillery of the other two Russian divisions and the army's heavy artillery. After one hour, the 9th and 13th Divisions attacked from the west and the 3rd Infantry Division (belonging to the 2nd Army), commanded by brig. general Alexandru Margineanu, from the north. After some heavy fighting, the 13th Division advanced up t o200 m of Muncelul. The 18th Corps counterattacked in the sector of the 3rd Infantry Division, but was repulsed. The following day, the same 3rd Division suffered the brunt of the 9th Army's strike. The main objective was the Porcului Hill, defended by the 30th Dorobanti Regiment Muscel. It lost the positions, but they were retaken following the counterattack of the division's reserves and of a Russian regiment. It was the last major operation of the German 9th Army in the Marasesti sector.
The offensive of the 1st Army in the Muncelul area was resumed on 3 September. The 11th Infantry Division was subordinated to the General Popescu Group, entering the first line beside the 9th and 13th Divisions. The Russian division and the regiments of the 2nd Army formed the reserve. The plan was to attack frontally with the 9th Division and a brigade of the 11th, while the 13th Division and the other brigade of the 11th Division were going to attack the Muncelul village, threatening the enemy flank. The artillery preparation started at 0630 hours and at 0800 hours the 13th Infantry Division started the assault, but could not make any progress. The same happened in the sector of the 9th Division. A second artillery preparation, which lasted for an hour and a half, and some violent hand-to-hand fighting were necessary for the 13th Infantry Division to occupy the eastern edge of the Muncelul village. But the Romanian losses that day were heavy: about 2,700 men.
This was the last day of the battle of Marasesti, both sides deciding to adopt a defensive attitude on the entire front. The Romanian 1st Army had lost 610 officers and 26,800 NCOs and soldiers, while the German 9th Army had lost about 47,000. Forty Mihai Viteazul Orders 3rd class were awarded for deeds accomplished during the fighting around Marasesti. Maj. general Eremia Grigorescu received the Mihai Viteazul 2nd class. Also, the flags of no less than 9 regiments were decorated with the Mihai Viteazul 3rd class.
The fighting continued with little intensity the following days, with local attacks and counterattacks. In one of these clashes, on the Secuiului Hill on 5 September, the volunteer Ecaterina Teodoroiu was killed by machine-gun fire, while leading her platoon. On the other side, on 8 September, maj. general Kurt von Wenniger, CO of the German 18th Reserve Corps, was killed by an artillery shell in the Muncelul area.
Author: Victor Nitu
Sources:
Cupsa I. Marasti, Marasesti, Oituz, Editura Militara, 1967
Ichim E. Ordinul militar de razboi Mihai Viteazul, Editura Jertfa & Modelism, 2000
Rosetti R. Marturisiri (1916-1919), Modelism, 1999
The Romanian 2nd Army's success at Marasti forced the Central Powers to revise their plans. The offensive planned in the Namoloasa area was abandoned and the bulk of the forces were moved in the Focsani area. The new offensive was going to be launched west of the Siret River, on the Focsani � Marasesti � Adjud direction, with the German 9th Army (general Johannes von Eben) and on the Oituz Valley with the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army (Archduke Joseph). The objective was to encircle and destroy the 2nd Army.
On the other side, the Romanian General Headquarters decided to cancel its attack in the Namoloasa area. The Russian 4th Army had to be pulled out from the front in southern Moldavia and moved north, where it could threaten the flank of the Austro-German forces advancing in Galicia. The Romanian 1st Army was going to replace the Russian troops departing the area.
For the offensive, the German 9th Army was strengthened with units brought from the French (the Alpine Corps, which arrived on 6 August) or Italian fronts. General von Eben decided to deliver the main blow with the German 1st Corps (6 divisions), while to its left the German 18th Reserve Corps (3 divisions) had to pin down the Entente troops opposite it. The right wing of the 9th Army was manned by the Ramnic Group (2 divisions). The reserve was made up of one German and one Austro-Hungarian divisions and the Alpine Corps, which arrived in the area during the first day of the battle. The German forces in the attack sector were 102 infantry battalions, 10 cavalry squadrons, 24 pioneer companies, 2 armored cars, 1,135 machine-guns, 356 mortars, 223 field guns and 122 heavy guns and howitzers.
Opposite the German 1st Corps was the Russian 4th Army, which had in contact with the enemy only two corps: on the right the 8th (3 divisions) and on the left the 7th (2 divisions). The reserve was made up of one infantry and one cavalry divisions. These totaled 84 infantry battalions, 52 cavalry squadrons, 280 field guns and 36 heavy guns. The bulk of the Romanian 1st Army was at Tecuci and was getting to cross the Siret River and replace the Russians.
The German 9th Army's offensive was preceded by a powerful artillery preparation, which began at 0430 hours on 6 August 1917. At 0730 hours the 1st Corps (general Kurt von Morgen) started the attack, with the 12th Bavarian, 76th and 89th Infantry Divisions in the first line and with another two divisions in the second echelon. The front defended by the Russian 13th and 34th Infantry Divisions was broken and 10 km breach was created. The Russians started a disorderly retreat east of the Siret River. At the request of the Russian command, general Constantin Christescu, CO of the 1st Army, ordered maj. general Eremia Grigorescu, CO of the Romanian 6th Corps, to intervene west of the Siret with the 5th Infantry Division and with the 9th Infantry Division to defend the river's eastern bank. The 32nd Dorobanti Regiment Mircea and the 8th Dorobanti Regiment Buzau counterattacked and stopped the Central Powers offensive on the line Moara Alba � Doaga � Furceni.
Seeing that the chances to force the crossing over the river are minimal, in the morning of 7 August, the German command redirected the offensive to the north, with four divisions. The effort was concentrated against the Romanian 5th Infantry Division, but the assault was repulsed. However, a bulge was created at the junction with the Russian troops, but the situation was saved by the counterattack of two battalions from the division's reserve. At noon, after a short artillery preparation, the enemy renewed the attack enjoying a 3 to 1 numerical superiority. The 3rd Vanatori Regiment held out in the Doaga village against an entire German division. The same thing happened in the sector of the 32nd Dorobanti Regiment Mircea. The soldiers in this unit made several bayonet charges only in their shirts, because of the suffocating heat, managing to push back the Germans to their positions. In the evening, the 1st Corps attacked and broke through the front of the Russian division on the right flank of the Romanian 5th Division. Threatened with the encirclement, the 32nd Regiment retreated to the Cosmesti Bridge. To fill the gap created, the Romanian 9th Infantry Division was introduced west of the Siret River. It was continuously attacked. In the evening of 7 August, under the cover of darkness, a German group approached and assaulted the 9th Division's flank, engaging into hand-to-hand fights. The Romanians abandoned Doaga and retreated to the outskirts of the Prisaca Forest, where a new defensive line was established. That day the 5th Division lost 44 officers and 1,770 soldiers (dead, wounded and missing). The front moved back 2-3 km.
