Full Version: Tannenburg
I recieved a copy of a book on the battle of Tannenburg from my girlfriend. I tried reading it but it all came out as gibberish. Not well written at all. It never did fully explain the reasons behind the sacking of the Russian Generals right before the opening of the battle. I was curious on that note. Also with the vast number of men, how did the Russians loose. I know their main goal during the opening days was to reclaim Poland and take it as theirs.
Hi Jeremy,
Russia actually already controlled the largest portion of Poland of the partitioning powers, even had the capital Warsaw.
Russia attacked East Prussia in order to draw forces away from Germany's drive on France, the attack took the Germans by surprise as they thought the Russians were incapable of mounting an attack so quickly.
I don't recall the Russian commanders being changed on the eve of battle, though, others may have more information on this.
The brief answer as to why the Russians lost was failure to effectively coordinate two armies in broken, wooded country. The two Russian armies werr rarely working in concert and communicated openly over the radio, giving the Germans an insight into their whereabouts and marching plans.
This information allowed Ludendorff and Hindenburg to defeat each Russian army by concentrating their forces against first one Russian army than the other. The Russians never effectively concentrated their two armies.
This is, naturally, a simplification but I think covers the reasons for the final result.
Take care,
Neil
Russia actually already controlled the largest portion of Poland of the partitioning powers, even had the capital Warsaw.
Russia attacked East Prussia in order to draw forces away from Germany's drive on France, the attack took the Germans by surprise as they thought the Russians were incapable of mounting an attack so quickly.
I don't recall the Russian commanders being changed on the eve of battle, though, others may have more information on this.
The brief answer as to why the Russians lost was failure to effectively coordinate two armies in broken, wooded country. The two Russian armies werr rarely working in concert and communicated openly over the radio, giving the Germans an insight into their whereabouts and marching plans.
This information allowed Ludendorff and Hindenburg to defeat each Russian army by concentrating their forces against first one Russian army than the other. The Russians never effectively concentrated their two armies.
This is, naturally, a simplification but I think covers the reasons for the final result.
Take care,
Neil
QUOTE (JeremyScott @ Nov 9 2005, 09:23 PM)
I recieved a copy of a book on the battle of Tannenburg from my girlfriend. I tried reading it but it all came out as gibberish.
For a marvellous fictional treatment , try Solzhenitsyn's " August 1914".
QUOTE (JeremyScott @ Nov 9 2005, 10:23 PM)
I recieved a copy of a book on the battle of Tannenburg from my girlfriend. I tried reading it but it all came out as gibberish.
Jeremy - just out of interest, what was the title of the book?
Tom
It was called Tannenburg 1914. It was complete rubbish. To many pictures. Looked like a coffee table type book.
There is a chapter on the battle in Barbara W. Tuchman's book The Guns of August which gives a description of what happened and why as well as describing the Generals involved on both sides. Splendid read and worth getting hold of.
The Battle of Tannenberg was the most spectacular and complete German victory of World War I. We tend to forget that it was Hoffmann who was the strategist of that victory, it is always Lundendorff and Hinderburg who received the credits for that spectacular victory but we should not forget him.
I also have never heard that the Russian commanders were changed on the eve of that Battle. Any info about it would be really appreciated.
Regards
I also have never heard that the Russian commanders were changed on the eve of that Battle. Any info about it would be really appreciated.
Regards
I just thought I would add that a lot of the guns captured from the Russians were brought to Ireland by Roger Casement in the 'Aud' for the Irish rebels and was scuttled off Cork, he was executed after being incarcerated in the Tower of London. He was not met at
Banna strand because the rebels who were to meet him drove into a ditch and died.
The Aud is still there and was used for target practice and eventually sunk by the Irish navy. The song Banna Strand says the rifles were German which is half right. They were captured from the Russians and sold by the Germans for the Irish cause.
We ( at the museum) had a few rounds taken from the ship (diving on it is verboten!!!) and they were mosin nagant, 7.62 rimmed.
Tom.
Banna strand because the rebels who were to meet him drove into a ditch and died.
The Aud is still there and was used for target practice and eventually sunk by the Irish navy. The song Banna Strand says the rifles were German which is half right. They were captured from the Russians and sold by the Germans for the Irish cause.
We ( at the museum) had a few rounds taken from the ship (diving on it is verboten!!!) and they were mosin nagant, 7.62 rimmed.
Tom.
Readers digest version: There was a serious lack of cooridnation between 1st and 2nd Russian Armies, and this allowed the Germans to defeat them one at a time.
The book seems to have pretty good reviews over at Amazon. I must admit though, I've never read it.
It's Tannenberg, BTW, not Tannenburg.
Paul
The book seems to have pretty good reviews over at Amazon. I must admit though, I've never read it.
It's Tannenberg, BTW, not Tannenburg.
Paul
QUOTE (museumtom @ Nov 30 2005, 03:16 PM)
I just thought I would add that a lot of the guns captured from the Russians were brought to Ireland by Roger Casement in the 'Aud' for the Irish rebels and was scuttled off Cork, he was executed after being incarcerated in the Tower of London. He was not met at
Banna strand because the rebels who were to meet him drove into a ditch and died.
The Aud is still there and was used for target practice and eventually sunk by the Irish navy. The song Banna Strand says the rifles were German which is half right. They were captured from the Russians and sold by the Germans for the Irish cause.
We ( at the museum) had a few rounds taken from the ship (diving on it is verboten!!!) and they were mosin nagant, 7.62 rimmed.
Tom.
Banna strand because the rebels who were to meet him drove into a ditch and died.
The Aud is still there and was used for target practice and eventually sunk by the Irish navy. The song Banna Strand says the rifles were German which is half right. They were captured from the Russians and sold by the Germans for the Irish cause.
We ( at the museum) had a few rounds taken from the ship (diving on it is verboten!!!) and they were mosin nagant, 7.62 rimmed.
Tom.
Some years ago I was sitting in a New York Irish pub with my boss, a (sort of) German that I was providing computer and language services to. We were speaking in German, and the bartender, a young lad, clearly just off the boat from Ireland, finally said: "You guys are German, arn't you?" I responded "Yes. We are the guys who sent you the rifles by submarine." He seemed puzzled.
My father told me when I was a boy that he was sent to Tannenburg to help clean up the Russian dead. This was when his school was closed but he had not yet been drafted into the Army. He probably was staying at Frankfurt am Oder at this time. There were so many corpses that a horse would not approach within 10 miles, and the work was done by men (and boys, obviously) and oxen, both wearing masks dipped in something like peppermint oil. His description sounded more like the Masurian swamps than Tannenberg itself.
Before I started to study WW I seriously, or translate his and my grand-father's Feldpost, I wrote down his oral history, which I had mostly heard about 50 years before. The portions that I have been able to check out against documents, histories, family correspondence, etc. has surprisingly proved to be remarkably accurate. Of course, some anecdotes cannot be checked.
