Michael,

I quite agree with you; their high rate of fire places them in the same category as machine guns. With regard to Helles and Kapa Tepe, there is no doubt in my mind that Nordenfelts were employed and that these guns may have been mistaken for the newer Maxim 08 machine guns. They were actually know as Maxim - Nordenfelts which may explain the reference to "old pattern Maxims" in the British OH. Irrespective, IMO, we can be sure that the troops at V beach were confronted by rapid firing weapons which in themselves could be regarded as machine guns. It is apparent that similar guns were at Kapa Tepe and fired on the Anzac landing from the south, albeit at a range of over 3000 yards. I had thought we had pretty much agreed on this previously.

Sorry for the misunderstanding but my query about mistaking rapid rifle fire was directed at the situation at Anzac Cove and the Fisherman's Hut to the north.

Regards
Chris

Michael,

Can I offer the thought that not all Nordenfeldts may have been fixed defence weapons as the one that was captured was. I was reminded in a conversation with others this evening that the Nordenfeldt was a common fixed coastal defence weapon against infantry assaults for fortifications of the late 19th Century. Indeed I was reminded that they were in Australia at places like Fort Queenscliff at the turn of the last century and I expect the thirteen reported on the Gallipoli Penninsula are of that type. But not all Nordenfeldt's were sold as fixed defence weapons, the 25mm version was quite often sold from 1880 as a mobile machine gun mounted on a carriage, Naval & Military press have done a reprint of a book on them, if anyone has the book I would be interested in seeing the images.

I think we have partially fallen into the trap of applying modern concepts, when we should be thinking in the terms of the period, Nordenfeldt guns were regarded as machine guns, as long as you cranked the action it fired bullets, stop cranking no bullets fired, same as the Gatling guns. The difference is they had no trigger and required manual action, rather pull and hold the trigger and then a mechanical action will continue automatically until you release the trigger. By 1914 yes manually operated gns were antiquated and obsolete for most purposes, though still excellent for fortress defence.

Anyway, back on thread, the British Army Intellience Handbook of the Turkish Army for the period identifies two different machine gun company establishments, one for companies equipped with Hotckiss MG's and one for those equipped with Maxims. In all of the reporting, and discussion here, the Hotchkiss MG companies seem to be overlooked. Next the Hotchkiss MG that we think of was created after the events we are discussing, BUT, what machine guns did Hotckiss sell to the Turks, what were they? Nordenfeldt's or the early Hotchkiss designed in 1897. Is it possible that the Turks employed a small number of carriage mounted Nordenfeldts mancine guns, that had been replaced by the Maxims or Hortchkiss, and brought them back out of the Arenals? They weren't unkown to bring obsolete weapons out for just such a purpose and the carriage would have made it much easier to move in comparison to the Maxim's. Were the first machine gun companies, equippped with Nordenfeldts in the late 1880's?

Food for thought,
Chris Henderson

Chris,

They were actually know as Maxim - Nordenfelts which may explain the reference to "old pattern Maxims" in the British OH

I may be wrong, but I was under the impression that the 25mm was known as the Nordenfeldt
and that it was the later, 37mm (Pom-Pom), which was produced under the new (joint) name of Maxim-Nordenfeldt.
................................................................................

Chris H,

I agree that the Hotchkiss element of the machine gun arsenal is often over looked
personally I know nothing about them, but have seen this web page here http://www.jedsite.info/smallarms/mike-mod...897-series.html
which interestingly uses the description "Light-machine-guns"

I have been puzzled for some time by the Turkish references to their machine guns; references which sometimes use only those two words, but at other times preface them with the word 'heavy'

e.g.:
TGS's Brief History, page 110
Halil Sami, the Commander of the 9th Division prepared a different and new plan for the 25-26 night attack
According to the plan, the reserve regiment (most of the 25th Regiment) was to be divided in three:
1. Two companies from the 1st Battalion of the 25th Regiment with two heavy machine gun companies are to be reinforced to the 3rd Battalion in Zigindere and destroy the English in the region with a night attack
2. The other half of the 1st Battalion with a machine gun company is to be under the battalion commander, positioned at Seddulbahir sector, and attack the English units with the 3rd Battalion of the 26th Regiment
and on page 111
However a total of one and a half battalion with two machine guns was able to defeat the English forces
On the other side two companies sent for reinforcing the 3rd Battalion of the 26th Regiment comprised one team and two heavy machine guns. This force was positioned north of Harapale

Where only the two words 'machine gun' are used can we read this as Hotchkiss
and where the word 'heavy' is added can we read Maxim/Vickers or some such?

Also worthy of consideration is the following passage
"The heavy machine gun fire power was 13 times more with the armada support fire and this number would reach 25 with the second stage."
Does this mean a 'heavy' machine gun proportion (Allied to Ottoman) of 13 to 1 at the landing?
And, equally important, what was the proportion for 'light' machine guns?


regards
Michael

Hi Michael,

The sources available to me mention four 37mm nordenfelts posted at V Beach, no mention of the 23 mm gun. This also accords with Eceabat's information at post #151. Thus in Bryn's source 'An article by a Turkish officer in the "Turkish Military Review", October 1926, admits that the Turks had four old-pattern maxim guns at V, '. Could 'old patterned maxim guns' mean the 37mm Maxim-Nordenfelts that are mentioned in the Turkish accounts? 'Old patterned" maxim is unlikely to mean the Maxim 08 guns used in the machine gun companies.

If this is so, then the Turkish records would seem to be accurate.

Cheers
Chris

The British Official History states there were two 'pom-poms' and four machine-guns at V Beach, with a note to see the remark concerning the previously-quoted reference to these MGs. 'Pom-poms' was the term commonly used for Nordenfeldt guns and it doesn't seem, in allied accounts, that the two were confused. Nordenfeldts were used and encountered in the Boer War, so fire from them had been experienced by the allies prior to Gallipoli.
The Official History also states that there were 'at least two machine guns' at 'W' Beach during the landing on 25th April.

Can some one please determine what classifies a machine gun, as a machine gun.
From a very ignorant position, it seems that this has bogged down into a debate on what species of gun, was a what species of machine gun, or not, as what they were called in 1915.
Did the Turks refer to species of machine guns , the same as what the Allies did?
Or did they have a different interpretation on the description, machine gun.
Possibly a list of guns, described in Allied technical terms and the same guns described in Turkish technical terms might help.
I apologise in advance if I am being dumb about this and have missed the obvious.

Kim

Chris & Bryn,

quote from Bill's post #151
"Of the 11 (sic) 25mm multi barrelled guns, we positively identified the positioning of eight: two were at Kabatepe; two at Zigindere (at the mouth of Gully Ravine) with one of these guns being captured at X Beach; two guns at Ece Liman, the small port area on the Gulf of Saros; and two at Kumtepe, in the hills above where the present day Kum Hotel is located about 3.5 km to the south of Kabatepe."

Bill and co. have identified the positions of eight of the 25mm Nordenfeldt guns from a total of thirteen (not 11) which are shown on the 5th Army's Organization Chart [see my post #100] as being at the disposal of the 9th Division.
Where were the other five 25mm Nordenfeldt guns?