On 8 August, general von Eben changed the attack sector to the west, on the front held by Russian units. In the evening, during the second assault, they were forced to retreat. A Russian regiment was almost completely destroyed. The Romanian front was bombarded and the attack on the 5th and 9th Infantry Divisions resumed the following day. On 9 August 1917, the German effort was increased. The assault started at 1900 hours, after a powerful artillery preparation, which caused many casualties to the 9th Division. Its troops were only able to dig foxholes, because the ground was very dry and hard to dig. The Germans again took heavy casualties because of the Romanian and Russian artillery situated on the eastern bank of the Siret River, which was firing directing into the attackers' flank. However, the first line of the Romanian defense was pierced in several spots, but reserves intervened and repulsed them after some very violent fighting. The 34th Regiment, which faced the 12th Bavarian Division, held out against three consecutive assaults. Only the 2nd Battalion, under the command of Major Gheorghe Mihail, the future Chief of the General Staff in 1940 and 1944, remained in the first line. It counterattacked and captured 62 prisoners and two machine-guns. The unit's battle flag was decorated later with Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class. The same award was bestowed upon the regiment's CO, colonel Virgiliu Dumbrava, as well the 2nd Battalion's CO. But the casualties were heavy: 35 officers and 1,551 soldiers. The 36th Regiment lost 36 officers and 954 soldiers. Also, the 7th and 32nd Dorobanti Regiments suffered many casualties. During the night, at 0200 hours, another assault took place and the Germans managed to push back for several hundred meters the 9th Division and the right wing of the 5th Division. The neighboring Russian division was also forced to retreat, but the Russian 4th Army counterattacked and captured 2,500 prisoners and recovered the lost ground.
The last failures had weakened the German 9th Army. Thus, general von Eben strengthened the 1st Corps with a new division and the 18th Reserve Corps with the Alpine Corps.
On 10 August, it was the Entente's turn to attack. General Christescu and general Ragoza, the CO of the Russian 4th Army, decided to strike each with a corps of two divisions the bulge in the German line. During the morning, the 9th Army attacked the Russian sector, but gained little ground. At 1700 hours, the allied infantry started the assault, after a long artillery preparation. The 9th Infantry Division took the first German trenches, but because of the losses it had to abandon them. Reinforced with a regiment form the Romanian 13th Infantry Division, it resumed the attack, but again without success. The 5th Infantry Division and a regiment of the 14th Infantry Division managed to get inside the German positions, but could keep them. The 8th Dorobanti and 3rd Vanatori Regiments managed to enter the Doaga village, but were repulsed. The situation was similar in the sector of the Russian 4th Army. However the offensive had reduced the combat potential of the German 76th, 89th and 115th Infantry Divisions, which had suffered the brunt of the assault. These were already exhausted after several days of failed attacks. The report of general von Eben to the Army Group CO, marshal von Mackensen, mentions the fact that the 216th Infantry Division had suffered many casualties because of the flank bombardment of the Romanian artillery yon the eastern bank of the Siret.
For the following day, general Christescu imposed a limited objective to the 6th Corps: the Doaga � Susita Valley. The Russian 4th Army had decided to remain on the defensive. The Germans attacked in its sector at 1600 hours, after a three hour artillery preparation, and again forced the Russian troops to retreat. At 1630 hours, the Romanian 9th Infantry Division began the assault without knowing the situation in the neighboring sector. After the Russian retreat the flank was exposed. The division's CO sent a battalion to extend the line. The Germans were advancing on Marasesti and the situation became extremely dangerous for the Entente. The 9th Vanatori Regiment, which was in the division's reserve, was quickly brought in and set up positions in the factory north of the town. It managed to stop the German troops that were threatening to encircle the 9th Infantry Division. For this action, lt. col. Gheorghe Rasoviceanu, the regiment's CO, was awarded the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class. A regiment of the 13th Infantry Division, from the 6th Crops' reserve, established the link with the Russians. The 5th Infantry Division attacked in the Doaga area, but the 7th and 8th Dorobanti Regiments failed to enter the village. The same day, maj. general Eremia Grigorescu was named at the command of the 1st Army.
Noticing that the troops of the German 1st Corps were exhausted, general von Eben decided to assign the main strike to the 18th Reserve Corps of maj. gen. Kurt von Wenniger, which had suffered fewer losses and was less tired. Thus, on 12 August, the 9th German Army attacked with small forces the 5th Infantry Division, in order to pin it down, and concentrated its forces against the Russian 4th Army, taking Panciu. Following this failure, general Ragoza wanted to retreat the Russian-Romanian front north of Marasesti., but abandoned the idea at maj. gen. Eremia Grigorescu's pleas. Lt. gen. Constantin Prezan, the Chief of the General Staff, decided to replace the Russian 7th Corps with the Romanian 5th Corps (10th and 13th Infantry Divisions) and to put the Russian 8th Corps under the command of the Romanian 1st Army. The staff of the Russian 4th Army was retreated to Bacau from where it was reassigned to another front.
On 13 August, the 18th Reserve Corps attacked the Russian troops north of Panciu, but failed to make any breakthrough. The following day, general von Eben ordered the 1st Corps to eliminate the Romanian bulge in the area of the Prisaca Forest and take the bridge over the Siret River at Cozmesti. In the same time, the 18th Reserve Corps had to attack on the Zabraut Valley. After powerful artillery preparation commenced the assault on the Russian 8th Corps' positions. Brig. gen. Henri Cihoski, CO of the 10th Infantry Division, sent the 10th Vanatori Regiment as help. It surprised the Alpine Corps and caused it important casualties, some in vicious hand-to-hand combat. The vanatori managed to take Hill 334, but were forced to retreat following a powerful artillery bombardment. The 38th Infantry Regiment Neagoe Basarab also intervened and its CO, col. Gheorghe Cornescu, received the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class for the counterattack that stopped the German offensive, which threatened to penetrate in the Susita Valley, behind the Romanian 2nd Army. The Russian 8th Corps was forced to pull back north of Iresti and Straoani.