Anyone know anything about this phase of the battle(s)? I guess later in the war everyone got (more) comfortable living among the corpses.
Bob Lembke
Here are two excerpts from the informative Great War website FirstWorldWar.com which include comments by two opposing generals from the Battle of Tanneberg. The website, part of the CEF Study Group's recommended list is as follows:
The First World War. Com - The War to End All Wars
The purpose of this website is to provide an overview of the First World War. Necessarily a long-term undertaking - and a little over four years into the process - much remains to be covered. Michael Duffy, site editor
http://www.firstworldwar.com/index.htm
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Summary of the Battle of Tannenberg by General Vasily Gurko
Tannenberg took its name from a large wood behind the battlefield into which the two central corps were driven and surrounded by the Germans, the entire forces, with all their remaining officers, being captured.
The plans which had been made, owing to tactical errors on the part of the corps commanders on the flanks, were never carried out, and the two corps in the centre, left entirely without support and surrounded by the living wall of the enemy, had no option but to lay down their arms after a heavy fight.
Fighting began on the morning of September 28th, and from the beginning the corps on the flanks met with some resistance, the Germans threatening an attack on their exterior, which was but poorly protected with cavalry.
Probably this resistance was unexpected, for both corps, without half their troops having come into action, began to retire at the moment the two central corps were heavily engaged. On the front the battle had been going well for the Russian troops; a few thousand prisoners had been taken, and there was every possibility of a great victory.
Things moved normally for some time afterwards and heavy losses had been incurred by both sides, when suddenly fresh German columns made their appearance, marching to strike a blow at both flanks of the Russian troops attacking in the northerly direction. It was reported at the same time that these enemy columns could turn both flanks of our forces, which, of course, would mean that both army corps would be encircled.
Headquarters of the central corps were entirely without information as to what had happened to the corps on the flanks. They were supposed to be holding in check any turning movement attempted by the Germans. In reality they were retreating and had altogether lost touch with the enemy.
Probably it is quite natural to ask why General Samsonof did not give orders to compel the flanking corps to stop their retreat, to re-attack and by a single frontal blow strike hard at the flank and rear of the German columns which were then beginning to surround the two corps in the centre.
Failing this in any case he could have given orders in due time to withdraw from a fight that was fast threatening to become unequal.
General Samsonof and his Staff were at an observation post in company with General Martson, the commander of the 15th Corps, watching, within the limits of their visibility, the attack which was successfully developing before them.
It was subsequently reported by eye-witnesses that during the battle Samsonof several times inquired from General Martson if any information had been received from the corps on the flanks. Each time the answer was in the negative.
The absence of news was due to the difficulty of maintaining connection in such open fighting and also to the fact that both the flanking corps were moving, and had the utmost difficulty in maintaining any kind of communication with the other commanders.
Destitute of any information concerning the other troops under his control, Samsonof lost all power of directing operations and thus infringed one of the elementary rules of military strategy, that which provides that the commander of an army shall choose as his headquarters some spot where information can readily be brought to him and whence he can communicate with all the forces under his command.
The worse the organization of communication, the more an army commander is disinclined to come close to the actual scene of the fighting and by personal supervision counterbalance the failure to maintain communication between himself and the unit under his command.
Again the tendency to generalize, which nearly every man possesses, will inevitably lead an army commander to imagine that an operation happening before his eyes must be similar to that of the other areas where fighting is taking place, which he cannot see. The defeat or success of a unit under the immediate observation of the army commander may result in such orders being given to the whole army as would certainly meet the situation immediately within vision but might prove disastrous taking the battle altogether.
In the Battle of Tannenberg the preliminary success enjoyed by the troops under General Samsonof's immediate observation was such an encouraging picture that final victory appeared a matter of certainty. Unfortunately, just at this time the retreat of the two flanking corps, of which Samsonof was totally unaware, was leading from hour to hour towards the catastrophe which was ultimately to overtake the corps in the centre.
Every hour that passed brought confirmation of the fact that the 13th and 15th Corps were being more and more completely surrounded by the Germans. General Martson set out for the scene of the frontal attack to issue orders for a gradual retirement, for the divisions to withdraw one by one. Simultaneously, Samsonof set off in a different direction, presumably to get in touch with the other army corps of his army. But these measures were taken too late.
Disaster had already overtaken the 13th and 15th Corps; German turning columns had already penetrated their flanks and rear so deeply that only a portion of the transport and a comparatively insignificant number of infantrymen managed to escape from the ring of German masses which every minute became more contracted.
The two army corps fell back slowly into the shades of Tannenberg Wood, absolutely helpless and unable to use their artillery. The result of this disaster was that the Germans captured, almost in full strength, two army corps with all their officers, and recovered possession of their own troops who had been captured earlier during the battle.
Caught in the ring, although the Germans did not know it, was General Samsonof and his personal staff.
Night fell. Samsonof, accompanied by five other staff officers, was guiding himself through the thick forest towards the Russian frontier. Their motor-cars had been abandoned, for it was too risky to use the roads. The little party mounted on horseback, passing out of the forest, despite the darkness were seen by a party of German infantry armed with machine guns.
Amidst a hail of bullets the party dismounted and continued their way on foot, into another belt of forest. Utter darkness surrounded them. The sounds of fighting died away, and all that could be heard was the trampling of the undergrowth and an occasional voice as members of the little party called out to each other in order to keep together.
From time to time a halt was called and all drew closer to make sure that nobody was missing.
General Samsonof, who suffered from heart trouble, and found his breathing more and more difficult, lagged behind. There came a time when everybody had been called and all had answered but Samsonof. General Postovski, the Chief of his Staff, immediately called a halt and in the thick darkness led a search for the missing general. It was fruitless.
Source: Source Records of the Great War, Vol. II, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni 1923
Internet Source: http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/tannenberg_gurko.htm
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A Summary of the Battle of Tannenberg by General Paul von Hindenburg
In the pocket-book of a dead Russian officer a note had been found which revealed the intention of the enemy Command.
It told us that Rennenkampf's Army was to pass the Masurian Lakes on the north and advance against the Insterburg-Angerburg line. It was to attack the German forces presumed to be behind the Angerapp while the Narew Army was to cross the Lotzen-Ortelsburg line to take the Germans in flank.
The Russians were thus planning a concentric attack against the Eighth Army, but Samsonof's Army now already extended farther west than was originally intended.
What, indeed, could we do to meet this dangerous enemy scheme? It was dangerous less on account of the audacity of the conception than by reason of the strength in which it was to be carried out - at any rate, strength from the point of view of numbers.
We could hope that it would be otherwise as regards strength of will. During the months of August and September Russia brought up no fewer than 800,000 men and 1,700 guns against East Prussia, for the defence of which we had only 210,000 German soldiers and 600 guns at our disposal.