Bryn's "The British Official History states there were two 'pom-poms' and four machine-guns at V Beach" seems to indicate that as well as the 37mm (Pom-Pom) guns there were other guns there with a rate of fire equivalent to a machine gun
If we accept the Turkish statement that they had no 'machine guns' there at that time,
then could this firing have been made by some of the missing five 25mm Nordenfeldts?

No argument about calling the 37mm (Pom-Poms) either old pattern Maxims if you like, or even Maxim-Nordenfeldt, but I think that it just adds to the confusion if they are referred to as 'Nordenfeldt'

regards
Michael

Kim, Bean (Volume 2 p615) defines a Nordenfeldt gun as : " an early type of machine gun firing a 1-in projectile." 1 inch is approximately 25mm.

Nordenfeldt guns were first produced in 1877. Although Nordenfelt produced other types of guns, the term usually refers to a multi-barreled (two to ten barrels) semi-automatic gun. In 1888 Nordenfeldt (the company) merged with the Maxim Gun Company and became Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunitions Company Limited. Prior to that the guns they manufactured were known as 'Nordenfeldt guns'.

See here:

http://production.investis.com/heritage/no...denfelt_guns_a/

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...mp;#entry801603

http://www.historum.com/showthread.php?t=3110

http://users.westconnect.com.au/~ianmac5/e...it9.html#pompom

Thanks, Bryn, for the links.

Kim

May I thank all contributors who have participated in this most interesting and thought provoking discussion. This topic has become one of those that have put forward a wealth of information on the 25th April Gallipoli landings, a subject I have previously only taken a general interest in, concentrating instead on events after the 19th May with the arrival of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade at Anzac Cove, and a discussion that I have had little confidence of being able to make any worthwhile or informed contribution to.
I was privileged to be kindly given much of the Turkish documentation referred to with regard to the machine gun question by Bill Sellars and professor Haluk Oral last August, and since that time to have acquired Haluk’s magnificent Book, “GALLIPIL, Through Turkish Eyes”, so I am well acquainted with the Turkish accounts of their defence of Ari Burnu on the 25th.

I am now firmly convinced that there was no Turkish machine guns that fired on the initial Australian landing force, as outlined by the accounts of Lt Col Sefik Aker and Lt İbradılı Ibrahim, also from what can be gleamed from the Turkish General Staff brief history of the Cannakkale campaign.
The various accounts of officers and men from M.E.F. who report coming under machine gun fire would now seem to be wrong in fact. From the many accounts of the landing, as outlined in the various quotes put forward within the 259 posts of this topic, there is conjecture amongst those reporting coming under heavy rifle fire and shrapnel only, and those reporting heavy rifle, shrapnel and machine gun fire being brought to bear upon the landing parties.

Of the two 25 mm Nordenfeldt guns purported to be sighted at, or near, Gaba Tepe, neither of these guns could have put down any ranged fire upon Anzac Cove, or beyond, for the simple reason that Hell Spit/Queensland Point obscured any view of the beaches to the north.
On both, map No. 116, 1940, historical section of the Askeri Mecmua (GALLIPOLI 1915, Through Turkish Eyes, Prof Haluk Oral, page 46) and map, ‘The movements of Mehamet Sekik and his 27th Regiment between 05:30 and 08:30 a.m.’ (Companion to the Feature Length Documentary, GALLIPOLI, Tolga Ornek and Feza Toker, page 26), there is shown an anomaly not indicated in any of the Turkish symbols for artillery guns and machine guns. The first map shows this small symbol roughly 1500 yards North of Gaba Tepe just above the beach line, the second map has one at a similar distance from Gaba Tepe, but about 100 to 200 yards further back on higher ground, and another about 500 to 600 yards South of Gaba Tepe, again about 200 yards from the shore on higher ground.
I am of the opinion that these symbols represent the 25 mm Nordenfeldt gun positions, their placement seems to offer complete coverage of the beaches either side of Gaba Tepe as well as total enfilade fire for the Gaba Tepe defences.
As to Michael’s pondering as to where the missing other five 25mm Nordenfeldt guns where, it would be fairly certain that they were not in the Cannakkale area of defences, they may well have been on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles.

With regard to the deadly fire brought to bear on the two boats of the 7th Battalion and the one of the 12th Battalion, from the knoll above the “Fisherman’s Hut” and the knoll about 500 yards South East of that, the statements purporting to this being from, one to two, machine guns and heavy rifle fire, when it is quite apparent that the 90 men under the command of Lt İbradılı Ibrahim, part of the 4th Company, 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment were only armed with rifles, is quite perplexing. How could the accounts from either side be so totally at odds?

The reasoning put forward by Chris (Crunchy), particularly at post 244, PeterH, post 211, and others, as to how the impression of coming under machine gun fire could be arrived at by inexperienced troops, and the not so inexperienced, seem very valid. To emphasize this point such misconceptions of relating very heavy rifle fire to be that of machine gun fire continued on both sides at Gallipoli during the campaign.
The men of the Turkish 18th Regiment who launched the attack on the 8th & 9th LH positions at Russell’s Top, night of 29th/30th June were under the impression that they had come under intense machine gun and rifle fire, when in fact the overwhelming weight of fire was rifle fire alone. The two machine guns of the 9th LH positioned at Turks Point, and the only machine guns able to bring any effective fire onto the Turkish lines, were nearly overrun by a party of approximately 40 Turks who had managed to advance through the Australian lines under the line of fire of these guns.
SSM Norman Worrall No. 477, “A” Troop, “C” Sqdn, 8th LHR diary entry: That such an attack was repulsed with only 100 rifles and no machine guns supporting us is a tribute to the deadly accuracy of our rifle fire.”
With the reports to the number of Turkish machine guns that fired upon the 3rd Light Horse Brigades charge at the Nek, most of these are grossly over estimated, with figures varying from 10 to 40, when in fact the number could have been no more than six, and possibly not all these guns engaged the charge on Russell’s Top. C.E.W Bean has estimated that the Turkish troops lining the front line trenches must have been between 200 and 250 rifles. He wrote of hearing this fire as he was making his way along a path from the left of the area: “The tremendous fusillade broke out. It rose from a fierce crackle into a roar in which you could distinguish neither, rifle or machine gun, but just one continuous roaring tempest.”

To endeavour to try and understand how so many men could have firmly believed that they had come under machine gun fire when the evidence points to there having been no Turkish machine guns sighted at Ari Burnu, I put forward the following for consideration, and this pertaining to the fire from the Fisherman’s Hut area.
If Lt İbradılı Ibrahim did indeed have 90 riflemen positioned behind and South East of the Fisherman’s Hut, and these men armed with their Mausers opened fire upon the approaching boats at a range of somewhere between 900 to 1000 yards, the first volley of fire would have seen 90 aimed shots ranged onto those targets. If one assumes that all of these men were reasonably competent riflemen another 360 rounds will have been discharged within the next 20 seconds. Within in the first minute of engagement it would be expected that around 1350 rounds would have then been fired. For this rate of fire to be kept up for over an hour, subject to the intensity of fire and the quantity of ammunition available, it would be possible that over 10,000 rounds to have been fired.
I would base this assumption upon the of competency of the Turkish troops being in line with the expected standard of competency of the A.I.F. troops, of being able to fire 15 rounds per minute.