The 5th Infantry Division, at the other end of the front, had been reduced to one third of its initial size during the last days of fighting. The positions in the Prisaca Forest were heavily bombarded by German artillery. At 1700 hours the assault began with two divisions and forced the Romanian troops to retreat. The division's reserves, as well as a regiment form the 14th Infantry Division, in the army's reserve, intervened and stopped the German advance north of the Prisaca Forest. The bridge at Cozmesti was blown up, as the Romanian engineers had built another two to the north. The exhausted 5th Infantry Division was pulled out of the first line.
On 15 August, the 18th Reserve Corps continued the offensive and managed to create a breach at the junction between the 10th Infantry Division and the Russian division to its right. The 10th Vanatori Regiment, supported by 10 Romanian and 3 Russian batteries, counterattacked and reestablished the situation. However, with its left wing, the 18th Corps took Muncel, forcing theRussians to pull back. Thus the link between the two Romanian armies was threatened. The 2ndArmy attacked with the "Colonel Alexiu" Detachment made up of 2 vanatori battalions, 2 infantry battalions and 3 artillery batteries, which, together with a Russian cavalry division, retook control of the village. The following day, the Germans occupiued half of Muncel, but were again forced to retreat after the assault of col. Alexandru Alexiu's men.
The days of 17 and 18 August were calm. The losses suffered by both sides, forced the commanders to reorganize their units. Maj. gen. Eremia Grigorescu replaced the 14th Infantry Division, which was deployed east of the Siret River, with the 1st and 6th Rosiori Brigades and the hard pressed 5th Infantry Division with the 2nd Cavalry Division. The latter and the two brigades formed the Cavalry Corps. The 14th Infantry Division was moved on the northern bank of the Siret River in the Cozmestii de Vale area. Also, the army's heavy artillery was redeployed so that it could better cover the sector of the 5th Corps (10th, 13th and 9th Infantry Divisions). The 1st Army's reserve was made up of the 15th Infantry Division and of the 5th Infantry Division, under reorganization. On the other side, at the intervention of marshal von Mackensen, general von Eben grouped 7 infantry divisions under the command of the German 1st Corps and subordinated almost all the heavy artillery of the 9th Army to it. These forces totalized 55 battalions and 95 batteries.
On 19 August, the Germans resumed the offensive, attacking with the 1st Corps towards Marasesti and with 18th Reserve Corps on the Panciu-Muncel direction. The main effort was concentrated in the sector between Marasesti and the Razoare Forest, defended by the Romanian 9th and 13th Infantry Divisions, the latter being assaulted by three enemy divisions. The artillery preparation started at 0630 hours in the area of the trenches of the 47/72nd, 51/52nd and 50/64th Infantry Regiments, from the first line of the 13th Infantry Division, and at the western outskirts of Marasesti, where the 9th Vanatori Regiment of the 9th Infantry Division was located. It lasted for two hours and was the most violent artillery bombardment of the entire battle. At 0900 hours the first assaults small scale began and were easily repulsed. After 1100 hours a very powerful attack started. The main blow was delivered north of the Razoare Forest, at the junction of the 13th and 10th Infantry Divisions. The 10th Infantry Division was attacked by the 13th Austro-Hungarian Division, which failed to breakthrough the Romanian lines.
The 13th Infantry Division, commanded by brig. gen. Ioan Popescu, was the Romanian unit that saw the most action that day. It occupied a front 6 km wide, with the 47/72nd Infantry Regiment at the south-western edge of the Razoare Forest, the 50/64th Infantry Regiment in the Negroponte Vineyards and the 51/52nd Infantry Regiment in the middle. The reserve was made up of one battalion of the 50/64th Regiment and the 48/49th Regiment. 15 Romanian and 15 Russian batteries provided artillery support.
The attack started at 0900 hours. In the sector of the 47/72nd Infantry Regiment, the German assaults failed one after another. The 1st Battalion was situated on the left wing, south of the Razoare Forest. It was attacked by the 28th Bavarian Infantry Regiment (from the 12th Bavarian Division) and by units of the German 89th and 115th Divisions. The 2nd Battalion, on the right wing, was assaulted by the Austro-Hungarian 13th Infantry Division. The 3rd Battalion was kept in reserve. The regiment's CO, lt. col. Radu Rosetti, the former chief of the Operations Bureau of the General Staff in 1916, was wounded at a leg during the fighting. At the center, the 51/52nd Regiment was situated in an open position ands was also powerfully attacked. It had to pull back. The Germans tried to use the momentum and infiltrate behind the positions of the two regiments on the flanks of the Romanian 13th Infantry Division. The 3rd Battalion/47/72nd Infantry Regiment, under the command of maj. Draganescu counterattacked and stopped their advance. The reserves of the 51/52nd Regiment joined the fight directed by the unit's CO, lt. col. Ioan Cristofor, buying time for the reinforcements sent by the division to arrive. The 1st Machine-gun Company commanded by cpt. Grigore Ignat, stubbornly held its position, being almost totally destroyed. Its CO was posthumously awarded the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class. However, the Germans advanced towards Hill 100, behind which the allied artillery was situated. The 50/64th Regiment had to pull back its right wing, because of the enemy advance in the sector of the 51/52nd Regiment. Lt. col. Diamandi Genuneanu, the 50/64th Regiment's CO, organized the defense south of Hill 100 and managed to hold out against two Bavarian regiments for two hours.
General Popescu organized the counterattack against the German forces closing in on Hill 100. The 2 battalions in reserve, together with the 3rd Battalion/47/72nd Regiment and other units attacked from several different directions the German 115th Infantry Division, which had infiltrated between the Razoare Forest and the Negroponte Vineyards. The artillery of the 10th Infantry Division also intervened in the fighting at that moment, at the orders of the army's CO. The 1st Battalion/50/64th Regiment, commanded by cpt. Nicolae Miclescu, emerged from the Negroponte Vineyards and surprised the German infantry in the area and pushed it back to towards the Razoare Forest. Cpt. Miclescu was wounded during the action. He was later awarded the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class. The 3rd Battalion/47/72nd Infantry Regiment and the 2nd Battalion/48/49th Infantry Regiment joined the battle. The resistance at the edge of the Razoare Forest was broken following a violent bayonet charge. The Germans started a disorderly retreat. The entire 47/72nd Infantry Regiment started a counterattack, followed soon by the 39th Infantry Regiment (from 10th Infantry Division). The German troops retreated towards the Susita Valley, dragging along the units of the Austro-Hungarian 13th Division. The Romanians captured the first line of the enemy positions, but the advanced was stopped by maj. general Eremia Grigorescu, because von Eben had already started to deploy his reserves.
