QUOTE(Bill Woerlee @ Mar 1 2006, 10:41 PM)
and that in Damascus, through sheer neglect by the AIF, Turks died in great numbers of cholera
QUOTE
Gidday Bill,
Stuck my head out of the bunker with a quick Q for u mate
I agree with the general sentiment reflected in your post , but I am not sure about the cholera bit. I think the AIF was not in a very healthy postion by the time in reach Damascus (as I am sure you were probably aware)- So many of it's own men were suffering from severe illness that required significant attention from it's own medical corps. What more could the AIF have done to assist the Turks suffering from cholera? I am guessing that you must have read of a particular event involving the AIF to have made this kind of motherhood statement.
With this in mind could you please elaborate on what you mean by your quote when u get some time. And please quote your source documents.
Bob the issue of the treatment of POW by the Turks has been briefly discussed in the past on this forum. Here is the link...you might find of interest http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...ood+in+the+mist
Cheers
Geoff S
Geoff
G'day mate
So this thread is not hijacked, could you start a new thread with the very same question. No probs with answering you in all aspects - you probably already knew that.
Cheers
Bill
Full Version: Cholera in Damascus
Great War Forum > The War On Other Fronts > Away From The Western Front > Middle East & North Africa
Bill- as requested.
I don't know about being active again mate ,but sometimes if I read a statement that catches my attention I feel compelled to Q it.
Without referring to all my references I seem to vividly recall the 10th ALHR made some improvements to rectify the cholera situation in Damascus...
I look forward to your response.
Cheers
G
I don't know about being active again mate ,but sometimes if I read a statement that catches my attention I feel compelled to Q it.
Without referring to all my references I seem to vividly recall the 10th ALHR made some improvements to rectify the cholera situation in Damascus...
I look forward to your response.
Cheers
G
Geoff
G'day mate
To kick things off, here is a quote from Darley. I will let Darley speak for himself and give commentary in another post.
Cheers
Bill
Darley, TH, With the Ninth Light Horse in the Great War, Adelaide, Hassell Press, 1924, pp 163 - 166.
On October 6th 1918 a combined church parade and thanksgiving service for the recent victory was held, being attended by the whole Brigade.
Many thousands of prisoners, taken during the recent operations, had been collected at a point close to the village of El Mudhamiye, and on the banks of the stream which flowed through that place. This stream, which provided our drinking water supply, quickly became polluted to a degree which rendered it beyond the possibility of human consumption. Thousands of these prisoners were in urgent need of medical attendance, and there was the gravest suspicion of cholera, as they were dying like flies.
None of these men appeared to have the slightest idea of sanitation and their camping area was soon a place to be avoided. This state of affairs needed drastic action, and as their own officers appeared to take no notice of the deplorable condition of their men, Colonel Todd, 10th Light Horse, was appointed Commandant of the Prisoner of War Compound, Kaukab.
On the 9th October 1918, a suspicious case of sickness occurred in the Regiment, and a few hours later Smith, 1212 Trooper EK, died of cholera. The Regiment was therefore nastily moved to a point half a mile above the prisoners' camp. Reports were received that Down, 921 Corporal AC; and, Hanrahan, 2116 Lance Corporal EP, had died of wounds in the German hospital at Damascus. Nelson, Captain AH, proceeded to Damascus to assist in the administration of the hospital which had been formed in the captured barracks.
On the 11th October 1918, Johns, 142 Trooper AA, was suddenly taken ill, and died a short time later, evidently from the effects of cholera.
Attention was now directed to the enemy prisoners. It was no question of how they had treated our men who had been so unfortunate as to fall into their hands, but of how best to relieve them of the awful conditions under which they were at present existing. As we had no cover of any description for ourselves it was impossible to provide any for them, except for a few of the more serious cases, who were taken into the shelter of the field ambulance.
This small field ambulance with its two medical officers and a few orderlies was daily surrounded by hundreds of Turkish prisoners, many of whom were suffering from the effects of recent wounds, whilst the remainder were seriously ill. The lack of medical comforts was deplorable, but this state of affairs was speedily remedied by supplies being rushed up country in motor cars.
The handful of troops of the 4th Light Horse Brigade, who had been guarding the prisoners, had done all they possibly could, but met with little success. The unfortunate Turks, enduring their great hardships without a murmur, were dying in hundreds, their death rate being from 150 to 170 per day.
It could not be said that the British were responsible for this awful state of affairs. The desperate effort of the 4th Turkish Army to escape, their long retreat from the Jordan Valley, coupled with the breakdown or capture of their transport and supply columns, had contributed largely to the pitiable plight they were now in. Other influences were now at work, far more sinister and sordid than the sudden overwhelming of an honourable foe in battle, which had to be faced and fought for fear that this camp would remain a blot on the British conquest of Syria.
Damascus, apart from being the capital and by far the most important city in Syria, had also been, from the beginning of the war the main depot of supply for the whole Yilderim Army, which had been driven back, step by step, from the banks of the Suez Canal. It contained huge stores of everything necessary to equip and maintain an army in the field. For over two years the troops of the British Empire had fought and struggled through the burning sands of the Sinai Peninsula, through Palestine, Judea, and Syria, until the enemy were beaten to the ground, and their dreams of conquest shattered.
Twelve thousand British and Indian Cavalry, breaking through the gap prepared for them by the British and Indian Infantry and Artillery, had fought and ridden until the capture of the Syrian capital marked the culmination of their great effort. Now that the armies of Turkey and their allies in this theatre of war were broken the British role in the drama appeared to be one of self-effacement. To Amir Feisal, the son of the King of Hejaz, who with his Arab rabble had followed in the wake of the conquering army, as jackals follow a wounded animal, the government of Syria was immediately handed, with Damascus as headquarters.
The city was soon a blaze of colour, the Hejaz flag being flown from every building of importance, the flag of Arab independence. Feisal and his motley crew, ever a standing joke to any British soldier with the slightest sense of humour, installed themselves in the public offices and palatial residences of the city, and proceeded to administer the affairs of state, assisted by a handful of British officers, called liaison officers.
The few hundred Arab irregulars, who comprised the "Army of the Hejaz" at this stage, spent their time in galloping madly up and down the main streets on their little ponies, brandishing their rifles and calling, for recruits. As long as they confined themselves to these antics they simply caused amusement to our troops, and a scarcely concealed feeling of disgust amongst the more decent residents, but the deeper mischief underlying all this was soon seen when the Arab officials began to assume control of the various departments.
These people had long since persuaded themselves that it was owing to their own efforts that the city, with its huge booty of stores and supplies, was now a prize in their hands. Seized with the Arab lust for gold and baksheesh, their chiefs soon indicated that they meant to turn these supplies to good account. Whether they were required for friend or foe, they were determined that they would have to be paid for at top price.
The records of the heartbreaking efforts of our medical personnel to obtain drugs and stores for the sick and dying during those early days of Arab administration would make surprising reading, if it did not stir one's blood to indignation. In the huge stores there was a plentiful supply of food, drugs, tents, and clothes, but these they would not part with except for cash, and at most exorbitant prices.
Such then was the condition of affairs when that splendid officer, Todd, Lieutenant Colonel TJ, was faced with the problem of organizing the prisoner of war camp at Kaukab, but no better officer could have been selected. A man of untiring energy, and of great administrative and organizing ability, he threw himself heart and soul into the task. Not only did he work himself, but he instilled the same spirit into the whole of his Regiment, with the result that the unfortunate prisoners were soon enjoying a certain amount of comfort, regular meals, and proper medical treatment.
A cemetery was formed in which the dead were decently interred, their graves being marked with the crescent, the symbol of their faith, and their names and unit carefully listed. In the adjacent villages he established two hospitals, which were soon crowded with patients, and organized the remainder into companies, each under the command of his squadron leaders.
Each day the prisoners who were fit to work were divided into groups of various sizes and sent to the units of the Brigade, where they were employed in clearing the camp area of stones and various light tasks. This work not only kept them healthy, but kept their thoughts occupied, and certainly put them into a much better state of mind. It can safely be said that the unfortunate prisoners received the kindliest treatment at the hands of our troops wherever they went.
After a few weeks the death rate dropped to practically nil under the splendid management of their camp. With the regular meals and good cooking, things they had not enjoyed since the war started, they soon grew strong and well, and when things had settled down orders were received for their transfer to the compound at Ludd. Each day a party of 1,000 were paraded, and after being rationed for the journey, were despatched under escort, via Nazareth to railhead. It is certain that many of these men were sorry to part with the members of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade, who had done so much to make their hard lot as easy and bright as possible.
Todd, Lieutenant Colonel TJ, was warmly thanked for his splendid services by Chauvel, Lieutenant General Sir HG, who commanded the Desert Mounted Corps.
After many pleasant days spent in the vicinity of Kaukab the Brigade was notified that it would march northward to rejoin the remainder of the Division, who were pushing on to the support of the 5th Cavalry Division in the vicinity of Aleppo.
G'day mate
To kick things off, here is a quote from Darley. I will let Darley speak for himself and give commentary in another post.