Based upon Lt İbradılı Ibrahim’s statement: “As for us, we faced them with our few weapons and our faith, and thanks to the devastating fire we rained down upon them, within an hour’s time we had felled and destroyed so many invading soldiers that the shores were covered with their bodies.”
And that of post 58 by Bryn:

“Unit history, 7th Battalion AIF, 25 April 1915:
'As they neared the land they saw immediately north of Ari Burnu knoll the Red Cross flag of the 3rd Field Ambulance. The original orders being to guard the left flank from Fisherman's Hut up to 971, they rowed towards the Hut, under a severe rifle and machine gun fire. Casualties were severe. The boats were filled with dead and wounded. The survivors landed and occupied a trench on the knoll behind Fisherman's Hut. Of 140 officers and men only 38 reached the shore.' (p16).

Unit history, 12th Battalion AIF, 25 April 1915:
'This portion of the beach was under direct machine-gun fire, apparently coming from the lower slopes of Walker's Ridge, or perhaps further north from the vicinity of Fisherman's Hut. ... As they neared the foot of the cliff the machine-gun still worried them considerably, and the Colonel ordered Rafferty to take his platoon and endeavour to silence it.' (p43).”

It would be reasonable to assume that even if only one tenth of the Turkish fire found its mark, this would have easily accounted for the losses of the stated killed and wounded. The volume of fire being put down on the boats and the men landed on the beach would in every respect, appear to be that of machine gun fire. The roar of this fire could, and would, have given rise to the assumption that it was from machine guns and heavy rifle fire. This at the beginning would have been one continuos roar for the first few minutes, subsiding and increasing over the hour, if indeed the engagement did actually last that long.
I find all the varying accounts of this action, both Australian and Turkish, very difficult to work out precisely what did take place, apart from the initial fire put into the three boats as they approached the beach. The Turkish fire, if indeed machine gun fire, stated to have come from the lower reaches of Walker’s Ridge is a mystery, as I cannot see any evidence of a concentration of Turkish troops at that position unless they were the retreating survivors of the first trench taken at Ari Burnu.


Jeff

Webster's defines machine gun as an automatic gun using small-arms ammunition for rapid continuous firing. The first use of the term by the U.S. Army that I've seen dates from the 1880s and refers to the Gatling gun and a couple of lesser known makes and models of rapid-firing gun. The term does have a 19th-century ring to it.

Jeff

G'day mate

You have given an excellent summary of the facts as you see them.

There are always philosophical problems in such an exposition. The major being - whose account do we accept? Bryn's thesis has been just that ... attempting to determine the veracity of each account even though the contradictions are obvious. Harmonising the accounts is a fraught process. By definition, as a historical writer, you need to get into the mind of the primary record producer, a difficult task as the events occurred over 90 years ago and thus are out of living memory. Where accounts are contradictory, second guessing appears to be the only way forward. The obvious result is diminishing the veracity of some eye witness accounts. That may seem fine for this example but to maintain consistency, do we keep diminishing the accounts? Thus a war diary that makes an extravagant claim which is dismissed as such in the summary - do you rely upon this war diary for other material? It creates a dichotomy in interpretation - "when is an account reliable?" - the real philosophical question regarding source material.

Finally, there is the philosophical school of "You weren't there so how do you know?" There are many members of this forum who hold this very view, even some who have passed comments on this thread. Personally, I don't think it matters if one was there or not since the full range of contradictory opinions in the primary source documents indicates that on the day the participants were no clearer with their view of history than we are today. However, since you weren't there, and this is a common critique, I am wondering about your process in determining the veracity of each claim to achieve your historical outcome.

Cheers

Bill

Jeff,

Unlike Bill I feel your on the money here.

I believe Turkish accounts and am still skeptical of aussie accounts and the mention of MG's.

Although your ammo useage seems a bit out for a soldier to use that much ammo:

"Within in the first minute of engagement it would be expected that around 1350 rounds would have then been fired. For this rate of fire to be kept up for over an hour, subject to the intensity of fire and the quantity of ammunition available, it would be possible that over 10,000 rounds to have been fired."

This would mean all the ammo (10,000 rds) was avalible to the Turks and they reloaded their ammo pouches time and time again as the mauser had a smaller magizine then the Lee enfield. That means not all soldiers would be firing all the time and that fire would wax and wane, but basicly I agree with your idea.

Both you and Bill are right we may never know for sure, and the reports of the capture of MG's should not be discounted either, even if the reports of MG useage is misleading.

We have mention the idea of MG fire before and vetern troops and officer can not be relied on to understand this problem let alone inexpireced troops or troops and officers who had not seen action for many years.

That there we no MGs and Anzac untill the arrival of the MG Company of the 27th Turkish Regt within a few hours of the landing can not be discounted either as there is proof from the Turks while aussie accounts can't confirm these Mg's before that time.

S.B

Steve

G'day mate

Just to correct your misconception - I haven't said Jeff was wrong. You would be hard pressed to come to that conclusion. I haven't said he is correct either. I am not fence sitting here but this is an admission that I do not have enough information to hand to make that judgement. My comments were more shaped towards the process employed by Jeff to come to his conclusions which appear to be fairly strongly held. When a person makes a decision to suggest that one primary account appears unreliable in comparison to another primary source this opens up a whole Pandora's box of speculation. The problem is at the moment a cogent argument could also be mounted for a case with an opposite outcome. The reason for doubt is the lack of quality and reliable primary source material, an issue upon which we all agree. So when a description is given, there must be some powerfully good reasons to discount the veracity of some primary source documents. My curiosity relates to this fundamental question: When you label one account as unreliable, on what basis do you label it as unreliable? The corollary of that question is the point at which you deem it reliable.

Cheers

Bill

Can I just add that this discrepancy between what one side reported and what the other did is nothing new.

Bean was well aware of it, and so - it seems - was Aspinall-Oglander. These two official historians saw more reports, documents and diaries regarding Gallipoli, and interviewed many more witnesses than anyone else ever did or will, and yet they believed the explanation for the discrepancy was that the Turkish records were incomplete. In other words, after examining all the evidence available to them, both from Allied and Turkish sources, they were not swayed into believing there were no Turkish machine guns present during the landings.

For some of us to simply write off every account by every allied soldier - Australian, British and French - as incorrect, on the basis of having seen much less information than Bean and Aspinall-Oglander did, and having interviewed no witnesses to, for example, the landing on the northern Anzac flank, is, to me, barely comprehensible.

