While looking through the correspondence of a Bury Grammar School boy killed in November 1915, I have come across a remarkable atrocity story from a letter written on 2nd August 1915, immediately after the Hooge flamethrower attack. The writer is a corporal in 7th KRRC , Philip Holmes, writing to his parents and he is describing an officer of his own battalion:
'other officers killed are (name crossed out by censor, see below) , the Germans got his body, stuck it on bayonets and held it over the prapet with the label "One of Kitchener's Bastards". These are the sort of devils we're fighting and even if I don't see you all for years I hope we stay and really wipe them out'.
The censoring officer, J.M. Roe has added a remarkable postscript :
'I have scratched out the name of the officer on page 3 as his family must on no account hear of it and by some strange means it might leak out'. He has also 'blue pencilled' an estimated casualty figure given by the corporal.
What do Pals make of this?

Mark,

I suppose it could be true. It could also have been some sort of Dummy mock up that was made to look like an officer and they took it to be the 'missing' officer.

I would say some sort of War Diary search may be needed to ascertain if an officer appropriate to the 'story' went missing around this time.

The censor officer may have not validated the story but just took precausions to hide identities. I guess also it would be interesting to know if he saw this himself or got the story second hand?

Regardless a fascinating story.

Any chance of posting images of the letter in full

regards
Arm

Like Arm, I think this story is well worth some further research. Although the censoring officer won't pass the officer's name, he does pass the story itself, rather than supressing the whole thing.

All very interesting. There were lots of atrocity stories appearing in the local press, many supposedly taken from soldiers' letters home. But this is the first time I've seen any "official" comment on such a story so close to its origin - i.e. added by an officer to the original letter itself.

Tom

Officer casualties of the 7th KRRC for July 30th and July 31st (killed):
- Capt. G.C. Dowling
- Lt. F. Seymour
- Lt. S.H. Snelgrove
- Lt. A.B. Findlay
- 2nd lt. R.B. Arnell
- 2nd lt. R.F. Robinson
- 2nd lt. R. Longbottom

source: Major-general Sir Steuart, The Annals of The King's Royal Rifle Corps, Volume V (The Great war); london 1932.

There are two more who died on 30/7/1915:

- G.F. Carter, 2nd lt.
- John Douglas Henderson Radcliffe, capt.

(source CWGC d-base)

All officers have no known grave and are commemmorated on the Menin Gate

Thanks for your replies. It is possible to narrow down the possible identity of the officer. In the letter Philip Holmes records that Capt Dowling, Mr Robinson and Mr Findlay of his own 'C' Company have been killed and that Mr Arnell and two others have also died. That leaves Seymour, Snelgrove and Longbottom. Sadly I no longer have the original letter to peruse, but my photocopy has a line sticking out from under the censor mark, which could be Philip Holmes's 'Y' or 'G'. It could be Seymour or I think more likely Longbottom from the length of the word and the fact that the last letter looks like an 'M'
I will scan the relevant section and post it when I have the chance.

This is a summary of Longbottom's CWGC entry:
LONGBOTTOM, ROBERT

Rank: Second Lieutenant
Regiment: King's Royal Rifle Corps
Unit Text: "D" Coy. 7th Bn.
Age: 19
Date of Death: 30/07/1915
Additional information: Son of William Henry and Ethel Longbottom, of Wingfield, Bournemouth.
Grave/Memorial Reference: Panel 51 and 53.
Cemetery: YPRES (MENIN GATE) MEMORIAL

He was in 'D' Company whereas Philip Holmes was in 'C'. Nevertheless, it's a bit different to the usual 'I heard it from a friend of a friend in the Royal Scots' type story and written immediately after the events it describes. Plus it has apparent, although slightly ambiguous confirmation from the censoring officer-he doesn't actually say whether he believes that the story is true, just that he doesn't want it to reach the family. All very intriguing.

Here is the relevant extract from the letter:

Mark;

Does the letter discuss the flame attack? Was the described event supposedly related to the attack?

You might be interested of a snippet out of a source written by a ranking officer of the flame unit, almost unknown in the English-speaking world; I have only found two copies cataloged anywhere in the world. (My translation.)

- “Attack of Company Beck against the Hooge Position in Flanders on July 30, 1915 with nine large flame-throwers and 11 small flame-throwers. After shocking the forward positions the ones behind were occupied without much resistance. Many prisoners.”

As far as published materials are concerned, having read hundreds of sources in the last four years, I have come across a great number of clearly engineered atrocity stories (clearly false as the physical situation, medical situation, etc. is simply impossible), a lot of which seem to have had American public opinion as the target audience. The generation of this stuff was sometimes generated in quite an organized fashion. I have also come across, in the post-war memoirs of generals, the discussion of "hate German" programs that they organized during the war for their troops.

But this account is something new to me. My instinct is to doubt such accounts (possibly influenced by my Hunnish instincts) but the nature of the source is curious and on the face of it more believable. The incident itself seems odd and without purpose, and physically difficult.

My father served in the German Army 1915-18 and came to the US in 1926. The Hollywood movies were still full of that stuff. He described it to me as having two levels of sophistication.

At one level, the German trench would be seen, there would be a whistle blast or a bugle call, and the German infantry would rise up and charge. Each soldier had a Belgian baby on his bayonet. (Had to be Belgian, no substitutes.)

At the second, higher level of sophistication, the scene is someone interviewing a monocled Prussian officer. (Here the monocle, not the Belgian baby, is mandatory.) The officer is asked: "Is it true that your men always charge with a Belgian baby on their bayonet?" Answer: "Of course not! That story is rediculous. What military advantage would that provide?"


