Today 95 years ago, started the first battle of Ypres, the last major battle of 1914.

Peter

An invitation to all and sundry - or, more properly, a request :

How much distortion do you think there is in British accounts of the battle ? Has the role of the French and Belgian contingents been insufficiently acknowledged ? How close did the Germans come to breaking the allied defence, and if they had succeeded, would the result have been catastrophic ?

Did the germans suffer casualties that vastly exceed those of the allies, or did their artillery enjoy an advantage that gave them the edge in this respect ?

How far did Haig's performance as commmander 1st Corps account for the containment of the german attack ? Did Haig's experience there impart a visceral attachment to the battlefield that gave him a fixation for Flanders as the place to seek conclusions ?

Apologies if this has all been aired before ....I look forward to learning more about this battle !


Phil

Peter;

A timely and worthy reminder to us all, thank you

Phil;

Not enough time for me to reply fully at the moment, and I'm sure other members have a vastly superior knowledge of the battle to my own; but my own brief opinions are that it showed the very best determined defensive and counter-attacking abilities of the old Regular Army, demonstrated the fighting potential of the 'temporary' or 'part-time' soldier with the efforts of certain Territorial units, gave Haig and other senior or semi-senior officers (who themselves might well have risen to higher command later in the War) an effective appreciation of the REAL power of the German Army (in terms of the fact that, by the time of 1st Ypres, it would have become apparent that this bladed instrument of war was slightly chipped but by no means blunted), and despite the understandably chaotic lack of central control at least familiarised British, Belgian and French troops with the close, if somewhat indefinable, psycholgical value of fighting alongside against a common enemy.

Peter,
You might be interested in visiting the "Remembering them" section of the forum I posted a list of the men of the 2nd Batt Royal Irish Regiment that were killed on 19th -20th October 1914.
Sherpamick

A very atypical battle for WW1. A genuine encounter with Sir John heading to Lille. This was a battle which was fought by small units and to no overall plan. I don't think corps commanders had a great deal to do except supply subordinate units with resources. Very difficult to say what would have happened if Ypres had not been held. There is no obvious line between the Channel Ports and Ypres. I believe that British High Command would not have tolerated a German presence at Dunkirk or Calais. I think we would have seen a landing on the coast as was planned but never carried out. A different strategy for the Royal Navy with bombardment of any German held Channel port. How that would have played against submarines I have no idea. I wonder whether it is correct to talk of 3 battles at Ypres? I think there was one long battle. We tend to think of Ypres as a terrible place for the British. It was not a lot better for the Germans. There is no doubt that they wanted the Channel ports and they lost a lot of men and expended a lot of resources for almost 4 years in a vain attempt to get them. If the Great War was one of attrition then Ypres saw that at its bloodiest and a battle of attrition which the British and the Empire troops with the support of Belgian, French and Portuguese troops won in the end.

There is a park in the City of Worcester called Gheluvelt Park. The action of a single battalion at the end of October 1914 is commemorated by having a park named after it. This does not happen often, does it ? Here we have an example of how the story of the First Battle of Ypres impinged on British national consciousness. There is something of the Rorke's Drift flavour about this battle, at least in the way it has been depicted. My mother, as a child, possessed a series of volumes called " Childrens' Treasure House" : they were, in fact, encyclopaedias, with different volumes relating to various aspects of general knowledge, and were published about three or four years after the end of the Great War. One of them is titled " Motherland and Empire", and tells the stories of British national heroes. There is a chapter devoted to the Worcesters at Gheluvelt. I'll try and find it, and put some of the passages on this thread.

Phil

This is mortifying ! I've found the old volumes, and they're called The Children's Treasure House
...Oh, Crickey, I put the apostrophe in the wrong place !

The chapter I'm referring to is " The Day That Saved The World". Here are some passages from it :

"...the fate of Christendom and the entire world turned upon the action of less than four hundred Worcestershire men on October 31, 1914.

