Hello,

I have been in contact with a few forum members in recent days with an interest in the Aisne/ Chemin des Dames battle 27th May -6th June 1918.

It might be a good idea for members to register an interest on this particular thread.


It might also be useful to clarify the units involved

Below is an order of battle for British Forces in this battle (Apart from the 19th Division)

From the Official History: Position of British and German Forces on the First Day of the Battle

Hi David

My interest lies firstly in the 1/4th K.S.L.I. and the 19th Div, who entered the fight on the 29th. Also a relative throu marriage lost their grandfather, 53737 Pte. Woodhouse, Charles Henry. 11/Ches. (formerly 34250 K.S.L.I.), who was K. in A. on 01/06/18. His name is on the Soissons Memorial. His family asked me to find out about the battle for them.


Annette

I've got some diary entries from a French gendarme who was attached to the 25th Div. I'll try and translate it later when I'm at home.

I once tried to find the area on Cote 108 just above Berry au Bac where a group of the Lincolns got wiped out - it is a weird place. We got completely lost despite having maps and compasses, and the hill being quite small. I thought we were in for a 'Picnic at Hanging Rock' experience but we eventually got down safely out of the undergrowth none the wiser about the disposition of the Lincolns.

There are one or two websites connected with the battle to recommend:


The 50th (Northumbrian) Division by Guy Smith Click Here


and the 4th Northumberland Fusiliers by Neil Storey click here


There are few books which deal with the battle, but the best is the account written in 1937 by Sidney Rogerson, 'The Last of the Ebb'. He served on the Staff of the 2nd West Yorks, 8th Division.


Other books to look out for are:


Cumming, Hanway R 'A Brigadier in France' (Jonathan Cape 1922) Cumming served as Brigadier General of the 110th Brigade, 21st Division.


Nettleton, John 'The Anger of the Guns' (London 1979): 2nd Middlesex Officer


Purcell, VWWS The Other Side of No-Man’s Land ( J M Dent & Sons, Ltd 1929): 4th Green Howards officer, deals with him being made POW on the Chemin des Dames, and subsequent imprisonment.


Kiernan R H Little Brother Goes Soldiering (Constable 1930) An other ranks perspective from a private in the 8th Leicestershire Regiment in 1918 battles.


Colwill, R A Through Hell to Victory (Reginald A Colwill, at 33 Thurlow Road, Torquay, Devonshire 1927): A very biased view of the stand made by the 2nd Devons at the Bois des Buttes.


Kelly D V 39’ Months with the Tigers (London, Ernest Benn Limited1930): An officer on the staff of the 110th Brigade, contains a section on the Aisne Battle.

Gregory Henry Never Again: A Diary of the Great War (Arthur Stockwell 1934: By an ordinary soldier from the 50th MGC.


There are other secondary works which deal with the battle but these are the main published primary works.


Cote 108 is certainly an impenerable area I got caught up a number of bramble bushes mosquito nests etc a couple of years back.

Regards

David

A large percentage of men are commenerated on the Soissons Memorial to the Missing:


'The Soissons Memorial commemorates almost 4,000 officers and men of the United Kingdom forces who died during the Battles of the Aisne and the Marne in 1918 and who have no known grave. The memorial was designed by G H Holt and V O Rees, with sculpture by Eric Kennington.'

(from 'The Silent Cities' Website click here)

these are transcripts from the french gendarme's diaries that I have. He was attached to the 47th div, then with the 25th during the Somme battles until the end of the war.

24th, 25th may he was at Montigny.
sunday 26th. With the 19th at Vaux Varennes, patrolled and returned via Wantelay (?) nice little place. Very calm, absolutely no gunfire.

monday 27th
at 20 past 1 shell fire wakes us up, they are very close. I get up, shells are falling all around and seem to be getting closer. One falls in a garden next our billet, we don't feel very safe. At 3 o'clock we smell gas. We receive the order to go around and warn the people to have their masks ready. Around 6 o'clock the bombardment seems to slacken off. It starts again, but even more than before. We don't know what's going on. At 11, a captain comes but he too knows nothing, seems to think that the attack has failed. It's raining shells and groups of planes pass overhead. Around 1 o'clock the first evacuees arrive, rumours abound but there is no concrete news. Some say that they( the Germans) have crossed the Aisne and that Roncy has fallen. Boche airplanes come over and machine gun the roads, we still don't know what's happening.
Delville goes to Corps HQ at 2 pm and comes back an hour later without orders. A gendarme from the 8th says he has evacuated Vantclay (?). No one knows what to do and we wait for orders to leave. A group of artillery men arrive saying that all their guns are lost. We realize that things are bad. At 4 we tell people to leave although they can stay if they want to. Two thirds leave but the others prefer to stay. At 5 am we receive the order to leave , the 8th stay. The road Montigny Jonchery is swept by shell fire. The road is choked with refugees, pushing handcarts, horesdrawn carts and so on. What a sad spectacle. There are atleast 30 people in the barn wher ewe sleep. The village is full.

Thanks very much for the additional information. I would be very interested to know where you got the transcripts from provenace or source? The place you mention is most likely to be Ventelay to the south of the Aisne.



Regards

David

The diaries were found by a friend in 2004. The strange thing is there are three notebooks, two were found at a bootsale and the other turned up at another a couuple of weeks later and was found by the same friend. The diaries describe the 25th division during the 21st march offensive, the Lys and the Blucher Yorke. Now they went through the mill didn't they ?

Bill,

Who is Delville you mention in your extract?

Do you have other extracts for subsequent days?


Regards

David

David
Delville is one of his fellow gendarmes from what I can gather. I will try and get some more transcripted. Up to my eyes in kids' homework and little Kate's nappies.

In Lachapelle by 2 am. Passed the day at Lachapelle. We feel safe here. By evening our artillery is posted on this side of the Marne. The battery fires all night without stopping, the first sign of resistance. They say that the bridge at Verneuil has been blown up. Shells fall on Dormans.
31st leave at 5am for Bergères, all along the way we see convoys of refugees and troops.

that's all of any interest in your area David.

Thans Bill for completing the picture:

A post by Stiletto in April is concerned with the 8th Division on 27th May 1918

He has kindly transcribed this extract from: 8th Division 1914 - 1918, by Lt.-Colonel J.H. Boraston & Bax



Yet the feeling of silence persisted. Not a shell came from the enemy, and his quietness removed any lingering doubts as to his intentions.
How that evening dragged. The time crept slowly on towards zero hour till only a few minutes were left.... Suddenly two German Gas shells burst close at hand, punctual heralds of the storm. Within a second, a thousand guns roared out their Iron hurricane. The night was rent with sheets of flame. The earth shuddered under the avalanche of missiles... leapt skywards in dust and tumult. Ever above the din screamed the fierce crescendo of approaching shells, ear splitting crashes as they burst... all the time the dull thud, thud of detonations... drum fire. Inferno raged and whirled round the Bois des Buttes. The dug outs rocked... filled with the acrid fumes of cordite, the sickly sweet tang of gas. Timbers started, earth showered from the roof, men rushed for shelter, seizing kits, weapons, gas masks, message pads as they dived for safety. It was a descent into hell. Crowded with jostling, sweating humanity the dug outs reeked and to make matters worse Headquarters had no sooner got below than gas began to filter down.