To return to my own selfish interests; does the letter have any information about the flame attack itself? (I am currently writing a book on German flame troops of WW I.) Most German sources of the period do not mention the weapon or its use; it was considered secret.

I'm not especially interested in the topic of propaganda, but I sure have seen a lot of raw material for such a study.

Anyone with info on the Hooge flame attack, which was, I think, the third flame attack in WW I?

Bob Lembke

Bob-The letter describes the action fought by 7th Kings Royal Rifle Corps on 31st July 1915, i.e.the Hooge flamethrower attack. Holmes was in a reserve trench and reports the front line going up in a 'mass of flame' before his unit is ordered to counter-attack.

Mark;

Very interesting. I am attempting to write my book as much as possibly from primary sources, and have little or nothing of this kind of source from the British side. I would love to cite the letter in my book, with a proper citation, which would also help preserve the memory of the brave men who were struck with this terrible weapon. Is it at all possible to receive a scan of the entire letter? I would be happy to meet any requirement as to handing it, releasing it to others (or not), etc., and meet costs, if any. I certainly would want a complete description of the lad who penned the letter, to give him his due. I do not plan to use anything without a full scholarly citation.

I do not know too much about the German side of the attack, yet, but I assure you that the brief citation I posted is completely authorative. I have to be coy about the exact source until my book is out. The German Highest Army Command's daily communique for August first mentions the attack, cites booty, but of course does not mention Flammenwerfer.

I have the complete death roll of the German flame units, and the flame troops themselves did not lose a single man in this attack. Here, as often happened, the shock of such an attack simply collapsed the defense, at least the first line. In the largest flame attack 154 flame throwers were used, their advance directed from the air. The opening barrage was often two minutes, just to get the defenders' heads down and give the attackers a few more seconds, or sometimes there was no barrage. There was an extensive effort to obscure the effectiveness of this weapon, which was actively pursued till at least 1934 by an American and a British general, and which really obscured and distorted the history of this weapon till the present day.

Many thanks for any help.

I hope you guys don't mind my frequent self-annointed pronouncements as a Hunnish "Devil's Advocate". Happily, in this miserable war I think outright brutality was the exception rather than the rule, and the "tales" were more common than the actual events. There was a lot of fabrication. I have a book by a Canadian disabled soldier, an actor, who after returning to Canada was hired by the English to write the book (If he did it himself), tour the US to give lectures, and even make a Hollywood movie. Much of the material was obviously physically impossible, as well as historically improbable, and was clearly intended to inflame US public opinion, get them further into the war, and bolster Canadian/UK solidarity.

My own father got shot on Hill 304 at Verdun attempting to save the life of a French officer on a pre-dawn raid. ("No good deed goes unpunished.")

Bob Lembke

I for one welcome a different viewpoint. With regard to propaganda,it gave rise to some of the myths which are still trotted out today and because it was 'official' is very hard to refute.
The other trap to watch out for when trying to get to the truth of something is anecdotes. In my first job, I was fortunate to work with a WW1 RHA driver. He was a driver and I was his assistant. He regaled me daily with tales of his wartime experience. Every week, we visited a social club for Old Contemps. We spent about half an hour there 'having the crack'. I believe I was privileged to gain an understanding of just what it was like to serve at the front. I also learned that old soldiers love to tell tall tales. It was an art form which was appreciated greatly by their fellows. At the time I drank it all in and believed every word. As I learned more about the war, I became more discriminating. I would always seek corroboration for any important piece of information. I am not talking about deliberate untruth. Rather, guilding the lily. Borrowing an episode and embellishing it. Everybody likes a good story and that's what grandads are for.

Bob what were the circumstances of your father's action? I assume he was US Army.

Paul;

My father was first sworn into Pionier Bataillon Nr. 3 (von Rauch), and was sent to Gallipoli to serve in the volunteer pioneer company there. He was not wounded, but contracted malaria.

On return, he joined Garde=Reserve=Pionier=Regiment (Flammenwerfer). He was wounded four times, and probably survived the war by spending so much time in hospitals or being held at Berlin as unfit for flame thrower service. His left arm spit bone fragments for over ten years. When the war was over he was robbed and partially stripped at gunpoint by a patrol of Red sailors in Hamburg, and, very "pissed", went back to Berlin, joined a Freikorps, used the FW in burning their way in the back of the Voerwarts building. They took 26 prisoners out of the 300 they took who were wearing sailors' uniforms and shot them, ample payback for the boots and greatcoat lost in Hamburg.

After the second round of fighting in Berlin he left the Freikorps, and later joined the Schwartze Reichswehr. He moved to the US in 1926.

He was a great, gentle Dad, but was obviously a bit of a hothead and ruffian when younger. He was one of that 2% who loved the war, despite a lot of hardship and being as much at war with the command of his company as he was with the French, shooting and killing the company CO on the manuver ground, and in another incident shooting a sergeant in the butt on manuvers.

My grand-father was the "Id" of the III. Reservekorps, being the head of the "d" Section of the Operations Branch of the corps' Generalkommando. Although he had been a professional Prussian officer and former NCO, he hated the war from day one, unlike his son.

Bob Lembke

Mark, Bob,
If it is of any interest to you I have some good accounts of the flamethrower attack at Hooge by some 7th & 8th Rifle Brigade Officers.

Andy

Andy;

Such accounts would be of great interest to me, and would allow me to flesh out a more complete description of the engagement, hopefully to appear in print.

I have access to a set of the official British histories, which I do not know well, but being on this side of the Big Pond I do not have access to most materials of this sort. I did pop up in London a couple of years ago and did some research at the IWM and the British Library. But I can't just pop in the Tube and emerge at Kew.