Cheers
Bill
Darley, TH, With the Ninth Light Horse in the Great War, Adelaide, Hassell Press, 1924, pp 163 - 166.
On October 6th 1918 a combined church parade and thanksgiving service for the recent victory was held, being attended by the whole Brigade.
Many thousands of prisoners, taken during the recent operations, had been collected at a point close to the village of El Mudhamiye, and on the banks of the stream which flowed through that place. This stream, which provided our drinking water supply, quickly became polluted to a degree which rendered it beyond the possibility of human consumption. Thousands of these prisoners were in urgent need of medical attendance, and there was the gravest suspicion of cholera, as they were dying like flies.
None of these men appeared to have the slightest idea of sanitation and their camping area was soon a place to be avoided. This state of affairs needed drastic action, and as their own officers appeared to take no notice of the deplorable condition of their men, Colonel Todd, 10th Light Horse, was appointed Commandant of the Prisoner of War Compound, Kaukab.
On the 9th October 1918, a suspicious case of sickness occurred in the Regiment, and a few hours later Smith, 1212 Trooper EK, died of cholera. The Regiment was therefore nastily moved to a point half a mile above the prisoners' camp. Reports were received that Down, 921 Corporal AC; and, Hanrahan, 2116 Lance Corporal EP, had died of wounds in the German hospital at Damascus. Nelson, Captain AH, proceeded to Damascus to assist in the administration of the hospital which had been formed in the captured barracks.
On the 11th October 1918, Johns, 142 Trooper AA, was suddenly taken ill, and died a short time later, evidently from the effects of cholera.
Attention was now directed to the enemy prisoners. It was no question of how they had treated our men who had been so unfortunate as to fall into their hands, but of how best to relieve them of the awful conditions under which they were at present existing. As we had no cover of any description for ourselves it was impossible to provide any for them, except for a few of the more serious cases, who were taken into the shelter of the field ambulance.
This small field ambulance with its two medical officers and a few orderlies was daily surrounded by hundreds of Turkish prisoners, many of whom were suffering from the effects of recent wounds, whilst the remainder were seriously ill. The lack of medical comforts was deplorable, but this state of affairs was speedily remedied by supplies being rushed up country in motor cars.
The handful of troops of the 4th Light Horse Brigade, who had been guarding the prisoners, had done all they possibly could, but met with little success. The unfortunate Turks, enduring their great hardships without a murmur, were dying in hundreds, their death rate being from 150 to 170 per day.
It could not be said that the British were responsible for this awful state of affairs. The desperate effort of the 4th Turkish Army to escape, their long retreat from the Jordan Valley, coupled with the breakdown or capture of their transport and supply columns, had contributed largely to the pitiable plight they were now in. Other influences were now at work, far more sinister and sordid than the sudden overwhelming of an honourable foe in battle, which had to be faced and fought for fear that this camp would remain a blot on the British conquest of Syria.
Damascus, apart from being the capital and by far the most important city in Syria, had also been, from the beginning of the war the main depot of supply for the whole Yilderim Army, which had been driven back, step by step, from the banks of the Suez Canal. It contained huge stores of everything necessary to equip and maintain an army in the field. For over two years the troops of the British Empire had fought and struggled through the burning sands of the Sinai Peninsula, through Palestine, Judea, and Syria, until the enemy were beaten to the ground, and their dreams of conquest shattered.
Twelve thousand British and Indian Cavalry, breaking through the gap prepared for them by the British and Indian Infantry and Artillery, had fought and ridden until the capture of the Syrian capital marked the culmination of their great effort. Now that the armies of Turkey and their allies in this theatre of war were broken the British role in the drama appeared to be one of self-effacement. To Amir Feisal, the son of the King of Hejaz, who with his Arab rabble had followed in the wake of the conquering army, as jackals follow a wounded animal, the government of Syria was immediately handed, with Damascus as headquarters.
The city was soon a blaze of colour, the Hejaz flag being flown from every building of importance, the flag of Arab independence. Feisal and his motley crew, ever a standing joke to any British soldier with the slightest sense of humour, installed themselves in the public offices and palatial residences of the city, and proceeded to administer the affairs of state, assisted by a handful of British officers, called liaison officers.
The few hundred Arab irregulars, who comprised the "Army of the Hejaz" at this stage, spent their time in galloping madly up and down the main streets on their little ponies, brandishing their rifles and calling, for recruits. As long as they confined themselves to these antics they simply caused amusement to our troops, and a scarcely concealed feeling of disgust amongst the more decent residents, but the deeper mischief underlying all this was soon seen when the Arab officials began to assume control of the various departments.
These people had long since persuaded themselves that it was owing to their own efforts that the city, with its huge booty of stores and supplies, was now a prize in their hands. Seized with the Arab lust for gold and baksheesh, their chiefs soon indicated that they meant to turn these supplies to good account. Whether they were required for friend or foe, they were determined that they would have to be paid for at top price.
The records of the heartbreaking efforts of our medical personnel to obtain drugs and stores for the sick and dying during those early days of Arab administration would make surprising reading, if it did not stir one's blood to indignation. In the huge stores there was a plentiful supply of food, drugs, tents, and clothes, but these they would not part with except for cash, and at most exorbitant prices.
Such then was the condition of affairs when that splendid officer, Todd, Lieutenant Colonel TJ, was faced with the problem of organizing the prisoner of war camp at Kaukab, but no better officer could have been selected. A man of untiring energy, and of great administrative and organizing ability, he threw himself heart and soul into the task. Not only did he work himself, but he instilled the same spirit into the whole of his Regiment, with the result that the unfortunate prisoners were soon enjoying a certain amount of comfort, regular meals, and proper medical treatment.
A cemetery was formed in which the dead were decently interred, their graves being marked with the crescent, the symbol of their faith, and their names and unit carefully listed. In the adjacent villages he established two hospitals, which were soon crowded with patients, and organized the remainder into companies, each under the command of his squadron leaders.
Each day the prisoners who were fit to work were divided into groups of various sizes and sent to the units of the Brigade, where they were employed in clearing the camp area of stones and various light tasks. This work not only kept them healthy, but kept their thoughts occupied, and certainly put them into a much better state of mind. It can safely be said that the unfortunate prisoners received the kindliest treatment at the hands of our troops wherever they went.
After a few weeks the death rate dropped to practically nil under the splendid management of their camp. With the regular meals and good cooking, things they had not enjoyed since the war started, they soon grew strong and well, and when things had settled down orders were received for their transfer to the compound at Ludd. Each day a party of 1,000 were paraded, and after being rationed for the journey, were despatched under escort, via Nazareth to railhead. It is certain that many of these men were sorry to part with the members of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade, who had done so much to make their hard lot as easy and bright as possible.
Todd, Lieutenant Colonel TJ, was warmly thanked for his splendid services by Chauvel, Lieutenant General Sir HG, who commanded the Desert Mounted Corps.
After many pleasant days spent in the vicinity of Kaukab the Brigade was notified that it would march northward to rejoin the remainder of the Division, who were pushing on to the support of the 5th Cavalry Division in the vicinity of Aleppo.
Geoff
G'day mate
Here is the commentary on Darley's chapter.
It was the Australian Light Horse whom had captured the predominant amount of prisoners. The boast from Chauvel was that the DMC had captured in excess of 35,000 Turkish prisoners. What is absent from Chauvel's boast was the infrastructure to cope with such a large influx of Turksih prisoners. There is nothing in the writings of Wilson to indicate that any addition that preperations were made for the capture of any volumes of prisoners. There are no orders for extra drafts of provos, rations or wagons all items necessary to maintain a large group of prisoners.
Well duh ... even the men of that period would have understood the natural outcome - cholera. So we have a large collection of people, no sanitation or medical facilities and no organised maintenance.
The only word for this - a very forseen event - is deliberate neglect. Who was responsible for the neglect is unknown. When it comes down to it, Harry Chauvel is the only fellow I can think of regarding the Light Horse - he had control of all the assets and also the ear of Allenby to get any resources required.
the rest of the passage by Darley indicates the actions taken when Chauvel realised he had stuffed up badly. He moved the Light Horse Brigades but left the Turks in the same place knowing the consequences.
I hope that clarifies my comment.
Cheers
Bill
G'day mate
Here is the commentary on Darley's chapter.
QUOTE
Many thousands of prisoners, taken during the recent operations, had been collected at a point close to the village of El Mudhamiye, and on the banks of the stream which flowed through that place.
It was the Australian Light Horse whom had captured the predominant amount of prisoners. The boast from Chauvel was that the DMC had captured in excess of 35,000 Turkish prisoners. What is absent from Chauvel's boast was the infrastructure to cope with such a large influx of Turksih prisoners. There is nothing in the writings of Wilson to indicate that any addition that preperations were made for the capture of any volumes of prisoners. There are no orders for extra drafts of provos, rations or wagons all items necessary to maintain a large group of prisoners.
QUOTE
This stream, which provided our drinking water supply, quickly became polluted to a degree which rendered it beyond the possibility of human consumption.
Well duh ... even the men of that period would have understood the natural outcome - cholera. So we have a large collection of people, no sanitation or medical facilities and no organised maintenance.