When this little band of English heroes defeated their enemy at Gheluvelt, by Ypres, they shaped fpr thousands of years the life, mind, and character of men and women yet unborn.

The check to the two million German invaders, effected along the Marne by the outnumbered French and British force, was not decisive.......

Their armies raced to the sea....they closed down towards the Straits of Dover. Their conquest of Calais was to open, with every advantage of position, a direct attack on the British Isles. New and terrible instruments of destruction - the submarine, the floating mine, gigantic guns throwing a ton shell twenty miles, Zeppelins and flying machines - were to be brought in overwhelming strength against the British race.

....General von Moltke, the German Commander- in - Chief [ whoops!], instantly changed the direction of attack, and, keeping the Belgians and Frenchmen at play with 150,000 troops, hurled 600,000 men against the British line.

The British forces.....numbered considerably less than a hundred thousand men at the time when the grand battle for the world was closely engaged....

The German Emperor in person watched from Menin the opening of the critical battle. He launched an army corps of forty thousand men against the remnants of the two British brigades....Nevertheless, the survivors managed to drive back the enemy, and...rallied round the village of Gheluvelt.

In the evening of October 29 the German Emperor brought up fresh forces numbering one hundred and twenty thousand men. The British troops opposing this host at the critical point along the Menin road then numbered less than three thousand.....

Then at dawn of the day of destiny, October 31, 1914, the fresh German forces of 120,000 men were launched by their commander, General von Deimling, into the battle for the village of Gheluvelt - and for the whole earth....

The single Briton killed masses of Germans, often by the score and sometimes by the hundred. Never had been such marksmen in the world as the Regular British soldier of the year 1914. He had been trained to fire from his rifle twenty or more rounds a minute, and to aim straight and true every time he pressed the trigger.

Twenty rounds of aimed fire a minute was the average. There were, however, many men who could bring forty Germans down in sixty seconds, when the enemy was advancing, shoulder to shoulder, in a grey - blue mass that could not be missed.....

In marksmanship the bowmen of Crecy and Agincourt were clean excelled by the riflemen of Ypres. The dense masses of German infantry were actually killed or maimed in hundreds of thousands. Their total losses in the end were at least three hundred thousand men......"

At this point, children, I will stop the story. If requested, I'll continue and describe how the gallant men from Wocestershire saved the world.

Phil

Whoa, steady on, Phil - critical analysis of an old book written for children is one thing, but your sarcasm is beginning to smack of disrespect for what the BEF in general, and the Worcester's in particular, did at 1st Ypres. To quote Anthony Farrar-Hockley:

"...The tale of losses is too continuous to sustain an impact; the mind becomes saturated with figures. It is true, too, that the total number of their casualties is insignificant in comparison with those suffered on the Somme or in the attempt to clear the Ypres ridge again in 1917. But it is not for the number fallen, much as they were mourned, that they deserve to be remembered; or for their courage and patriotism - they were, after all, doing their duty as professional soldiers, holding the ring while their countrymen took up arms. What marks them is the standard they set as fighting men, holding for weeks a wide sector of attack against an enemy four to seven times their strength..."

The book you have may be factually inaccurate in places and well over-the-top in jingoistic sentiment and by modern standards deserves to be criticised, but lets not forget for one moment that the old British regular army, including the Worcester's, "died" when successfully defending Ypres in 1914 against a much-vaunted, numerically superior, enemy force. And that statement is neither factually inaccurate nor jingoistic.


Cheers-salesie.

True, salesie, true....

What strikes me here is how my parent's ( see...I'm learning where to put the apostrophe ) generation, born in the five years after the Great War, were taught to perceive the First Battle of Ypres in much the same way as ours, born in the decade after the Second World War, were encouraged to view the Battle of Britain. The same peril of onslaught against the Island Race thwarted - the Old Contemptibles of 1914 being the precussors of "The Few" of 1940.