Our counter-measures were simple. I will attempt to make the broad outlines of our plan clear to the reader even if he is not an expert.
In the first place we opposed a thin centre to Samsonof's solid mass. I say thin, not weak. For it was composed of men with hearts and wills of steel. Behind them were their homes, wives and children, parents and relatives and everything they had. It was the 10th Corps, brave East and West Prussians.
This thin centre might bend under the enemy's pressure, but it would not break. While this centre was engaged two important groups on its wings were to carry out the decisive attack.
The troops of the 1st Corps, reinforced by Landwehr - likewise sons of the threatened region - were brought for the battle from the right, the northwest, the troops of the 17th Corps and the 1st Reserve Corps, with a Landwehr brigade, from the left, the north and northeast. These men of the 17th Corps and 1st Reserve Corps as well as the Landwehr and Landsturm also had behind them everything which made life worth living.
We had not merely to win a victory over Samsonof. We had to annihilate him. Only thus could we get a free hand to deal with the second enemy, Rennenkampf, who was even then plundering and burning East Prussia. Only thus could we really and completely free our old Prussian land and be in a position to do something else which was expected of us - intervene in the mighty battle for a decision which was raging between Russia and our Austro-Hungarian Ally in Galicia and Poland.
If this first blow were not final the danger for our Homeland would become like a lingering disease, the burnings and murders in East Prussia would remain unavenged, and our Allies in the south would wait for us in vain.
It was thus a case for complete measures. Everything must be thrown in which could prove of the slightest use in manoeuvre warfare and could at all be spared. The fortresses of Graudenz and Thorn disgorged yet more Landwehr fit for the field.
Moreover, our Landwehr came from the trenches between the Masurian Lakes, which were covering our new operations in the east, and handed over the defence there to a smaller and diminishing number of Landsturm. Once we had won the battle in the field we should no longer need the fortresses of Thorn and Graudenz, and should be freed from anxieties as regards the defiles between the lakes.
Our cavalry division and the Konigsberg garrison with two Landwehr brigades were to remain facing Rennenkampf, who might fall upon us like an avalanche from the north-east at any time. But at the moment we could not yet say whether these forces would really be sufficient.
They formed but a light veil which would easily be torn if Rennenkampf's main columns moved or his innumerable cavalry squadrons advanced, as we had to fear. But perhaps they would not move. In that case the veil would be enough to cover our weakness.
We had to take risks on our flanks and rear if we were to be strong at the decisive point. We hoped we might succeed in deceiving Rennenkampf. Perhaps he would deceive himself. The strong fortress of Konigsberg with its garrison and our cavalry might assume the proportions of a mighty force in the imagination of the enemy.
But even supposing Rennenkampf cradled himself in illusions to our advantage, would not his High Command urge him forward in forced marches to the south-west-in our rear? Would not Samsonof's cry for help bring him in hot haste to the battlefield? And even if the sound of human voices echoed in vain, would not the warning thunder of the battle reach the Russian lines north of the Lakes, nay, to the enemy's Headquarters itself?
Caution with regard to Rennenkampf was therefore necessary, though we could not carry it to the extent of leaving strong forces behind, or we should find ourselves weaker on the battlefield than we ought to be.
When we considered the numbers on both sides a comparison with the probable Russian forces showed a great disparity against us, even if we counted in on our side the two Landwehr brigades which were then coming from Schleswig-Holstein, where they had been employed in coast protection (and assuming that they would arrive in time for the battle), and even if Rennenkampf did not move and indeed played no part.
Moreover, it must be remembered that large bodies of Landwehr and Landsturm had to fight in the first line. Older classes against the pick of Russia's youth! We had the further disadvantage that most of our troops and, as the situation decreed, all those which had to deliver the coup de grace, had just been engaged in heavy and expensive fighting.
Had they not just been compelled to leave the battlefield of Gumbinnen to the Russians? The troops were not therefore marching with the proud feeling of being victors. Yet they pressed forward to the battle with stout hearts and unshaken confidence. We were told that their moral was good, and it therefore justified bold decisions.
Where it was somewhat shaken such decisions could not fail to restore it. It had been thus before; could it be otherwise now? I had no misgivings on the score of our numerical inferiority. He who reckons solely by the visible in-war is reckoning falsely. The inherent worth of the soldier is everything. It was on that that I based my confidence.
What I thought to myself was this:
The Russian may invade our Fatherland, and contact with the soil of Germany may lift up his heart, but that does not make him a German soldier, and those who lead him are not German officers.
The Russian soldier had fought with the greatest obedience on the battlefields of Manchuria although he had no sympathy with the political ambitions of his rulers in the Pacific.
It did not seem unlikely that in a war against the Central Powers the Russian Army would have greater enthusiasm for the war aims of the Tsar's Empire. On the other hand, I considered that, taking it all round, the Russian soldier and officer would not display higher military qualities in the European theatre than they had in the Asiatic, and believed that I was entitled to credit our side with a plus on the ground of intrinsic value instead of a minus for our numerical inferiority.
Such was our plan and such our line of reasoning before and for the battle. We compressed these ideas and intentions into a short report which we sent from Marienburg to Main Headquarters on August 23:
"Concentration of the army for an enveloping attack in the region of the 10th Corps planned for August 26."
On the evening of the 23rd I took a short walk on the western bank of the Nogat. From there the red walls of the proud castle of the Teutonic Knights, the greatest brick monument of Baltic Gothic, made a truly wonderful picture in the evening light. Thoughts of a noble chivalry of the past mingled involuntarily with conjecture as to the veiled future.
The sight of the refugees flying past me from my home province deepened the sense of responsibility that possessed me. It was a melancholy reminder that war not only affects the fighting man, but proves a thousandfold scourge to humanity by the destruction of the very essentials of existence.
On August 24 I motored with my small Staff to the Headquarters of the 10th Corps, and thus entered the village which was to give its name to the battle so soon to blaze up.
Tannenberg! A word pregnant with painful recollections for German chivalry, a Slav cry of triumph, a name that is fresh in our memories after more than five hundred years of history.
Before this day I had never seen the battlefield which proved so fateful to German culture in the East. A simple monument there bore silent witness to the deeds and deaths of heroes. On one of the following days we stood near this monument while Samsonof's Russian Army was going to its doom of sheer annihilation.
On our way from Marienburg to Tannenberg the impression of the miseries into which war had plunged the unhappy inhabitants were intensified. Masses of helpless refugees, carrying their belongings, pressed past me on the road and to a certain extent hindered the movements of our troops which were hastening to meet the foe.
Among the Staff at the Corps Headquarters I found the confidence and resolution which were essential for the success of our plan. Moreover, they had a favourable opinion of the moral of the troops at this spot, which was at first the crucial point for us.