The only word for this - a very forseen event - is deliberate neglect. Who was responsible for the neglect is unknown. When it comes down to it, Harry Chauvel is the only fellow I can think of regarding the Light Horse - he had control of all the assets and also the ear of Allenby to get any resources required.
the rest of the passage by Darley indicates the actions taken when Chauvel realised he had stuffed up badly. He moved the Light Horse Brigades but left the Turks in the same place knowing the consequences.
I hope that clarifies my comment.
Cheers
Bill
Geoff
... oh and those last couple posts got me promoted to Lieutenant ... not too many more posts and I will be Generalissimo ... the power ... [wipes sweat from the brow] I don't know if I can take it.
Bill
... oh and those last couple posts got me promoted to Lieutenant ... not too many more posts and I will be Generalissimo ... the power ... [wipes sweat from the brow] I don't know if I can take it.
Bill
... but I think I can. 
QUOTE (Bill Woerlee @ Mar 2 2006, 11:41 PM) 
the rest of the passage by Darley indicates the actions taken when Chauvel realised he had stuffed up badly. He moved the Light Horse Brigades but left the Turks in the same place knowing the consequences.
I hope that clarifies my comment.
Cheers
Bill
I hope that clarifies my comment.
Cheers
Bill
Congratulations on your promotion!`
Hi Bill -Can I have the rest of the passage where Chauvel realised he had stuffed up -please?
I have re-read your post a few times & I afraid I believe that your comment is incorrect or perhaps inaccurate.
My reasoning was that the AIF or Chauvel could never have fully envisaged the number of prisoners that they were to have captured. I think the disintegration of the Turkish 4th Army was at a rate fare greater than could have ever been expected or planned. Added to this the campaign was still quite fluid as the Turks were surrendering themselves in massive numbers (and the Turks captured were generally in awful state), and the advance with the mounted troops was still being pushed forward. The strain on AIF resources was extremely high. There simply not the facilities to cope with the sickness (on either side) that became evident toward the end of this campaign. The Aust Mtd Div was engaged or exhausted, & it was not the force it had been due the departure of the 1918 men, and the illness rampant within its own ranks. The Anzac Mtd Div was dealing with its own prisoners around Amman and in the same basic situation .
I dont' believe the logistics existed to transport the Turks away immediately. The AIF ‘heads’ would have have done so if it were possible - more to avoid a general cholera outbreak perhaps,,. I am sure had the facilties or logistics existed the AIF would have done more to assist.
You will need more information to convince me of the veracity of your comment at this stage...I would caution anyone about using a single text or referernce as the basis of making a general statement about the AIF as a whole...as you are reading only a single point of view - I hope you my get my drift olde mate...you need to take care.
Cheers
G
Geoff
G'day mate
I am a tad bit confused about your comments. The reason lies in the internal contradictions.
You say: "I afraid I believe that your comment is incorrect or perhaps inaccurate."
Then you support my argument by saying:
You say: "I dont' believe the logistics existed to transport the Turks away immediately. The AIF "heads" would have have done so if it were possible - more to avoid a general cholera outbreak perhaps,,. I am sure had the facilties or logistics existed the AIF would have done more to assist."
Now Geoff, you know you can't have it both ways. You cannot say I am inaccurate and then support my argument.
Your apology in no way contradicts my conclusions but on the contrary supports them and indeed adds extra weight. If you feel I have been inaccurate, the first thing you need to do is impugn my source.
However these are the points we agree upon:
1. Many thousands of prisoners were taken;
2. Little thought was given to victulating or sheltering these men;
3. The consequence of the collection of many people in a small squalid location will lead to cholera.
4. There was an outbreak of cholera at Damascus which affected both the Turks and Australians.
So far, that is all Darley has stated. If we agree on these common facts, then you cannot impugn Darley.
Next we deal with this comment:
You say: "Can I have the rest of the passage where Chauvel realised he had stuffed up"
You will notice that I made this note in front of Darley:
I say: "To kick things off, here is a quote from Darley. I will let Darley speak for himself and give commentary in another post."
In my next post I made this comment:
I say: "Here is the commentary on Darley's chapter."
I did this specifically to avoid confusion between Darley's comments and my commentary. It is my conclusion that Chauvel stuffed up - not Darley's and I deliberately seperated the posts to avoid this confusion.
Why did I come to this conclusion? Here is my evidence:
I say: "There are no orders for extra drafts of provos, rations or wagons all items necessary to maintain a large group of prisoners."
In your apology, you state:
You say: "Added to this the campaign was still quite fluid as the Turks were surrendering themselves in massive numbers (and the Turks captured were generally in awful state)"
Exactly Geoff. I agree. And Chauvel would have known this too. So what did he do to solve this question? The paperwork is bare. In other words, very little. No troops were placed in readiness for this task - my note about provos - nor were there any buying agents given the scope to gather whatever material needs were required over and above the supplying of the Light Horse. No preparations were made at all.
Geoff, this is tantamount to the same negligence exercised by Kitchener in South Africa with the concentration camps. Women and children were dumped in the middle of no where without supplies, shelter or anything else and over 30,000 died. So they knew the consequences. The people involved in this campaign had South African experience. In essence, your apology is the same given by Kitchener to defend his policy. Nothing has changed except "insert name here" rather than the action.
The neglect is unconscionable because Chauvel and Allenby knew the consequences of their actions and did nothing until the deaths started rolling in at hundreds per day.
Cheers
Bill
G'day mate
I am a tad bit confused about your comments. The reason lies in the internal contradictions.
You say: "I afraid I believe that your comment is incorrect or perhaps inaccurate."
Then you support my argument by saying:
You say: "I dont' believe the logistics existed to transport the Turks away immediately. The AIF "heads" would have have done so if it were possible - more to avoid a general cholera outbreak perhaps,,. I am sure had the facilties or logistics existed the AIF would have done more to assist."
Now Geoff, you know you can't have it both ways. You cannot say I am inaccurate and then support my argument.
Your apology in no way contradicts my conclusions but on the contrary supports them and indeed adds extra weight. If you feel I have been inaccurate, the first thing you need to do is impugn my source.
However these are the points we agree upon:
1. Many thousands of prisoners were taken;
2. Little thought was given to victulating or sheltering these men;
3. The consequence of the collection of many people in a small squalid location will lead to cholera.
4. There was an outbreak of cholera at Damascus which affected both the Turks and Australians.
So far, that is all Darley has stated. If we agree on these common facts, then you cannot impugn Darley.
Next we deal with this comment:
You say: "Can I have the rest of the passage where Chauvel realised he had stuffed up"
You will notice that I made this note in front of Darley:
I say: "To kick things off, here is a quote from Darley. I will let Darley speak for himself and give commentary in another post."
In my next post I made this comment:
I say: "Here is the commentary on Darley's chapter."
I did this specifically to avoid confusion between Darley's comments and my commentary. It is my conclusion that Chauvel stuffed up - not Darley's and I deliberately seperated the posts to avoid this confusion.
Why did I come to this conclusion? Here is my evidence:
I say: "There are no orders for extra drafts of provos, rations or wagons all items necessary to maintain a large group of prisoners."
In your apology, you state:
You say: "Added to this the campaign was still quite fluid as the Turks were surrendering themselves in massive numbers (and the Turks captured were generally in awful state)"
Exactly Geoff. I agree. And Chauvel would have known this too. So what did he do to solve this question? The paperwork is bare. In other words, very little. No troops were placed in readiness for this task - my note about provos - nor were there any buying agents given the scope to gather whatever material needs were required over and above the supplying of the Light Horse. No preparations were made at all.
Geoff, this is tantamount to the same negligence exercised by Kitchener in South Africa with the concentration camps. Women and children were dumped in the middle of no where without supplies, shelter or anything else and over 30,000 died. So they knew the consequences. The people involved in this campaign had South African experience. In essence, your apology is the same given by Kitchener to defend his policy. Nothing has changed except "insert name here" rather than the action.
The neglect is unconscionable because Chauvel and Allenby knew the consequences of their actions and did nothing until the deaths started rolling in at hundreds per day.
Cheers
Bill
The hard work put in by Lt-Col Tom Todd to improve the lot of the Turkish prisoner could have quite well contributed to his own death from sickness early in 1919.
I think you are probably correct Andrew mate. It was highly likely Lt Col Todd's death was as a result of the hard-work he put in trying to assist the Turkish POW's situation.
Bill- I am not longer sure what part we agree & disagree on, so without pulling out a dozen references or so would make the following pts.
Any deficiencies in the facilities to care for Turkish prisoners rest with largely with Allenby, and not Chauvel or the AIF. Chauvel attention or energy was focused on the battles not the Turkish POW’s- Would he have been able to stop the great advances being made into the enemy territory even had he wanted to?. Perhaps he felt that the victory that he was achieving was his core requirement. What would Allenby have thought if he had stopped or delayed because of the cholera??
One Australian regiment’s apparent failure should not be seen as a guide to the actions of the AIF as a whole. The 10th ALHR as has been noted (with Todd) did a lot to alleviate the Turkish suffering in and around Damascus. The situation of Arab administration was a political situation forced on the AIF by British..