On re reading my post, I can appreciate that it carries a sarcastic tone, which I now wish that I had supressed. Let me say, though, that I read that story avidly when I was twelve years old, and was spellbound by it then .....I still am now.

Phil

Jack Sheldon's next book will go some way to restoring any imbalance of the German side of the story. It will be dealing with the German Army and First Ypres. Many accounts in English focus too much on a very limited number of sources and on one aspect in particular, der Kindermord bei Ypern.

The French and Belgian sides of this story are referred to, with varying degrees of not much detail by comparison to the details about the BEF.

Robert

Your integrity does you credit, Phil - but, I'm afraid, the apostrophe should be after the "s" in parents because, in this context, there are are two of them (plural) not one parent e.g. ...my parents' generation (I know I'm a saddo, so no need to comment).

As for the book you have, I think it can be summed by saying, "When I was a child I thought as a child...but when I became a man I put childish things aside." (If only it was as easy as that?)


Cheers-salesie.

But it does matter, salesie. My belief was that it should be The Childrens' Treasure House - just as you advise me. This is how I spelt it in my earlier post : but when I found the books, I was horrified to see them titled The Children's Treasure House....I would have thought that the grammar of the 1920s was more meticulous than it is now, and so I reckoned that I had been wrong : now I'm wondering.

Reverting to our Ypres discussion - I recollect reading that the Kaiser was generous in his praise of the British defence, and actually declared that he rated the 1st Corps of the BEF to have been the best soldiers on the Continent. If this is so - and I would be suprised if Wilhelm would have admitted that - then the epic of this battle is indeed worthy of some of the British hype.

Phil

Phil, it's straightforward in this case. Parent is singular so when it's a possession of one it's parent's but if of both then it's parents'. Children is a plural so the possession applies to all and the apostrophe goes before the s. It's the Treasury of the Children, not of the Childrens.

Now let me be even more sad, salesie...shouldn't you have inserted an apostrophe after the "t" in lets, and spelt it "let's" , as in let us ? You have also been incorrect in using an apostrophe in the word "Worcester's", because in this case it was not being used in the possesive sense. Hang on, maybe I'm wrong about this...perhaps the regiment might be said to have belonged to Worcester.

Actually, that battalion escaped with losses that were not so very bad, considering the boldness of the counter attack and the strength of the force it contended with. I have read that a resolute attack, if pressed with sufficient determination, can help reduce casualties. Am I right in saying that the Worcesters suffered about 40% casualties ? That's severe, but hardly excessive considering losses sustained by other battalions of the BEF in that fighting. The Germans at Gheluvelt were, apparently, caught off balance by this attack.

Phil

Thank you ! This was bothering me. I must read that book "Eats shoots and leaves" !

Phil

Whatever else happened at Ypres, there is no gainsaying the fact that the BEF came up against a far larger force with better artillery support, brought them to a halt and held them there. Then again, the BEF was by far the most experienced army on the continent at that time so perhaps there was no need for a miracle, just very good leadership on the ground and some very determined fighting by well trained, hard bitten professionals. There is no need to downplay the part played by the French or the Belgians. The BEF was asked to play their part and they did that and more.

This is where I strike a contrarian's note ( I edited this to put in the apostrophe )...are we right to assume that the BEF was uniquely experienced ? The French had been fighting a lot in their colonies, especially Algeria. The Russians had fought a huge war against the Japanese.

Phil.

I can't help with what Kaiser Bill said about the BEF at 1st Ypres, Phil - but the BEF did distinguish themselves as true fighting men in a damn close run thing, as did the French and Belgian troops involved, but, in my opinion, so much has been written about the BEF simply because they were so few in number and in theory the outcome should have been very different indeed - as I've said before about the Old Contemptibles, they certainly punched well above their weight.

As for Haig - he did carry a lasting impression of this battle with him up to and including 3rd Ypres - he is on record as saying that we must not make the same mistake as the enemy did in Flanders in 1914 and stop pushing too soon (paraphrased, exact quotes and sources available).