I would of course, as mentioned above, want to provide a proper complete citation. As convenient as the Internet is, it leads to a plague of disembodied snippets and quotes without pagination and with sketchy attribution, leading to dubious scholarship.

So, any guidance to such accounts would be gratefully received.

As a quid pro quo, please feel free to ask me for guidance on the Hunnish side of the fence; I have a fair accumulation of references, such as Ranglisten (Official rank lists of officers) and other resources.

Thanks.

Bob Lembke

Hi Bob,
The flamethrower attack is something I have done a lot of research on as the attack fell on the Regiment I have collected too and researched for years. If you go to the 90th anniversary section you will find something I placed there to mark the 90th. I also have in my library the memorial book to Edward James Kay-Shuttleworth, an officer of the 7th Rifle Brigade who was involved in the attack which gives his personal account of the battle, an article from the Rifle Brigade Chronicles on 3 officers of the 8th Rifle Brigade concerning the friendship of these officers and the Hooge flamethrower attack with the end of this friendship due to fatalities. Also from the chronicles the last letter of Sydney Woodroffe who won the V.C. at Hooge and the account of his last action. The 7th & 8th Rifle Brigades War Diaries for the whole war and the Regimental account of this action.
Hence I think you will find sufficient and accurate quotes from people that were actually there as I have to agree with you regarding some of the pieces appearing on the Internet.

Andy

This is the first part of the letter, describing the actual flamethrower attack and its aftermath:

let me know if you need help with transcribing it. I'm hoping to transcribe all the letters eventually.
Here is a photo of the author. Philip Lawton Holmes was a doctor's son from Whitefield, Bury, Lancashire. He married in 1912 and had a young son, but volunteered for service in 1914. He was killed on trench duty north of Ypres on 22nd November 1915 aged 32. He is buried at La Brique No 2 Cemetery. His son , then in his 80's, allowed me to photocopy the letters a few years ago.

While the source is allegedly an original letter from the front I seriously doubt the story is true. I have been studying the German Army, especially the individual soldiers for many decades now and from what I can see the only difference between the German and British soldier is the language and place of birth.

They had the same interests, the same occupations, some were good, some not, they had families, friends, hopes for the future and a sense of patriotism.

I have seen or heard of so many similar stories including one book on a trench raid involving Australian troops in 1917 I believe. The tone of the book was a dastardly German plot to murder Australian soldiers and cover up the crime. Considering the type of fighting in Flanders at that time, the difficulties in keeping records and track of men, etc. the idea of a complicated plot is improbable as well as impractical.

Without additional supporting evidence as well as additional details on the original source it simply has to be taken as a fabrication. If one man saw this others did as well. Why no post-war discussion, investigation, etc.? Let's see some more evidence before jumping to conclusions.

Ralph

Mark - can you post the diary in larger format? I would love to read that entry before making any comment.
Des

I am a professionally-trained historian who has handled a lot of documents. This was part of an original and extensive cache of communications which had been in the hands of the author's wife and latterly son for 80 years when I was shown them 9 years ago. The son who showed them to me was an old man with virtually no knowledge of the First World War-he was under the impression that his father had been killed at Mons and I was unable to persuade him otherwise. Unfortunately I was only allowed to borrow the letters briefly to make photocopies. I have lost touch with the old man since and suspect that he has subsequently died. There are several dozen letters in total. The author was undoubtedly who he says he was-I have been to his grave on several occasions, have seen his photograph and newspaper obituary etc etc. All the incidental details I have researched from the letters have checked out. He died only three months after the letter was written and it is in the same hand as the other letters, postcards etc. I know that you don't know me personally Ralph, but I would hope that you would realise that I have been a member of this forum for several years, I have been a WFA member since 1984 and I have absolutely no motive for or interest in fabricating Great War letters, I can assure you! This is the first occasion that my bona fides as an historian or researcher have ever been questioned, which is rather a novel experience. I fully acknowledge that the story may be a 'trench legend' but it is nevertheless an interesting example of the genre having been written so close to the purported events it describes and naming an individual involved. I have no doubt in my mind that the letter itself is genuine.
I had to reduce the images to post them. I can e-mail larger versions to you, Des.

Mark,

I believe you have misread my meaning. I do not doubt your involvement, honesty, etc. as a researcher or otherwise. I believe the letter(s) are true and original but I doubt the story. Something along these lines would have drawn a great deal more attention at the time.

I am a trained investigator, been a member of the WFA since the 1980's and a member of the forum as well and there is no way to establish the authenticity of an event on a single letter. In my occupation we require certain facts or allegations to be corroborated by additional competent evidence. All I am saying is that if this incident did occur there would have been additional evidence to support the story from either British or German sources during the war or afterward.

Regardless of the other supporting evidence of the individuals involved we still need to see something other than a single letter in my opinion. I cannot state the story is true or otherwise unless I can prove it one way or another.

I do not attack the integrity of anyone on the forum nor do I acuse anyone of fabricating the evidence. My response only stated that I feel the original materials were a fabrication of some sort from the author of the documents, mistaken or otherwise. This is based upon the years of research I have done on the 'evil hun' who eats babies and burns soldiers for soap. I have heard far too many stories, seen too many 'authentic' photos and then discovered the truth to be completely different.

I am open to further evidence to verify the story in the original documents and look forward to seeing if the truth can be uncovered. After all, we are all looking for the truth, no matter where it takes us.