The AIF was a pawn in a larger polital game..
The overall number or percentage of AIF troops involved in the campaign to Damascus was small in comparison with previous years. (1916 for example)
Turkish troops captured in this campaign were generally already in very poor condition. There own command had not been able to stem illness that was rife. The AIF inherited the situation from the failures of Turkish command to adequately care for their own men.
The AIF in this campaign (as has been mentioned) was quite small (Aust Mtd Div) .Not all of whom passed through Damascus. And the AIF was heavily reliant on the logistics/support commanded by British command (i.e CTC, etc)
The captured Turkish troops were more than could have been planned to have been taken- and any medical facilities to cope with the situation would have been required from the outset. As has been demonstrated in the past the Allies were not very good at providing adequate levels of medical stores fro their own men on many occasions.
The AIF around Damascus was fully engaged in fighting the Turks, & were need as a mobile force, not as a stationary guarding POW force.
The AIF that were engaged were mainly under-strength & suffering themselves from illness that was having a material; impact on there own fighting strength. The AIF was not in a position to transport the Turks or the provisions they needed as well as look after there own men.
I would not compare the incarceration & deaths of women & children in S.A. with incarceration of Turkish POWs’- they are two seperate issues.
Fodder for thought.
Cheers
G
Bill- I am not longer sure what part we agree & disagree on, so without pulling out a dozen references or so would make the following pts.
Any deficiencies in the facilities to care for Turkish prisoners rest with largely with Allenby, and not Chauvel or the AIF. Chauvel attention or energy was focused on the battles not the Turkish POW’s- Would he have been able to stop the great advances being made into the enemy territory even had he wanted to?. Perhaps he felt that the victory that he was achieving was his core requirement. What would Allenby have thought if he had stopped or delayed because of the cholera??
One Australian regiment’s apparent failure should not be seen as a guide to the actions of the AIF as a whole. The 10th ALHR as has been noted (with Todd) did a lot to alleviate the Turkish suffering in and around Damascus. The situation of Arab administration was a political situation forced on the AIF by British..
The AIF was a pawn in a larger polital game..
The overall number or percentage of AIF troops involved in the campaign to Damascus was small in comparison with previous years. (1916 for example)
Turkish troops captured in this campaign were generally already in very poor condition. There own command had not been able to stem illness that was rife. The AIF inherited the situation from the failures of Turkish command to adequately care for their own men.
The AIF in this campaign (as has been mentioned) was quite small (Aust Mtd Div) .Not all of whom passed through Damascus. And the AIF was heavily reliant on the logistics/support commanded by British command (i.e CTC, etc)
The captured Turkish troops were more than could have been planned to have been taken- and any medical facilities to cope with the situation would have been required from the outset. As has been demonstrated in the past the Allies were not very good at providing adequate levels of medical stores fro their own men on many occasions.
The AIF around Damascus was fully engaged in fighting the Turks, & were need as a mobile force, not as a stationary guarding POW force.
The AIF that were engaged were mainly under-strength & suffering themselves from illness that was having a material; impact on there own fighting strength. The AIF was not in a position to transport the Turks or the provisions they needed as well as look after there own men.
I would not compare the incarceration & deaths of women & children in S.A. with incarceration of Turkish POWs’- they are two seperate issues.
Fodder for thought.
Cheers
G
Geoff
G'day mate
I understand the essence of your post.
Regardless of Chauvel's job of attacking, there are a number of events that are going to occur and have occurred since the dawn of organised warfare.
1. There will be casualties.
2. There will be prisoners.
3. Humans who are soldiers need to eat and have shelter.
Generals and their staff who prepare campaigns also prepare for these eventualities - some prepare better than others. Regardless of those doing the fighting, these basic needs require care.
This is nothing new nor is it rocket science. Humans consume a certain amount of tucker, horses consume a certain amount of tucker, they both drink water and so on. The military handbooks on rationing tell of this gained knowledge. A campaign plans for this. If not, it ends in disaster. So an army requires so many tonnes of food and so many litres of water every day. There is a baggage train employed to ensure that this supply is kept up.
I hope we can agree on this.
In terms of actions and captives, in the Sinai the generals planned for this. Stockades were prepared in Egypt, trains ordered and provos moved to the front to collect the prisoners. At Magdhaba at the end of the day, all the Turks were given 24 hours of rations - British soldiers' rations. This was considered to be adequate until the provos took over.
Even in the early parts of the Palestine campaign, these things occurred. The limiting factor was scale. None of the actions during the first eight months of the Palestine campaign were on any great scale. They were divisional actions rather than army actions. Prisoners were coped with on a proper basis in terms of transit and incarceration at POW camps.
The September breakout was an army action. The AIF breakout was planned. They knew the consequences and were prepared for them. Prior to Damascus, there were no outbreaks of cholera or starvation amongst the Turkish prisoners.
The move to Damascus was made on an ad hoc basis - it was unplanned. The opportunity presented itself through the rapid collapse of the Turksih resistance in Palestine. The 7th and 8th Turkish Armies had been destroyed and few enemy troops remained further north between Nazareth and Damascus.
Here's how Lindsay Daly in Horseman Ride by in the chapter "The Sleepless Fortnight: 'What about Damascus?" reports the event:
"A famously reported meeting between Allenby and Chauvel at Megiddo on 22 September has them marvelling at their success. Instead of the considerable casualties allowed for, there had been almost none. Instead of a Turko-German counterattack slicing through the line anywhere from Acre to Beisan, splitting the British in two, it hadn't happened. Chauvel tells the Chief he has 15,000 prisoners. The Chief growls jocosely: 'No bloody good to me! I want 30,000 before you've done.'
There was really not much work to do. not much to discuss. There had been no delays, no setbacks, no administrative or supply difficulties. Nothing to put right. The Chief says he would never have believed that a mounted brigade could accomplish what Wilson's 3rd Light Horse had at Jenin.
Then, perhaps turning his back to look out over the Plain of Esdraelon, he murmurs: 'What about Damascus?'
Chauvel, at his desk, makes some slight movement. His trim cavalryman's figure is poised, his expression is alert. 'Rather,' he says.
Carpe diem. The great make history without strings."
Here is Gullett's version:
"The destruction, moral and material, worked by the airmen, had been far greater than Allenby had expected. Nor had he believed it possible that his mounted troops, despite all their dash, could have accomplished what had been done by Wilson's brigade at Jenin. When Chauvel told him that scarcely a Turk had crossed the Esdraelon plain or the river near Beisan, lie for the first time mentioned the northern ride which was to conquer Syria. seize the Baghdad railway at Aleppo, and so bring to a sudden end the campaign in Mesopotamia.
" What about Damascus?" he abruptly asked Chauvel; and the Australian, who never wasted his words, replied; " Rather."
Allenby at the time said no more; but the occupation of Haifa and Acre was then decided upon. as well as an advance lo the Sea of Galilee at Tiberias and Semakh, a railway village at the southern end of the lake. This advance would give Allenby the line Tiberias-Nazareth-Acre, which he had foreshadowed in his despatches to the War Office at the end of 1917. With Haifa and Acre in his hands, Chauvel directed Hodgson with the Australian Mounted Division to seize Tiberias and Semakh. After the capture of the 8,000 prisoners by the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade at Jenin, Hodgson's command passed a few days of relative inactivity. The 3rd and 4th Brigades patrolled the plain between Macandrew's 5th Division about El Afule and Barrow's 4th at Beisan, and picked up parties of broken Turks coming from the southern hills. But these were glad to surrender, and there was no fighting. Water and horsefeed were plentiful, supplies were arriving regularly under the master hand of Colonel Stansfield, and the brigades were ready for fresh enterprises. "
In other words, the staff were not under any pressure after clearing 15,000 prisoners. The infrastructure may have been bursting at the seams but this is Allenby giving the suggestion and Chauvel jumping at the chance. No additional resources were asked for nor provided.
The conditions in Damascus were not unknown. Men from the 4th LHB, without any prisoner handling skills, were put in charge of a vast quantity of prisoners who were in all states of fitness. They could only do what they could with the resources at hand which were precious few.
What all this adds up to is negligence pure and simple. I don't know what else one can call it.
Finally Geoff, you say:
I am afraid you will have to alert me to the subtle distinction between a child or woman dying of cholera and a Turkish POW. As far as I can see, all die a hideous and painful death. In this case the negligence was brought on by the same authority. To my way of thinking, you would have expected the British and Australian staff to have twigged to this after 18 years and a scandal. Apparently not.
Cheers
Bill
G'day mate
I understand the essence of your post.
Regardless of Chauvel's job of attacking, there are a number of events that are going to occur and have occurred since the dawn of organised warfare.
1. There will be casualties.
2. There will be prisoners.
3. Humans who are soldiers need to eat and have shelter.
Generals and their staff who prepare campaigns also prepare for these eventualities - some prepare better than others. Regardless of those doing the fighting, these basic needs require care.