Whether rifle fire could or could not do just as much damage as a machine gun seems to have been grasped by a number of writers here as some kind of evidence that this was the basis for the 'confusion', yet it has never been stated, anywhere, that the Australians believed they were under machine gun fire because they were sustaining heavy casualties. I maintain still that they could and did recognise when a machine gun was firing on them by the distinctive sound a machine gun makes. Jeff's quote of Bean regarding the action at The Nek: “The tremendous fusillade broke out. It rose from a fierce crackle into a roar in which you could distinguish neither rifle or machine gun, but just one continuous roaring tempest.” The implication is that, when there is not such a 'tempest' of fire, the sounds of rifles and machine guns are distinguishable. Well, no such tempest has ever been reported as having occurred during the landing, so the implication is, again, that the sounds of rifle fire and machine guns were distinguishable.

I also have to come back to the oft-repeated speculation that the 'inexperienced Australians' couldn't tell a machine gun when they heard one. Which soldiers couldn't? Are they among the ones that reported machine guns? Where is the evidence for them not being able to distinguish the sound of a machine gun? At what point do soldiers suddenly become 'experienced enough' that they now can tell a machine gun? What about Brigadier-General Hare, who reported them at W Beach? Was he an inexperienced soldier too? In short - Where's the evidence that nullifies these reports, as opposed to speculation regarding the unreliability of everyone who made them?

Hi all,

just popping in for a moment.

Regarding ammunition carried by Turkish troops. Soldiers were equipped with two sets of ammunition pouches, carried on their belts. Each pouch had three pockets, with each of these holding three five round clips. As such, every soldier would have carried 90 rounds on his belt. In addition, Turkish soldiers in fighting order carried a further 150 rounds, in their clips, in the pack that was part of their normal fighting order.

However, the standard rate of fire by Turkish troops was a bit slower than that of Allied troops armed with the .303. In research I have carried out, the rate of fire for Turkish troops has generally been given as about 12 rounds a minute, due mainly to their Mauser rifles only being able to take one clip in the magazine at a time.

As an aside, some of the men who formed part of the garrison at Fisherman's Hut at dawn on 25 April turned up near Battleship Hill later in the day, being the ones ordered by Mustafa Kemal to fix bayonets and lie down and face the advancing Australians when they told hi they had shot off all their ammunition.

Cheers
Bill

Excuse the interruption, but I think it's way past the time that this thread was moved to the 'Classics' section. I'll leave a marker in the original sub-forum should anyone be wondering where it's gone to.

Congratulations to all for such a detailed and informative thread.

quote from Jeff: "As to Michael’s pondering as to where the missing other five 25mm Nordenfeldt guns where, it would be fairly certain that they were not in the Cannakkale area of defences, they may well have been on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles"

I don't think so, Jeff.
They are clearly shown as part of the 9th Division (amongst their artillery weapons for some reason) and I do not think that the 9th Division (of IIIrd Corps) was involved in the defence of the Asiatic coast. As far as I am aware, the Turkish defence on the Anatolian side was given to their XVth Corps, whose 3rd and 11th Divisions each had two 25mm guns, per the same organization chart

regards
Michael

Bill (Eceabat),

I am grateful for your above post which is very instructive
However, it differs from the info provided by The Handbook of the Turkish Army (eighth provisional edition - Feb. 1916 - Intel. Sec., Cairo)
quote:
The cartridge pouches are of leather and are carried on the waist-belt one on each side; they can be slipped on and off the belt as required. The pouch consists of three pockets, opening separately, the lids of which are each fastened by a strap buttoning on a stud under the pocket. To open one of these pockets is a very simple matter, being done in a second with one hand. Each pocket holds four clips of five cartridges, so that each pouch has sixty rounds and the soldier 120 rounds on his belt. With thirty rounds carried in the pocket under the flap of the knapsack, the soldier has 150 rounds altogether on his person.

The Handbook also provides the photograph below [presumably the third pocket of each pouch (on each side) is hidden by the arms of the infantryman]



Would you like to comment on The Handbook's version?

Thanks for taking this subject forward
Michael

Hi Jeff

Thanks for posting that information. Certainly gives the open minded on this topic more information to think about.

Cheers
Andrew

Hi Michael,

al I can say is that I actually have a Gallipoli era set of Turkish ammunition pouches and you would be hard pressed to get four clips into each pocket. While I can't put my hands on the Turkish source just yet, the mind failing you know, I do remember reading somewhere of the fighting kit of a Turkish soldier, including the orders for the 240 rounds I referred to, 90 rounds on the belt and the rest in the pack.

Of course, with the shortage of equipment experienced by the Ottoman army, there were also reports of Turkish troops not having either belts or ammunition pouches, and just carrying their ammunition in bags.

Another issue is the rate of fire. Units such as the 27th regiment, which had not gone through the mill of the Balkan wars and was a regular unit with extensive training, would have been far better at both fire control and rate of fire than other units of the Ottoman army, many of them made up of reserves or recently called up conscripts. For example, the 33rd Regiment, which served in the Ariburnu sector from the early days of the campaign, was a reserve unit, a cardre of regular officers and men built up with men returned to the colours.

It also depended on what weapons they were issued with. While the Mauser was the standard infantry rifle of the Ottoman Army, there were a couple of models in use. However, some units were still armed with Peabody-Martini single shot rifles dating from the Turkish-Russian war of 1877-78. A number of these rifles have turned up on the battlefields and records show units such as the Bursa and Gelibolu Gendarme used these weapons during the campaign.

Cheers
Bill

Bill,

Many thanks for finding the time for such a prompt reply
Your hands-on knowledge is much appreciated

I wonder if you or our Turkish friends have anything to comment regarding the point raised by Chris H [his post #252] re the Ottoman Hotchkiss machine gun companies
And my own follow-up, i.e. whether there was any significance in the Turkish history's use of the different word combinations
'machine gun' and 'heavy machine gun' e.g: by Halil Sami in his plan for the 25-26 night attack - see post #253

Finally, my best wishes to everyone over there, following yesterday's bad news
Hoping friends and family are OK

regards
Michael

Aspinall-Oglander visited Turkey whilst preparing the Official History (in 1925 I think) and some years later related a discussion with a senior Turkish officer on this very subject, possibly the same one quoted here. Cecil was apparently told that there were four "old" machine guns shared between V & W beaches on 25th April. It was clearly a view he held to be good and was clearly remembered some years later as coming from a Turkish source he trusted.

I must admit that I lean towards accepting this point of view.

Jeff,

A thoughtful and well reasoned argument to back up your opinion. Many thanks for taking this thread forward with a great contribution to the discussion.

Concerning the amount of rifle fire being received from the Fisherman's Hut, I was working on about 10 rounds per minute (one round every six seconds, including loading from the charger) which is easily achievable. Assuming there was an average of 70 men firing, as not all the Turks would have had a clear view of the boats. This would provide a rate of fire of 700 rounds per minute, and in excess of 800 rounds per minute if Bill's figures of the Turkish soldier being capable of firing 12 rounds per minute are correct. But I will use the lower figure so as to be conservative in the examples below. The maxim 08 fired 400 -500 rounds per minute. If there were two maxims at the Fisherman's Hut ,as Bean seems to think and Jackson used the plural, that would total 800 - 1000 rounds per minute from both guns.