Gas masks were hurriedly donned and anti gas precautions taken- the entrance closed with saturated blankets, braziers lighted on the stairs. If gas could not enter, neither could air. As a fact both did in small quantities and the long night was spent forty feet underground, at the hottest time of the year, in stinking overcrowded holes, their entrances sealed up and charcoal braziers alight drying up the atmosphere - suffocation rendered more complete by the gas mask with clip on nostrils and gag in teeth.

It was one o'clock in the morning of the 27th May, punctual to the predicted time, that the German bombardment was loosed. The whole of IX Corps front and many back areas - railheads, ammunition dumps and the like - were drenched with gas shell. Outpost lines were assailed in addition by trench mortars of every calibre, and the Battle Zone received the terrible bombardment from artillery of all natures which has just been so graphically described. Our artillery positions were also violently attacked with gas shell and H.E. and had area shoots carried out upon them, with the result that by 6am most of our guns North of the river were out of action. A mist which rose into being with the opening of the bombardment, as though evoked at the will of the German Higher Command and in fact accentuated by the enemy's gas and smoke shells, grew steadily thicker as the night proceeded and made the task of defence additionally difficult.It was indeed, almost uncanny how in this spring of 1918 the luck of the weather favoured the Germans in attack. On each preceding night spent on the new front the weather had been clear and when, for the third time, the troops of the division found their defence hampered by a dense blanket of fog, men and officers began firmly to believe that the enemy had discovered means to put down a mist whenever it was wanted.

The first Infantry attack, assisted by tanks which flattened out the wire, was delivered, it is probable, at about 4 o'clock in the morning, against the angle of the salient in our right sub-sector (25th Infantry Brigade). Owing to the dense mist and to the fact that nearly all units in the Outpost Zone were cut off to a man, it is difficult to reconstruct precisely the sequence of events. It is only at intervals that a clear message comes back out of the chaos and coonfusion which the fog necessarily produced. Even such a message only serves to emphasize the assistance which the lack of visibility and the exposed position of our troops in the salient gave to the enemy in his attack. Take for instance, the following pidgeon message, the following pidgeon, timed at 5.15am, which was received at Divisional Headquarters at 6.05am: HQ 2nd R.Berks Regt, consisting of Lieut-Col Griffen, Capt Clare, RSM Wokins, Sergt Trinder, Corpl Dobson, Ptes Stone, Gregory, Slee, and QM surrounded. Germans threw bombs down dug outs and pressed on. Appeared to approach from right rear in considerable strength. No idea what has happened elsewhere. Holding out in hopes of relief.
Such hopes were alas in vain.


The attack swept forward, and although our troops resisted stubbornly for a time in the Battle Zone and caused severe losses to the enemy on this line, the defence was overwhelmed by weight of numbers. Brigade HQ had been early involved in the fighting, being practically surrounded before it was known that the front line had gone. It was near here that the brigade major, Captain B.C. Pascoe, M.C., Rifle Brigade, was killed while making a gallant stand. General Husey and what remained of his HQ staff fought their way out and moved back to Gernicourt to organise its defences. At 6.30am General Husey reported to Divisional HQ that he was holding the river line there with the remnants of his brigade. At 7.15am he further reported that all the bridges east of the junction of the Miette and Aisne had been blown up and that he was holding the high ground west of Gernicourt. Later in the morning General Husey, who had only taken command of the brigade front (vice General Coffin, promoted to Divisional Command) on the 7th May, was badly wounded and gassed, and he died a few days after in German hands.

Meanwhile the fortunes or misfortunes of the other two brigades remain to be considered. These two brigades do not appear to have been seriously attacked until about 5am. The front line battalion of the 24th Infantry Brigade (2nd Northamptonshire) was then gradually driven back to the Battle Zone. Tanks do not appear to have been used on this front, but as the light increased enemy aeroplanes were observed flying low over our forward system and firing into the trenches. Colonel Buckle, whose conduct and example had been an inspiration to his men, was killed outside his Battalion HQ, but his battalion fought on and in the Battle Zone in this sector the enemy's advance was definetely checked. The position here was very strong and repeated attacks were beaten off bith by the 2nd Northamptons and 1st Worcestershires.
The last message sent by Colonel Buckle to his front line companies a short time after the German bombardment started, is recorded in tribute to a very gallant officer, and as an example of the spirit in which the defence was made. It ran

"All Platoon commanders will remain with their platoons and ensure that the trenches are manned immediately the bombardment lifts. Send short situation wire every half hour. No short bombardment can possibly cut our wire and if sentries are alert it cannot be cut by hand. If they try it shoot the devils.
C.G.Buckle, Lieut-Col"

This message was found pinned on the wall of the battalion HQ dug out by Colonel Buckles father, who visited the spot after the Armistice. He found his son's grave close to the entrance, and on each side of the grave a German had been buried. Those who knew Colonel Buckle felt sure he would fight to a finish and never surrender.


The position here was, as has been said, so strong that our troops might well have held out indefinetely against any frontal assault, but the enemy was able to profit by his success on our right. At 5.45am large numbers of Germans were suddenly observed from the 24th Brigade H.Q. approaching along the line of the Miette Stream which they had crossed south of the Battle Zone. The main line of defence was taken by this movement in flank and rear and its defenders were cut and surrounded. Major Cartland, commanding the 1st Worcestershires, was killed in the trenches with his men and, at 6am, Brigade HQ was itself attacked from the rear. The staff captain to the brigade was taken prisoner, and General Haig, and his acting brigade Major (Capt. F.C. Wallace, M.C.) both of whom were suffering from gas, had great difficulty in getting clear. A few others, including the signalling officer, intelligence officer and some of brigade H.Q personnel, managed to fight their way back to la Pecherie bridge, the defence of which they organised under Captain Pratt, M.C., 1st Worcetershire. The Germans, however, were seen shortly afterwards to have worked round behind Capt. Pratt's party and appear to have cut them off. Soon after 9 o'clock in the morning the collected remnants of this brigade, now numbering 3 officers and 68 other ranks only, were holding a trench on the north east side of Roucy.

The 23rd Infantry Brigade had been attacked at about the same time as the 24th Brigade. The enemy were held for a short time by the forward battalion (2nd West Yorkshire) who were then forced back to the Battle Zone, where, with the 2nd Middlesex they held their ground against all attacks. The 2nd Devonshire maintained their positions in the Bois des Buttes with equal stubborness. The enemy brought up tanks against these troops, but these were destroyed by the French anti-tank guns. At 7am these battalions were still holding out. Once again, howveer, the gallant frontal defence was of no avail. The turning movement which had got round the flanks and rear of the 24th Brigade was continued against the 23rd Brigade, and not only so but a breach had been made in the right front of the 149th Infantry Brigade (50th Division), the neighbouring brigade on the 8th Divisions left. As a result of this double thrust the unfortunate West Yorkshire and Middlesex were taken in rear from both flanks and cut off.