This is nothing new nor is it rocket science. Humans consume a certain amount of tucker, horses consume a certain amount of tucker, they both drink water and so on. The military handbooks on rationing tell of this gained knowledge. A campaign plans for this. If not, it ends in disaster. So an army requires so many tonnes of food and so many litres of water every day. There is a baggage train employed to ensure that this supply is kept up.
I hope we can agree on this.
In terms of actions and captives, in the Sinai the generals planned for this. Stockades were prepared in Egypt, trains ordered and provos moved to the front to collect the prisoners. At Magdhaba at the end of the day, all the Turks were given 24 hours of rations - British soldiers' rations. This was considered to be adequate until the provos took over.
Even in the early parts of the Palestine campaign, these things occurred. The limiting factor was scale. None of the actions during the first eight months of the Palestine campaign were on any great scale. They were divisional actions rather than army actions. Prisoners were coped with on a proper basis in terms of transit and incarceration at POW camps.
The September breakout was an army action. The AIF breakout was planned. They knew the consequences and were prepared for them. Prior to Damascus, there were no outbreaks of cholera or starvation amongst the Turkish prisoners.
The move to Damascus was made on an ad hoc basis - it was unplanned. The opportunity presented itself through the rapid collapse of the Turksih resistance in Palestine. The 7th and 8th Turkish Armies had been destroyed and few enemy troops remained further north between Nazareth and Damascus.
Here's how Lindsay Daly in Horseman Ride by in the chapter "The Sleepless Fortnight: 'What about Damascus?" reports the event:
"A famously reported meeting between Allenby and Chauvel at Megiddo on 22 September has them marvelling at their success. Instead of the considerable casualties allowed for, there had been almost none. Instead of a Turko-German counterattack slicing through the line anywhere from Acre to Beisan, splitting the British in two, it hadn't happened. Chauvel tells the Chief he has 15,000 prisoners. The Chief growls jocosely: 'No bloody good to me! I want 30,000 before you've done.'
There was really not much work to do. not much to discuss. There had been no delays, no setbacks, no administrative or supply difficulties. Nothing to put right. The Chief says he would never have believed that a mounted brigade could accomplish what Wilson's 3rd Light Horse had at Jenin.
Then, perhaps turning his back to look out over the Plain of Esdraelon, he murmurs: 'What about Damascus?'
Chauvel, at his desk, makes some slight movement. His trim cavalryman's figure is poised, his expression is alert. 'Rather,' he says.
Carpe diem. The great make history without strings."
Here is Gullett's version:
"The destruction, moral and material, worked by the airmen, had been far greater than Allenby had expected. Nor had he believed it possible that his mounted troops, despite all their dash, could have accomplished what had been done by Wilson's brigade at Jenin. When Chauvel told him that scarcely a Turk had crossed the Esdraelon plain or the river near Beisan, lie for the first time mentioned the northern ride which was to conquer Syria. seize the Baghdad railway at Aleppo, and so bring to a sudden end the campaign in Mesopotamia.
" What about Damascus?" he abruptly asked Chauvel; and the Australian, who never wasted his words, replied; " Rather."
Allenby at the time said no more; but the occupation of Haifa and Acre was then decided upon. as well as an advance lo the Sea of Galilee at Tiberias and Semakh, a railway village at the southern end of the lake. This advance would give Allenby the line Tiberias-Nazareth-Acre, which he had foreshadowed in his despatches to the War Office at the end of 1917. With Haifa and Acre in his hands, Chauvel directed Hodgson with the Australian Mounted Division to seize Tiberias and Semakh. After the capture of the 8,000 prisoners by the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade at Jenin, Hodgson's command passed a few days of relative inactivity. The 3rd and 4th Brigades patrolled the plain between Macandrew's 5th Division about El Afule and Barrow's 4th at Beisan, and picked up parties of broken Turks coming from the southern hills. But these were glad to surrender, and there was no fighting. Water and horsefeed were plentiful, supplies were arriving regularly under the master hand of Colonel Stansfield, and the brigades were ready for fresh enterprises. "
In other words, the staff were not under any pressure after clearing 15,000 prisoners. The infrastructure may have been bursting at the seams but this is Allenby giving the suggestion and Chauvel jumping at the chance. No additional resources were asked for nor provided.
The conditions in Damascus were not unknown. Men from the 4th LHB, without any prisoner handling skills, were put in charge of a vast quantity of prisoners who were in all states of fitness. They could only do what they could with the resources at hand which were precious few.
What all this adds up to is negligence pure and simple. I don't know what else one can call it.
Finally Geoff, you say:
QUOTE
I would not compare the incarceration & deaths of women & children in S.A. with incarceration of Turkish POWs’
I am afraid you will have to alert me to the subtle distinction between a child or woman dying of cholera and a Turkish POW. As far as I can see, all die a hideous and painful death. In this case the negligence was brought on by the same authority. To my way of thinking, you would have expected the British and Australian staff to have twigged to this after 18 years and a scandal. Apparently not.
Cheers
Bill
QUOTE (Bill Woerlee @ Mar 5 2006, 11:24 PM)
Geoff
G'day mate
I understand the essence of your post.
Regardless of Chauvel's job of attacking, there are a number of events that are going to occur and have occurred since the dawn of organised warfare.
1. There will be casualties.
2. There will be prisoners.
3. Humans who are soldiers need to eat and have shelter.
Generals and their staff who prepare campaigns also prepare for these eventualities - some prepare better than others. Regardless of those doing the fighting, these basic needs require care.
This is nothing new nor is it rocket science. Humans consume a certain amount of tucker, horses consume a certain amount of tucker, they both drink water and so on. The military handbooks on rationing tell of this gained knowledge. A campaign plans for this. If not, it ends in disaster. So an army requires so many tonnes of food and so many litres of water every day. There is a baggage train employed to ensure that this supply is kept up.
I hope we can agree on this. AGREED
In terms of actions and captives, in the Sinai the generals planned for this. Stockades were prepared in Egypt, trains ordered and provos moved to the front to collect the prisoners. At Magdhaba at the end of the day, all the Turks were given 24 hours of rations - British soldiers' rations. This was considered to be adequate until the provos took over.
Even in the early parts of the Palestine campaign, these things occurred. The limiting factor was scale. None of the actions during the first eight months of the Palestine campaign were on any great scale. They were divisional actions rather than army actions. Prisoners were coped with on a proper basis in terms of transit and incarceration at POW camps.
I WOULD NOT CAMPARE THE SINAI CAMPAIGN WITH THE LATER CAMPAIGN IN SEPT 1918. ALTHOUGH THE FORCES UNDER ALLENBY’S COMMAND WERE MUCH LARGER THEY WERE DISPERSED OVER A MUCH LARGER AREA AND WERE MORE MUCH MORE MOBILE THAN IN THE EARLIER SINAI CAMPAIGN. INDEED, THE ALLIED COMMANDERS WERE FORCED INTO LIMITED OBJECTIVES IN SINAI CAMPAIGN PRIMARILY DUE TO LOGISTIC & MANPOWER ISSUES THAT ENSURED THEY PROGRESS OCCUR AT A STEADY & QUITE STAGED MANNER. THE TRANSPORT & LOGISTICS KEPT UP WITH MEN ENUSRED THAT TURKISH POW’S COULD BE PROCESSED MORE EFFICIENTLY.
The September breakout was an army action. The AIF breakout was planned. They knew the consequences and were prepared for them. Prior to Damascus, there were no outbreaks of cholera or starvation amongst the Turkish prisoners.
The move to Damascus was made on an ad hoc basis - it was unplanned. The opportunity presented itself through the rapid collapse of the Turksih resistance in Palestine. The 7th and 8th Turkish Armies had been destroyed and few enemy troops remained further north between Nazareth and Damascus.
Here's how Lindsay Daly in Horseman Ride by in the chapter "The Sleepless Fortnight: 'What about Damascus?" reports the event:
"A famously reported meeting between Allenby and Chauvel at Megiddo on 22 September has them marvelling at their success. Instead of the considerable casualties allowed for, there had been almost none. Instead of a Turko-German counterattack slicing through the line anywhere from Acre to Beisan, splitting the British in two, it hadn't happened. Chauvel tells the Chief he has 15,000 prisoners. The Chief growls jocosely: 'No bloody good to me! I want 30,000 before you've done.'
There was really not much work to do. not much to discuss. There had been no delays, no setbacks, no administrative or supply difficulties. Nothing to put right. The Chief says he would never have believed that a mounted brigade could accomplish what Wilson's 3rd Light Horse had at Jenin.
Then, perhaps turning his back to look out over the Plain of Esdraelon, he murmurs: 'What about Damascus?'
Chauvel, at his desk, makes some slight movement. His trim cavalryman's figure is poised, his expression is alert. 'Rather,' he says.
I WOULD NOT CHOOSE TO USE THIS REFERENCE AS IT OBVIOUSLY QUOTES FROM ANOTHER SOURCE DOC? THE AUTHORS DIV WAS NOWHERE NEAR DAMASCUS. I WOULD NEED TO KNOW THE ORIGINAL SOURCE DOC THE AUTHOR USED TO MAKING ANY COMMENT ABOUT IT’S WORTH…THUS CANNOT COMMENT
Carpe diem. The great make history without strings."