The destructiveness of machine gun fire in a confined space, such as a ship's boat, is greater than rifle fire because of the concentration of the cone of fire itself, whether the cone is landing along the length of the boat or the boat is transiting across it. The strike rate is higher, the impact on a confined space is greater and the killing time shorter. With concentrated rifle fire the cone of fire hitting the same confined space is wider and higher, that is the bullets striking home have a larger spread. This is because of the greater spread of the firing points (many barrels firing a yard apart along converging lines and the different sight pictures taken by the firers), thus the strike rate will be lower, the impact on the confined space is likely to be less and it will take longer to kill or hit all of the occupants in the confined space.

Jackson says 40 men survived unwounded, that is 1/3 of the 120 who left the Galeka at 0500. Thus with four boats we can assume there about 30 men per boat, of whom roughly 20 men per boat were hit, probably heavier casualties in some boats and lighter in others. Jackson said the Turks opened fire on the four boats when they were about 200 hundred yards from the shore. Let's assume they took two minutes to row the last 200 yards, which is a reasonably fast stroke for heavily laden lifeboats, covering a yard every 1.66 seconds, particularly as they had to change rowers who were hit. It is possible they could have taken longer, perhaps two and half to three minutes, to reach the shore.

I have done some rough calculations to assess the effect of the differing combination of weapons believed to have been employed at the Fisherman's Hut. I emphasize these are rough calculations and averages to try and demonstrate a point, they are NOT to infer the actual way in which the boats were engaged.

If there were 70 riflemen and two maxim guns firing into the boats over that last 200 yards, around 3000 - 3400 rounds would have been fired at the boats, or an average of 3200 rounds. That is a rough average of 800 rounds per boat over the two minutes. Of course not all rounds would strike home. Let's assume the strike rate was a low 10%, that means 80 rounds per boat would have found a man or 2.8 bullets per man for the 30 men in the boat.

Lets take one maxim gun out of the equation. The 70 riflemen and one maxim would have fired 2200 - 2400 rounds at the boats, or an average of 2300 rounds and a rough average of 575 rounds per boat. Using the same strike rate of 10%, gives us 57 rounds per boat hitting a man or 1.9 bullets per man.

The 70 riflemen alone would have fired 1400 rounds in the two minutes or an average of 350 rounds per boat with 35 hitting a man or 1.01 bullets per man.

We must assume that some men were hit more than once, and especially if they were hit by a machine gun, or none of them would have got ashore unwounded.

Of course it is not a simple matter of figures, which I will address below. This exercise simply shows that using very conservative figures and rough averages that had two maxim guns and 70 riflemen been firing on the boats over the last 200 yards to shore it is unlikely any of the men in the boats would have got ashore unwounded, with every man in all of the boats being hit two or three times. With one maxim firing, together with the 70 riflemen, the chances of survival were greater but with 1/3 of them ashore unwounded, the remaining 20 per boat would all have been hit two or three times; thus any man hit only once lowers the number who got ashore unwounded. With rifle fire alone, the chance of 1/3 getting ashore unwounded was even greater.

However, it is more likely the maxims would have concentrated on one boat at a time. It is probable that with the concentration of the cone of fire and the higher strike rate discussed above, two guns could have pretty much destroyed the four boats in two minutes and one gun could have destroyed two in that time. Even if only half the riflemen were firing on the remaining two boats, with a 10% strike rate that is still 35 rounds hitting a man in each of the boats which would cause considerable but not annihilating casualties. If only half the men in each of these two boats were hit, that is still only 30 odd men getting ashore unwounded.

Thus I am inclined to agree with Jeff. Balanced against the reports that some Anzacs believed they heard or were subjected to machine gun fire; the Turkish accounts and the analysis of probabilities above and elsewhere in this thread point to a conclusion it is unlikely maxim guns were at the Fisherman's Hut. If anyone has any evidence to prove otherwise, other than repeats of what participants say they heard, I would be delighted to hear it.

Regards
Chris

For those who interested in seeing the Nordenfelt mechanism in action go to the You Tube box at the bottom of the article here http://www.military-heat.com/79/nordenfelt-gun/

The commentary mentions a gardiner machine gun although other You Tubes showing the same film have it as a nordenfelt. Can anyone clarify if this is actually a nordenfelt please? It certainly looks like one.

Cheers
Chris

Chris, I think you have just taken this thread to a new level.

We have Anzac sources that say.....,Turkish sources that say....., but when you put forward such a compelling diagnosis of military science, ( if I may describe it thus), then it does give one something to think about.


Best regards

Kim

quote from Chris: Can anyone clarify if this is actually a nordenfelt please? It certainly looks like one.

Agreed Chris, it certainly looks similar to the example (4 barrel version) shown here with the firing lever on the right hand side
see http://web.ukonline.co.uk/stephen.johnson/arms/nord1.jpg

regards
Michael

These two You Tube clips give an impression of the concentrated cone of fire from a maxim gun I was referring to in post #274 above.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=knH2Hqt3J9U...feature=related

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pIpQ3JvcbV8...feature=related

Hi Chris,

unfortunately, Turkey has blocked access to Youtube again so I can't comment on the images shown. (Noooo, Turkey doesn't have censorship)

Michael, given the shortage of machine guns and other heavy weapons in the Ottoman army following the Balkan wars, the machine gun companies of some regiments were equipped with Hotchkiss machine guns, though Sahin and I are still trying to work out of what sort. It should be noted that Ottoman cavalry brigades each were supposed to have a machine gun squadron, these being equipped with Hotchkiss guns. In at least one case, a cavalry brigade was stripped of its machine gun component, this unit being transformed into a machine gun company for an infantry regiment, the 20th.

Cheers
Bill

PS Michael, friends and family fine, country in turmoil.

Bill,

Glad to hear all of you are well. Keep safe Mate.

Michael,

I think this may be the model of the Hotchkiss the Turks were using. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hotchkiss_M1914_machine_gun although it would have been an earlier model of the same design. if not, then possibly it was the Hotchkiss Light Machine gun which was introduced into the French Army in 1909 here http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hotchkiss_M19...cie_machine_gun which appears to have been used for cavalry units in the British Army. This second gun may be the one Bill is referring to being re-issued from the cavalry to the 20th Regiment.