Here is an account of the receipt, turn by turn, of these disastrous tidings at Brigade H.Q. "Dawn began to break, but no news came of any Infantry attack. The Brigade intelligence officer reported that a heavy ground mist rendered observation impossible, but shortly afterwards sent the amazing message: "Enemy balloons rising from our front line." Hot upon this message came another from the 24th Brigade: "Enemy advancing up Miette Stream. Cannot hold out without reinforcements." Such news was startling in the extreme, but worse was still tocome, for at about 5.30am the 149th Brigade on the left reported: "Enemy has broken our Battle Line and is advancing on Ville au Bois." Thus before word had come of the brigade front being assaulted, the enemy had turned both flanks and was advancing on the Butte des Buttes."


The 2nd Devonshire here posted were soon in desperate straits. Heavily attacked in front and on both flanks, the battalion slowly fell backwards towards Pontavert. When some distance north of the town the gallant commanding officer, Lieut-Col. R.H. Anderson-Morshead, D.S.O., refused to retire further and called upon his battalion to take up a position and protect the crossing. This they did, but the enemy coming in from the east along the river finally got into Pontavert itself and thus surrounded them and cut them off. The fact that the Germans were behind them made no difference to the dauntless spirit of the Devons. There they remained, an island in the midst of a sea of determined enemies, fighting with perfect discipline, and, by the steadiness of their fire, mowing down assault after assault. A battery commander, who was an eye witness, gives the following account of the action:

"At a late hour in the morning I, with those of my men who had escaped the enemies ring of machine guns and his fearful barrage, found the C.O. of the 2nd Devon Regiment and a handful of men holding on to the last trench north of the canal. They were in a position in which they were entirely without hope of help, but were fighting on grimly. The Commanding Officer himself was calmly writing his orders with a perfect hail of H.E. falling round him. I spoke to him and he told me that nothing could be done. He refused all offers of help from my artillerymen, who were unarmed, and sent them off to get through if they could. His magnificent bearing, dauntless courage and determination to carry on to the end moved one's emotion."

Refusing to surrender and preferring to fight to the last, this glorious battalion perisheden masse, its losses comprising the C.O., 28 officers and 552 N.C.O.'s and men. In fit acknowledgement of its splendid choice the battalion was "cited" in French Army Orders and awarded the Croix de Guerre. Its self sacrifice enabled Brig-Gen Grogan to organise, with the remnants of his brigade, a defensive position on the high ground about la Platrerie, due south of Pontavert and across the river, to which he moved his H.Q. The command of such troops as were left was entrusted to Capt. Clive Saunders, Adjutant of the 2nd West Yorkshire.

Thus, by early morning, the remnants of the division were all across the river and the enemy, rapidly following up, was crossing the river also. Before continuing the further narrative of the battle it will, however, be convenient to consider what what had happened to our artillery during the progress of the initial attack.
There can be no doubt that our battery positions were known to the enemy and when his artillery was loosed at 1am all our gun positions were heavily shelled, at first with gas shells and later with H.E., or mixed with H.E. and gas. H.E and gas in mixed doses following the preparatory gas says one battery report, and the enemy shooting seemed uncannily accurate. Under these conditions it was, in many cases, impossible to carry on the counter preparation and harassing fire which was to have continued all night, but it was maintained whenever possible and for as long as possible. The 5th battery (XLV Brigade) for instance, continued to fire throughout the night until, at about 6.30am the enemy appeared on the battery position. Many guns, however, were early put out of action by direct hits. The three guns at the main position of the 57th battery (Major B.W. Ellis) of the same brigade hade been absolutely wrecked by 2.30am and the fourth pit (which was unoccupied) had been set on fire. The 1st battery (Major M.T. Bargh), also of the XLV brigade, similarly had three guns put out of action by hostile shell fire.

The 8th Divisions Artillery dispositions when the battle opened were as follows: The zone of the 25th Infantry Brigade on the right, was covered by the French Group Pau, under Commandant Paul.This group of 75mm guns was located south of the Aisne. The 24th Infantry Brigade, in the centre, was covered by the XXXIII Brigade, R.F.A. (Lieut-Col H.G. Fisher, D.S.O.) while the XLV Brigade, R.F.A. (Lieut-Col J.A. Ballard), covered the zone of the 23rd InfantryBrigade. Both these brigades of 18 pounder guns were north of the river. Owing to the circumstances and as a result of the rapid German penetration which has already been described, the personnel of the two British brigades became involved, between 6 and 7am in hand to hand fighting, and such guns as had not been previously destroyed were ultimately captured by the enemy. The 1st battery was completely surrounded by 7am. Breech blocks were taken out to render the guns useless to the enemy and the men fought with rifles and lewis guns, but of the whole battery only 2 Sergeants and 6 men succeeded in breaking their way through and getting back to the wagon lines.

When the enemy in like manner approached the position of the 32nd battery ( XXXIII Brigade) Major A.G. Ramsden, the battery commander, had one of his guns run out of its emplacement, so as to give it a wider arc of fire, and with it kept the enemy off at close range, the remaining gunners and N.C.O.'s assisting with lewis and rifle fire. The gun was eventually placed on a small railway truck, and after all the maps, records, kits etc etc, which could not be moved had been burnt and the other guns had been rendered useless by the removal of the breech blocks and sights, Major Ramsden retired down the Miette valley fighting a rearguard action with his one gun. Although nearly surrounded and ultimately forced to abandon his gun, he was finally able to get the remaining personnel of his battery across the canal.

A detailed account has been compiled from survivors statements of the heroic action of the 5th battery (XLV Brigade), already mentioned, and it may be quoted fairly fully here as a typical example of the appalling trials which our gunners on ths night had to undergo, and of the magnificent spirit with which they were met.
The battery was carrying out its counter preparation work when the deluge from the enemies guns broke over it.

"Gas masks were instantly adjusted and about ten minutes later the rocket sentry reported S.O.S. rockets on the front. The call was immediately responded to by our gunners, Capt. J.H. Massey controlling the fire of the battery, while Lieut. C.E. Large and 2nd Lieut. C.A. Button commanded their sections. To continue to serve the guns indefinetely during such a terrific bombardment was a physical impossibility for any one man, and Capt. Massey, realizing this, organised a system of reliefs, two gunners and one N.C.O. manning each gun. The remainder of the personnel took cover until their turns came round to take their place at the guns.
After the customary period of fire on the SOS lines, guns were once more laid on counter preparation lines and a steady rate of fire was continued during what seemed an interminable night.

Lieut. Large and 2nd Lieut. Button frequently took their places with the gunners in the reliefs, while Capt. Massey kept moving from pit to pit and dug out to dug out and then to the detached sections, encouraging the detachments and telephonists and reminding them of the splendid traditions of the Royal Regiment.
By about 5am No 4 gun had been put out of action owing to a shell splinter tearing up the guides. The detachment was withdrawn and sent in to reinforce the other detachments.