Here is Gullett's version:
"The destruction, moral and material, worked by the airmen, had been far greater than Allenby had expected. Nor had he believed it possible that his mounted troops, despite all their dash, could have accomplished what had been done by Wilson's brigade at Jenin. When Chauvel told him that scarcely a Turk had crossed the Esdraelon plain or the river near Beisan, lie for the first time mentioned the northern ride which was to conquer Syria. seize the Baghdad railway at Aleppo, and so bring to a sudden end the campaign in Mesopotamia.
" What about Damascus?" he abruptly asked Chauvel; and the Australian, who never wasted his words, replied; " Rather."
THIS INDICATES TO ME THAT THE ORIGINAL PLAN HAD POSSIBLL ONLY INCLUDED THE CAPTURE OF DAMASCUS IN A ‘BEST CASE’ SCENARIO. SO THE PLAN HAD PROBABLY BEEN EXTENDED TO INCLUDE DAMASCUS, AND I WOULD HAZZARD A GUESS IT DID NOT FOCUS ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF A CHOLERA OUTBREAK AMONGST TUKISH POWS- BUT RATHER AN OTTOMAN ARMISTACE.[b]
Allenby at the time said no more; but the occupation of Haifa and Acre was then decided upon. as well as an advance lo the Sea of Galilee at Tiberias and Semakh, a railway village at the southern end of the lake. This advance would give Allenby the line Tiberias-Nazareth-Acre, which he had foreshadowed in his despatches to the War Office at the end of 1917. With Haifa and Acre in his hands, Chauvel directed Hodgson with the Australian Mounted Division to seize Tiberias and Semakh. After the capture of the 8,000 prisoners by the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade at Jenin, Hodgson's command passed a few days of relative inactivity. The 3rd and 4th Brigades patrolled the plain between Macandrew's 5th Division about El Afule and Barrow's 4th at Beisan, and picked up parties of broken Turks coming from the southern hills. But these were glad to surrender, and there was no fighting. Water and horsefeed were plentiful, supplies were arriving regularly under the master hand of Colonel Stansfield, and the brigades were ready for fresh enterprises. "
In other words, the staff were not under any pressure after clearing 15,000 prisoners. The infrastructure may have been bursting at the seams but this is Allenby giving the suggestion and Chauvel jumping at the chance. No additional resources were asked for nor provided. DO NOT AGREE THAT IS WAS CHAUVEL RESPONSIBILTY TO HAVE KNOWN THAT THE TURKISH POW'S WERE LIKLIHOOD TO HAVE BEEN IN SUCH A CRIMINALY POOR STATE WHN THEY WERE CAPTURED - OR HE MAY HAVE BEEN SO KEEN TO RISK HIS OWN MEN. I BELIEVE THAT CHAUVEL MAY HAVE BEEN DISTRACTED BY HIS OWN ADVANCING ARMY. AND INDEED CHAUVEL'S GUILT OR INNONCENCE IN THE CHOLERA ISSUE HAD NOTHING TO TO WITH THE AIF. AS HE WAS THE LEADER OF A COMBINED FORCE OF MANY NATIONALITIES.
The conditions in Damascus were not unknown. Men from the 4th LHB, without any prisoner handling skills, were put in charge of a vast quantity of prisoners who were in all states of fitness. They could only do what they could with the resources at hand which were precious few.
What all this adds up to is negligence pure and simple. I don't know what else one can call it.
Finally Geoff, you say:
I am afraid you will have to alert me to the subtle distinction between a child or woman dying of cholera and a Turkish POW. As far as I can see, all die a hideous and painful death. In this case the negligence was brought on by the same authority. To my way of thinking, you would have expected the British and Australian staff to have twigged to this after 18 years and a scandal. Apparently not.
THE SUBTLE DISTINCTION I IS I WOULD CLASSIFY THE DEATHS OF NON-COMBATANTS (CIVILIANS) AS WORSE- BUTS THAT’S JUST MY OPINION.
CHEERS
G
Bill
G'day mate
I understand the essence of your post.
Regardless of Chauvel's job of attacking, there are a number of events that are going to occur and have occurred since the dawn of organised warfare.
1. There will be casualties.
2. There will be prisoners.
3. Humans who are soldiers need to eat and have shelter.
Generals and their staff who prepare campaigns also prepare for these eventualities - some prepare better than others. Regardless of those doing the fighting, these basic needs require care.
This is nothing new nor is it rocket science. Humans consume a certain amount of tucker, horses consume a certain amount of tucker, they both drink water and so on. The military handbooks on rationing tell of this gained knowledge. A campaign plans for this. If not, it ends in disaster. So an army requires so many tonnes of food and so many litres of water every day. There is a baggage train employed to ensure that this supply is kept up.
I hope we can agree on this. AGREED
In terms of actions and captives, in the Sinai the generals planned for this. Stockades were prepared in Egypt, trains ordered and provos moved to the front to collect the prisoners. At Magdhaba at the end of the day, all the Turks were given 24 hours of rations - British soldiers' rations. This was considered to be adequate until the provos took over.
Even in the early parts of the Palestine campaign, these things occurred. The limiting factor was scale. None of the actions during the first eight months of the Palestine campaign were on any great scale. They were divisional actions rather than army actions. Prisoners were coped with on a proper basis in terms of transit and incarceration at POW camps.
I WOULD NOT CAMPARE THE SINAI CAMPAIGN WITH THE LATER CAMPAIGN IN SEPT 1918. ALTHOUGH THE FORCES UNDER ALLENBY’S COMMAND WERE MUCH LARGER THEY WERE DISPERSED OVER A MUCH LARGER AREA AND WERE MORE MUCH MORE MOBILE THAN IN THE EARLIER SINAI CAMPAIGN. INDEED, THE ALLIED COMMANDERS WERE FORCED INTO LIMITED OBJECTIVES IN SINAI CAMPAIGN PRIMARILY DUE TO LOGISTIC & MANPOWER ISSUES THAT ENSURED THEY PROGRESS OCCUR AT A STEADY & QUITE STAGED MANNER. THE TRANSPORT & LOGISTICS KEPT UP WITH MEN ENUSRED THAT TURKISH POW’S COULD BE PROCESSED MORE EFFICIENTLY.
The September breakout was an army action. The AIF breakout was planned. They knew the consequences and were prepared for them. Prior to Damascus, there were no outbreaks of cholera or starvation amongst the Turkish prisoners.
The move to Damascus was made on an ad hoc basis - it was unplanned. The opportunity presented itself through the rapid collapse of the Turksih resistance in Palestine. The 7th and 8th Turkish Armies had been destroyed and few enemy troops remained further north between Nazareth and Damascus.
Here's how Lindsay Daly in Horseman Ride by in the chapter "The Sleepless Fortnight: 'What about Damascus?" reports the event:
"A famously reported meeting between Allenby and Chauvel at Megiddo on 22 September has them marvelling at their success. Instead of the considerable casualties allowed for, there had been almost none. Instead of a Turko-German counterattack slicing through the line anywhere from Acre to Beisan, splitting the British in two, it hadn't happened. Chauvel tells the Chief he has 15,000 prisoners. The Chief growls jocosely: 'No bloody good to me! I want 30,000 before you've done.'
There was really not much work to do. not much to discuss. There had been no delays, no setbacks, no administrative or supply difficulties. Nothing to put right. The Chief says he would never have believed that a mounted brigade could accomplish what Wilson's 3rd Light Horse had at Jenin.
Then, perhaps turning his back to look out over the Plain of Esdraelon, he murmurs: 'What about Damascus?'
Chauvel, at his desk, makes some slight movement. His trim cavalryman's figure is poised, his expression is alert. 'Rather,' he says.
I WOULD NOT CHOOSE TO USE THIS REFERENCE AS IT OBVIOUSLY QUOTES FROM ANOTHER SOURCE DOC? THE AUTHORS DIV WAS NOWHERE NEAR DAMASCUS. I WOULD NEED TO KNOW THE ORIGINAL SOURCE DOC THE AUTHOR USED TO MAKING ANY COMMENT ABOUT IT’S WORTH…THUS CANNOT COMMENT
Carpe diem. The great make history without strings."
Here is Gullett's version:
"The destruction, moral and material, worked by the airmen, had been far greater than Allenby had expected. Nor had he believed it possible that his mounted troops, despite all their dash, could have accomplished what had been done by Wilson's brigade at Jenin. When Chauvel told him that scarcely a Turk had crossed the Esdraelon plain or the river near Beisan, lie for the first time mentioned the northern ride which was to conquer Syria. seize the Baghdad railway at Aleppo, and so bring to a sudden end the campaign in Mesopotamia.
" What about Damascus?" he abruptly asked Chauvel; and the Australian, who never wasted his words, replied; " Rather."