The day brought us no decisive information either about Rennenkampf's operations or Samsonof's movements. Apparently it only confirmed the fact that Rennenkampf was moving forward very slowly. We could not see the reason for this.
Of the Narew Army, we knew that its main columns were pressing forward against the 10th Corps. Under its pressure this corps refused its left wing. There was nothing doubtful about this measure. Quite the contrary. The enemy, following up, would all the more effectively expose his right flank to our left enveloping column which was marching on Bischofsburg.
On the other hand the hostile movement which was apparently in progress against our western wing and Lautenburg attracted our attention, as it caused us some anxiety. We had the impression that the Russians were thinking of enveloping us in turn at this point and coming in on our flank.
August 25 gave us a rather clearer picture of Rennenkampf's movements. His columns were marching from the Angerapp, and therefore on Konigsberg. Had the original Russian plan been abandoned? Or had the Russian leaders been deceived by our movements and suspected that our main force was in and around the fortress?
In any case we must now have not the slightest hesitation in leaving but a thin screen against Rennenkampf's mighty force. On this day Samsonof, obviously feeling his way, was directing his main columns towards our 20th Corps. The corps on the Russian right wing was undoubtedly marching on Bischofsburg, and therefore towards our 17th Corps and 1st Reserve Corps, which had reached the district north of this village on this day.
Apparently further large Russian forces were concentrating at Mlawa.
This day marked the conclusion of the stage of expectation and preparation. We brought our 1st Corps round to the right wing of the 20th Corps. The general attack could begin.
August 26th was the first day of the murderous combat which raged from Lautenburg to north of Bischofsburg. The drama on which the curtain was rising, and whose stage stretched for more than sixty miles, began not with a continuous battle line but in detached groups; not in one self-contained act, but in a series of scenes.
General von Francois was leading his brave East Prussians on the right swing. They pushed forward against Usdau with a view to storming the key to this part of the southern battle front next day.
General von Scholtz's magnificent corps gradually shook off the chains of defence and addressed themselves to the business of attack. Fierce was the fighting round Bischofsburg that this day witnessed.
By the evening magnificent work had been done on our side at this point. In a series of powerful blows the wing corps of Samsonof's right had been defeated and forced to retreat on Ortelsburg by the troops of Mackensen and Below (10th Corps and 1st Reserve Corps), as well as Landwehr.
But we could not yet realize how far-reaching our victory had been. The Staff expected to have to meet a renewed and stout resistance south of this day's battlefield on the following day. Yet was their confidence high.
It was now apparent that danger was threatening from the side of Rennenkampf. It was reported that one of his corps was on the march through Angerburg. Would it not find its way to the rear of our left enveloping force?
Moreover, disquieting news came to us from the flank and rear of our western wing. Strong forces of Russian cavalry were in movement away there in the south. We could not find out whether they were being followed up by infantry. The crisis of the battle now approached.
One question forced itself upon us. How would the situation develop if these mighty movements and the enemy's superiority in numbers delayed the decision for days? Is it surprising that misgivings filled many a heart, that firm resolution began to yield to vacillation, and that doubts crept in where a clear vision had hitherto prevailed?
Would it not be wiser to strengthen our line facing Rennenkampf again and be content with half-measures against Samsonof? Was it not better to abandon the idea of destroying the Narew Army in order to ensure ourselves against destruction?
We overcame the inward crisis, adhered to our original intention, and turned in full strength to effect its realization by attack. So the order was issued for our right wing to advance straight on Neidenburg, and the left enveloping wing "to take up its position at 4. a.m. and intervene with the greatest energy."
August 27 showed that the victory of the 1st Reserve Corps and 17th Corps at Bischofsburg on the previous day had had far-reaching results. The enemy had not only retired, but was actually fleeing from the battlefield.
Moreover, we learned that it was only in the imagination of an airman that Rennenkampf was marching in our rear. The cold truth was that he was slowly pressing on to Konigsberg. Did he, or would he, not see that Samsonof's right flank was already threatened with utter ruin and that the danger to his left wing also was increasing from hour to hour?
For it was on this day that Francois and Scholtz stormed the enemy's lines at and north of Usdau and defeated our southern opponent. Now, when the enemy's centre pushed forward farther towards Allenstein-Hohenstein, it was no longer victory but destruction that lured it on.
For us the situation was clear. On the evening of this day we gave orders for the complete encirclement of the enemy's central mass, his 13th and 15th Corps.
The bloody struggle continued to rage on August 28.
On the 29th a large part of the Russian Army saw itself faced with total annihilation at Hohenstein. Ortelsburg was reached from the north, Willenberg, through Neidenburg, from the west.
The ring round thousands and thousands of Russians began to close. Even in this desperate situation there was plenty of Russian heroism in the cause of the Tsar, heroism which saved the honour of arms but could not longer save the battle.
Meanwhile Rennenkampf was continuing to march quietly on Konigsberg. Samsonof was lost at the very moment when his comrade was to give proof of other and better military qualities.
For we were already in a position to draw troops from the battle front to cover the work of destruction in which we were engaged in the great cauldron, Neidenburg-Willenberg-Passenheim, and in which Samsonof sought for death in his despair. Swelling columns of prisoners poured out of this cauldron.
These were the growing proofs of the greatness of our victory. By a freak of fortune it was in Osterode, one of the villages which we made our Headquarters during the battle, that I received one of the two captured Russian Corps Commanders, in the same inn at which I had been quartered during a General Staff ride in 1881 when I was a young Staff officer. The other reported to me next day at a school which we had converted into an office.
As the battle proceeded we were able to observe what splendid raw material, generally speaking, the Tsar had at his disposal. I had the impression that it doubtless contained many qualities worth training. As in 1866 and 1870, I noticed on this occasion how quickly the German officer and soldier, with their fine feeling and professional tact, forgot the former foe in the helpless captive.
The lust of battle in our men quickly ebbed away and changed to deep sympathy and human feeling. It was only against the Cossacks that our men could not contain their rage. They were considered the authors of all the bestial brutalities under which the people and country of East Prussia had suffered so cruelly.
The Cossack apparently suffered from a bad conscience, for whenever he saw himself likely to be taken prisoner he did his best to remove the broad stripe on his trousers which distinguished his branch of the service.
On August 30th the enemy concentrated fresh troops in the south and east and attempted to break our encircling ring from without. From Myszaniec - that is, from the direction of Ostrolenka - he brought up new and strong columns to Neidenburg and Ortelsburg against our troops, which had already completely enveloped the Russian centre and were therefore presenting their rear to the new foe.
There was danger ahead; all the more so because airmen reported that enemy columns twenty-three miles long - therefore very strong - were pressing forward from Mlawa. Yet we refused to let go of our quarry.