Ralph

I thought that was what you meant, Ralph, and couldn't really believe that you suspected me of forging the thing. The last thing I want to do is fall out with a fellow Pal, it's not my style. As I said I also have severe doubts that the incident actually occurred although Holmes, who is quite clearly from his letters an intelligent man, obviously believes that it did. There are other references in the letters to the 'Huns' bayonetting prisoners etc and he does refer to the Germans as 'devils' on a few occasions in connection with their supposed bad behaviour. I'd be interested to find out how common this opinion of the Germans, obviously tied in with the 'Belgian babies being bayonetted' stories of British propaganda, was amongst front line troops in this early war period. What I find particularly interesting is that Holmes is recounting a story which supposedly happened to a named officer of his own battalion only 3 days before he wrote the letter, not the usual 'bloke I got talking to in the estaminet from the Manchesters who said it happened to a mate of his in the Warwicks' type story. There is also the very unusual detail of the officer's postscript which appears to indicate (albeit rather ambiguously) that the officer gives some sort of credence to the story himself.

I think the remark of a forum member that the officer was probably a kind of dummy doll is most plausible. No German officer would allow his men to treat an adversary (even being the corpse of one) in such a manner...

Jan may have hit this on the head; I missed the suggestion he cited. I have been ruminating about this; the "atrocity" seemed odd to me. To those who do not know him, "AOK4' is an exceptional, published scholar of the German Army of WW I.

The psychology of the event seemed all wrong to me. The Germans had just used a new weapon and easily drove the British out of their positions. I would think the prevailing mood among the Germans would be pleasure or even glee, not hate and bitterness. Some also may have been embarrassed or ashamed of having used a weapon that might have seemed unmanly. But not bitter hatred. I also agree with his assessment of the attitude of German officers; better that it was expressed by a non-German.

The prank hypothesis is probably what happened. The Germans, having skunked the Brits, were having some fun. Possibly they used the officer's uniform? I was also wondering how two or three men could wave a corpse that, with kit, might have even weighed 160 or 180 pounds on the ends of their rifles. They might have even broken their rifles; they are not made for such abuse. Even actually bayonetting someone might only involve a force of 10 to 25 pounds max., with dynamics, the stunt with a real corpse, with dynamic loads (pardon the mechanical engineer slipping out) could easily put a 100 pound load on the end of the rifle, easily breaking the fore-stock.

Mark, please be assured that Ralph, who I have had off-forum exchanges with, is a real gentleman and I am sure was not impunging your scholarly nature or instincts.

Until the prank explaination surfaced I was thinking that Corporal Holmes might have been approached by a psywar officer and asked to plant a story to tone up the home folks about the enemy. Certainly the British did a lot of "disinformation" during the war to, in particular, inflame American public opinion. But I have not heard about anything like that. Certainly after having been subjected to the largest flame attack of the war, to date, the British troops in the area must not have been in a good mood and would have been receptive to something like that. But I think that the prank idea leads the pack, and an actual atrocity having occurred is running in third place.

Bob Lembke

Mark,

This is my first posting on this forum - please bear with me.

I will be posting a new topic shortly in direct relation to this day: 30th July, 1915 [mainly request from people like yourself that might have any information lurking at the back or front of their research!]. However, I couldn't resist responding to your posting and I wonder if you know whether or not Philip received any visits from British Staff Officers whilst in hospital wounded and, indeed, which hospital he was sent to. Would be grateful for your input.

Incidentally: I'm pretty sure [without looking at the original in close up] that the officer censored was Bobbie Longbottom. He was a close personal friend of Jack Kipling, Rudyard's son as you know. A clue to Longbottom's personality is the fact that earlier that day, before being killed, being outflanked on 3 sides and the farthest forward in that part of the front line, one of his men had tactfully suggested that perhaps they withdraw, like the rest of the garrison, to the support line. Longbottom pulled his revolver and threatened to shoot the first man who made a move in that direction. Brave words for a 19 year old. This incident would tend to suggest that his general conduct that morning, in this exposed forward position, would perhaps have been one of similar adrenalin and aggression.

Re. Bob: I would be a little wary of leaning too heavily on official British sources for this day. Almost from the outset, too much emphasis was placed on flammenwerfer's role in the events which unfolded. This day was all about the murderous British counter-attack that had never any chance of success, launched at 2.45p.m on a small frontage against several known and plotted enemy machine-gun emplacements.

Flammenwerfer, in this instance, was a supreme masterstroke of German initiative in being a successful 'opener' to a superbly-executed and highly successful massive ground assault with specific and relatively limited objectives. The flames [all of 30 or 40 seconds-worth] acted as a curtain, a virtual window of paralysis of our front line garrison, behind which the German stormtroops could move quickly and effectively in capturing their initial objectives with relative ease. The Flammenwerfer type used that morning was 9 large stationary canisters sunk in to the bank behind the newly-formed Hooge Crater: Gros Flammenwerfer as I believe the Germans called it. I have an eye-witness to this: a veteran recounted seeing them there after the line was re-captured on the 9th August.
Official British casualties for the morning in terms of living wounded who 'faced the flame' are just 3. Most accounts [many private or unpublished] that I have, state that casualties were incurred by bombs and the bayonet [the chosen method for all forward waves of the stormtroops]. This concurs with official German statistics from their records although their prisoner tally of British captured that morning is 16.