THIS INDICATES TO ME THAT THE ORIGINAL PLAN HAD POSSIBLL ONLY INCLUDED THE CAPTURE OF DAMASCUS IN A ‘BEST CASE’ SCENARIO. SO THE PLAN HAD PROBABLY BEEN EXTENDED TO INCLUDE DAMASCUS, AND I WOULD HAZZARD A GUESS IT DID NOT FOCUS ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF A CHOLERA OUTBREAK AMONGST TUKISH POWS- BUT RATHER AN OTTOMAN ARMISTACE.[b]
Allenby at the time said no more; but the occupation of Haifa and Acre was then decided upon. as well as an advance lo the Sea of Galilee at Tiberias and Semakh, a railway village at the southern end of the lake. This advance would give Allenby the line Tiberias-Nazareth-Acre, which he had foreshadowed in his despatches to the War Office at the end of 1917. With Haifa and Acre in his hands, Chauvel directed Hodgson with the Australian Mounted Division to seize Tiberias and Semakh. After the capture of the 8,000 prisoners by the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade at Jenin, Hodgson's command passed a few days of relative inactivity. The 3rd and 4th Brigades patrolled the plain between Macandrew's 5th Division about El Afule and Barrow's 4th at Beisan, and picked up parties of broken Turks coming from the southern hills. But these were glad to surrender, and there was no fighting. Water and horsefeed were plentiful, supplies were arriving regularly under the master hand of Colonel Stansfield, and the brigades were ready for fresh enterprises. "
In other words, the staff were not under any pressure after clearing 15,000 prisoners. The infrastructure may have been bursting at the seams but this is Allenby giving the suggestion and Chauvel jumping at the chance. No additional resources were asked for nor provided. DO NOT AGREE THAT IS WAS CHAUVEL RESPONSIBILTY TO HAVE KNOWN THAT THE TURKISH POW'S WERE LIKLIHOOD TO HAVE BEEN IN SUCH A CRIMINALY POOR STATE WHN THEY WERE CAPTURED - OR HE MAY HAVE BEEN SO KEEN TO RISK HIS OWN MEN. I BELIEVE THAT CHAUVEL MAY HAVE BEEN DISTRACTED BY HIS OWN ADVANCING ARMY. AND INDEED CHAUVEL'S GUILT OR INNONCENCE IN THE CHOLERA ISSUE HAD NOTHING TO TO WITH THE AIF. AS HE WAS THE LEADER OF A COMBINED FORCE OF MANY NATIONALITIES.
The conditions in Damascus were not unknown. Men from the 4th LHB, without any prisoner handling skills, were put in charge of a vast quantity of prisoners who were in all states of fitness. They could only do what they could with the resources at hand which were precious few.
What all this adds up to is negligence pure and simple. I don't know what else one can call it.
Finally Geoff, you say:
I am afraid you will have to alert me to the subtle distinction between a child or woman dying of cholera and a Turkish POW. As far as I can see, all die a hideous and painful death. In this case the negligence was brought on by the same authority. To my way of thinking, you would have expected the British and Australian staff to have twigged to this after 18 years and a scandal. Apparently not.
THE SUBTLE DISTINCTION I IS I WOULD CLASSIFY THE DEATHS OF NON-COMBATANTS (CIVILIANS) AS WORSE- BUTS THAT’S JUST MY OPINION.
CHEERS
G
Bill
Geoff
G'day mate
I am not sure what you are actually arguing about mate. At no stage have you offered any documentay to suggest my conclusions are incorrect. Apart from casting doubt without any substantiation on my three sources - two who were on the spot and one who provided a summary in his book - I cannot actually see what you are driving at. If you wish to impugn a source of mine, you need to present the contradictory evidence. As much as I like and respect you Geoff, in the matter of evidence, it is just not good enough to express an opinion.
Sure, I see a sentimental issue - you are finding it difficult to accept that Chauvel could be callous about the lives of prisoners in obtaining his objectives. Also you seem to be reluctant to accept that Australian troops could be just as hideous and negligent in their treatment of the Turks as the Turks were to their prisoners. But that is sentiment not polemic.
I hope you can see why I am confused about the thread of your comments.
Cheers
Bill
G'day mate
I am not sure what you are actually arguing about mate. At no stage have you offered any documentay to suggest my conclusions are incorrect. Apart from casting doubt without any substantiation on my three sources - two who were on the spot and one who provided a summary in his book - I cannot actually see what you are driving at. If you wish to impugn a source of mine, you need to present the contradictory evidence. As much as I like and respect you Geoff, in the matter of evidence, it is just not good enough to express an opinion.
Sure, I see a sentimental issue - you are finding it difficult to accept that Chauvel could be callous about the lives of prisoners in obtaining his objectives. Also you seem to be reluctant to accept that Australian troops could be just as hideous and negligent in their treatment of the Turks as the Turks were to their prisoners. But that is sentiment not polemic.
I hope you can see why I am confused about the thread of your comments.
Cheers
Bill
Hi Bill,
Thank you for your additional comments
Just to confirm you r belief that my statements are indeed based on just my humble opinion. This opinion is based on my limited reading on this subject. So YES I am unable to substantiate my impression- so I think you will be unsatisfied
The basis of our disagree/argument/discussion (if I may) is that Chauvel (& perhaps the AIF as you first stated) was responsible for the deaths of numerous Turkish POW's in Damascus.
Well maybe, but I would place it in a larger context of the imperatives that in War sometimes allow these dreadful things to occur. As I have mentioned on this forum, it is quite easy for amateur historians to view the situation in a very rigid framework like you have depicted. i.e fair or lawful Unfortunately, these Turkish POW’s suffered, but did they suffer any more or less than the thousands of men that died of Spanish flu in the same period? Who can we find to blame? Was someone responsible for their deaths? NO the answer is that the deaths were as a result of combined circumstance- much the same as the Turkish POW’s.
I feel confident that Chauvel’s first consideration was to his men & their objectives. These military objectives were set by British command, and resources allocated accordingly So Chauvel worked with what he had. I think that Chauvel would not have risked a cholera outbreak- under any circumstances & so would not have knowingly allowed this perceived ‘crime’ to happen-& so would have done as much as he good to ensure the situation was dealt with as soon as he became aware of the situation
Your point (if I may) is that he should have planned for the likelihood of that many prisoners & that they would contact cholera. My argument is that his main objectives were the campaign & his own men, & that sometimes (and particularly in Wars all commanders are guilty of errors that resulted in the deaths of many men- often their own)
Should they all have been charged with negligence? You don’t have to dig very far to find these types of incidents, so I fail to see what makes Chauvel more noteworthy than many others.
I am not surprised that Chauvel’s main objectives were the campaign that he was fighting. (Allenby was quite a demanding boss) My statements were not based on any sentimentality- just my reading of the way the campaign probably was conducted. And yes I am sure that the vast majority of Australian troops felt that being white made them feel superior There was undoubted a well schooled hierarchy of racist sentiment. The Arabs were at the bottom. But Turkish POW’s were not. And they were usually treated very well by the AIF when captured. I think this is confirmed by the large numbers of Turkish soldiers who preferred to surrender to the Allied advance (and its limited supplies) rather than continue to suffer under their own command.
I fear we will run this into the ground if it goes much further. – But my guess is that you will feel compelled to go further. Are the AIF soldiers who killed the masses of Turks at Barada Gorge guilty of murder under your code? what chance of escape did they have? So who was responsible for allowing that to occur? was Chauvel again negligent?
Cheers
Geoff S
Thank you for your additional comments
Just to confirm you r belief that my statements are indeed based on just my humble opinion. This opinion is based on my limited reading on this subject. So YES I am unable to substantiate my impression- so I think you will be unsatisfied
The basis of our disagree/argument/discussion (if I may) is that Chauvel (& perhaps the AIF as you first stated) was responsible for the deaths of numerous Turkish POW's in Damascus.
Well maybe, but I would place it in a larger context of the imperatives that in War sometimes allow these dreadful things to occur. As I have mentioned on this forum, it is quite easy for amateur historians to view the situation in a very rigid framework like you have depicted. i.e fair or lawful Unfortunately, these Turkish POW’s suffered, but did they suffer any more or less than the thousands of men that died of Spanish flu in the same period? Who can we find to blame? Was someone responsible for their deaths? NO the answer is that the deaths were as a result of combined circumstance- much the same as the Turkish POW’s.
I feel confident that Chauvel’s first consideration was to his men & their objectives. These military objectives were set by British command, and resources allocated accordingly So Chauvel worked with what he had. I think that Chauvel would not have risked a cholera outbreak- under any circumstances & so would not have knowingly allowed this perceived ‘crime’ to happen-& so would have done as much as he good to ensure the situation was dealt with as soon as he became aware of the situation
Your point (if I may) is that he should have planned for the likelihood of that many prisoners & that they would contact cholera. My argument is that his main objectives were the campaign & his own men, & that sometimes (and particularly in Wars all commanders are guilty of errors that resulted in the deaths of many men- often their own)
Should they all have been charged with negligence? You don’t have to dig very far to find these types of incidents, so I fail to see what makes Chauvel more noteworthy than many others.
I am not surprised that Chauvel’s main objectives were the campaign that he was fighting. (Allenby was quite a demanding boss) My statements were not based on any sentimentality- just my reading of the way the campaign probably was conducted. And yes I am sure that the vast majority of Australian troops felt that being white made them feel superior There was undoubted a well schooled hierarchy of racist sentiment. The Arabs were at the bottom. But Turkish POW’s were not. And they were usually treated very well by the AIF when captured. I think this is confirmed by the large numbers of Turkish soldiers who preferred to surrender to the Allied advance (and its limited supplies) rather than continue to suffer under their own command.