Samsonof's main force had to be surrounded and annihilated; Francois and Mackensen sent their reserves - weak reserves, it is true - to meet the new enemy. Against their resistance the attempt to mitigate the catastrophe to Samsonof came to naught.
While despair seized on those within the deadly ring, faint-heartedness paralyzed the energies of those who might have brought their release. In this respect, too, the course of events at the Battle of Tannenberg confirmed the human and military experience of yore.
Our ring of fire round the Russian masses, crowded closely together and swaying this way and that, became closer and narrower with every hour that passed.
Rennenkampf appears to have intended to attack the line of the Deime, east of Konigsberg and between Labiau and Tapiau, this day. From the region of Landsberg and Bartenstein his masses of cavalry were approaching the battlefield of Tannenberg. However, we had already concentrated strong forces, weary but flushed with victory, for defence in the neighbourhood of Allenstein.
August 31 was the day of harvesting for such of our troops as were still engaged, a day of deliberation about the further course of operations for our leaders, and for Rennenkampf the day of the retreat to the Deime-Allenburg-Angerburg line.
As early as the 29th the course of events had enabled me to report the complete collapse of the Russian Narew Army to my All-Highest War Lord. The very same day the thanks of His Majesty, in the name of the Fatherland, had reached me on the battlefield. I transferred these thanks, in my heart as with my lips, to my Chief of Staff and our splendid troops.
On August 31st I was able to send the following report to my Emperor and King:
I beg most humbly to report to Your Majesty that the ring round the larger part of the Russian Army was closed yesterday. The 13th. 15th and 18th Army Corps have been destroyed. We have already taken more than 60,000 prisoners, among them the Corps Commanders of the 13th and 15th Corps.
The guns are still in the forests and are now being brought in. The booty is immense though it cannot yet be assessed in detail. The Corps outside our ring, the 1st and 6th, have also suffered severely and are now retreating in hot haste through Mlawa and Myszaniec.
The troops and their leaders had accomplished extraordinary feats. The divisions were now in bivouacs and the hymn of thanks of the Battle of Leuthen rose from them.
In our new Headquarters at Allenstein I entered the church, close by the old castle of the Teutonic Knights, while divine service was being held. As the clergyman uttered his closing words all those present, young soldiers as well as elderly Landsturm, sank to their knees under the overwhelming impression of their experiences. It was a worthy curtain to their heroic achievements.
Source: Source Records of the Great War, Vol. II, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni 1923
Internet Source: http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/tannen..._hindenburg.htm
The First World War. Com - The War to End All Wars
The purpose of this website is to provide an overview of the First World War. Necessarily a long-term undertaking - and a little over four years into the process - much remains to be covered. Michael Duffy, site editor
http://www.firstworldwar.com/index.htm
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Summary of the Battle of Tannenberg by General Vasily Gurko
Tannenberg took its name from a large wood behind the battlefield into which the two central corps were driven and surrounded by the Germans, the entire forces, with all their remaining officers, being captured.
The plans which had been made, owing to tactical errors on the part of the corps commanders on the flanks, were never carried out, and the two corps in the centre, left entirely without support and surrounded by the living wall of the enemy, had no option but to lay down their arms after a heavy fight.
Fighting began on the morning of September 28th, and from the beginning the corps on the flanks met with some resistance, the Germans threatening an attack on their exterior, which was but poorly protected with cavalry.
Probably this resistance was unexpected, for both corps, without half their troops having come into action, began to retire at the moment the two central corps were heavily engaged. On the front the battle had been going well for the Russian troops; a few thousand prisoners had been taken, and there was every possibility of a great victory.
Things moved normally for some time afterwards and heavy losses had been incurred by both sides, when suddenly fresh German columns made their appearance, marching to strike a blow at both flanks of the Russian troops attacking in the northerly direction. It was reported at the same time that these enemy columns could turn both flanks of our forces, which, of course, would mean that both army corps would be encircled.
Headquarters of the central corps were entirely without information as to what had happened to the corps on the flanks. They were supposed to be holding in check any turning movement attempted by the Germans. In reality they were retreating and had altogether lost touch with the enemy.
Probably it is quite natural to ask why General Samsonof did not give orders to compel the flanking corps to stop their retreat, to re-attack and by a single frontal blow strike hard at the flank and rear of the German columns which were then beginning to surround the two corps in the centre.
Failing this in any case he could have given orders in due time to withdraw from a fight that was fast threatening to become unequal.
General Samsonof and his Staff were at an observation post in company with General Martson, the commander of the 15th Corps, watching, within the limits of their visibility, the attack which was successfully developing before them.
It was subsequently reported by eye-witnesses that during the battle Samsonof several times inquired from General Martson if any information had been received from the corps on the flanks. Each time the answer was in the negative.
The absence of news was due to the difficulty of maintaining connection in such open fighting and also to the fact that both the flanking corps were moving, and had the utmost difficulty in maintaining any kind of communication with the other commanders.
Destitute of any information concerning the other troops under his control, Samsonof lost all power of directing operations and thus infringed one of the elementary rules of military strategy, that which provides that the commander of an army shall choose as his headquarters some spot where information can readily be brought to him and whence he can communicate with all the forces under his command.
The worse the organization of communication, the more an army commander is disinclined to come close to the actual scene of the fighting and by personal supervision counterbalance the failure to maintain communication between himself and the unit under his command.
Again the tendency to generalize, which nearly every man possesses, will inevitably lead an army commander to imagine that an operation happening before his eyes must be similar to that of the other areas where fighting is taking place, which he cannot see. The defeat or success of a unit under the immediate observation of the army commander may result in such orders being given to the whole army as would certainly meet the situation immediately within vision but might prove disastrous taking the battle altogether.
In the Battle of Tannenberg the preliminary success enjoyed by the troops under General Samsonof's immediate observation was such an encouraging picture that final victory appeared a matter of certainty. Unfortunately, just at this time the retreat of the two flanking corps, of which Samsonof was totally unaware, was leading from hour to hour towards the catastrophe which was ultimately to overtake the corps in the centre.
Every hour that passed brought confirmation of the fact that the 13th and 15th Corps were being more and more completely surrounded by the Germans. General Martson set out for the scene of the frontal attack to issue orders for a gradual retirement, for the divisions to withdraw one by one. Simultaneously, Samsonof set off in a different direction, presumably to get in touch with the other army corps of his army. But these measures were taken too late.
Disaster had already overtaken the 13th and 15th Corps; German turning columns had already penetrated their flanks and rear so deeply that only a portion of the transport and a comparatively insignificant number of infantrymen managed to escape from the ring of German masses which every minute became more contracted.
The two army corps fell back slowly into the shades of Tannenberg Wood, absolutely helpless and unable to use their artillery. The result of this disaster was that the Germans captured, almost in full strength, two army corps with all their officers, and recovered possession of their own troops who had been captured earlier during the battle.