The strain on all concerned was terrific, but at last at about 6.45am the enemies barrage lifted clear of the position. Instead, however, of the expected respite, large numbers of German Infantry and gunners came into view less than 200 yards from the battery position. A few rounds were fired at point blank range, but it was then reported that Germans were coming up in rear. There was nothing left but to resort to rifles and lewis guns. Capt. Massey, realizing the situation a little earlier, had called for volunteers and pushed off with 4 gunners and a lewis gun to a small eminence to the eastward in an endeavour to protect the flank. Nothing more has been heard of Capt. Massey and his men. Lieut. Large, although wounded in the foot, took the other lewis gun, 2nd Lieut. Button, after having destroyed all the maps, papers and records, was last seen moving off with a rifle to assist Capt. Massey. The remainder of the battery fought to the last with their rifles till overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers."

Only three gunners who were unarmed and were ordered to retire, and one with a rifle who fought his way out, survived.Of the two F.O.O.'s, 2nd Lieut. C. Counsell and 2nd Lieut. H.Reakes, and their telephonists nothing was heard of again. The 5th battery shared with the 2nd Devonshire the honour of being "cited" in French Army Orders and awarded the Croix de Guerre.

Many a similar conflict, carried to the same grim, gallant and inevitable end, must have been fought in the dim and misty dawn on that tract of coutry north of the Aisne, where were collected on the night of the 26th May the fighting troops of the 8th Division.

To continue now with the main story. By 6.30am the right of the line rested on the Gernicourt position, but between this and the right of the 24th Infantry Brigade there was a gap. The battalion in divisional reserve (1st Sherwood Foresters) was ordered to move forward and fill it, and succeeded in preventing the enemy crossing the river on its front in the vicinity of la Pecherie bridge. Elsewhere, however, he was getting across and, well covered by artillery (of which the 8th division now possessed none), he outflanked and drove back General Grogan's party (23rd Brigade), which was holding the high ground above la Platerie. The enemy drove forward thence and the Sherwood Foresters and the other defenders of the Gernicourt position were ultimately cut off. The great natural strength of the position, which must have made it a most serious obstacle to a direct assault, was thus of no avail. It was turned from the south westahe ttle passed it by. The garrison, including the French Territorial Troops, appear to have put up a good fh, but they were surrounded and, later in the morning, were overpowered. All the French 75's and the guns of the VX brigade, R.F.A. which were in action in this neighbourhood were lost.


In view of the rapid advance of the enemy the divisional commander decided, shortly after 10am, to use his remaining reserves - some 600 men from the lewis gun school, men from the transport lines etc - to hold the second position. This ran alongbthe northern slopes of the high ground south of the river Aisne on the general line Bouffignereux - Roucy - Conevreux. Troops of the 25th Division were already moving up to this line in accordance with corps orders. At 1.20pm the 75th Infantry Brigade, which had originally been ordered forward from 25th Division division in reserve to fill a gap between the remnants of the 8th division and what was left of the 50th division, was put under General Henekers orders and the line about this time was held generally as follows. On the right front, isolated and surrounded, remnants of the 22nd Durham L.I. and 1st Sherwood Foresters were still holding portions of the Bois de Gernicourt. The 75th infantry brigade was holding the second position from Bouffignereux to Concevreux as follows: On the right, from Bouffignreeux to Roucy, the 2nd South Lancashire with remnants of the 24th and 25th Infantry Brigades: on the left, from Roucy to Concevreux, the 11th Cheshires, with the remnants of the 23rd infantry brigade. The 8th Border Regiment was in close support behind Roucy. On the divisional right the forward swell of the hill on the right of Bouffignereux was occupied by the 7th infantry brigade of the 25th Division, on its left at Concevreux wa the 74th infantry brigade.


During the afternoon there was a lull in the fighting. "The day was extremely hot, the sunshine brilliant and, but for the deep drone of heavy shells winging their way rearwards, all sounds of battle were temporarily stilled. Viewed from the hills above Roucy the battle area presented a vivid spectacle. The Aisne and its attendant canal glittered like silver ribbons in the sun, while in the vacated trench area beyond hung a pall of haze and dust, which lifting at intervals revealed the roads thick with marching regiments in field grey, with guns, lorries and wagons.


Above, like great unwinking eyes rode observation balloons, towed along by motor transport. These balloons were brought up very close and the German preparations fro a fresh assault continued methodically and with hardly any molestation.

Between 4 and 5 o'clock in the afternoon, under cover of heavy fire from trench mortars and machine guns, the attack was renewed all along the line. Our line on the right, at the point of junction with the 7th infantry brigade, was pierced and the village of Bouffignereux was captured. This success was vigorously exploited and our whole line forced back. By 7.15pm it had been pushed back some 3000 yards and ran along the tops of the hills seperating the valley of the Aisne from the valley of the Vesle. The GOC 75th infantry brigade (Brig-Gen H.A Kennedy) was calling urgently for reinforcements and ammunition. The latter was sent at once. To meet the former demand, General Heneker sent out officers to collect all the stragglers they could find and these, supplemented by his HQ guard and the personnel of his HQ - a total force of some 500 men - were sent forward under his ADC, Major G.R. Hennessy and were handed over to General Kennedy at 10pm. Our line, often out of touch with adjacent formations, continued to fall back and, before midnight, Ventelay and Bouvancourt were in the hands of the enemy. So rapid was the enemy's advance that in the latter village the entire 25th Ambulanc was captured. The village was surrounded before the ambulance knew that any danger existed. Subsequently the OC, Lieut-Col T.P. Puddicombe, D.S.O., and another officer, Lieut. Kelly, an American Doctor, managed to escape and to regain our lines.


Divisional HQ, which had already at 5 o'clock that afternoon fallen back to Montigny-sur-Vesle, were opened at 11.30pm at Branscourt to the south of that river, but during the night the enemy succeeded in turning our right flank, our troops were forced to fall back to the line of the river Vesle, and Divisional HQ had again to retire, opening at Faverolles at 9.45 am on the 28th May. Meanwhile General Grogan, GOC 23rd infantry brigade was ordered at 6am, to assume command of all troops in the vicinity of Jonchery and to hold a front on the river Vesle extending 1 mile on either side of that town.

(most of the information supplied to the regimental historians for this account came from Captain Sidney Rogerson of the 2nd West Yorkshire Regiment)


If anyone has any photographs of men mentioned in this extract I would be grateful if they could post them on.

Regards

David

This thread is a great idea, Dave. And thanks for your efforts in starting it up. Eventually I shall be wanting to use it, I shall be particularly interested in the 2nd Devons, and 7th Leics. It is going to be useful to know that this stock of information awaits me.

David , after reading your post it really gives me an idea of just how desperate the situation was on the Aisne ,I look forward to further information.

Researching Private Henry Joseph Bridge 1/4thBn East Yorkshire Regiment

Enlisted Londonderry Nth Ireland KIA 8th June 1918 age 42 leaving a wife and four children.