Back to the apostrophe problem - there is no such word as childrens, children is the plural of child so no "s" is added to make it plural, the possessive apostrophe should be written children's as per the jingoistic tome has - whereas, parents is the plural form of parent so written as parents', it is only written as parent's when referring to a single parent. The "apostrophe s" is not added for plurality but for possession, yet the apostrophe moves and the "s" is not used when the word becomes plural by using an "s" at the end e.g. how awkward would parents's look and sound? It all stems from the old days when written as, for example, my father his house (now written as my father's house) and convention over the centuries has grown to ignore gender and to make it somewhat confusing regarding plurality i.e. my mother's house (my mother his house), these women's houses (women is the plural form of woman (not womans) so the” apostrophe s” is added as with a singular woman). Nearly everyone, myself included, has problems with this and I'm not explaining it very well, so I hope you get the gist?


Cheers-salesie.

Spot on, Phil - as I said earlier, everyone, including myself, has problems with this (especially when rattling off text at speed).


Cheers-salesie.

Phil wrote:




As John Keegan states, 50,000 Germans were killed in action during the Battle of First Ypres.

Keegan and Ian Passingham record that the BEF's casualties at Ypres were 24,000 killed in action, 36,000 wounded; the French sustained 45,000 casualties (I do not have the breakdown of the dead versus wounded).

The BEF had additionally suffered casualties earlier at Mons, the Marne, and the Aisne, so after the 'Race to the Sea' and First Ypres its unwounded were less than half the original 160,000 men that had been sent to France, with a total of 30,000 killed in action.

Passingham states the German Army's total casualties for 1914 were 120,000 killed in action, and 400,000 wounded or prisoners of war.



Al

I think that this thread could use some information about the Belgian activities during this period. This is of course no detailed summary. On 18/10/1914 general Foch asked the Belgians to hold for 48 hours. They held for longer.

18/10/14: the Belgian army held a sector about 40 km long. It went from Nieuwpoort on the coast to Boesinghe. The line was held , starting from the coast, by the 2nd division, the 1st division, the 4th division, the French naval infantry brigade in Diksmuide, part of the 3rd division and the 6th division. The reserves consisted of the 5th division, part of the 3rd division and the 2nd cavalry division. The 1st cavalry division was held apart to support the French offensive in the direction of Cortemark and Roeselare. Total were down to about 75000 men of which there were 50.000 in the infantry, 184 machine guns and 200 artillery pieces. The mixed brigades had disappeared, all infantry divisions (except the 3rd ) had been reduced to 3 infantry regiments each.

18/10:
the outlying posts of the 1st, 2nd and 4th divisions are in contact with German forces

19/10:
French naval infantry and elements of the 5th division attack and capture Vladslo.. On hearing the news that the French offensive to the right of the Belgian forces has stopped, the troops are recalled. There is a heavy German attack (4th ersatz division) on Lombartzijde. This is stopped with the support of British naval support

20/10:
The 4th German ersatzdivision captures Lombartzijde. An attack by the 4th German reservedivision on Mannekensvere. Heavy attacks on Diksmuide are halted by the 11th and 12th infantry regiments and the French naval infantry. The attacks continue through the night.

21/10:
German forces attack Nieuwpoort and Diksmuide throughout the day

22/10:
During the night German forces are able to cross the Ijzer in force near Tervaete. A Belgian attack recaptures Lombartzijde. The sector of Diksmuide is quieter.

23/10:
In support of the Anglo French offensive of that day elements of the French 42nd division attack without result in the direction of Westende. German forces advance near Tervaete. An attack on Diksmuide is stopped.

