The Great War abounds in heroes and villains, and not a few occupy both camps, depending on your point of view. But is there anything whatever to be said in extenuation of Luigi Cadorna? References to Cadorna in Keegan’s The First World War indicate behaviour so monstrous and inexcusable as to suggest actual derangement. I am not really a battles or generals person so I would appreciate opinions from those Pals who are. Was Cadorna simply pitiless and brutal in the extreme or was he beyond the border of rationality? And what explains his promotion to Field Marshal in 1924, except that it was made by another whose grip on reality could be questioned?

I have only a limited knowledge of Cadorna but I'm of the opinion that he wasn't deranged (I am assuming by derangement we are talking about a bona-fide mental illness)............He was certainly brutal both in deeds & opinion.............& I think he used this brutality to screen his own incompetence. He should have been removed from his post far sooner than after Caporetto..............My understanding is that there was no significance of his promotion to Field Marshall by Mussolini in 1924...........It was a gesture rather than anything more sinister or the actions of an unbalanced mind & there was no real power attached to the promotion

No.

"The man's a maggot."

To attack once onto the Bainsizza plateau was foolish. To do so repeatedly beggars comprehension. The ground was so hard there that the Italian army suffered the highest rate of head wounds of any army - due to the flying stones whenever a shell went off.

Not deranged, just an out and out - well, I don't think I can use that word here...

Thanks for the replies Will and duckman. Cadorna does not seem to be of much interest to the forum as a whole, which is a pity. I was hoping to find out more about him.

In one sense he seems sadly typical of many Great War generals. He possessed a self regard so profound that any failure could only be attributed to a lack of resolution by his troops. A faulty plan was inconceivable. Where I think he differs is in the savagery he employs to make them to try harder. Apparently the constitution gave him supreme authority, independent of King and Prime Minister. The demands made on his army – an offensive every three months from May 1915 to August 1917 – exceeded anything undertaken by German or British forces. The offensives were fought over harsh terrain that created 70 percent more casualties per shell than fighting in France or Belgium. According to Keegan, Cadorna dismissed 217 generals – another reference mentions 217 officers – and ordered the summary shooting of officers of retreating units. He presided over punishments of a severity unmatched in other armies. The repertoire included summary executions, sometimes with victims chosen by lot. In all, he authorised more than 750 executions. My sources for the foregoing are Keegan and www.firstworldwar.com.

These atrocities are why I speak of derangement. He seems to me like a psychopath given a state licence to kill.

I often find that bullying and bluster often hide not madness but a deep routed inadequacy followed by lack of good inter communicational skills.

regards
Arm.

Well I agree Arm but I think 750 executions, some of them random, suggests something more than a lack of communication skills.

Perhaps power corrupts and perverts the mind, a kind of sane madness!!!


regards
Arm.

Clive,

Hope my reply wasn't too flippant, I expected many more sensible ones here.

Cardorna seemed to posses the worst failings of any commander I can think of, as a General, a leader and a human being.

His disregard for his troops (even when he wasn't throwing them into some of the most futile attacks of the war) was legendary, his lack of humanity appalling, his military incompetance, outstanding, even amongst some fairly impressive contemporaries. I assume his elevation in 1924 was just part of the post-war "lets reward all our generals so no one notices how hopeless most of them were" process. There were a few charmers who benefitted from that.

To be truthful, even discussing him makes my flesh crawl. He's like a creature from another era. There is a Byzantine quality to him. But I don't believe mad, as such, just corrupted by absolute power. Like Arm says - a kind of sane madness.

In regard to the 217 Generals, I would have thought that represented most of the Italian General Staff. I'd seen the claim before, but never knew what to make of it. Do you have a feel for whether it should be "generals" or "officers"?

"lack of good intercommunication skills" Now that sounds familiar. I trust you are not paving the way to reopen a debate about a well known British Field Marshal....

Tim

No, not at all. I expected, as you did, that there would be some Italian experts lurking on the forum. Keegan mentioned 217 generals and the claim surprised me. It seems a lot. On the other hand, 217 officers is not a particularly large number, and would Cadorna have been involved in dismissing mere officers? I don’t know. I had a quick look in the British Library catalogue and there does not seem to be anything on Cadorna in English.

I wonder about the social and political scene in Italy at the time. Why was the man allowed to run riot? Why wasn’t there an irresistible level of disapproval? Did execution by lot really happen and if it did was it concealed at the time?

I would like to know what has happened since. Have all those executed men been rehabilitated and commemorated? And is Cadorna reviled in Italy?

Deranged or not, he does seem to have been the worst of the worst.

Mario Morselli, an Italian historian, makes the following observations in his book 'Caporetto 1917: Victory or Defeat?':

'The Austro-Hungarian military leaders, like their Italian counterparts, often thought in late-nineteenth-century strategic and tactical terms. On this account, Cadorna was certainly no less rigid than Boroevic, Conrad or Krobatin.'

'In more than one way... Luigi Cadorna should be considered one of the harshest and sternest army commanders of the First World War. An amiable man only within his small circle of friends, his disciplinary regulations, applying throughout the ranks, were almost legendary. (Famous, for instance, was the restriction on a soldier in uniform entering a public place with a woman unless she was his mother or wife.) Cadorna was certainly detested by the troops and many officers of other ranks as well. The rout at Caporetto was in no small measure due to the personality of the Italian Chief of Staff.'

'General Cadorna and his commanders also had their own problems of rivalry and dissension at this time. The Duke of Aosta, naturally, as a member of the Royal family, was a separate case. But Capello, Cadorna and di Robilant had different warfare experience, strategic philosophies and views on the conduct of operations. Common to all were their Piedmontese roots [this is mentioned on a few occasions. There is clearly some notion of being 'Piedmontese'].'