The 10th Division and, especially, the 13th Division had achieved a great victory. The commanders of the two divisions, as well as the commanders of the 47/72nd, 50/64th and 51/52nd Regiments were awarded the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class. Another 7 officers received this high distinction for the fighting on 19 August. The 39th Infantry Regiment Petru Rares captured 376 POWs and 7 machine-guns and advanced 500 m on a 4 km wide front. The 47/72nd Infantry Regiment took 209 POWs and 4 machine-guns. But the losses were high. The same regiment lost 880 men (99 killed, 300 wounded and 481 missing). The regiment's flag, as well as those of the other hard pressed units on 19 August were also decorated with the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class.
The same day, the Germans attacked the sector of the 9th Infantry Division, situated south of the 13th Division. It had been reduced to 4,500 men in the previous days of hard fighting. In the first line were the 9th Vanatori Regiment on the right wing and the 40th Infantry Regiment Calugareni on the left wing. After a powerful artillery preparation, two German infantry divisions started their attack. Following some heavy fighting in the ruins of the factory north of Marasesti, the 9th Vanatori Regiment was forced to fall back towards the city. The 40th Infantry Regiment also abandoned its first positions. The 9th Division reformed the front on the line south Negroponte Vineyards � Marasesti Railroad Station � south Marasesti, which it held against the enemy assaults, with the help of the artillery of the 14th Infantry Division from the eastern bank of the Siret River, firing directly in the German flank.
Because of the failure of its army to take the objectives on 19 August, general von Eben decided that the continuation of the offensive was no longer possible. A week of pause followed, which both sides used for reorganizing. The 9th Army again changed the attack sector. The 18th Reserve Corps was strengthened with 3 divisions and the entire heavy artillery at the army's disposal. The Romanian 1st Army received the 11th Infantry Divison. Maj. general Eremia Grigorescu redeployed his forces. Thus, the Russian 8th Corps formed the army's right wing in the Muncelul area. It had two divisions in the first line and another two reforming in the back. The Romanian 5th Corps (10th and 15th Infantry Divisions) held the front all the way to Marasesti Railroad Station, where it linked up with the 3rd Corps (14th Infantry Division), situated between Marasesti and the Siret River. East of the river was the Cavalry Corps (1st and 6th Rosiori Brigades, 2nd Cavalry Division and one brigade of the 5th Infantry Division). The army's reserve was made up of the 9th, 11th and 13th Infantry Divisions and the other brigade of the 5th Division.
The offensive of the 18th Corps started in the sector of the Russian 8th Corps on 28 August. At 0900 hours the German troops infiltrated between the two Russian divisions and forced them to retreat. Two regiments of the Romanian 3rd Infantry Division from the 2nd Army intervened and managed to stop the German advance together with the Russian reserves. The following day, general Grigorescu prepared an attack in the Muncelul area, aimed at eliminating the bulge created by the Germans. He put at the disposal of the Russian 8th Corps another Russian division, as well as the Romanian 9th Infantry Division, a regiment from the 13th and another from the 15th Division. The two regiments from the 2nd Army were also supposed to participate in this action.
The assault started at 0800 hours, from the north and west, but found the Germans ready for an attack of their own and it was repulsed. The second one, around 1700 hours, was also repulsed. The Germans forced the right wing of the Russian 124th Division to pull back. Two battalions from the 2nd Army intervened and managed to stop the enemy advance during the night. The 11th and 13th Infantry Divisions were brought behind the threatened areas. The 5th Division crossed to on the western bank of the Siret River. On 30 August, the German 18th Reserve Corps resumed the attack and its troops managed to get between the 18th Dorobanti Regiment Gorj and the 2nd Vanatori Regiment of the 2nd Army. The 34th Infantry Regiment Constanta, belonging to the 9th Division from the 1st Army, counterattacked and plucked in the breach.
The Russian 8th Corps was strengthened with the 13th Infantry Division on 31 August, when, because of the weather, there was no fighting. General Eremia Grigorescu subordinated the 9th Infantry Division and a Russian division to the CO of the 13th Division, brig. general Ioan Popescu. This group attacked on 1 September. The artillery preparation started at 0600 hours, with all the artillery available to the group, as well as with the artillery of the other two Russian divisions and the army's heavy artillery. After one hour, the 9th and 13th Divisions attacked from the west and the 3rd Infantry Division (belonging to the 2nd Army), commanded by brig. general Alexandru Margineanu, from the north. After some heavy fighting, the 13th Division advanced up t o200 m of Muncelul. The 18th Corps counterattacked in the sector of the 3rd Infantry Division, but was repulsed. The following day, the same 3rd Division suffered the brunt of the 9th Army's strike. The main objective was the Porcului Hill, defended by the 30th Dorobanti Regiment Muscel. It lost the positions, but they were retaken following the counterattack of the division's reserves and of a Russian regiment. It was the last major operation of the German 9th Army in the Marasesti sector.
The offensive of the 1st Army in the Muncelul area was resumed on 3 September. The 11th Infantry Division was subordinated to the General Popescu Group, entering the first line beside the 9th and 13th Divisions. The Russian division and the regiments of the 2nd Army formed the reserve. The plan was to attack frontally with the 9th Division and a brigade of the 11th, while the 13th Division and the other brigade of the 11th Division were going to attack the Muncelul village, threatening the enemy flank. The artillery preparation started at 0630 hours and at 0800 hours the 13th Infantry Division started the assault, but could not make any progress. The same happened in the sector of the 9th Division. A second artillery preparation, which lasted for an hour and a half, and some violent hand-to-hand fighting were necessary for the 13th Infantry Division to occupy the eastern edge of the Muncelul village. But the Romanian losses that day were heavy: about 2,700 men.
This was the last day of the battle of Marasesti, both sides deciding to adopt a defensive attitude on the entire front. The Romanian 1st Army had lost 610 officers and 26,800 NCOs and soldiers, while the German 9th Army had lost about 47,000. Forty Mihai Viteazul Orders 3rd class were awarded for deeds accomplished during the fighting around Marasesti. Maj. general Eremia Grigorescu received the Mihai Viteazul 2nd class. Also, the flags of no less than 9 regiments were decorated with the Mihai Viteazul 3rd class.
The fighting continued with little intensity the following days, with local attacks and counterattacks. In one of these clashes, on the Secuiului Hill on 5 September, the volunteer Ecaterina Teodoroiu was killed by machine-gun fire, while leading her platoon. On the other side, on 8 September, maj. general Kurt von Wenniger, CO of the German 18th Reserve Corps, was killed by an artillery shell in the Muncelul area.