Caught in the ring, although the Germans did not know it, was General Samsonof and his personal staff.
Night fell. Samsonof, accompanied by five other staff officers, was guiding himself through the thick forest towards the Russian frontier. Their motor-cars had been abandoned, for it was too risky to use the roads. The little party mounted on horseback, passing out of the forest, despite the darkness were seen by a party of German infantry armed with machine guns.
Amidst a hail of bullets the party dismounted and continued their way on foot, into another belt of forest. Utter darkness surrounded them. The sounds of fighting died away, and all that could be heard was the trampling of the undergrowth and an occasional voice as members of the little party called out to each other in order to keep together.
From time to time a halt was called and all drew closer to make sure that nobody was missing.
General Samsonof, who suffered from heart trouble, and found his breathing more and more difficult, lagged behind. There came a time when everybody had been called and all had answered but Samsonof. General Postovski, the Chief of his Staff, immediately called a halt and in the thick darkness led a search for the missing general. It was fruitless.
Source: Source Records of the Great War, Vol. II, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni 1923
Internet Source: http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/tannenberg_gurko.htm
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A Summary of the Battle of Tannenberg by General Paul von Hindenburg
In the pocket-book of a dead Russian officer a note had been found which revealed the intention of the enemy Command.
It told us that Rennenkampf's Army was to pass the Masurian Lakes on the north and advance against the Insterburg-Angerburg line. It was to attack the German forces presumed to be behind the Angerapp while the Narew Army was to cross the Lotzen-Ortelsburg line to take the Germans in flank.
The Russians were thus planning a concentric attack against the Eighth Army, but Samsonof's Army now already extended farther west than was originally intended.
What, indeed, could we do to meet this dangerous enemy scheme? It was dangerous less on account of the audacity of the conception than by reason of the strength in which it was to be carried out - at any rate, strength from the point of view of numbers.
We could hope that it would be otherwise as regards strength of will. During the months of August and September Russia brought up no fewer than 800,000 men and 1,700 guns against East Prussia, for the defence of which we had only 210,000 German soldiers and 600 guns at our disposal.
Our counter-measures were simple. I will attempt to make the broad outlines of our plan clear to the reader even if he is not an expert.
In the first place we opposed a thin centre to Samsonof's solid mass. I say thin, not weak. For it was composed of men with hearts and wills of steel. Behind them were their homes, wives and children, parents and relatives and everything they had. It was the 10th Corps, brave East and West Prussians.
This thin centre might bend under the enemy's pressure, but it would not break. While this centre was engaged two important groups on its wings were to carry out the decisive attack.
The troops of the 1st Corps, reinforced by Landwehr - likewise sons of the threatened region - were brought for the battle from the right, the northwest, the troops of the 17th Corps and the 1st Reserve Corps, with a Landwehr brigade, from the left, the north and northeast. These men of the 17th Corps and 1st Reserve Corps as well as the Landwehr and Landsturm also had behind them everything which made life worth living.
We had not merely to win a victory over Samsonof. We had to annihilate him. Only thus could we get a free hand to deal with the second enemy, Rennenkampf, who was even then plundering and burning East Prussia. Only thus could we really and completely free our old Prussian land and be in a position to do something else which was expected of us - intervene in the mighty battle for a decision which was raging between Russia and our Austro-Hungarian Ally in Galicia and Poland.
If this first blow were not final the danger for our Homeland would become like a lingering disease, the burnings and murders in East Prussia would remain unavenged, and our Allies in the south would wait for us in vain.
It was thus a case for complete measures. Everything must be thrown in which could prove of the slightest use in manoeuvre warfare and could at all be spared. The fortresses of Graudenz and Thorn disgorged yet more Landwehr fit for the field.
Moreover, our Landwehr came from the trenches between the Masurian Lakes, which were covering our new operations in the east, and handed over the defence there to a smaller and diminishing number of Landsturm. Once we had won the battle in the field we should no longer need the fortresses of Thorn and Graudenz, and should be freed from anxieties as regards the defiles between the lakes.
Our cavalry division and the Konigsberg garrison with two Landwehr brigades were to remain facing Rennenkampf, who might fall upon us like an avalanche from the north-east at any time. But at the moment we could not yet say whether these forces would really be sufficient.
They formed but a light veil which would easily be torn if Rennenkampf's main columns moved or his innumerable cavalry squadrons advanced, as we had to fear. But perhaps they would not move. In that case the veil would be enough to cover our weakness.
We had to take risks on our flanks and rear if we were to be strong at the decisive point. We hoped we might succeed in deceiving Rennenkampf. Perhaps he would deceive himself. The strong fortress of Konigsberg with its garrison and our cavalry might assume the proportions of a mighty force in the imagination of the enemy.
But even supposing Rennenkampf cradled himself in illusions to our advantage, would not his High Command urge him forward in forced marches to the south-west-in our rear? Would not Samsonof's cry for help bring him in hot haste to the battlefield? And even if the sound of human voices echoed in vain, would not the warning thunder of the battle reach the Russian lines north of the Lakes, nay, to the enemy's Headquarters itself?
Caution with regard to Rennenkampf was therefore necessary, though we could not carry it to the extent of leaving strong forces behind, or we should find ourselves weaker on the battlefield than we ought to be.
When we considered the numbers on both sides a comparison with the probable Russian forces showed a great disparity against us, even if we counted in on our side the two Landwehr brigades which were then coming from Schleswig-Holstein, where they had been employed in coast protection (and assuming that they would arrive in time for the battle), and even if Rennenkampf did not move and indeed played no part.
Moreover, it must be remembered that large bodies of Landwehr and Landsturm had to fight in the first line. Older classes against the pick of Russia's youth! We had the further disadvantage that most of our troops and, as the situation decreed, all those which had to deliver the coup de grace, had just been engaged in heavy and expensive fighting.
Had they not just been compelled to leave the battlefield of Gumbinnen to the Russians? The troops were not therefore marching with the proud feeling of being victors. Yet they pressed forward to the battle with stout hearts and unshaken confidence. We were told that their moral was good, and it therefore justified bold decisions.
Where it was somewhat shaken such decisions could not fail to restore it. It had been thus before; could it be otherwise now? I had no misgivings on the score of our numerical inferiority. He who reckons solely by the visible in-war is reckoning falsely. The inherent worth of the soldier is everything. It was on that that I based my confidence.
What I thought to myself was this:
The Russian may invade our Fatherland, and contact with the soil of Germany may lift up his heart, but that does not make him a German soldier, and those who lead him are not German officers.
The Russian soldier had fought with the greatest obedience on the battlefields of Manchuria although he had no sympathy with the political ambitions of his rulers in the Pacific.