This day has been put forward to posterity as The Flamethrower Attack etc. etc. [please note all references to this day on the forum!] Infact, it is quite possibly, in my opinion, the first usage of intelligent Stormtroop tactics in a cohesive local offensive: almost the working blueprint for Blitzkrieg, without air support. It was well-planned, well-executed and full credit was given by the German official and unofficial sources for the British garrison who simply had the misfortune to find themselves unprepared and in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Oh yes, and Mark: a German Second Lieutenant described the front line garrison as : '.. the first men of Kitchener's Army, young, strong, honourable people'. The Germans knew they were facing men from K1: the first divisional draft of Kitchener's Army. Interesting, don't you think? I'd be very interested in talking to you further about Philip and his involvement in this day.

Hi Simmy,
Firstly welcome to the forum. Interesting, Carey who was an officer in the 8th Rifle Brigade in the Regimental History on page 126 states that"Those who had faced the flame attack were never seen again." General Nugent says "I have endeavoured to trace witnesses who could speak as to the effect of the flame, but have been unable to trace a single man who got away from the trench."
What you have said could well be true as from the personal and Regimetal accounts that I have read on the subject could be interpreted into forming your opinion.
I look forward to reading your theory.

Andy

Andy:
Yes; Gordon Carey's account is superb and extremely informative and I wouldn't want to give the impression that his contribution was diminished in any way at all. There are one or two observations of his that are inaccurate but as a soldier on the battlefield it is impossible for any individual to give an overall comprehensive report, which is what he was effectively being asked to give. As to Brigadier General Nugent: he played a pivotal role in the entire day. These men of the front line garrison were subject to insinuations of cowardice and defeat which spread across the reputation of RB and KRRC. Infact they had reassembled themselves very smartly after seeking cover at the bottom of G5 and fought bravely and with distinction. This could be typified by Second Lieutenant Keith Rae's dying moments. Many who did survive the attack stayed on the battlefield and reassembled in Zouave Wood to participate in the counter attack. One reason alone why Nugent found it difficult to locate any survivors in the initial aftermath. There are a few actually; one even from the edge of the crater itself, and also several of Keith Rae's men.
Nor am I wishing to diminish the effect of Flammenwerfer or its efficacy: it spearheaded a superb German success. In addition: the trees around Hooge Chateau and the crest of the ridge caught fire by the arc of the flame frontage accompanied by a Minenwerfer barrage of fearsome intensity - a weapon which, by itself, must have caused copious fatalies and burns. An awesome spectacle for a totally unprepared garrison of just 10 weeks' active service and mere days of front line occupation experience.

I was referring Bob to the weight given to Flammenwerfer from the official British position on the matter which has successfully survived to the present day. Personal accounts give a different weight entirely and a more balanced one. Problem is finding them! I know! Which is why accounts like Mark's Grammar School boy are important. When I've navigated the workings of this forum a little more [and found some extra hours in every day!] I'll sort out how to contact people direct.

Cheers for your thoughts on this day Andy.

Hi Simmy,
Gordon Carey's son wrote an article for The Rifle Brigade Chronicles some years later concerning the Hooge incident and the friendship of some of the officers of the 8th RB in which he states "In the agony of remorse, weighing what might have been argued as carnage against what his conscience charged as cowardice, my father wrote a letter to Colonel Maclachlan accusing himself of a share in the disaster.
The Colonel's reply, written in indelible pencil on a budget letter card reads "Don't be a sensitive old ass!! You did spledidly well, as I knew you would. Don't allow an aftermath of useless regrets to spoil the main idea, that you played your part right well."

Edward James Kay-Shuttleworth of the 7th RB after his part in the disastrous counter-attack wrote to his wife "I feel an outcast to be alive"

Andy

Returning to the 'dummy' scenario. If this was the case I wonder how they arrived at the identification of the supposed officer?

Uniforms of officers would have been similar surely?

How far apart were the trench systems for identifying visually in the first place?

Was the id done (real body or not) by surmising time area unit platoon etc and not actually by visual?

This is a fascinating thread. Lets keep the investigating going

regards
Arm

If someone knows for sure which German regiment was on the other side, I can have a look at the regimental History.

I did some research myself in the meanwhile, and it seems that Infanterie-Regiment 126 was the one conducting the attack on the 30th with the flamethrowers. their history speaks of very grim fightings. Here's just a selection of their detailed accounts of the fightings:
" The enemy, the 8th Rifle Brigade of the 14th Division, who just spend 9 weeks in rest fell back to their lines at Zouave Wood. They suffered very heavy losses in comparison to ours. Only 19 prisoners were made by us. This shows how stubborn the fightings were. The English tried to keep their ground at all costs. We had to storm all 4 machine guns directly to stop them."
The history also features a picture of two wounded British soldiers taken prisoner. I will try to post it as soon as I manage to scan it.

As for the KRRC, Marc, do you know their exact locations? Do the diaries give numbers of the trenches they were holding? During the 30th and 31st the Germans reorganised their defence at Hooge, and brought in several other units which makes it difficult to find out which ones were facing the KRRC unless you can give me their exact location.

As Jan allready brought up, all german Infantry units at Hooge were Württembergers, Infantry regiments of the regular army. They were of a very high standard and saw plenty of action in 1914 allready.

regards,

Bert

Hi Bert:

Wish I'd known you a couple of years ago. I ended up having to translate the history myself which took me weeks! I hit the wrong button with 6 instead of 9: as you quote - German official figures for prisoners were 19. Bearing in mind the number of British garrison, it gives some indication of what ferocity the stormtroops hit our front line. I was especially impressed with Wollinsky's report of his involvement. Quite a poet. Would appreciate comms with you at another time on this as I'll stick to the essence of the thread. In which case - Armourer Sergeant: your observations are absolutely spot on. I'll get back to you later as I'm already running late. Mark: this in no way reduces the credability of your man Philip. It's merely that, in my opinion, he was not an actual eye-witness. I still await your response to my query in my first posting. Cheers.