Regards Tony

"The 15th Field Company (Major E.C. Hillman) was in dug-outs on the Aisne Canal a short distance west of Gernicourt, with one section, under 2nd Lieutenant H.C. Garbutt, detached near Berry-au-Bac. All sections had parties told off for bridge demolitions. As soon as news of the impending attack had been received, orders were issued that the bridges were to be blown at the discretion of the field company commanders on the spot. Accordingly, when he received the warning order from the C.R.E. at 8 p.m. on the 26th, Major Hillman went along the canal to verify the readiness of all his bridge-demolition parties. He was at Berry-au-Bac when the German bombardment opened at 1 a.m., and returned at once to his headquarters to order immediate packing-up and readiness to move. He sent out Lieutenants E.H. Jacobs-Larkcom and C. Sutton with written orders to blow their bridges as soon as it became evident to them that the enemy was advancing, and that the blowing of the bridges was necessary to prevent him from crossing the river. The canal bridges were to be blown after the river bridges. Shortly after this, all telephonic communications was cut, and no further instructions were received from the C.R.E., but at about 4:30 a.m., Major Hillman was handed a message from the 25th Brigade stating that the enemy had penetrated the right flank of the Rifle Brigade. Stragglers and wounded coming along the canal bank reported that the Germans were advancing rapidly. At 6 a.m., 2nd Lieutenant Strong was sent out to his bridges. At 6:15 a.m. 2nd Lieutenant Garbutt came in with his section and reported that he had blown all his six bridges at Berry-au-Bac, and that the enemy was being prevented from working along the canal by some gunners. At 7 a.m., Lieutenant Jacobs-Larkcom returned to company headquarters, wounded in the face, and was evacuated. Major Hillman, who had by now collected a number of stragglers and three infantry officers, disposed of his little force for the defence of the canal bank."




"At 10 a.m., he was visited by Brigadier-General R.H. Husey, commanding the 25th Brigade, and ordered to take his men back across the canal and endeavour to hold the front edge of the Bois de Gernicourt. In the village itself were the 22nd D.L.I. (Pioneers) and some of the 490th Field Company. At 11 a.m., Major Hillman received word that the Germans were well across the river at Pontavert and were working round behind the Bois de Gernicourt. He was becoming more and more isolated, and there was a gap of 1,000 yards on his right between him and the East Lancashire Regiment, who were south-west of the village of Gernicourt. About midday, when it became obvious that the Germans were in the wood, he sent Captain A.D. Black, of the 490th Field Company, with twenty-five sappers, southwards to do what he could to prevent the enemy coming out of the wood. Captain Black evidently went to far, for at 12.30 p.m., the Germans suddenly appeared within a few yards of Major Hillman in his trench. They threw bombs, but the sappers had none to throw back. Hillman, seeing that the position was hopeless, passed the word down to retire towards the East Lancashires. Hillman was the last out, and following a trench that he thought would lead him to the infantry, came upon the remains of Captain Black's party, Captain Black having been killed. He told them to follow him, as he intended to get through the wood if possible, although groups of Germans could be seen on all sides. Crossing a clearing one by one, the little party managed to get into the wood and discovered a track leading southwards. On this track Hillman found an abandoned 18-pounder gun and removed the breech-block. At the end of the track, they saw a group of men whom they took to be British, but soon found that they were Germans, making signs to them to surrender. Hillman shouted to his men to follow him, but they were evidently too close to the enemy to do so. Hillman, now left by himself, doubled through the wood, but came upon six Germans talking together. He made a rush towards a trench but it turned out to be a cul-de-sac, and he was taken prisoner."[8]




"The 490th Field Company (acting O.C., Captain A.D. Black), which was working in the front line and was billeted at Le Cholers farm, turned out at 1 a.m. on the 27th to go into support under 25th Brigade arrangements, leaving bridge demolition parties under Lieutenant P. Burr and 2nd Lieutenant W.C. Leslie-Carter. Heavy casualties were incurred in moving up, but the company manned their trenches until daylight, when Germans appeared in the trench fifty yards to their left. Black gave orders to retire to 25th Brigade headquarters. Before these were reached, the company, now much reduced in strength, met some men of the Rifle Brigade, whom they joined and assisted to hold their position until a tank bore down on them. They then retired past Brigade headquarters and reached Le Cholers farm. Here Captain Black sent out Burr and Leslie-Carter to blow up their bridges, while he took his own party to Gernicourt, where men were being collected in a trench to make a stand. After some four hours, word was passed along that Germans were massing on the left, and a party of thirty R.E. and infantry was sent to hold up their advance. By this time, Major Hillman, O.C. 15th Field Company, had taken over command, and Captain Black with some twenty-five sappers and infantrymen, was ordered to man a trench on the left, but found it occupied by Germans. He gave orders to retire, and word was passed along to Major Hillman asking for orders. The reply was to get forward, as the enemy were killing men in the rear. Captain Black then led the way over the top of his trench, but was immediately shot. Lieutenant Otway followed safely, gathered the men together in another trench, and then, as ammunition had been exhausted, and there were no organized troops left in sight, he returned by stages with ten other ranks to the company's transport lines."



The end of the battle of the Aisne found the 8th Division in the Villers-aux-Bois area. On 3 June 1918 it was moved to the Bergeres-lez-Vertus area and on 8 June moved yet further south to the neighborhood of Pleurs. Training commenced at once but was cut short on 14 June when the division entrained and proceeded to the Huppy area where it came temporarily under the administrative orders of the British XIX Corps, which was then part of General Rawlinson's Fourth Army. The journey was made via Paris, Pont Remy, Longpre and Hangest. On 18 June the division came under orders of the British VIII Corps. At Huppy the following days were spent by units in reorganizing and refitting, with drafts of men arriving daily.



On 22 and 23 June 1918 the division was transferred back to the XIX Corps, marching by road from the Huppy area to the Gamaches-St. Valery area nearer the coast, in order to obtain better training facilities.

I've just remembered that there's a pretty over-excited account of the 'Bruchmuller Concerto' and the following infantry assault in John Toland's '1918', but it is stronger on narrative detail than cold facts and unit detail. There's also a French book called either 'Les Fantassins de Craonne' or 'Les Fantassins de la Chemin des Dames' - it's in the IWM reading room, and there's a chapter called 'The Tommies Return to Craonne' (but in French!) which deals with the May 'r & r' postings of the British divisions and the dramatic outcome.

I've just remembered there's a rather over-excited account of the 'Bruchmuller Concerto' and its aftermath in John Toland's 1918. It's stronger on narrative sweep than unit detail, but it gives a good flavour of how the onslaught affected individuals. There's also a book called 'Les Fantassins de Craonne' which has a chapter called (in French) 'The Tommies Return to Craonne'. The book is in the IWM reading room. I once set out to translate the chapter, but my grasp of idiom was not strong enough to make too much sense of it

I have a french book called 'Les Fantassins du Chemin des Dames' by R G Nobecourt, which has a chapter on the Aisne battle of 1918, is this the same book or different?