24/10:
German forces from the 5th reserve division, the 6th reserve division and the 44th division advance near Tervaete and capture Stuyvekenskerke, Schoorbakke and Sint Joris. A counter attack by part of the French 42nd division fails to stop the German advance. A heavy German attack by the 43rd reserve division on Diksmuide is stopped during the night. Belgian high command decides that the railway between Nieuwpoort and Diksmuide will be a final position.

25/26 and 27/10
Belgian forces maintain their positions from Nieuwpoort to Diksmuide. Engineers start work on the inundations. By 30 October the inundations take effect and force the German units back.

These battles reduced the strength of the Belgian infantry to about 32000 men. Most of the artillery was nearly out of order (the French were now supplying 75mm artillery rounds which caused damages on the Belgian pieces)
All in all not a bad performance by a small, badly trained ,poorly equipped army without any experience!

No Russians on the Western Front at this period of the war and never, as far as I am aware, at Ypres. The experience of the Russo Japanese War was of good soldiers badly let down by officers of all ranks. An experience best forgotten. The British Army had fought the South African War against modern rifles and artillery a mere dozen years before. I should say that all senior officers had experience of working in a professional army under something approaching modern war conditions. This was far from true for the conscript army which France put into the field. It was also the case for the German conscripts. Only a very small proportion of these mass armies had taken part in their countries' colonial actions.

It seems forgotten that The counter attack at Gheluvelt was by 3 Coys of the 2/ Worcesters and 1 Coy of the 1/ Berkshire's.

After that fatefull day in 1914 when 1 SWB and 2nd Welch were vertually destroyed the remnants saved by the intervention of 2 Worcesters, it became customary for The SWB and Worcesters to exchange greeting telegrams on each annervesary of the action, it continues today as far as I am aware. With the amalgamation of the SWB and Welch in 1969 it continued with the new regiment.

Of course there were no Russians on the Western Front, Tom...but they were on the continent; if their experiences at Mukden and Port Arthur were best forgotten, then, surely, so should those of the British at Spion Kop and Colenso have been. The Russian ordeal was closer to 1914 than that of the British in South Africa. As for the French, their most experienced troops were the ones that took the most murderous punishment of all when their Colonial Division of Infantry was massacred at Rossignol.

Phil

2 Russian divisions served with the French in the French sector but came to a sorry end in 1917.The Russian Army was improved from the one which had been trounced by the Japanese in 1905 but was still very poorly led and badly armed. I did not claim that the history of the British army consisted only of victory but I still maintain that the BEF was a full time, long service, professional army whose officers and many of the men, especially the reservists, had served in a war where they were exposed to modern rifles and artillery. The British Army had instigated a major reform to take account of the lessons learned in that war. This was not true of the French or Germans.

Yes, you're right about the Russians that got hammered in the Nivelle Offensive....I should have remembered them.

This perception that only the BEF had taken account of the lessons of the Boer War, and that hence the British of 1914 were uniquely prepared for the subsequent battles, is debatable : surely the Russians had also faced artillery and automatic fire ten years previously, and the Germans, according to Zuber, were conspicuously successful in the deployment of men and firepower....remember our classic thread "The Machine Guns of Mons" ? Incidentally, by way of an edit, I should emphasise that I refer to the continent as being the whole European land mass, and not just France and Belgium.

Phil

I don't know who learnt what from previous conflicts, Phil, but, as far as I can see, all sides learnt pretty quickly the true meaning, in human terms, of modern warfare.

Surely, the most important point is how the respective armies performed once reality dawned? The regulars of the original BEF (the Old Contemptibles) punched well above their weight from the very beginning, and, as was pointed out in the "The Machine Guns of Mons" thread, after the first couple of contact encounters, the German army was not overly keen to close with them - the French army, after massive early setbacks, got their act together just in time and played a blinder on the Marne and for the rest of 1914 - the German army, despite Zuber's over-the-top eulogising of their prowess, never achieved any of its objectives in the west at any time in the war, and, more importantly, failed in 1914 when their strategic disadvantage was relatively small.