Meant to qualify myself in my last posting by clarifying that Philip never actually stated he was an eye-witness, he merely relates the event. Sorry.

Hi All,
Bert, the Infantrie Regiment 126 History is slightly in error, the 8th Rifle Brigade only arrived in France on May 20th 1915, 9 weeks prior to this action, and, had their first stint in the trenches at the end of May under instruction. Since their arrival in France they had not exactly been in rest.
Re Philip's letter, another possibility and one I have come across from officers letters before, and this is not in anyway meant to diminish this letter or indeed what was without doubt a brave soldier, is that in this time of the dreaded Boche, letters were embelished slightly and had been noted as such by officers censoring the letters. In this I mean that i.e we were in the thick of it giving the Boche a dose of his own treatment, or we saw this happen etc etc, just a thought and something else to think about.
Arm, I am not exactly sure of the distance between the 7th KRRC and German trenches, on the 8th RB section it was roughly 15yards with the left end of "C" Company on the right of the crater and the right of "A" Company on the left side, not exactly desirable to put it mildly.
Simmy, according to the field return of the 8th RB on 24/7/15 they were 3 officers and 58 other ranks under war establishment with no replacements arriving until after this action. Actual men who took over the trenches from the 7th Rifle Brigade were 24 officers and 745 other ranks according to the war diary.

Andy

Hello Bert,

The Germans at Hooge 1915 were from the 39. (Alsacian) Infanterie-Division, to which belonged this Württemberg regiment, 126. They were engaged in Flanders since October 1914.

Jan

Guys;

Lots of interesting posts; I will have to digest before commenting. Three quick points.

Simmy; The name printed under the three lines of the censor's note is:

" J M Roe " The M. could be an "H".

One really basic thing to be established (I assume that many of the Pals know this to a "T") is the correct date of the attack. In the last several days I have seen, in print, July 29, July 30, and July 31. A problem was that it was in the early morning hours. I think that the truth (just based on the predominant number of dates on different accounts) is that the attack was in the early morning hours of July 31, 1915, which could, of course, be thought of as the night of July 30. (I prefer the notation of "the night of July 30/31" that is sometimes used.) Any comments or corrections?

Simmy; The availability of German regimental histories is limited, and they then to be quite expensive, typically $100 or more, although lately some can be found on CDs. you want me to take a run at translating it and posting the translation for the forum? Not to cast doubt on your effort, but your comments suggest that it was quite an effort for you. I often read German military material of the period, in the old typefaces, say four or five hours a day. German is a very difficult language, often with many meanings for a word, and a very different grammar (actually, it is Latin, basically, probably a souvenir of the Roman occupation of the Rhineland), and there were many quirks and abbreviations used in military matters. Again, no offense, but I might be able to tease a bit more out of it.

The comments on the utility of the Flammenwerfer in screening the assault is well-taken. the large flame throwers (GROss Flammenwerfer = GROF = large flame thrower) were used to open up first, utilizing their greater range and oil capacity, often firing at a diagonal across no-man's land to screen the assaulting troops, which might be led by men with light flame throwers; when the screening fire of the Grof stopped the storm troops were upon the first line, perhaps firing light flame throwers directly into the trench. These attacks were carefully planned, and the commander of the flame pioneers on the spot, often a senior NCO, and rarely of higher rank than a lieutenant, had the right to veto an attack plan drawn up under the athority of, say, a Generalleutnant, based on his judgement that the attack plan did not utilize flame throwers correctly. And the sergeant had a written order from the Highest Army Command (Hindenburg and Ludendorff, later) that he was empowered to veto the plan! This amazing arraingement led to these elite and highly trained troops being used correctly and not squandered in incorrect applications. As I said, in this attack not a single flame pioneer died in combat or of wounds.

Bob Lembke

I would say given that, and assuming they would not have wanted to pop up above the trench and have a good look see, id would have been very difficult and that assumptions would have been made in identifying and naming the officer?

ta
Andy

regards
Arm

Fascintaing thread and some excellent information for us observers to read - Thank You.

Just one point which is rather sad to note is the subsequent reputation that the RB and KRRC got from this event. I am about to embark on further research on a 7th KRRC man who was a 15/9/16 KIA. From what I have found out to date the Battalions of the RB and the 7th KRRC at Hooge certainly defied their critics at Fleurs Courcelette a year later.

Guys;

For my own selfish purposes, and to advance the general understanding of this important engagement, perhaps we can cooperate systematically and organize the references to the engagements and make some materials available. For my part, as I have little knowledge of or access to the sources, I would be happy to pitch in and do some grunt work, such as prepare and post a translation of the German history of the IR 126, at least that section bearing on the engagement, including preparation. It would be interesting to see how they prepared, at that point in time; I have done a lot of work on German preparation for later storm attacks, which often were rather elaborate, including building mock-ups of the positions to be assaulted, days or weeks of rehearsals, culling units to select the most active men and officers to conduct the actual attack, and possibly (have to check on this) having the men have aerial photos pinned to their uniforms to consult as they wended their way thru the enemy positions. I have an interesting insight into one of these attacks, on Dead Man's Hill at Verdun, in the form of four letters from my father, two before the attack, as they prepared, one immediately after he was wounded, reporting this to his father, a staff officer, and a fourth later in hospital, long, with lots of detail, as he had a lot of time and paper. As the recipient was to be a staff officer with almost 30 years' service, they were written for a serious military mind, not the warm and fuzzy letters to Mum. The second, the eve of the attack, had him (accurately) lay out the plan of the attack, including the bredth of the attack front, and the day and hour that they planned to pull out of the captured French trenches. And he was a private! (This is an interesting insight in the level of preparation and additionally into the German system of individual responsibility. I think that in the British Army, at least until 1917, the question would be if this info would have gone down past the battalion commander, never mind to the individual private.) I assume that the mail was embargoed until the attack went off.