Regards

David

I think it must be the same book - I probably got the title muddled

Good Day

The great book of Roger Nobécourt "les Fantassins du Chemin des Dames "is a good start to understand the tragedy of 27 may 1918 on Chemin des Dames..but we have to be carefull because it was written in the 60ies. and Roger Nobécourt had not all the cards in his hands . and since new material and archives are available. even if today nothing is clear ...and To sump up : we know today that French and British intelligence services failed to understand that Germans were ready to launch a big push..why French High command did not quickly understand the German threat ? Optimism ? or stupidity ?
The study of command of general Duchêne shows well the key of the problem. It seems well that there was at least a problem of relationship between Pétain and duchêne and a non understanding of Pétain's order.. Duchêne gave the order to hold the the first line of French and British positions..;till the end..like at Verdun in 1916..
The power of german artillery and the number of German soldiers with the study of French and British regiments strenght holding the lines reveal today the lack of capacity to hold the ground and the weakness of this French front line.( Germans knew it also so well )
Knowing very well the battlefield..I still ask to myself also why The understrenght British troops were given such area to rest ? was it a choice of Pétain ? We know today that he did not appreciate much the "Anglais"
General Foch way to think shows also above all that he was sure that a river like Ailette or the Aisne river or the canal waterway was " enough" would be a key problem for a German assault... I think that one day we shall know the truth about French High command mistakes..
But as usual ..front line French and British soldiers did their duty and obey orders...their names are on memorials .Lest We Forget them

Yves
Battlefield guide on the Chemin des Dames

Yves,

Thanks for your contribution.

I think the key to understanding the displacement of French and British troops on top of the Chemin des Dames, is like you said best understood in terms of the French defence of Verdun. The Chemin des Dames ridge had been wrested from the Germans in the Nivelle Offensive of 1917, at a tremendous cost in lives lost. Like the British at Ypres, holding the salient made little tactical or strategic sense, but to pull back and straighten the trench lines would have been resisted by both British military and Political authorities, as so many mens lives had been lost, the rationale was to be that the salient had to be defended at all costs.


So in a like manner to Verdun and Ypres, the Chemin des Dames became a potent symbol of resistence: another 'Voie Sacree'. A withdrawl back across the Aisne - a much more sensible military strategy, and advocated as such by many British officers of the IX Corps- would have smacked too much of defeatism.

Regards

David

Yves,

Sorry I forgot to mention in my last post, but as Battlefield Guide do you have any other books you would recommend for a study of this battle?


Regards

David

Good evening David


thanks for your wise comments....I also want to specify that I do not want to judge anybody ..I just want to know the truth.. to pass on to the next generations the facts
For sure Gen Duchêne thought it would have been a foolish idea to leave the Chemin Des Dames to the Germans without fighting..just because of the bloodbath paid to take some parts of it in spring and summer 1917...the French opinion and French deputees or French government ( an other question is what is the responsability of French politicians in this tragic disaster ?)...note also that this situation and this way to think was very near of the British V army on the 21 march 1918.
So to answer your question about French books..I know none ..just because at the moment at last French historians focuse their study mainly about 1917 Chemin des Dames battle , the mutinees and the men shot at down 5 with the rease of archives we know now that just 27 men were shot after the 1917 mutinees ). to understand the importance of this "Holyground" one of the last study made ( but almost nothing about 1918 fighting) is the book : Le Chemin des Dames " Nicolas Offenstadt Stock editions 2004.
For 6 years I have been researching French diaries .. very few men survived .. and those very few of them are describing the 27 may 1918 battle...In the following days ( months ? joke !!!) I shall translate some of them in English language.
I keep in contact..it is just the start
regards
Yves

Yves,

I think its important that this particular thread remains active. The Chemin des Dames/ Aisne is a fascinating part of the Western Front that has long been neglected. Most British vistors to France and Belgium will naturally head to the Somme and Ypres and as a result the Aisne is sadly overlooked. For me the battle of the Aisne in 1918 is personally very interesting with my family connections so therefore I am naturally biased, but the countryside of the region is much more imposing than either the Somme or Flanders.


Yves, if more information is added about the area, your battlefield guiding will be even more in demand!


Just as a matter of interest, are most of the people you guide French, or are a guide for British or German vistors?

David and Yves, strictly speaking the Chemin des Dames ridge was not taken in Nivelle's offensive. Parts of it were occupied but the Germans retained control. The ridge was abandoned by the Germans in response to the wonderfully executed Battle of Malmaison in October 1917. Petain ensured that the Malmaison flank was captured, thereby exposing the rest of the ridge in enfilade. Ludendorff ordered the withdrawal back across the Ailette.

The ridge is not really like Ypres. As you know, it is quite a spectacular piece of geography. The valleys on either side are very exposed, which makes forming up for an attack quite difficult. The numerous shelters, caves and old quarries afforded a much greater level of protection to the defenders than was ever possible in Ypres. The ridge itself is not overlooked in the way Ypres was. It does not have much depth though. This meant that it was best held lightly, with reliance either on counter-attacks from protected positions to recover ground or on a second line of defence along the far bank of the Aisne as the fall-back position.

Jean de Pierrefeu gives some very interesting insights into the rationale for the defensive stance taken in response to the impending German attack in May. In his book 'French Headquarters', he wrote:

'With his usual boldness and that splendid confidence with which he knew so well how to inspire others, Foch accelerated the move of his reserve divisions northwards.

Pétain, more prudent, a believer in safety first, convinced that a Fabian policy was necessary and that a counter-attack could only succeed at a time when the enemy was exhausted, which was still distant, would have preferred that the north should not be favoured at the expense of the rest of the front. I have been told that at the end of May, scarcely a week before the German attack, he tried to retain the last reserves, whose movement north-west had just been ordered. Foch, staking his last card, would have none of it.

Besides, everything confirmed him in his idea. During the end of April, and several times during the last fortnight of May, the Germans showed already that their attention was fixed entirely on the scene of their former offensive, both by attempting violent attacks in the neighbourhood of Hangard-en-Santerre and Locre, and by making desparate efforts to repel our counter-attacks. The discoveries of the Second Bureau [Intelligence] confirmed the idea that if anything was in preparation it was in the region where it was expected; elsewhere there was nothing to signify.

But to complete the analysis, it must be confessed that if these indications seemed sufficient to us, it was because we had not taken enough trouble to instruct ourselves as to the enemy's intentions. Our troops did not penetrate deeply enough into the enemy's lines. Further, the special Intelligence Section, that mysterious organization that had a secret network and agents among the enemy, had been attached through a regrettable error to the ordinary Intelligence Department, with which it had nothing to do. [This lead to] disorganization of this wonderful service.

There was also a certain carelessness as to the rest of the front. And if one sector seemed safe enough, it was the Chemin des Dames. Why were we so certain of our security in this region? First, because, since the offensive of April 16th, when our troops dashed themselves in vain against the defences of the plateau, we had considered them impregnable. So sure of this were we that we had sent to the absolutely peaceful sector the Franco-British divisions exhausted in the last battle. Second, because another factor of great importance had supervened.

In order to demonstrate the importance of this factor, it will be well to trace it from its source. Since General Pétain spent the greater part of his time at his Command Post at Chantilly, General Anthoine, the Major-General, had become the virtual Chief at GQG (French GHQ).