It did not seem unlikely that in a war against the Central Powers the Russian Army would have greater enthusiasm for the war aims of the Tsar's Empire. On the other hand, I considered that, taking it all round, the Russian soldier and officer would not display higher military qualities in the European theatre than they had in the Asiatic, and believed that I was entitled to credit our side with a plus on the ground of intrinsic value instead of a minus for our numerical inferiority.
Such was our plan and such our line of reasoning before and for the battle. We compressed these ideas and intentions into a short report which we sent from Marienburg to Main Headquarters on August 23:
"Concentration of the army for an enveloping attack in the region of the 10th Corps planned for August 26."
On the evening of the 23rd I took a short walk on the western bank of the Nogat. From there the red walls of the proud castle of the Teutonic Knights, the greatest brick monument of Baltic Gothic, made a truly wonderful picture in the evening light. Thoughts of a noble chivalry of the past mingled involuntarily with conjecture as to the veiled future.
The sight of the refugees flying past me from my home province deepened the sense of responsibility that possessed me. It was a melancholy reminder that war not only affects the fighting man, but proves a thousandfold scourge to humanity by the destruction of the very essentials of existence.
On August 24 I motored with my small Staff to the Headquarters of the 10th Corps, and thus entered the village which was to give its name to the battle so soon to blaze up.
Tannenberg! A word pregnant with painful recollections for German chivalry, a Slav cry of triumph, a name that is fresh in our memories after more than five hundred years of history.
Before this day I had never seen the battlefield which proved so fateful to German culture in the East. A simple monument there bore silent witness to the deeds and deaths of heroes. On one of the following days we stood near this monument while Samsonof's Russian Army was going to its doom of sheer annihilation.
On our way from Marienburg to Tannenberg the impression of the miseries into which war had plunged the unhappy inhabitants were intensified. Masses of helpless refugees, carrying their belongings, pressed past me on the road and to a certain extent hindered the movements of our troops which were hastening to meet the foe.
Among the Staff at the Corps Headquarters I found the confidence and resolution which were essential for the success of our plan. Moreover, they had a favourable opinion of the moral of the troops at this spot, which was at first the crucial point for us.
The day brought us no decisive information either about Rennenkampf's operations or Samsonof's movements. Apparently it only confirmed the fact that Rennenkampf was moving forward very slowly. We could not see the reason for this.
Of the Narew Army, we knew that its main columns were pressing forward against the 10th Corps. Under its pressure this corps refused its left wing. There was nothing doubtful about this measure. Quite the contrary. The enemy, following up, would all the more effectively expose his right flank to our left enveloping column which was marching on Bischofsburg.
On the other hand the hostile movement which was apparently in progress against our western wing and Lautenburg attracted our attention, as it caused us some anxiety. We had the impression that the Russians were thinking of enveloping us in turn at this point and coming in on our flank.
August 25 gave us a rather clearer picture of Rennenkampf's movements. His columns were marching from the Angerapp, and therefore on Konigsberg. Had the original Russian plan been abandoned? Or had the Russian leaders been deceived by our movements and suspected that our main force was in and around the fortress?
In any case we must now have not the slightest hesitation in leaving but a thin screen against Rennenkampf's mighty force. On this day Samsonof, obviously feeling his way, was directing his main columns towards our 20th Corps. The corps on the Russian right wing was undoubtedly marching on Bischofsburg, and therefore towards our 17th Corps and 1st Reserve Corps, which had reached the district north of this village on this day.
Apparently further large Russian forces were concentrating at Mlawa.
This day marked the conclusion of the stage of expectation and preparation. We brought our 1st Corps round to the right wing of the 20th Corps. The general attack could begin.
August 26th was the first day of the murderous combat which raged from Lautenburg to north of Bischofsburg. The drama on which the curtain was rising, and whose stage stretched for more than sixty miles, began not with a continuous battle line but in detached groups; not in one self-contained act, but in a series of scenes.
General von Francois was leading his brave East Prussians on the right swing. They pushed forward against Usdau with a view to storming the key to this part of the southern battle front next day.
General von Scholtz's magnificent corps gradually shook off the chains of defence and addressed themselves to the business of attack. Fierce was the fighting round Bischofsburg that this day witnessed.
By the evening magnificent work had been done on our side at this point. In a series of powerful blows the wing corps of Samsonof's right had been defeated and forced to retreat on Ortelsburg by the troops of Mackensen and Below (10th Corps and 1st Reserve Corps), as well as Landwehr.
But we could not yet realize how far-reaching our victory had been. The Staff expected to have to meet a renewed and stout resistance south of this day's battlefield on the following day. Yet was their confidence high.
It was now apparent that danger was threatening from the side of Rennenkampf. It was reported that one of his corps was on the march through Angerburg. Would it not find its way to the rear of our left enveloping force?
Moreover, disquieting news came to us from the flank and rear of our western wing. Strong forces of Russian cavalry were in movement away there in the south. We could not find out whether they were being followed up by infantry. The crisis of the battle now approached.
One question forced itself upon us. How would the situation develop if these mighty movements and the enemy's superiority in numbers delayed the decision for days? Is it surprising that misgivings filled many a heart, that firm resolution began to yield to vacillation, and that doubts crept in where a clear vision had hitherto prevailed?
Would it not be wiser to strengthen our line facing Rennenkampf again and be content with half-measures against Samsonof? Was it not better to abandon the idea of destroying the Narew Army in order to ensure ourselves against destruction?
We overcame the inward crisis, adhered to our original intention, and turned in full strength to effect its realization by attack. So the order was issued for our right wing to advance straight on Neidenburg, and the left enveloping wing "to take up its position at 4. a.m. and intervene with the greatest energy."
August 27 showed that the victory of the 1st Reserve Corps and 17th Corps at Bischofsburg on the previous day had had far-reaching results. The enemy had not only retired, but was actually fleeing from the battlefield.
Moreover, we learned that it was only in the imagination of an airman that Rennenkampf was marching in our rear. The cold truth was that he was slowly pressing on to Konigsberg. Did he, or would he, not see that Samsonof's right flank was already threatened with utter ruin and that the danger to his left wing also was increasing from hour to hour?
For it was on this day that Francois and Scholtz stormed the enemy's lines at and north of Usdau and defeated our southern opponent. Now, when the enemy's centre pushed forward farther towards Allenstein-Hohenstein, it was no longer victory but destruction that lured it on.
For us the situation was clear. On the evening of this day we gave orders for the complete encirclement of the enemy's central mass, his 13th and 15th Corps.
The bloody struggle continued to rage on August 28.
On the 29th a large part of the Russian Army saw itself faced with total annihilation at Hohenstein. Ortelsburg was reached from the north, Willenberg, through Neidenburg, from the west.
The ring round thousands and thousands of Russians began to close. Even in this desperate situation there was plenty of Russian heroism in the cause of the Tsar, heroism which saved the honour of arms but could not longer save the battle.