Author: Victor Nitu
Sources:
Cupsa I. Marasti, Marasesti, Oituz, Editura Militara, 1967
Ichim E. Ordinul militar de razboi Mihai Viteazul, Editura Jertfa & Modelism, 2000
Rosetti R. Marturisiri (1916-1919), Modelism, 1999
Connaught Stranger.
Source:-
http://www.worldwar2.ro/primulrazboi/?article=118
Connaught Stranger.
http://www.worldwar2.ro/primulrazboi/?article=118
QUOTE
Second battle of Oituz (August 1917)
After the battle of Marasti ended, the 2nd Army occupied the following positions: the 4th Corps had the 7th Infantry Division between the Dofteana and Oituz Rivers, the 6th Infantry Division between the Oituz River and the Casin Hill and the line was continued to the north to the Zboina Neagra by the 8th Infantry Division. The 2nd Corps had between the Zboina Neagra and Sarii Valley the 12th, 1st and 3rd Infantry Divisions. Four battalions made up the reserve. There hadn't been enough time to strengthen the weak fortifications existing in the area.
On the other side, teh Austro-Hungarian 1st Army planned to attack with its left wing, the Gerock Group, along the Oituz Valley. The main strike element was the Austro-Hungarian 8th Corps, deployed between the Dofteana Valley and the Casin Hill, in front of the Romanian 7th and 6th Infantry Divisions. It was made up of the Austro-Hungarian 70th and 71st Infantry Divisions and the German 117th Infantry Division. In reserve it had the Austro-Hungarian 7th and 8th Cavalry Divisions, which were ready to exploit the eventual break through of the infantry.
The attack was supposed to start on 8 August 1917. The German 117th Infantry Division had to advance north of the Oituz Valley, towards the Ungureanu and Cosna Peaks and the Austro-Hungarian 71st Infantry Division had to advance south of the valley. The 70th Division was going to attack towards Targul Ocna over the Ciresoaia and Pravila Peaks. The front was 7 km wide and the Central Powers had a 4 to 1 numerical superiority.
The artillery preparation lasted four and a half hours and was extremely violent. In the sector of the 7th Infantry Division, the Pravila Peak was assaulted four times by the Austro-Hungarian 70th Division, but the 27th Dorobanti Regiment Bacau, on the right wing of the Romanian division, stood its ground. On the left wing, the 16th Dorobanti Regiment Baia was hard pressed by the German 117th Division and gave away 1-2 km in the area around Ungureanu Peak, suffering high casualties. The 9th and 10th Companies were surrounded, but managed to break through to the friendly lines. The Balcuta Peak was attacked by the Austro-Hungarian 71st Division, which, with great effort, pushed 1-2 km back the 11th Dorobanti and 7th Vanatori Regiments. To the south, the 10th Dorobanti Regiment Putna kept its position. Thus, during the first day of the battle, the Austro-Hungarian 8th Corps made a break through in the central part of the front.
During the night, general Valeanu, the CO of the Romanian 4th Corps, ordered a counterattack in that area. His troops managed to regain some of the ground lost during the day. The 27th Regiment captured 200 prisoners, 3 machine-guns and a gun. But on 9 August, in the afternoon, the Central Powers resumed the offensive. The German 117th Infantry Division forced the 16th Regiment to abandon the Cosna Mountain. The Austro-Hungarian 70th Infantry and 7th Cavalry Divisions took the Pravila Peak. The Romanian 7th Infantry Division retreated to a new line of defense.
On 10 August 1917, the pressure on the 7th Division increased, the Romanian troops having to abandon Slanic. The remaining positions on the Cosna Mountain were repeatedly assaulted, but resisted. For the Romanians the situation was critical, because the troops in the first line were exhausted after three days of very violent fights and the reserves of the 4th Corps were inexistent. Also, the current positions were situated on the last heights standing in front of the Trotus Valley and the road to the plains beyond. Lt. general Alexandru Averescu, the CO of the 2nd Army, ordered the 2nd Corps to urgently send all its available reserves and asked for more troops from the Romanian General Headquarters. Because in the same time, the 1st Army was engaged into a more violent clash at Marasesti with the German 9th Army, all that could be sent was the 1st Cavalry Division, which arrived at Onesti the following morning. The Mountain Battalion (the first such unit in the Romanian army) and the Frontier-guard Brigade were on their way to Oituz.
General Gerock, seeking to achieve the much desired break through into the Trotus Valley, engaged his last reserves in the battle on 11 August. The 70th Infantry and 7th Cavalry Divisions attacked the Ciresoaia Peak, defended by the 15th Dorobanti Regiment Razboieni. All assaults were repulsed, but several Austrian units infiltrqated south of the peak and the Romanian regiment had to retreat in the Trotus Valley to avoid encirclement. Targul Ocna was directly threatened. To the south, the German 117th Division again assaulted the Cosna Mountain, but failed. However, several advances were made south of the mountain, which were stopped in the Oituz village. With their rear threatened, the Romanian troops on Cosna pulled back. The Gerock Group had managed to conquer the last two heights separating it from the Trotus Valley. At this moment the Romanian reinforcements had arrived. Two battalions attacked in the Ciresoaia area and managed to regain some of the lost ground and create the link with the Russian 9th Army. At 1900 hours the 1st Cavalry Division was also thrown into battle. It attacked with one brigade the German troops on the southern slope of the Cosna Mountain and with the 2nd Rosiori Brigade the Stibor Hill and by nightfall it had secured both objectives. The 1st Vanatori Regiment, sent by the 2nd Corps, counterattacked in the Oituz village supported by two armored cars and repulsed the units of the 117th Division.
The danger had passed, but the advance of the German 18th Reserve Corps in the Panciu area, on the 2nd Army's left flank forced general Averescu to move a part of the reserves to the 2nd Corps. Even though its forces had decreased and the Frontier-guard Brigade had arrived yet, general Valeanu decided to retake the Ciresoaia Peak on 12 August. The attack was carried out by the 27th Dorobanti Regiment, a battalion of the 15th Regiment, two battalions from the Russian 2nd Division (from the 9th Army) and the Mountain Battalion (which was in fact a strengthened battalion, made up of 5 rifle and 2 machine-gun companies). The latter had just arrived following a 160 km march and started the attack after a 20-minute pause. To achieve surprise, there was no artillery preparation. The Mountain Battalion, commanded by maj. Virgil Badulescu, broke through the defense of the Austro-Hungarian 70th Division and infiltrated befind enemy lines. It captured 417 prisoners and 4 machine-guns, while suffering minimal casualties: 2 dead and 19 wounded. In total the Austro-Hungarian division lost 1,500 men at Ciresoaia. For this action, the commander and seven of the battalion's officers received the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class, approximately a third of the 25 awarded for the actions during the battle of Oituz. The battalion's flag was also decorated this prestigious award.