And, it has to be said, that once the German army failed to achieve its objectives in 1914, it also failed to learn lessons from that as well as any previous conflicts - so it could be argued that Germany and its much-vaunted army failed to learn anything about the true realities of total-war; failed to learn right up until 1945.


Cheers-salesie.

There is actually a book about the Belgian contribution: the recent In Flanders Flooded Fields. I have a copy, but I do not find it an easy book to get into.

Jack

You repeat this frequently, salesie....but, as Dick Emery used to say " Oooooh...you are AWFUL...but I like you" !

Phil

may be of some intrest source worcester city museum

Vastly outnumbered by the Germans, the British and their allies were forced into a
long and exhausting retreat, fighting every step of the way to hold the Germans
back. By the time the Worcestershire's reached Ypres (Belgium) in mid-October,
they had already marched over 300 miles, and still had to face ten days of
continuous fighting as the British made a stand. By the 31st October, the Battalion,
which had landed in France 1025 men strong, had just 492 men left. They were
tired, weak and battered, but their biggest test was yet to come.
On the 31 st October, the Battalion was resting slightly behind the lines, near the
village of Gheluvelt. Captain 'Bowie' Clark remembered:
"Every sole was dog tired, cold, wet, and plastered with mud, had been unwashed
and unshaven for days on end ... There we were - a pretty picture indeed - dug in
along the edge of a wood, wondering what next, so to speak. The roar of artillery
and the crashing of the Bosche [German] shells were tremendous, whilst the
constant rattle of machine guns and bursts of rifle fire told us plain enough that there
was something doing on a big scale."
Sure enough, the Germans were launching a massive attack on Gheluvelt. The
British Army had reached breaking point, stretched dangerously thin and at the limits
of their endurance. As the Worcestershire's waited for news, the Battalion of the
South Wales Borderers who were holding the village were pushed out of it and were
surrounded off to the north. The line had broken. The Germans were now free to
turn their men loose behind the British, destroying them and capturing the Channel
Ports which were their supply life-line. If the Germans achieved this, the war would
be all but over, and only 500 exhausted soldiers of the Worcestershire's stood in
their way.
'A' Company was immediately sent forward and took up positions in some trenches
behind the village, ready to support the Welsh if they were to retreat. The other three
companies, around 370 men led by Major Hankey, advanced up the long, open
slope which led from their position towards Gheluvelt. As they crossed these fields,
shells rained down on them. For nearly a kilometer they advanced without cover,
taking over 100 casualties. Private Jack Cole was there:
"At the Major's command 'Charge!' the Battalion spread out, bayonets fixed, leaving
it to luck how many came out alive. The German reaction was swift. A barrage of
artillery burst among the troops, gaps appeared, buts the waves of bayonets went
on."
On the far side of the field, they reached a hedgerow which marked the edge of the
grounds of the Chateau of Gheluvelt. Hacking through the hedge, with the officers
using their swords for the job, they found on the other side the Chateau and beyond
that the village, with well over a thousand Germans milling around. Jack Cole:
"These unshaven, haggard men of the 2nd Worcesters came face to face with the
fresh-faced tough youngsters of the German 244th and 245th Regiments. The
swearing Tommies in khaki, with their remorseless cold steel, caused the heat to go
out of the Germans and they fled in a grey mass."
Taking the Germans by surprise, the Worcestershire's charged home and routed a
force three times their size. Holding the road between the village and the Chateau,
the Worcestershire's called up 'A' Company and dug in along a sunken road. On
their left, they linked up with and relieved the remains of the South Wales Borderers.
Together, they resisted all further German attempts to retake the village

tafski

It seems to be a knee-jerk reaction on my part, Phil. Whenever I hear things like "...and the Germans, according to Zuber, were conspicuously successful in the deployment of men and firepower..." I feel the need to say that the Germans were conspicuously successful in not being successful - that the German army of 1914-18 never achieved any of its objectives in the west. I feel the need to point out that any analysis, such as Zuber's, is inherently flawed simply because it creates a paradox with the realities that is conveniently (or mistakenly) ignored in any such analysis.