regards
Chris

May I thank to you all for your kind words, but it was more a sense, of trying to make sense, of all the varying reports of there being machine guns, and no mention of machine guns, on the morning of the 25th that prompted my post.
Chris, I would join Kim in acknowledging your concise analogy following from my post, some exceptional hypothesis to the rate of fire scenario and far better thought through than my febble attempt. Many thanks also for those fascinating links to the Nordenfeldt footage, it does indeed demonstrate its comparison to that of Maxim machine gun fire.
Michael, you are correct with regard to the listing of the 13 Nordenfeldt guns and quite right to pull me up on my throw away line, the Devil got hold of me, but if someone as knowledgeable about the Canakkale campaign as Sahin cannot locate the positions for the missing guns, I doubt if anyone can, even with Bill's help.
Journo Bill, Eceabat, thanks for your run down on the average rate of Turkish fire of 12 rounds per minute, I had tried to equate the speed in which the 5 round clip could have been loaded, but figured it could have been comparable to the .303, even with its 10 round magazine. I also used the rate of the two ammunition pouches of the Turkish soldier holding 90 rounds (3x5x3=45x2), and this from memory of the pouch my Grandfather brought home with 11 clips encased (now sadly stolen).
I had hoped my speculation to the two 25 mm Nordenfeldt guns being positioned either side of Gaba Tepe would have prompted the experienced military personnel, strategic analyst's, weapons experts and campaign experts, amongst you all, to examine this assumption and the true meaning of those two unidentified symbols. I'm no strategic or military expert myself, but such positioning looks quite plausible.
I still feel that we have all become a little bogged down on the question of whether there were machine guns at Anzac on the morning of the landing, regardless of what statements were made to there being machine gun fire brought to bear on the landing parties, there are now nearly as many that make no mention of any machine gun fire, referring to heavy rifle fire and shrapnel only. I suppose my even suggesting such further exacerbates the bogging down.
I am firmly convinced that the evidence, both Turkish and Anzac, predicate the non existence of any machine guns along the Anzac front until later in the morning, as per Lt Col Sefic Aker's account. There is just no actual evidence to these guns having existed other than the notion of some men to have been subjected to what they mistakenly perceived to be machine gun fire.

Jeff

Probably maxims.

yes

Jeff,

What do the symbols of the weapons positioned either side of Gaba Tepe look like?

We are seeking information on what these symbols refer to.

Regards
Chris

Thanks to all contributors to this very interesting and informative thread.

Without reading back through every post, I thought there was some agreement that one or more machine guns were sited at Gaba Tepe, but their existence at Fishermans Hut was still in dispute through lack of confirming Turkish documents.

I know there is a demand for 'evidence' and this hardly confirms anything, but Major General Bridges, 1st Australian Division commander, definitely pitched his tent in the 'machine guns at the Landing' camp, as his report on May 7th confirms:

"While in the tows and during the landing the troops were under machine gun and musketry fire and enfilade shrapnel fire from Gaba Tepe. An accurate statement of the losses incurred during disembarkation cannot be obtained; it is feared there were many casualties."

Good on you,

Grant

As far as I'm concerned, Grant, the evidence for the existence of a machine-gun in the vicinity of Fisherman's Hut is the number of witnesses to its fire. It's apparently easy for some to write all these off in order to conform to what Turkish documents are available, but I'm still not convinced by any of the counter-arguments to the many witnesses' ability to identify machine-gun fire. In fact, I'm yet to even read a counter-argument to most of these witnesses' observations that is not based on others' experiences.

Grant,

I think Bridges would have relied on the reports of others, as he came ashore about 7:30am by which time the Turks had withdrawn and the 3rd Brigade was well and truly secure on Second Ridge. He would have been well off shore when the initial landings were made. Perhaps there is also the element of trying to justify why the 1st Division failed to achieve its objectives. This would not be the first time a commander's report was not entirely accurate or tried to put the best face on failure. I am not saying Bridges did it deliberately, but the machine gun approach, as reported by others, would certainly add an element of difficulty to the task and a reason why more was not achieved.

It seems that Bridges was quite disappointed at the results achieved. His own performance at the landing was uninspiring and he showed a distinct lack of initiative and leadership that day, which reflects his inexperience in formation level command. He was a regular soldier, a very good gunner and he had considerable staff experience in the defence policy area during the formation of the Australian Military Forces post Federation. He was attached for Special Service to the RA of the British Cavalry Division during the South African War but it appears he never commanded a field unit or formation at any level prior to taking over the 1st Division in 1914.

An interesting aside; in the weeks prior to Bridges' mortal wounding, according to Casey's diary, he became quite reckless in exposing himself to enemy fire. Reading a Reveille article, a digger who witnessed his wounding stated that as Bridges arrived at the sandbag wall stretching across the path in Monash Valley he warned Bridges to run across the gap, as a Turkish sniper had shot a few men at that spot. According to the account Bridges walked out and hesitated in the open at which time he was shot.

regards
Chris

Mates

Giving appropriate weight to evidence is always a problem when examining the records as a consequence of historical events. I tend to give much weight to the immediate, on the spot information. Sometimes it is ill informed but most of the time it expresses the mood of the moment. So signals to me are the most valuable primary source information. A search of signals at the AWM reveals that only a bare few are available for 25 April 1915 and none relate to this subject. The other items I give weight to are the immediate reports generated on the day or close to the date being examined. These may be War Diary entries, personal diary entries, Routine Orders, Special Orders, and other reports. While generated after the event, they are still unvarnished and do not contain the glosses that later histories contain. Official Histories are wonderful markers but as I have discovered, they are remarkably unreliable documents. Worse still are the books produced by commanders many years after the events in which they took part.

Let me give an example - something totally removed from this subject but with quantifiable consequences. Then I will bring this back to the current discussion.

The engagement at El Buqqar Ridge on 27 October 1917 was a small engagement but it did produce a posthumous VC for Major Lafone of the 1/1st County of London Yeomanry. We have four published accounts of the event in addition to a report by the 9th LHR. I will only deal with the published accounts - 3 British and one Turk. One British account was produced during the war and the other accounts were produced post war when all the relevant material was available to establish casualties. The accounts were:

Lieutenant Colonel Hüseyin Hüsnü Emir, Yildirim
S. F. Hatton, The Yarn of a Yeoman
Cyril Falls in the Official British War History, Egypt & Palestine 1917-18
W.T. Massey, How Jerusalem was Won

You can read the four accounts at:

http://alh-research.tripod.com/Light_Horse...opic_id=1106205

Reading these four different accounts would lead a person to believe that four different battles were being discussed. Let us look at the only quantifiable information, casualty count. Here are the four different versions of the same event:

Falls: Turks - at least 15 dead; Allied 79 KIA and WIA
Hatton: Turks - 208 KIA; Allied ?
Massey: Turks ?; Allied 24 KIA 53 WIA 10 MIA = 87 casualties
Hüsnü: Turks 10 KIA 40 WIA; Allied 200+ KIA

Hüsnü describes the Allied dead as being in excess of 200 while Hatton makes a similar description about the Turkish dead.

If we accept Hüsnü for the quantum of Turkish casualties and Falls for the Allied casualties.

the thing is that Hüsnü describes the action as a "reconnaissance in force", sort of a post battle failure justification - "Oh well, we never meant to hold it anyway." Similar to putting the term "raid" upon the two Moab invasions. Hüsnü is usually reliable as he was a witness to all the events. However, he is a Kemalist and so employed this gloss to his work.

The point here is that the further we are away from the event, the more varnished the stories are with the gloss that is in vogue at the time. The voice on the day disappears to the voice of ideology and its concomitant style.

So now we come to the chief witness upon whom utmost reliance is placed by some in making their conclusions. That is, the notes made by Sefik Aker, in his book Canakkale - Ariburnu - Savaslari ve 27 Alay. Before even quoting from thsi source we need to bear in mind that Aker is writing 20 years after the events. The gloss employed is that of a Kemalist, keen to show the public that his stout defence was inspired by Ataturk. The natural corollary is to downplay the ability to defend. This is the classical "under dog" ploy. It makes for a heroic story where Kemal is able to play his part as the victor despite having nothing except a couple bayonets to win the day.