During the night the Frontier-guard Brigade had arrived. It received the task to attack south of the Oituz River. The 1st Cavalry Division, strengthened with four battalions and two batteries had to retake the Cosna Mountain and advance on Slanic, while the 7th Infantry Division had to continue the advance in the Ciresoaia area.
On 13 August, at 0500 hours, after a short artillery preparation, the 7th Division started the attack together with the Russian 2nd Division on its right, forcing the Austro-Hungarian 70th Division to retreat. The Gerock Group sent the reserves, which repulsed the Russian 195th Infantry Regiment, threatening the flank of the Romanian troops, which had to also pull back. In the Cosna sector, the 1st Cavalry Division managed to take the peak an hold it in front of the counterattacks of the German 117th Infantry Division. The Frontier-guard Brigade, commanded by colonel Gheorghe Cantacuzino, who had been awarded the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class for the fights in 1916, was tired following the march in the previous days. He asked for a postponement. The attack started at 1000 hours, but failed because of the stiff resistance put up by the Austro-Hungarian 71st Division. In the afternoon, a second assault had the same fate. The losses were estimated at about 800 men.
A pause of five days followed. There were local clashes and the two sides reorganized their forces and entrenched their positions. On 16 August, the 2nd Frontier-guard Regiment took the Runcu Peak, two of its offices being awarded the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class for this action.
On 19 August, the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army resumed the offensive. The sector chosen for the attack was the Cosna Peak, defended by the 1st Cavalry Division, which had been introduced between the 6th and 7th Infantry Divisions. Wisely using their numerical superiority, the Germans managed to take the peak, but the Romanian cavalrymen retreated to the mountain's eastern slope, where they resisted the following assaults. During the night, the 2nd Army sent two frontier-guard battalions and an infantry regiment as reinforcements. On 20 August, at 0700 hours, the strengthened 1st Cavalry Division, supported by the entire Romanian artillery available in the area, attacked and managed to regain some of the ground lost the previous day.
This action was the last major episode of the second battle of Oituz, carried out in the summer of 1917. The Austro-Hungarian 1st Army had managed to advance only 2-6 km deep on a 20 km wide front and failed to break through into the Trotus Valley and from there to threaten the rear of the Romanian and Russian armies in southern Moldavia. In total, 25 Mihai Viteazul Orders 3rd class were awarded to the Romanian officers for the actions in August 1917 in the Oituz area. The battle flags of only three units (one regiment and two battalions) also received the prestigious award.
Author: Victor Nitu
Sources:
Cupsa I. Marasti, Marasesti, Oituz, Editura Militara, 1967
Ichim E. Ordinul militar de razboi Mihai Viteazul, Editura Jertfa & Modelism, 2000
After the battle of Marasti ended, the 2nd Army occupied the following positions: the 4th Corps had the 7th Infantry Division between the Dofteana and Oituz Rivers, the 6th Infantry Division between the Oituz River and the Casin Hill and the line was continued to the north to the Zboina Neagra by the 8th Infantry Division. The 2nd Corps had between the Zboina Neagra and Sarii Valley the 12th, 1st and 3rd Infantry Divisions. Four battalions made up the reserve. There hadn't been enough time to strengthen the weak fortifications existing in the area.
On the other side, teh Austro-Hungarian 1st Army planned to attack with its left wing, the Gerock Group, along the Oituz Valley. The main strike element was the Austro-Hungarian 8th Corps, deployed between the Dofteana Valley and the Casin Hill, in front of the Romanian 7th and 6th Infantry Divisions. It was made up of the Austro-Hungarian 70th and 71st Infantry Divisions and the German 117th Infantry Division. In reserve it had the Austro-Hungarian 7th and 8th Cavalry Divisions, which were ready to exploit the eventual break through of the infantry.
The attack was supposed to start on 8 August 1917. The German 117th Infantry Division had to advance north of the Oituz Valley, towards the Ungureanu and Cosna Peaks and the Austro-Hungarian 71st Infantry Division had to advance south of the valley. The 70th Division was going to attack towards Targul Ocna over the Ciresoaia and Pravila Peaks. The front was 7 km wide and the Central Powers had a 4 to 1 numerical superiority.
The artillery preparation lasted four and a half hours and was extremely violent. In the sector of the 7th Infantry Division, the Pravila Peak was assaulted four times by the Austro-Hungarian 70th Division, but the 27th Dorobanti Regiment Bacau, on the right wing of the Romanian division, stood its ground. On the left wing, the 16th Dorobanti Regiment Baia was hard pressed by the German 117th Division and gave away 1-2 km in the area around Ungureanu Peak, suffering high casualties. The 9th and 10th Companies were surrounded, but managed to break through to the friendly lines. The Balcuta Peak was attacked by the Austro-Hungarian 71st Division, which, with great effort, pushed 1-2 km back the 11th Dorobanti and 7th Vanatori Regiments. To the south, the 10th Dorobanti Regiment Putna kept its position. Thus, during the first day of the battle, the Austro-Hungarian 8th Corps made a break through in the central part of the front.
During the night, general Valeanu, the CO of the Romanian 4th Corps, ordered a counterattack in that area. His troops managed to regain some of the ground lost during the day. The 27th Regiment captured 200 prisoners, 3 machine-guns and a gun. But on 9 August, in the afternoon, the Central Powers resumed the offensive. The German 117th Infantry Division forced the 16th Regiment to abandon the Cosna Mountain. The Austro-Hungarian 70th Infantry and 7th Cavalry Divisions took the Pravila Peak. The Romanian 7th Infantry Division retreated to a new line of defense.
On 10 August 1917, the pressure on the 7th Division increased, the Romanian troops having to abandon Slanic. The remaining positions on the Cosna Mountain were repeatedly assaulted, but resisted. For the Romanians the situation was critical, because the troops in the first line were exhausted after three days of very violent fights and the reserves of the 4th Corps were inexistent. Also, the current positions were situated on the last heights standing in front of the Trotus Valley and the road to the plains beyond. Lt. general Alexandru Averescu, the CO of the 2nd Army, ordered the 2nd Corps to urgently send all its available reserves and asked for more troops from the Romanian General Headquarters. Because in the same time, the 1st Army was engaged into a more violent clash at Marasesti with the German 9th Army, all that could be sent was the 1st Cavalry Division, which arrived at Onesti the following morning. The Mountain Battalion (the first such unit in the Romanian army) and the Frontier-guard Brigade were on their way to Oituz.