Cheers-salesie.

Zuber focuses entirely on the battles of the Ardennes, and so the analysis is necessarily confined to a few episodes. He does suggest - no, more than that, he declares - that German training and tactics were superior to those of the French. I have to say that his statements are almost chauvinistic : I find the book makes uncomfortable reading.....but he does a good job in so far as he brings attention to battles that most of us know too little about. The destruction of that French Colonial Division of Infantry at Rossignol is quite chilling to contemplate, nightmarish....Lord Above, what kind of fighting was this ?

Phil

You were the one who introduced Zuber's analysis in the context of this thread about 1st Ypres, Phil, and you also referenced it as being relevant to Mons - not just the Ardennes' battles. And, I was simply pointing out that any such analysis, because of its narrow focus, is at odds with the bigger picture. And, I would say that Zuber only makes uncomfortable reading if not recognising the flaws in his work (though, in fairness, you do allude to his chauvinism), which is why my knee-jerks whenever I see such references telling us about conspicuous German successes in the west (the bottom line is there weren't any; they were conspicuously unsuccessful in achieving their objectives despite all the modern hype they seem to be attracting).


Cheers-salesie.

Their strategic failures and ultimate defeat should not obscure the many tactical successes that the Germans achieved, both in defensive and offensive warfare, on both the Western and the Eastern Fronts.

Phil

Being reminded of the realities, Phil, especially the German failures of 1914 when their strategic disadvantage was practically nil, doesn't obscure anything but it does put analyses such as Zuber's into perspective - indeed, I would argue that it is such analyses which actually obscure the realities of German failure i.e. surely it's an oxymoron to argue that the German army had many tactical successes whilst failing to achieve any of their objectives? But writers such as Zuber are careful to avoid such an oxymoron by simply ignoring the realities - in other words, such analyses are so narrowly focused they paint a picture that obscures reality itself.

Here's another phrase I've often repeated - by going on about "many German tactical successes" and "the Germans were conspicuously successful" etc. without mentioning the realities of their failures at all stages of the war (including 1914), is akin to discussing what a wonderful piece of engineering the Titanic was for its day but then completely ignoring the role the iceberg played in demonstrating its flawed design.


Cheers-salesie.

There is an oft used expression - "winning the battles and losing the war" - that applies to the Germans in the Great War, just as it does to the South in the American Civil War. Of course the Germans did not win all the battles - as our discussion on First Ypres reminds us. I think that it's a good thing that Zuber wrote that book: especially given that, for people like me, The Children's Treasure House depiction of the 1914 battles was influential in establishing perceptions of that fighting.

Phil

The problems with battlefield communication was not confined only to the British. The German troops who made the break through at Gheluvelt carried out there orders to the letter, "capture the village", then as the British Infantry so often did, they stopped and had a brew up! and waited to be told what to do next! When the 2nd Welch were blown out of there trenchs,(except for 2 pls of C Coy who stayed in touch with the right of the SWB line) they were dug in across the Menin road, the Germans advanced North and south of the road, and entered the village from these directions, the SWB' left , and Queens both pulled back throwing up flanks, it was lucky that in them days fritz did not have radio's. A great many of them stacked there rifles and began making food, it was dinner time! in the Chateau grounds, others still kept contact with the SWB,s who were holed up with what was left of C coy Welch in the chateau out buildings and the railway embankment. They must have had the shock of there lives when the Worcesters and Berkshires came through that hedge. God Ive stood there so many times trying to imagine what it was like!

Very nice bar in the square there, and the food is very nice, and a great price too. I can see it now, all done up for halloween at this time of year.

Nothing like bouncing from one extreme to the other, Phil!


Cheers-salesie.

I understand the Connaught Rangers were involved in the the fighting. Does anyone have any information on them?