What does Aker say about Fisherman's Hut? If we go to Paragraph 34, we find this outline:

Click to view attachment

Essentially it says that No 1 Platoon under the command of 2/Lt Hayrettin established his defensive postion in the trenches around Fisherman's Hut. So we know that the area was covered by a platoon.

We go to Paragraph 35 for information about the significance of this disposition.

Click to view attachment

Here Aker is saying that there are three platoons to a company which at strength, contained 250 men. By deduction, we get the figure of about 80-85 men in No. 1 Platoon. In addition he says there was one Machine Gun Company per Regiment with 4 Machine Guns and none in the battalions. By deduction, Aker is saying that there were no machine guns at Fisherman's Hut.

QED.

Well apparently.

But he never says there were no machine guns. He leaves it up for us to deduce this information by referring to another factoid about an Infantry Platoon.

However, like Hüsnü who went before him, there was another agenda being served here. I am not sure we can treat Aker as a reliable and on the spot witness. His account is tainted by time and politics. Hüsnü gave us 200 dead Allies and a Reconnaissance in Force. Aker has his little gems as well. It would be better to view the actual Turkish War Diaries of the Battalions who took part in the action to view the immediate and on the spot commentary. I hold the work of the dead major from 1/33 IR in far higher regard in terms of evidence as he wrote at a time when the battle was still ongoing. He knew nothing of Ataturk.

It is the same as the immediate witnesses giving their accounts. They may or may not be correct but their accounts are far less likely to be corrupted by time and an agenda. They may well be, as Chris says, parts of a gloss to excuse lack of progress on the day.

But let us take a look at this idea. My original question to Jeff was framed to tease out the notion of acceptable evidence. Second guessing evidence by suggesting the witness statements may be an effort to explain failure requires more than this as a dismissal. They need analysis regarding the person making the utterance. Was the person prone to making exaggerated claims? I have seen no analysis of this sort at all. There must be a basis for dismissing testimony that is related to the individual and not the overall impact of that comment. That is the sophism of going from the general to the individual and so has little basis in logic. If we are dealing with the individual, we must look at that individual as an individual, with all the flaws and strengths that make an individual.

Let me illustrate the logic implicit in the above conclusions. Average debt per Australian is $23,800, therefore SWIMBO and I have a combined debt holding of $47,600. Reality is that I have nil debt. The result of going from the general to the individual creates a skewed outcome and an incorrect perception of the subject of examination. So too with the accounts of machine gun fire at Fisherman's Hut.

So back to our story, I would not be so keen to dismiss the eye witness accounts in favour of a third party account written 20 years later. Chris and Jeff may be 100% correct for all the wrong reasons. It is not because of the logic since that has yet to be established. So it is a guess. A calculated guess, but a guess none the less.

A guess I cannot accept without good reason.

Cheers

Bill

Chris, when you write, "I am not saying Bridges did it deliberately... ", surely you must mean, "IF Bridges did it at all, I am not saying he would have done it deliberately."

Otherwise the implication is that Bridges was lying, or at best going along with something he knew to be false, when this is not proven at all; it's only one possibility, based solely on the premise that others have been known to do it.

Hi Bill,

Thank you for a well reasoned opinion for the opposing view.

I agree with your point about the reliability of histories written after the event, particularly unit histories. I would think that the comments you make about Aker can also be made against Anzac accounts. I am more skeptical of first hand accounts than Bryn and yourself. This is based on personal observations where first hand accounts proved to be incorrect when all of the evidence was actually evaluated after the event. Mainly people assumed things were there when they weren't, others were mistaken in even what they thought they saw and others just repeated what they heard others say. On occasion, certain things were deliberately altered or left out so as to show things in a better perspective; too often this happens in some military reports. I treat all first hand accounts and after action reports with care - they are not always correct and can contain errors, either mistakenly or intentional; that is why they have to be evaluated against other sources and probabilities.

This tendency was countered by SLA Marshall's technique of questioning veterans as a group soon after battles in World War Two and Korea. He would sit the whole section down and go through the action with them, some made statements that turned out to be incorrect and it was only by questioning them in a group and going over the ground, where possible, did a truer picture emerge of what occurred. I say truer, because I don't believe we can ever be categorically sure of what actually happened. I experienced a similar approach in our after action debriefs in Vietnam.

The statements made by Anzacs are also a mixture of fact and opinion based on what each person thought they saw and heard, each independently made without the benefit of a group debrief. It is not a matter of dismissing them or trying to find reasons to dismiss them but an honest attempt to evaluate the validity of them, and those of the Turks, against all other factors. Accounts on both sides contain errors and that is natural. If we were to dismiss the whole of an account as erroneous because it contains one or two errors then we would be accepting very few, if any, first hand accounts.

The issue here is two completely opposite views from either side of the firing line. What I am trying to do is identify a possible element that could be mistaken on either side. The common element I think could be mistaken is what people thought they heard.

As you have rightly pointed out, none of the Turkish accounts actually say there were no machine guns at the Fisherman's Hut, This is a valid point and we cannot use them as proof there were no machine guns located there. When we consult the available maps, however, they have clearly marked their weapons and troop positions. Many of these have been confirmed by other accounts and by Allied aerial reconnaissance reports and maps prior to landing. We are prepared to accept those locations as correctly marked because they were confirmed by own sources, but can we readily dismiss no markings of weapon in a location as an error on their part? The Anzac accounts speak of maxims firing from Third Ridge later in the morning and the Turks readily show these guns marked on their maps in the same area and where they moved to later in the day. However, they don't have maxims marked at the Fisherman's Hut. Do we simply assume their map must be wrong because it doesn't accord with what some of our people said they heard? It is a rather tall ask for us Australians to suggest the Turks falsified their accounts or their records are wrong simply on the basis that our accounts must be correct.

The one thing we seemed to have overlooked is that over the years it is elements of the traditional Australian view of the landing that has been found wanting when we look closely at our own sources, let alone the Turkish sources. I might add that the comment you made about Aker's account could just as readily be said of some Anzac accounts.

I doubt that any of us will be able to provide conclusive evidence one way or the other on this issue so it is likely to remain a matter of conjecture. As a matter of curiosity, it would be nice to know one way or the other but I doubt that we ever will. Then again history is always a matter of opinion.

Cheers
Chris

Re post #289 For the record - I am surely NOT saying that at all nor am I suggesting Bridges was lying.

What I actually said was I am not saying Bridges did it deliberately, but the machine gun approach, as reported by others,

IF Bridges' report was inaccurate, it's implied this would be because it was based on 'the machine gun approach', as reported by others.

This in turn assumes all the reports of machine guns at the Landing are inaccurate, which has not, at least as far as I'm concerned, been proved.

Unless we accept that all these reports are inaccurate - which I don't - this provides no basis for believing Bridges' report would be inaccurate.