If people want to post complete citations of sources they are familiar with, giving proper identification, pages, etc., I will be happy to electronically snip them out and build a list on a word-processor file, and periodically (daily?) post the combined list, with notations, such as where the materials can be found. Is this an attractive idea? Should people "sign" their contributions?

If Simmy and/or Bert are willing and able to provide scans of the relevant section of the IR 126 history I would be happy to take a run and translate it and post it or otherwise distribute it. Possibly the divisional history has some insight. (Thanks, AOK4)

The discussions on the Forum are a lot of fun and informative, but perhaps we can build a really solid product to advance the study of this important action.

It is interesting in how, only after the participants have passed from the field, are we getting to the bottom of interesting questions about the Great War. In my own area of particular interest I seem to have found an organized effort to obscure and distort the history, efforts that actively were pursued till at least 1935, efforts that still poison current serious historical writings.

Bob Lembke

Bob,

I can send you copies if you PM me your adress. I also have quite a few other German and British regimental histories at my disposal, but until the beginning of next week I will be too busy with other things to investigate exactly which German units were engaged at Hooge around that time.
Towards the end of this month or the next I will also have photos of the war diaries of the 14th Division (divisional WD, Brigades and battalions). I allready have all those of the 3rd and 6th divisions for Hooge.
I think it would be great, like Bob said, if something substantial like an article or something could come forward from this. There are quite a few people following this thread I think, who have a good share of information. If we put everything together there is great potential!
For my work, I have to investigate this action anyway, and write up a 1 page resumé of what happened on the 30th and the 31st. But I would be glad to share my research material with people who want to take this a bit further.

regards,

Bert

Andy: forgot to thank you for your contributions. Ted Kay-Shuttleworth's book is excellent. Am intrigued by the Gordon Carey letters etc. Been trying to track down some letters written to his brother. Are these they, or are these additional ones? Would be very interested to know. Yes, Ronnie Mac was extremely close to his officers. And Gordon never really recovered from surviving the day. I think it was his meeting with young Woodroffe as he left the battlefield that did it. Gordon went on back to hospital as ordered by his C.O. Macafee. Woodroffe went back up to Zouave, and the rest, as they say, is history.

Bob: wouldnt take offence at your suggestion at all. I was a novice when I began translating but, curiously, it gave me the most amazing insight into the German perspective, which I probably wouldnt have got otherwise. I only hope I got it about right. I'll get back to you on other matters separately e.g. your kind offer of translation checks etc. and also concur with your thoughts that it's important to get things right, essential infact. The attack at Hooge took place in the early hours of the morning of the 30th July. Not the 31st. Handover between the 7th and 8th Bns R.B. was completed at approximately 2a.m. on the 30th - just over an hour before the Germans attacked at approximately 3.22a.m. Am endeavouring, and failing I think, to stick to the original thread of this posting. Am very anxious to hear back from Mark in this regard. Cheers.

Philip Holmes wasn't actually wounded in the action. Interestingly his next letter on 3rd August mentions a 'morale boosting' visit by two generals. I'll post this when I'm able. Rather snowed under at work as two of my department are now off sick.

Mark, does he name the two Generals? I would be greatly interested as to who these officers were. Obviously when you get time.

regards
Arm

Hi Mark,
The Rifle Brigade also makes notes of Generals visiting them and congratulating them on the action. One of these was Lieutenant - General Sir John Keir also mentioned is a letter received from the King through Lord Stamfordham, sympathizing with the Brigade on it's losses.

Simmy, it would appear from Carey's son that Gordon Carey had corresponded with Mac for some time afterwards especially when Carey was on light duty at Cambridge with a Company of No2 Officer cadet battalion.

Andy

Mark - thanks for responding. Know only too well pressures and nightmares of work. Same this end. Appreciate anything you have further with regard to Philip. In your own time. Look forward to it. Cheers.

And Priv: Andy is absolutely right. Accusations were short lived. There are complex reasons. However, look to the actions of these battalions the following summer on The Somme and you'll see their reputation restored within the official line. Delville Wood [Switch Trench] battle alone was a tour de force on their part, and, accredited as such.

On 3rd August, Philip Holmes writes:
'My dear Mother,
Don't get into a fit about me, two Generals inspected what was left of us yesterday and one said we should never see such fighting again, he was proud of us etc etc, see papers for aug 2nd, Daily Chronicle (London paper) calls it "The Flame Fight".
I have heard , and there is a lot in it, that the 7th saved the British line, if we had given way the G's would have been right through to a "well known town of 5 letters" and so got behind most of our line. Poor Mr (crossed out by censor) who I mentioned in my yesterday letter, was only a boy, 19 and of slight build, that helps to explain the German placard, there's no pity on our side now and there never has been from them.'

The rest of the letter asks mother not to send any 'baccy' as they've just had a new supply and discusses his chances of a second stripe. Holmes confirms that the officer involved in the alleged incident was 19, which fits in with Longbottom. Do we know if he was of 'slight build'? CWGC doesn't give an age for Seymour, the other major contender.
I am gradually transcribing the later letters and will see if there are any further references to the story . A pity I didn't do so when I first got hold of them a few years ago. Sadly after a cursory read through of later letters to establish the circumstances of his death, I put them in a file and only unearthed them again this year after visiting Hooge. As other correspondents have pointed out, Holmes never actually states that he saw the body and placard, but he clearly believes that the story is true.