Meanwhile Rennenkampf was continuing to march quietly on Konigsberg. Samsonof was lost at the very moment when his comrade was to give proof of other and better military qualities.
For we were already in a position to draw troops from the battle front to cover the work of destruction in which we were engaged in the great cauldron, Neidenburg-Willenberg-Passenheim, and in which Samsonof sought for death in his despair. Swelling columns of prisoners poured out of this cauldron.
These were the growing proofs of the greatness of our victory. By a freak of fortune it was in Osterode, one of the villages which we made our Headquarters during the battle, that I received one of the two captured Russian Corps Commanders, in the same inn at which I had been quartered during a General Staff ride in 1881 when I was a young Staff officer. The other reported to me next day at a school which we had converted into an office.
As the battle proceeded we were able to observe what splendid raw material, generally speaking, the Tsar had at his disposal. I had the impression that it doubtless contained many qualities worth training. As in 1866 and 1870, I noticed on this occasion how quickly the German officer and soldier, with their fine feeling and professional tact, forgot the former foe in the helpless captive.
The lust of battle in our men quickly ebbed away and changed to deep sympathy and human feeling. It was only against the Cossacks that our men could not contain their rage. They were considered the authors of all the bestial brutalities under which the people and country of East Prussia had suffered so cruelly.
The Cossack apparently suffered from a bad conscience, for whenever he saw himself likely to be taken prisoner he did his best to remove the broad stripe on his trousers which distinguished his branch of the service.
On August 30th the enemy concentrated fresh troops in the south and east and attempted to break our encircling ring from without. From Myszaniec - that is, from the direction of Ostrolenka - he brought up new and strong columns to Neidenburg and Ortelsburg against our troops, which had already completely enveloped the Russian centre and were therefore presenting their rear to the new foe.
There was danger ahead; all the more so because airmen reported that enemy columns twenty-three miles long - therefore very strong - were pressing forward from Mlawa. Yet we refused to let go of our quarry.
Samsonof's main force had to be surrounded and annihilated; Francois and Mackensen sent their reserves - weak reserves, it is true - to meet the new enemy. Against their resistance the attempt to mitigate the catastrophe to Samsonof came to naught.
While despair seized on those within the deadly ring, faint-heartedness paralyzed the energies of those who might have brought their release. In this respect, too, the course of events at the Battle of Tannenberg confirmed the human and military experience of yore.
Our ring of fire round the Russian masses, crowded closely together and swaying this way and that, became closer and narrower with every hour that passed.
Rennenkampf appears to have intended to attack the line of the Deime, east of Konigsberg and between Labiau and Tapiau, this day. From the region of Landsberg and Bartenstein his masses of cavalry were approaching the battlefield of Tannenberg. However, we had already concentrated strong forces, weary but flushed with victory, for defence in the neighbourhood of Allenstein.
August 31 was the day of harvesting for such of our troops as were still engaged, a day of deliberation about the further course of operations for our leaders, and for Rennenkampf the day of the retreat to the Deime-Allenburg-Angerburg line.
As early as the 29th the course of events had enabled me to report the complete collapse of the Russian Narew Army to my All-Highest War Lord. The very same day the thanks of His Majesty, in the name of the Fatherland, had reached me on the battlefield. I transferred these thanks, in my heart as with my lips, to my Chief of Staff and our splendid troops.
On August 31st I was able to send the following report to my Emperor and King:
I beg most humbly to report to Your Majesty that the ring round the larger part of the Russian Army was closed yesterday. The 13th. 15th and 18th Army Corps have been destroyed. We have already taken more than 60,000 prisoners, among them the Corps Commanders of the 13th and 15th Corps.
The guns are still in the forests and are now being brought in. The booty is immense though it cannot yet be assessed in detail. The Corps outside our ring, the 1st and 6th, have also suffered severely and are now retreating in hot haste through Mlawa and Myszaniec.
The troops and their leaders had accomplished extraordinary feats. The divisions were now in bivouacs and the hymn of thanks of the Battle of Leuthen rose from them.
In our new Headquarters at Allenstein I entered the church, close by the old castle of the Teutonic Knights, while divine service was being held. As the clergyman uttered his closing words all those present, young soldiers as well as elderly Landsturm, sank to their knees under the overwhelming impression of their experiences. It was a worthy curtain to their heroic achievements.
Source: Source Records of the Great War, Vol. II, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni 1923
Internet Source: http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/tannen..._hindenburg.htm
The accounts are interesting and useful. Two comments.
At the end of the Russian general's account is, I think, something incorrect. I think that Sansomoff wandered away from his staff. Supposedly, he shot himself, and his staff heard the shot, guessed what happened, and searched for him, but did not find him in the dark. I think his body was found quite a while later, weeks. Am I correct here? It is from memory. So this heart disease stuff, suggesting a natural death, is smoke in our faces.
Secondly, the two excerpts taken from Source Records of the Great War, Vol. II, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni 1923, were quite useful. However, although I have not actually seen the book, I have seen several citations from this source that were clearly inflammatory fabrications, along the "Belgian babies on bayonets" line. Active propaganda was being produced in the US well into the 1930's. I advise anyone using this source subject the material to a sanity check.
I have a poor opinion of most secondary sources on WW I (as I busily write some myself), but the material written during and immediately after the war is generally quite unreliable. Also, I have seen supposed actual documents, allegedly from the original, presented that are clearly fabrications concocted out of whole cloth, not simply slanted secondary source commentary.
Bob Lembke
At the end of the Russian general's account is, I think, something incorrect. I think that Sansomoff wandered away from his staff. Supposedly, he shot himself, and his staff heard the shot, guessed what happened, and searched for him, but did not find him in the dark. I think his body was found quite a while later, weeks. Am I correct here? It is from memory. So this heart disease stuff, suggesting a natural death, is smoke in our faces.
Secondly, the two excerpts taken from Source Records of the Great War, Vol. II, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni 1923, were quite useful. However, although I have not actually seen the book, I have seen several citations from this source that were clearly inflammatory fabrications, along the "Belgian babies on bayonets" line. Active propaganda was being produced in the US well into the 1930's. I advise anyone using this source subject the material to a sanity check.
I have a poor opinion of most secondary sources on WW I (as I busily write some myself), but the material written during and immediately after the war is generally quite unreliable. Also, I have seen supposed actual documents, allegedly from the original, presented that are clearly fabrications concocted out of whole cloth, not simply slanted secondary source commentary.
Bob Lembke
Yes, good points Bob. Information is only as good as its primary source: in this instance I provided the text material, the source and no comment on the material itself.
As this is not my field of study, perhaps someone more knowledgeable on this subject can offer further comment.
Borden Battery
As this is not my field of study, perhaps someone more knowledgeable on this subject can offer further comment.
Borden Battery
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