'While the Austro-German forces were wrestling with problems of troop transportation, Luigi Cadorna had more pressing tasks to attend to. His career had in fact reached its end. Since May 1915 he had dismissed more generals than any other commander-in-chief of the Entente; now it was his turn to go. Orlando [the Italian prime minister]... relates that when he faced the king he gave three reasons to justify his insistence on Cadorna's removal. First of all, the odious and unacceptable words used a few days earlier by Cadorna with regard to the behaviour of his troops after the Isonzo rout; second, the dimensions of the military disaster, the responsibility for which lay unequivocally with the Commander-in-Chief; and, finally, the absolute need he felt as prime minister to be always in close and loyal cooperation with the Army's Chief of Staff.

The next problem for the government in Rome and for Victor Emmanuel was that of finding a proper way to inform Cadorna that he had to leave at once. The Commander-in-Chief could not be discharged as easily as any other officer. Thus, it was decided to wait a few more days and to find a proper context. From the accounts now available, it seems that Cadorna, a hugely self-confident man, did not anticipate this move, despite the dreadful defeat of the Army under his command.'

'The diary [of Angelo Gatti] does not conceal its author's strong and consistent personal attachment to Cadorna, and also his bitterness against the men who, in his view, were eventually responsible for the latter's dismissal. In his own words, Gatti considered Cadorna "one of the greatest men of contemporary Italy". Yet, at the same time, he understood the Chief of Staff's serious flaws, such as his stubborness and strategy based more on "intuitions" (as Gatti writes) than on a logical approach to the reality of war.'

'[Following the success of the attack at Caporetto] Cadorna's mood swung from relaxed optimism to great despair, which greatly affected his staff's ability to do their work. On 25th October, one of his adjutants saw Cadorna crying for the very first time. later, when the situation had temporarily seemed to improve, the Chief of Staff went back to his normal daily routine. He did not miss taking his formal meals every day, followed by a walk and a conversation with his staff.'

'Cadorna, according to Gatti, tried to remain calm, and he certainly displayed a stoic attitude following the Caporetto rout. At dinner with his staff on the evening of 2 November, he explained why he refused to conside suicide as a way out of his personal and professional tragedy - an escape chosen in those days by some Italian generals of lower rank and with less responsibility than Cadorna. He explained to his guests that his mind was now set to "fight against destiny", and that his strong and deep-rooted Catholic faith would not permit him to do such a thing. Cadorna also told his retinue on this occasion that he expected to be removed from his position soon. Bitterly, he recalled how his father Raffaele, the army's Chief of Staff, had also been suddenly dismissed by King Victor Emmanuele II after taking Rome in 1871. Thus he saw a kind of recurring family fate.'

'While Gatti's diary shows that Cadorna dealt with the crisis in an untypically Italian manner, the reaction of many of his army and corps commanders was less commendable. As Cadorna had chosen and appointed these men personally, he could not blame anyone else for their conduct and shortcomings. Indeed, among the commanders-in-chief of the countries involved in the war, Cadorna had acquired the reputation for being "the best torpedo man". No one could keep count of the number of senior officers he had dismissed on the spur of the moment (or "torpedoed" to use the Italian military slang). Most senior officers acted as if they were scared of their own shadows, and felt mentally paralysed whenever they had to make decisions on their own. The senior officers, in turn, transmitted this feeling to their subordinates, and the psychological process went on down to the lower levels. The overall effect on the army's operations were often devastating. The critical decision-making process, with the related responsibilities, was always deferred to the next higher rank.'

'We need to bear in mind that Cadorna was successful in limiting the damage to the Italian Army after the breakthrough on the Isonzo. Cadorna immediately ordered a full retreat to the Tagliamento River on a 200-kilometre-wide front. At the time, a hesitation of even a few hours would probably have caused the army further huge unsustainable losses.

Cadorna also deserves credit for the construction of a fall-back position behind the front.'

'The generalissimo kept thinking out loud in front of an astonished Gatti: "My own spirit is dead. For me everything is over. I never sought this appointment. They just gave it to me." And, "personally, I feel at peace with myself, I did all I could. Is it my fault if the Army is rotten (in Italian "full of vermin")?"'

'Revealing of the situation at the time is the fact that at Rapallo, on 5 November, both Orlando and Sonnino told Gatti that "under no conditions" would Cadorna be replaced. Quite an example of political deception!".

Robert

Who would that be

[QUOTE]

Don't be vague, ask for H...

Robert,

Many thanks for that extract. It gives some idea of the environment that made it possible for Cadorna to go on long after his faults should have made that impossible. Of course, such things are not unknown today. It is a reminder of how little democracy we actually have or are willing to claim. Why have we always been so unwilling to mention the emperor’s nudity?

I begin saying that I don't know as much as I should about Cadorna.A general view about him here in Italy (and that I have received in school)is that he has never been really loved,he was considered,how can I say,an uncapable general,who made us run to many useless defeat.
About the italian situation at the time...my country had been reunited about 50 years before but wasn't really united inside,there were too many centuries of foreign domination and a mixture of different cultures.
A poor country trying yo make its way out the differences and the lack of education.Our army lacke dof everything,from shoes to guns,to food,and surely a good enough reason to do it,not well organized. But our army did not lack of bravery and courage,even if my great-grandfather used to tell my dad that waht helped italians(especially the Alpini.regiment,where he belonged) to win thw war was "grappa"(an alcoholic drink,a sort of whisky)!

Thanks for that authentic view. I am surprised that Cadorna is not positively hated in Italy. He was certainly incompetent but so were many other generals on all sides. Where Cadorna stands alone is in his incredible and inexcusable savagery towards his own troops.

In short: Cadorna was the best what could have happened to the Austrians.

lp,

Klemen