General Gerock, seeking to achieve the much desired break through into the Trotus Valley, engaged his last reserves in the battle on 11 August. The 70th Infantry and 7th Cavalry Divisions attacked the Ciresoaia Peak, defended by the 15th Dorobanti Regiment Razboieni. All assaults were repulsed, but several Austrian units infiltrqated south of the peak and the Romanian regiment had to retreat in the Trotus Valley to avoid encirclement. Targul Ocna was directly threatened. To the south, the German 117th Division again assaulted the Cosna Mountain, but failed. However, several advances were made south of the mountain, which were stopped in the Oituz village. With their rear threatened, the Romanian troops on Cosna pulled back. The Gerock Group had managed to conquer the last two heights separating it from the Trotus Valley. At this moment the Romanian reinforcements had arrived. Two battalions attacked in the Ciresoaia area and managed to regain some of the lost ground and create the link with the Russian 9th Army. At 1900 hours the 1st Cavalry Division was also thrown into battle. It attacked with one brigade the German troops on the southern slope of the Cosna Mountain and with the 2nd Rosiori Brigade the Stibor Hill and by nightfall it had secured both objectives. The 1st Vanatori Regiment, sent by the 2nd Corps, counterattacked in the Oituz village supported by two armored cars and repulsed the units of the 117th Division.
The danger had passed, but the advance of the German 18th Reserve Corps in the Panciu area, on the 2nd Army's left flank forced general Averescu to move a part of the reserves to the 2nd Corps. Even though its forces had decreased and the Frontier-guard Brigade had arrived yet, general Valeanu decided to retake the Ciresoaia Peak on 12 August. The attack was carried out by the 27th Dorobanti Regiment, a battalion of the 15th Regiment, two battalions from the Russian 2nd Division (from the 9th Army) and the Mountain Battalion (which was in fact a strengthened battalion, made up of 5 rifle and 2 machine-gun companies). The latter had just arrived following a 160 km march and started the attack after a 20-minute pause. To achieve surprise, there was no artillery preparation. The Mountain Battalion, commanded by maj. Virgil Badulescu, broke through the defense of the Austro-Hungarian 70th Division and infiltrated befind enemy lines. It captured 417 prisoners and 4 machine-guns, while suffering minimal casualties: 2 dead and 19 wounded. In total the Austro-Hungarian division lost 1,500 men at Ciresoaia. For this action, the commander and seven of the battalion's officers received the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class, approximately a third of the 25 awarded for the actions during the battle of Oituz. The battalion's flag was also decorated this prestigious award.
During the night the Frontier-guard Brigade had arrived. It received the task to attack south of the Oituz River. The 1st Cavalry Division, strengthened with four battalions and two batteries had to retake the Cosna Mountain and advance on Slanic, while the 7th Infantry Division had to continue the advance in the Ciresoaia area.
On 13 August, at 0500 hours, after a short artillery preparation, the 7th Division started the attack together with the Russian 2nd Division on its right, forcing the Austro-Hungarian 70th Division to retreat. The Gerock Group sent the reserves, which repulsed the Russian 195th Infantry Regiment, threatening the flank of the Romanian troops, which had to also pull back. In the Cosna sector, the 1st Cavalry Division managed to take the peak an hold it in front of the counterattacks of the German 117th Infantry Division. The Frontier-guard Brigade, commanded by colonel Gheorghe Cantacuzino, who had been awarded the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class for the fights in 1916, was tired following the march in the previous days. He asked for a postponement. The attack started at 1000 hours, but failed because of the stiff resistance put up by the Austro-Hungarian 71st Division. In the afternoon, a second assault had the same fate. The losses were estimated at about 800 men.
A pause of five days followed. There were local clashes and the two sides reorganized their forces and entrenched their positions. On 16 August, the 2nd Frontier-guard Regiment took the Runcu Peak, two of its offices being awarded the Mihai Viteazul Order 3rd class for this action.
On 19 August, the Austro-Hungarian 1st Army resumed the offensive. The sector chosen for the attack was the Cosna Peak, defended by the 1st Cavalry Division, which had been introduced between the 6th and 7th Infantry Divisions. Wisely using their numerical superiority, the Germans managed to take the peak, but the Romanian cavalrymen retreated to the mountain's eastern slope, where they resisted the following assaults. During the night, the 2nd Army sent two frontier-guard battalions and an infantry regiment as reinforcements. On 20 August, at 0700 hours, the strengthened 1st Cavalry Division, supported by the entire Romanian artillery available in the area, attacked and managed to regain some of the ground lost the previous day.
This action was the last major episode of the second battle of Oituz, carried out in the summer of 1917. The Austro-Hungarian 1st Army had managed to advance only 2-6 km deep on a 20 km wide front and failed to break through into the Trotus Valley and from there to threaten the rear of the Romanian and Russian armies in southern Moldavia. In total, 25 Mihai Viteazul Orders 3rd class were awarded to the Romanian officers for the actions in August 1917 in the Oituz area. The battle flags of only three units (one regiment and two battalions) also received the prestigious award.
Author: Victor Nitu
Sources:
Cupsa I. Marasti, Marasesti, Oituz, Editura Militara, 1967
Ichim E. Ordinul militar de razboi Mihai Viteazul, Editura Jertfa & Modelism, 2000
Connaught Stranger.
QUOTE (Connaught Stranger @ Oct 23 2009, 05:04 PM)
Author: Victor Nitu
Sources:
Cupsa I. Marasti, Marasesti, Oituz, Editura Militara, 1967
..................
As in 1945 the communism came to Romania ,the work written in 1967 is wat we call a communist work,as everything written in between 1946-48 and 1989 under the soviet union iron curtain we call "communist literature".So in 1946 the sovietization of Romanian begun(as a result of some romanians allying with germany in ww2).So All the upper class has been replaced in this process..If it is written in 1967 i wouldn't rely to much on it.Not to mention the Modelism magazine ,another communist publication of Romania;do they still love the editors there fw190 so much? You see some people would not be where they are today if it wasn't for the communism in Romania.Complicated isn't it?
Andrei
Dear Sir,
Are you saying the Romanian military history as presented,
in my previous post source is in correct?
Are you stating that the events described did not take place as happened??