In the eyes of the Staff, General Anthoine's defects were great. He had an abrupt and satiric manner... and quickly made himself unpopular by his internal regulations, which were certainly not without reason, but were applied with the harshness and inconsiderateness typical of him. Further, one thing which everybody in the Army knew must be mentioned, he was a brother-in-law of General Duchêne. He was extremely bad-tempered, always grumbling and finding fault. The natual result was that [Duchêne] Staff was always on edge and quarrelling, not daring to take responsibility; its members, most of whom were good men, were discouraged, and had no enthusiasm for work.

Under such conditions a Staff works badly. The departments lacked co-ordination. The Major-General was accused of shielding his brother-in-law and hiding his mistakes. As for the attack of May 27th, the Staff of the Sixth Army, which was holding the Chemin des Dames, had not the least idea of the preparations which the enemy had been making for a month on this front [until two German prisioners were interrogating on the evening before the attack]. It was declared at GQG that there was nothing surprising in this, that if General Duchêne had not unfortunately been in command in this sector, any sort of Staff, especially after the lesson of March 21st, should have been able to find out something of what was going on.'

The last reason smacks of scape-goating. De Pierrefeu states 'I do not know whether these remarks were justified'. To my mind, the notion that 'it was hard to take therefore it will be hard to retake' could easily lead to a false sense of security. Who knows. Interesting anyway and adds some more background to this story.

Robert

Hello Robert,

Do you have a particular interest in the Chemin des Dames battle? Or a general interest in terms strategy/tactics in the German offensives of 1918?

Just one point from what you say above: the Ypres Salient and the Chemin des Dames ridge are of course completely different in terms of topography but similar in terms of symbolic importance for the British and French respectively. Also I guess in terms of geographical significance: the capture of either these two areas by the enemy would have opened up the way to the channel ports with regard to the British, and the Germans would have been within striking distance of Paris had the Aisne front collapsed, which of course did happen at the beginning of June 1918.

David

David, I have an interest in both aspects. No personal connection with the May 27th offensive but it was part of the string of German offensives, as you know. The battles in the Chemin des Dames region, from 1914 through 1918, are of interest too.

You are quite right about the symbolic significance, though Verdun more closely matches Ypres I suspect. The capture of Chemin des Dames need not have opened up the way to Paris. Had the far bank of the Aisne been well defended (ie the bank that the BEF occupied in 1914), as had been proposed by Pétain but refused by Duchêne, then the Germans would have had a MUCH harder time. In essence, the Aisne would have acted as the same kind of brake as the Marne did. As you know, the British recognised the signs of the impending attack and were really annoyed when Duchêne refused to allow them to defend their sector more appropriately.

Robert

David
I just try to speak English and german languages and still going learning French language.
I shall post asap a translation of a French front line diary
I must take off
Yves

Good day

Here is the first part of Translation Extracted from Diary of 38 years old Lieutenant J . Miquelis
173e territorial Brigade. Cerny en Laonnois sector. Chemin Des Dames.

26 May 1918

In the evening, order to stand to and before night to collect ammunitions and barbed wire. 11 pm, order to shelter the men against bombardment and to get out after artillery barrage passing. The cooks stay in Troyon with the sick men. Enemy shellfire begins at 12 pm 40 very violent. First tear gas shells: Sergeant Fersal and the sentry outside come in saying : “ Gas gas !” and spew up all they have.
I put under culver just one sentry to be relieve every half an hour with order to bring me any man who will pass by in the large communication trench of our trench, whatever direction he goes. I order to wear gas helmets, to load rifles, to open hand-grenades boxes and to install them on the steps of our shelter, to close the entrances with canvas sprinkled with hyposulfite
of soda ( with vermorel sprayer)
The enemy barrage moves on , it comes close then goes away; it seems more intense on our left. Under heavy shell burst the shelter pitch. I put myself under the biggest wooden beamof our shelter with a spade and a pickaxe on my side and I wait. I have in front of myself the map of the sector and signals code. At any moment I wait to be buried.
French shells pass obliquely over our shelter; it is the 75mm battery of Paissy village which alone unmastered , counterstroke. Inside my shelter the tempest lamp is blown twice by the explosions.


TO BE CONTINUED

6th BATTALION NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS - War Diary - May 1918

CONCEVREUX

25th May 1918

Training.
The Battalion relieved 4th Northd. Fus. in support on night of 25th/26th.
Dispositions:-
'A' Coy between B. de la MUSETTE & B. D'ISSOUDIN
'B' Coy in line of Redoubts.
'C' Coy between B. D'ISSOUDIN & B. DES MILLEJOURE.
'D' Coy in P.C. Kleber.

26th May 1918

In front line.
About 7.30p.m. - Orders received to 'Take preliminary defensive measures'.
11.0p.m - Artillery commenced counter preparatory scheme.

27th May 1918

1.0a.m -
Enemy put down barrage of exraordinary intensity on the whole area - mixed H. E. & gas.
This fire was very accurate and caused heavy casualties to the troops 'Standing to'.
Counter battery work was very effective putting many of our guns out of action.
All communications with Brigade H.Q. were out by 3.0a.m.
3.45a.m. -
Enemy attacked all along the line. The first attacks seem to have been in a South Easterly direction parallel with Route 44
4.15a.m.
Battle Line came into action. By this time the Counter battery work had been so successful that our artillery was totally ineffective in supporting the infantry.
4.45a.m.
The battle Line was taken in the rear from the direction of LA VILLE AU BOIS.
No one returned from the centre and right Coys of this line.
Remainder of Left Coy. under Lt. Col. GIBSON, 4th Northd. Fus. withdrew at 5.0a.m.
This party consisted of 40 men.
5.30a.m.
Redoubt line and P.C. KLEBER outflanked and cut off from BOIS DE BUTTS.
8.0a.m.
Remainder of battalion formed part of Composite Brigade which withdrew to CHAUDAEDES.
8.30a.m.
All details of Transport Lines billeted in CONCEVREUX organised under MAJOR ROBB, 4th Northd. Fus. and MAJOR ROGERS.
9.0a.m.
Enemy crossed PONTAVERT Bridges and advanced down both banks of the Canal.
10.0a.m.
Party in CHAUDARDES withdrew across AISNE owing to enemy advance on to high ground to N. W. and advance down river from PONTAVERT.
Details and remainder of brigade organised on line CONCEVREUX bridge - Canal Bank - to bridge at 47.47 (BERRY AU BAC 1/20,000) thence to West end of wood.

May 28th, 29th, 30th & 31st

Driven from this line about 4.0p.m.
The remnants of the Battalion, now incorporated in Composite Coys and submerged in other Divisions, including 6th, 21st & 25th Divisions, took part in rearguard actions until the end of the month.

L. D. SCOTT
Lt. Col. Commanding 6th Batt. Northd. Fus.
21st June 1918

Appendix
Casualties 6th Battn. Northd. Fus. May 1918


Killed in Action - OFFICERS - 2 OTHER RANKS - 8
Wounded - OFFICERS - 8 OTHER RANKS - 71
Missing - OFFICERS - 13 OTHER RANKS - 541
Wounded & Missing - OFFICERS - 5 OTHER RANKS - 12

Officer casualties are named and dated and all except one casualty is 27/05/1918.
Other ranks are totalled and not named or dated.