While looking through the correspondence of a Bury Grammar School boy killed in November 1915, I have come across a remarkable atrocity story from a letter written on 2nd August 1915, immediately after the Hooge flamethrower attack. The writer is a corporal in 7th KRRC , Philip Holmes, writing to his parents and he is describing an officer of his own battalion:
'other officers killed are (name crossed out by censor, see below) , the Germans got his body, stuck it on bayonets and held it over the prapet with the label "One of Kitchener's Bastards". These are the sort of devils we're fighting and even if I don't see you all for years I hope we stay and really wipe them out'.
The censoring officer, J.M. Roe has added a remarkable postscript :
'I have scratched out the name of the officer on page 3 as his family must on no account hear of it and by some strange means it might leak out'. He has also 'blue pencilled' an estimated casualty figure given by the corporal.

While the source is allegedly an original letter from the front I seriously doubt the story is true. I have been studying the German Army, especially the individual soldiers for many decades now and from what I can see the only difference between the German and British soldier is the language and place of birth. And thus these must be the only differences between British and Germans? A profound conclusion indeed.

I think the remark of a forum member that the officer was probably a kind of dummy doll is most plausible. Ah, nothing like a little papier mache in the dugouts between stand-tos...

Flammenwerfer, in this instance, was a supreme of German initiative in being a successful 'opener' to a superbly-executed and highly successful massive ground assault with specific and relatively limited objectives. The flames [all of 30 or 40 seconds-worth] acted as a curtain, a virtual window of paralysis of our front line garrison, behind which the German stormtroops could move quickly and effectively in capturing their initial objectives with relative ease. Not identifying with this “masterstroke” overmuch are we? Could we have your opinions on the masterly use of poison gas too?

I think the remark of a forum member that the officer was probably a kind of dummy doll is most plausible. No German officer would allow his men to treat an adversary (even being the corpse of one) in such a manner...
Really? How much changed by 1939; and then back again of course after 1945...

The psychology of the event seemed all wrong to me. The Germans had just used a new weapon and easily drove the British out of their positions. I would think the prevailing mood among the Germans would be pleasure or even glee, not hate and bitterness. Some also may have been embarrassed or ashamed of having used a weapon that might have seemed unmanly. What a peculiar choice of words, or is that the closest you can bring yourself to “inhuman”?. But not bitter hatred. I also agree with his assessment of the attitude of German officers; better that it was expressed by a non-German.

The prank hypothesis is probably what happened. The Germans, having skunked the Brits, were having some fun. Odd kind of fun isn’t it? Possibly they used the officer's uniform? I was also wondering how two or three men could wave a corpse that, with kit, might have even weighed 160 or 180 pounds on the ends of their rifles. They might have even broken their rifles; they are not made for such abuse. Even actually bayonetting someone might only involve a force of 10 to 25 pounds max., with dynamics, the stunt with a real corpse, with dynamic loads (pardon the mechanical engineer slipping out) could easily put a 100 pound load on the end of the rifle, easily breaking the fore-stock. The forestock of a Gewehr 98 is secured to the barrel by steel bands. Have you never seen the films where a soldier stands on the barrel of a rifle held by two comrades who then lift the soldier over a wall using the rifle barrel as a step? A man could be bayoneted and lifted off the ground without breaking one rifle, let alone three. I’m sure I don’t need to explain the much higher loading in the scenarios I just described to an engineer...

Until the prank explaination surfaced I was thinking that Corporal Holmes might have been approached by a psywar officer and asked to plant a story to tone up the home folks about the enemy. Certainly the British did a lot of "disinformation" during the war to, in particular, inflame American public opinion. But I have not heard about anything like that. Certainly after having been subjected to the largest flame attack of the war, to date, the British troops in the area must not have been in a good mood and would have been receptive to something like that.. One wonders why they didn’t shoot some prisoners, after all in 1944/5 the captured crews of Churchill ‘Crocodile’ flame throwing tanks were frequently shot by the Germans for being so unsporting as to set fire to their enemies.

Returning to the 'dummy' scenario. If this was the case I wonder how they arrived at the identification of the supposed officer?
Uniforms of officers would have been similar surely?
How far apart were the trench systems for identifying visually in the first place?
Was the id done (real body or not) by surmising time area unit platoon etc and not actually by visual?
This is a fascinating thread. Lets keep the investigating going. Couldn’t we just have a nice friendly chat about the brilliance of flame thrower attacks and dispose of this unpleasant little story with some platitudes, generalities and half-baked excuses?

“I have scratched out the name of the officer on page 3 as his family must on no account hear of it and by some strange means it might leak out.”

Has no one noticed that censors do not usually explain their actions in little footnotes on letters? “...and by some strange means it might leak out” is surely a clear suggestion to the recipient of the letter to see that it does “leak out”. Funnily enough, it doesn’t seem to have.

A logical hyphothesis would be that the recipient of the letter decided not to publicize the matter knowing that the all of the families of the officers in that battalion killed that day would be left wondering if it was their relation whose body was so mutilated.

A pity that the soldier did not realize that in generation or three his countrymen would requre a sworn affadavit, not merely a letter, before giving any credence to his “story”. No, perhaps it’s just as well he didn’t.

Well! 2ndCMR attempts to hijack with some stunningly acute and perceptive observations. What a shame it's in a completely unacceptable format which renders me unable to respond. Gutted!

Mark: a speedy thank you for your time and trouble in posting the info. As usual I'm racing around like the proverbial in abusy day but will get back to you on this. Cheers.