In a previous post here by you on this forum, which as since been deleted,
http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...t&p=1288670
You also claim that "Ichim E. Ordinul militar de razboi Mihai Viteazul, Editura Jertfa & Modelism, 2000" is a communist publication, despite being published in the year 2000, when we know the Communist rule finished in 1989, which was two years previously.
I think it would be very advisable not to post such comments on a Public Forum such as the Great War Forum as the owners of this site would not wish to be drawn into any legal action, (should Mr. Victor Nitu be off a mind to take such action).
You might not be aware of it, but the internet does not give freedom to cast aspersions and make accusations that could be considered as libelous.
You appear to have a problem with anybody and anything that does not fit in with your views of how Romania conducted itself in the past.
It is the purpose of a militaria Forum such as the Great War Forum to promote an active discussion and debate of military history, unfortunately your posts are not following that guideline.
Connaught Stranger.
Are you saying the Romanian military history as presented,
in my previous post source is in correct?
Are you stating that the events described did not take place as happened??
In a previous post here by you on this forum, which as since been deleted,
http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...t&p=1288670
QUOTE
the people you mention above think,i think , that if germania would have won the2nd war we would have had a better life.Moreover they are admirers of Ion Antonescu(the romanian hitler) .
I cannot bring to my ggrandfather name General Aristide Razu such an insult, or the 220 000 Romanians that died figthing the germans .
...so you see for some people is very convenient the actul situation ,otherwise they wouldn't have been where they are today.
Andrei
you implied that Mr. Victor Nitu of the WW2.ro Forum was a supporter of WW2 Germany and Ion Antonescu (the romanian hitler), now you are implying that he uses Communist Sources to support the articles on the Romanian Army in WW2.I cannot bring to my ggrandfather name General Aristide Razu such an insult, or the 220 000 Romanians that died figthing the germans .
...so you see for some people is very convenient the actul situation ,otherwise they wouldn't have been where they are today.
Andrei
You also claim that "Ichim E. Ordinul militar de razboi Mihai Viteazul, Editura Jertfa & Modelism, 2000" is a communist publication, despite being published in the year 2000, when we know the Communist rule finished in 1989, which was two years previously.
I think it would be very advisable not to post such comments on a Public Forum such as the Great War Forum as the owners of this site would not wish to be drawn into any legal action, (should Mr. Victor Nitu be off a mind to take such action).
You might not be aware of it, but the internet does not give freedom to cast aspersions and make accusations that could be considered as libelous.
You appear to have a problem with anybody and anything that does not fit in with your views of how Romania conducted itself in the past.
It is the purpose of a militaria Forum such as the Great War Forum to promote an active discussion and debate of military history, unfortunately your posts are not following that guideline.
Connaught Stranger.
Well, even if these numbers are correct, it looks like a minor setback for the German war effort on a minor theatre. While this might be an exmaple of Romanian bravery during the war, it has nothing of giving Germany any decisive blow. During the fall of 1917 Germany and Austria were gradually transferring troops from the Eastern front to the more important fronts in Italy and France-Belgium.
Thus they had practically no interest in a major assault on Romania during the days, as Romania for the moment was eliminated as a serious opponent.
Thus they had practically no interest in a major assault on Romania during the days, as Romania for the moment was eliminated as a serious opponent.
QUOTE (Connaught Stranger @ Oct 23 2009, 05:53 PM)
Dear Sir,
Are you saying the Romanian military history as presented,
in my previous post source is in correct?
Are you stating that the events described did not take place as happened??
In a previous post here by you on this forum, which as since been deleted,
http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...t&p=1288670
you implied that Mr. Victor Nitu of the WW2.ro Forum was a supporter of WW2 Germany and Ion Antonescu (the romanian hitler), now you are implying that he uses Communist Sources to support the articles on the Romanian Army in WW2.
You also claim that "Ichim E. Ordinul militar de razboi Mihai Viteazul, Editura Jertfa & Modelism, 2000" is a communist publication, despite being published in the year 2000, when we know the Communist rule finished in 1989, which was two years previously.
I think it would be very advisable not to post such comments on a Public Forum such as the Great War Forum as the owners of this site would not wish to be drawn into any legal action, (should Mr. Victor Nitu be off a mind to take such action).
You might not be aware of it, but the internet does not give freedom to cast aspersions and make accusations that could be considered as libelous.
You appear to have a problem with anybody and anything that does not fit in with your views of how Romania conducted itself in the past.
It is the purpose of a militaria Forum such as the Great War Forum to promote an active discussion and debate of military history, unfortunately your posts are not following that guideline.
Connaught Stranger.
Are you saying the Romanian military history as presented,
in my previous post source is in correct?
Are you stating that the events described did not take place as happened??
In a previous post here by you on this forum, which as since been deleted,
http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...t&p=1288670
you implied that Mr. Victor Nitu of the WW2.ro Forum was a supporter of WW2 Germany and Ion Antonescu (the romanian hitler), now you are implying that he uses Communist Sources to support the articles on the Romanian Army in WW2.
You also claim that "Ichim E. Ordinul militar de razboi Mihai Viteazul, Editura Jertfa & Modelism, 2000" is a communist publication, despite being published in the year 2000, when we know the Communist rule finished in 1989, which was two years previously.
I think it would be very advisable not to post such comments on a Public Forum such as the Great War Forum as the owners of this site would not wish to be drawn into any legal action, (should Mr. Victor Nitu be off a mind to take such action).
You might not be aware of it, but the internet does not give freedom to cast aspersions and make accusations that could be considered as libelous.
You appear to have a problem with anybody and anything that does not fit in with your views of how Romania conducted itself in the past.
It is the purpose of a militaria Forum such as the Great War Forum to promote an active discussion and debate of military history, unfortunately your posts are not following that guideline.
Connaught Stranger.
Yes!
The communism officialy ended in 1989 ,but I doubt that the editors there left their job (for example) as modelism is a publication since communism .Or anybody in Romania for that matter .Noone has been arrested for 50 years of communism ,all are on the same positions as they were before 1989.
Also in the communist era there haven't been real works written ,as the real values have been sided by the bolsevization of the country.Also there was and still is today the so called "nephewism",not real values but only puppets in certain positions .Probably they copied from some already written works?
And if the country have been sovietized ,that rules out saying something bad about the soviet Russia.So it could be compromised in the end,as they are ruled out of the equation.
Just had a quick look over Nitu's work above and it doesen't say anything about Russian revolution.See, it is compromised in my oppinion,because the Russians defection triggered by the german propaganda within the Russian Army was the key element in the Criminal Treaty of Bucharest 1918.
Also everything written during communism was censured ..etc
http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...howtopic=116534
Andrei
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