Strength of Battn. on 1st May 1918 - Officers - 34 Other Ranks - 947
Strength of Battn. on 31st May 1918 - Officers - 12 Other Ranks - 323

Kate

Yves
Sorry to appear in the middle of your posting but it was my only time on the computer.

David and all who have contributed - this is a very useful and interesting thread and shows the full possibilities of the battlefield approach.

The maps posted at the beginning are excellent and I would like to be able to follow positions on the trench maps of this area.

Kate

Dear kate

No worries ..thanks for your excellent contribution..on my side I keep going translation here is the followin


Around 4.30 Jammes , watcher, comes down the steps and shouts me : “the Boches are here ! they have shot at me !” .I answer him : “you had the wind up; it’s a shell splinter which has passed by your ears. Go back to your post. I come with you.”. He half turns . Climbing up the stair I take two hand-grenades in hands from the box. Jammes has a look outside and return like the wind saying :” I tell you they are here !”. I go to the entrance, which the opening is sheltered against shell splinters by a wooden culver with logs covered with earth. In the trench, a Boche is knelt down, aims at me with his Mauser. I jump on the right to reach the large communication trench and to get rid myself of this nuisance with my hand-grenades. On the parapet of the communication trench I see feet, I watch up: a Boche looked at me coming, his automatic pistol in hand, aimed at me ; surprise I turn round . On the culvert, 6 Boches overcame me with their automatic pistols in hand. They speak to me in German , and show me to enter the shelter; I reply in French. My quartermaster sergeant Baccou comes and shouts at me : “ My Lieutenant , don’t shoot, they are English who come to help us. ( We had on our right , near Craonne , an English Divison reconstituted after Montdidier rout)
“- They are Boches, you do not see their helmets ?”

To be continued

g

Thanks Kate and Yves for your contributions.


Neil Storey's website devoted to the 4th Northumberland Fusiliers has a section devoted to the actions of the 149th Brigade on the 27th May 1918: Click Here

The trench map of the area reproduced is particularly impressive.


David

David
Thank you. Neil's website is excellent. I had visited it a long time ago. At the time I was mainly looking at St. Julien.
The trench map of the area of Concevreux is a big help in following the actions.

Yves
Your Lieutenant was right, they were not English at all were they.

Kate

Kate,


This photograph maybe of interest.

Alan Hall's photograph is from the 'Illustrated London News 1918'

When British units of the IX Corps arrived on the Aisne in early May 1918 they took over a section of the frontline from French troops. This exchange is illustrated in the photograph below:

' 23 June 1918: Awarded the Prussian Order Pour le Mérite for distinction in action during the engagement and capture of the Chatelet Woods on the Western Front. [On 27 May 1918, Oberleutnant von Ravenstein and six of his men, mounted on bicycles, dashed ahead of his battalion and seized a vital bridge over the river Aisne near Chemin des Dames. The seven men held French troops at bay with hand grenades until joined by the remainder of the battalion. On 31 May 1918, von Ravenstein's regiment suffered heavy losses attacking French positions near the Chatelet Woods. Ordered to attack again, von Ravenstein and 15 volunteers infiltrated the French lines and occupied the deserted Genevroy Farm in the enemy rear. A French battalion approached through the woods to investigate the farmhouse but was promptly put to flight with many casualties by heavy machinegun fire delivered by von Ravenstein's volunteers. His actions allowed Füsilier Regiment 37 to continue its advance and capture the Chatelet Woods.]
# June 1918: Promoted to Hauptmann.'

David
Thank you so much. What will you produce next?
Lt. Alan Ryder Hall is one of the two officers Killed in Action in this battle and he is the only one who was not a casualty of 27th May. He was Killed in Action on 30th May, when, according to the War Diary, the 6th were involved in rearguard action as part of a Composite Battalion.

The narrative of the War Diaries often detail an advance into a murderous bombardment.
In the case of this battle the terse statements of the War diaries seem particularly chilling.
'4.45a.m. The Battle Line was taken in the rear from the direction of La Ville Au Bois. No one returned from the centre and right Coys of this line.

and

9.0a.m. Enemy crossed Pontavert bridges & advanced down both banks of the Canal.'

The earlier discussion about the geographical features of the area, ridge, woods and river, certainly make it seem that the river would have been a more easily defensible barrier.

It is interesting to read the account of Hauptmann Hans von Ravenstein, which shows that the German losses were also heavy in their attack against the French in Chatelet woods on the 31st May.

Kate

Good Day

Here is the end of my transalation hope that it is of interest for all.
"My quartermaster rush for ward inside the shelter. After having again negociate a little bit with the Germans without understanding each other, I hide in the parapet my hand-grenades by now impossible to use and I decide to enter the shelter to destroy the signal codes and the map sector. I rush down the stairs. My men were inside the first room, paralysed with fear. I shout at them : “ Go to the other exit ! join the warrant officer’s platoon” and I run to where mes documents were. I burnt them. At this moment, hand-grenades thrown by the Boches burst inside the shelter and the explosion put out of fire my documents which I blaze up again. None of my men had been hit because they had quickly obeyed my order.

They flow back to the second exit which is also on guard.” To the third exit !” My documents destroyed, I follow the men in the dark. A man said “My lieutenant do not leave me !”
“- Hang’s up my greatcoat “
The exit is collapsed by the shells. I walk on all fours in the running soil, tugging at the man hanging my greatcoat from time to time .I reach the opening and the trench and go to the right vers The Poteau d4Ailles, but I am quickly stopped by my men who flow back : We are surrounded !”.

Lieutenant Miquelis was taken prisoner . He went back to France on 23rd December 1918. He was a teacher and passed away in 1971.


Regards
Yves

Thank you Yves. It is a very vivid account. How he survived the explosion of the German grenades in the dugout - that was lucky. The tunnel into the dugout must have been able to absorb most of the effect, perhaps because of the way it was constructed.

Robert

David, Sulzbach mentions the battle in his book 'With the German Guns'. He was a German artillery officer. Sulzbach's diary accounts are filled with the sense of glorious victory but you also get a clear sense of the losses that were sustained as well.

Robert

Good day Robert

Yes you are right to mention German losses of may 1918...among them was 20 years old Kanonier Albert Ruhe .brother of the bishop of Trier.buried in Cerny en Laonnois German cemetery..in 1960 his brother Willy ...planted a cyprès nearby the grey cross...in 1962 Adenauer with de Gaulle visited his grave..unfortunately alst year the cyprès was cut by a team of German war graves commission
Regards
Yves

Yves

Good to know that Lt. Miqhelis survived the war and was able to give this excellent first hand account of these events. The urgency and confusion are well captured. Thank you for the translation.

It is sad that the cyprus planted by Albert Ruhe's grave in 1962 was cut. I expect it had grown to a considerable size by 2005.

Kate