Chris,

Here is the symbol I am referring to. I can find no reference to it in any of the Turkish map legends.



I will post the relevant sections of the two Turkish maps that I have referred to after this.

Jeff

This is a section of the map, ‘The movements of Mehamet Sekik and his 27th Regiment between 05:30 and 08:30 a.m.’ (Companion to the Feature Length Documentary, GALLIPOLI, Tolga Ornek and Feza Toker, page 26).
These two symbols are either side of Gaba Tepe. The one in the North appears to be just South of Harris Ridge, and the one to the South of Gaba Tepe on the hill above Azmak dere.



Jeff

The map from, GALLIPOLI 1915, Through Turkish Eyes, Prof Haluk Oral, page 46, map No. 116, 1940, historical section of the Askeri Mecmua.
Here the symbol appears, but only North of Gaba Tepe at the same place as in the previous map, same symbol, different map.



Jeff

On re-reading this entire thread, one has to wonder at the many succinct and detailed analysis put forward from members within their own fields of expertise.
The thread has travelled from Helles to Anzac and has bought forward much information.

I find that the following seems to cause some conflict of opinion between posters.

What time is meant by the Landing?
4.30am on the 25th?
All day of the 25th?
This would seem to have some bearing on the question of Machine Guns, in regards to Anzac, as it was lightly held by the Turks at 4.30am, but reinforced later on.

Another question: Some sources say that the Turks had very few Machine Guns, others say that there were plenty enough to worry the invading forces.
On studying the sources and maps put forward by members, one has sift to through which sources where recorded at the time, that time being the 25th April, and what were sources from a later date, in which the authors of the documents had time to reconstruct, with hindsight, the movements of the day.

First hand accounts are great, but whose first hand accounts? There seems to be a wide difference, even amongst those of the same army.

A very thought provoking thread, which seems to highlight the differences between eye witness accounts.
And the discrepencies between Official Records.

Cheers
Kim

The fact that I could find no reference to just what this symbol represents and from all the maps, both Turkish and British, and that they give no indication to the position of the 25 mm Nordenfeldt guns purported to be at Gaba Tepe, aroused my suspicion that these two symbols might well be the Nordenfeldts.
Both michaeldr at Post 141, and Crunchy at Post 143, establish the fact that there were two Nordenfedlt guns attached to the 27th Regiment and positioned at Gaba Tepe, but were they actually positioned on Gaba Tepe itself?

It was the post by Bryn, at Post 144, that further gave weight to that suspicion, quote: -

"A party of mainly 11th Battalion, along with engineers, encountered a Nordefeldt gun on 4th May. Four boats containing approximately 120 men in total, and a shore party of about 13 (these came along the beach), assaulted the Turkish positions on Gaba Tepe:
'There was no sign of life on the land. No shot was fired. But it seemed impossible that the Turks could be surprised. ...Looking to the beach on their left Leane saw the forms of Rumball and his party of the 10th engaged in cutting the northward wire. Thirty yards from shore the boats grounded. As the men scrambled out, a heavy fire was opened on them. In their trenches high up the green slope the Turks had three machine-guns and an automatic gun firing a 1-in shell. Lieutenant Rockliff was hit, and another officer of Leane's party, Lieutenant H.B. Thompson - one of a number whose promotion from sergeant had been authorised the night before, though he had not actually heard of that fact - was killed.' (Bean Vol. 1 p559).

'We dashed over the sides and waded towards the beach. It was not until the boats grounded that the Turks appeared. Immediately a withering fire broke out from machine guns, rifles, and two small automatic guns firing 1lb shells. Lieut. Rockliff was shot with several others before they could clear the boats. Lieut. Thompson fell shot, fatally wounded.' (Leane, 'Gaba Tepe Raid: Gen. Leane's Review.' Reveille Vol.5 No.9 1 Jun 1932 p2)."

If one examines Map No. 23 from the "Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, by C.E.W. Bean, Vol 1, Chapter XXIV, ANZAC BEACH, 4th May 1915, here the position of Captain Raymond Lean's raiding party is shown. From the description of the Turkish fire, from the 'grassy slopes' this does no sound like the fire is coming from on top of Gaba Tepe, but more in line with what Map 23 outlines.

The map put up by Bill Woerlee at Post 125 shows 'one gun' at square 224, q, dot point 1, but what sort of gun?
From the AWM, "Mapping Gallipoli", Colonel Henry Maclaurin's map is digitised. On this map, at square 224, r, dot point 3, there is a black dot, but what does this represent?
At the same site, Captain Lean's map is also digitised, at square 224, w, dot point 1, there is a symbol for a gun, but again, what sort of gun?
Are all these references indicating that the unknown symbol could well be one of the Nordenfeldts?

There is more to done on this scenario, distances to be established, hight contours to be worked out, and the most probable location for the synbols to be established from the varying maps, and hopefully more information coming out of Turkey as to just what these symbols represent.

Jeff

A very good point Kim, and one I have contemplated.
Just what is "the landing" when referred to in many of the accounts?
Is it, leaving to tows and landing on the beach? Moving from landing at the beach and heading off up onto the heights above Anzac Cove?
Or is it encompassing events of the whole day of 25th April?
This is what makes this whole question so intriguing.

Jeff

Hi Jeff,

I am not sure what the symbols represent.

On the larger map you emailed to me, and indeed the one posted above, he shows the more conventional style of symbols for main weapons for the artillery pieces in the locations we know there were guns. He has no trenches marked - only main weapons and troop unit symbols. If you look at Michael's post #100 on page 4, the orbat chart for the 9th Division he has posted shows symbols for both the 25mm and 37mm Nordenbfelts which reflect the conventional style of symbols for weapon systems.

They don't look like a weapon symbol to me, but more like a troop position symbol. The other troop symbols, which are similar but larger, are in the same positions as other Turkish maps and sources place the platoons within the company boundaries. I then thought the symbols you are referring to might be detached sections but I am not sure of that either. I also notice on the map you emailed me the same symbol is marked at Cenup AriBurnu (Queensland Point) and we know a nordenfelt was not captured there and it is highly unlikely they could have got one away in the rapid withdrawal. Nor are they maxim guns as he shows the maxim gun weapon symbol at Scrubby Knoll exactly where where Aker said he first brought his machine company into action, and as marked on Aker's original map. I think the triangular flag represents the HQ of the 2nd Battalion and the reserve company is in the same area, which reflects where they expected a landing in the area, on the beaches immediately north and south of Kapa Tepe. The letters Bl, I think stands for company. Sorry I can't be more helpful.


Cheers
Chris

Jeff,

You wrote:

"The map put up by Bill Woerlee at Post 125 shows 'one gun' at square 224, q, dot point 1, but what sort of gun?"

I can't answer that but it seems to me the position is what later became Bolton's Hill. It would have been an ideal place to cover the beach and in fact now there is a concrete pillbox there, built some time before the Second World War.


Click to view attachment
Bolton's Ridge and Hill (concrete pillbox visible directly below 's' in word 'Bolton's'), 'Z' Beach. Taken from 'Turk Hill', a small knoll near Gaba Tepe.