I fear we will run this into the ground if it goes much further. – But my guess is that you will feel compelled to go further. Are the AIF soldiers who killed the masses of Turks at Barada Gorge guilty of murder under your code? what chance of escape did they have? So who was responsible for allowing that to occur? was Chauvel again negligent?
Cheers
Geoff S
Bill- I have just remembered that maternal grand father was incarcerated by the Japaneses during WW11 & i feel that your opinions on the subject of the treatment of POW's may well have been shaped by this...
So - I should apologise if you find my opinions overly callous- I now understand why you are so interested in the treatment of POW's by their captors..
Cheers
G
So - I should apologise if you find my opinions overly callous- I now understand why you are so interested in the treatment of POW's by their captors..
Cheers
G
Hi Guys
I hesitate to get involved in such an emotive thread but I have some background information which might interest you.
The information comes from the British Intelligence summaries prepared in Cairo and now lodged in the National Archives at Kew. The substance of this particular information is that it comes from a prisoner of war who was an Armenian doctor in the Turkish Army based in the Hospital of Infectious Diseases at Damascus. The report is dated 11th March 1918.
In the summer of 1917 cholera broke out among the troops stationed around Damascus. 20 cases per day were admitted to the hospital, of these cases 75% were chronic dysentery whilst 25% were cholera, mortality was small. Malaria was rampant around Damascus and mortality was about 5% in this case.
During the winter of 1917 10 cases per day (including scurvy) were admitted to the hospital. 25% died, 50% had to be given long leave to recover and 25% returned to their regiments. Cases of typhus ran to 100 per day, of these 50% died on the 1st day and 25% thereafter. All the survivors had to be sent on leave to recover. Most of these cases came from the Hejaz Expeditionary Force.
In the civil population in the Vilayets of Damascus, Beirut and Aleppo in the winter of 1915 it is estimated 50% of the population contracted typhus and of these 15-20% died. In the winter of 1917 an estimated 60% of the population contracted typhus with 30% dying.
What does all this mean?-well it is clear that serious diseases such as typhus, malaria and cholera (and in the case of the Hejaz Expeditionary force, scurvy) were rife both in the military and civilian populations in and around Damascus at least since the summer of 1917 and probably earlier. As the supply situation (particularly of food) declined in 1918 one cannot see conditions for improvement. Therefore the arrival of the allies in September/October 1918 was probably not the direct cause of but probably made worse a situation that already existed. I freely admit I am no medical expert and it would be interesting to see if any statistics survive for the period of 1918 up to the allied invasion.
Having said that this document makes it clear that the allies were aware of the dire situation in the area-do their subsequent actions make them culpable? Possibly, although I also think there was an ‘cock-up’ element to this in that the allies’advance was a lot quicker and reaped far more POW’s than expected. Like anything I think it six of one and half a dozen of another-although this does sound hard when you are talking about people’s lives-but then war is a hard thing. All very sobering when you think about it.
Cheers
Dominic
I hesitate to get involved in such an emotive thread but I have some background information which might interest you.
The information comes from the British Intelligence summaries prepared in Cairo and now lodged in the National Archives at Kew. The substance of this particular information is that it comes from a prisoner of war who was an Armenian doctor in the Turkish Army based in the Hospital of Infectious Diseases at Damascus. The report is dated 11th March 1918.
In the summer of 1917 cholera broke out among the troops stationed around Damascus. 20 cases per day were admitted to the hospital, of these cases 75% were chronic dysentery whilst 25% were cholera, mortality was small. Malaria was rampant around Damascus and mortality was about 5% in this case.
During the winter of 1917 10 cases per day (including scurvy) were admitted to the hospital. 25% died, 50% had to be given long leave to recover and 25% returned to their regiments. Cases of typhus ran to 100 per day, of these 50% died on the 1st day and 25% thereafter. All the survivors had to be sent on leave to recover. Most of these cases came from the Hejaz Expeditionary Force.
In the civil population in the Vilayets of Damascus, Beirut and Aleppo in the winter of 1915 it is estimated 50% of the population contracted typhus and of these 15-20% died. In the winter of 1917 an estimated 60% of the population contracted typhus with 30% dying.
What does all this mean?-well it is clear that serious diseases such as typhus, malaria and cholera (and in the case of the Hejaz Expeditionary force, scurvy) were rife both in the military and civilian populations in and around Damascus at least since the summer of 1917 and probably earlier. As the supply situation (particularly of food) declined in 1918 one cannot see conditions for improvement. Therefore the arrival of the allies in September/October 1918 was probably not the direct cause of but probably made worse a situation that already existed. I freely admit I am no medical expert and it would be interesting to see if any statistics survive for the period of 1918 up to the allied invasion.
Having said that this document makes it clear that the allies were aware of the dire situation in the area-do their subsequent actions make them culpable? Possibly, although I also think there was an ‘cock-up’ element to this in that the allies’advance was a lot quicker and reaped far more POW’s than expected. Like anything I think it six of one and half a dozen of another-although this does sound hard when you are talking about people’s lives-but then war is a hard thing. All very sobering when you think about it.
Cheers
Dominic
Geoff
G'day mate
I agree with the thrust of your comments that it is easy for armchair historians like us to make judgments. I won't be dying on the barracades on this issue because I feel you make excellent points in your defence. I can't disagree with their thrust.
I think our point of severence is the notion of blame. While it is not instructive to apportion blame for the sake of it, if it alerts future generations to the shortcomings of previous generations, then we might save lives in present or future conflicts. So here I am critical of the staff work done by both the British and Australian staffs in anticipating a problem which they knew was going to happen.
I can guess at one part - it was political. By perpetuating the myth that the Arabs took Damascus and were in control of the town, it was less sensitive to hand it over to the French as per the agreement. To that end it would have been impolitic to have a large British presence until it became necessary when the Arabs made a hash of the place.
LC Wilson fought against the TE Lawrence myth all his life over the above issue. He chastised Bean, castigated Gullett and caned the Brits in their Official History over this matter.
Now back to my armchair.
Cheers
Bill
G'day mate
I agree with the thrust of your comments that it is easy for armchair historians like us to make judgments. I won't be dying on the barracades on this issue because I feel you make excellent points in your defence. I can't disagree with their thrust.
I think our point of severence is the notion of blame. While it is not instructive to apportion blame for the sake of it, if it alerts future generations to the shortcomings of previous generations, then we might save lives in present or future conflicts. So here I am critical of the staff work done by both the British and Australian staffs in anticipating a problem which they knew was going to happen.
I can guess at one part - it was political. By perpetuating the myth that the Arabs took Damascus and were in control of the town, it was less sensitive to hand it over to the French as per the agreement. To that end it would have been impolitic to have a large British presence until it became necessary when the Arabs made a hash of the place.
LC Wilson fought against the TE Lawrence myth all his life over the above issue. He chastised Bean, castigated Gullett and caned the Brits in their Official History over this matter.
Now back to my armchair.
Cheers
Bill
Dominic
G'day mate
Thanks for sharing the conttents of that file with us. I appreciate your generosity.
I agree with your two conclusions:
1. It was a cock up rather than a deliberate policy
2. War is a tough beast
Cheers
Bill
G'day mate
Thanks for sharing the conttents of that file with us. I appreciate your generosity.
I agree with your two conclusions:
1. It was a cock up rather than a deliberate policy
2. War is a tough beast
Cheers
Bill
Dominic,
Thank you for sharing the additional statistics- very interesting. I had started to research the issue and also identified that Cholera had been a source of concern by the British command long before 1918- admitted with their interest being the well being of their own troops...
Bill,
Gidday-mate, & thankyou for your additional interesting perspective.
My concern with your original quote “and that in Damascus, through sheer neglect by the AIF, Turks died in great numbers of cholera” is that it did not take into account, nor did it even mention some of the mitigating factors that had combined to cause these deaths. In fact by nominating the AIF, you failed to identify that most of the AIF were nowhere near Damascus. In fact our men were already quite worn out by the years of earlier campaigning and amny were in a very poor state — And we did not have as many men involved in the Meddigo campaign. Also I have read enough about Damascus in Sept 1918 to believe that it was a filthy shambles ripe for disease even before the ALH arrived to guard these ill prisoners.
Unfortunately, as I believe is the case it would appear a combination of inextricably linked factors caused what you might judge as neglect pointed at a single party. Some of which we have discussed…
I, irrespective of any sentimental leanings you my have identified for my forebears always TRY and look at all the possible influencing factors before apportioning blame. This website is filled with comments from people quick to apportion blame at the feet of the guilty. I am not sure that we will ever witness a war like the one that occurred almost one hundred years ago. Thankfully the world has changed and thousands of men would no longer be prepared to sacrifice themselves in a war like the one that occurred so many years ago.
And as with all wars I am not sure much is ever really learnt from pervious experiences. So the problem is that with the benefit of hindsight and a myriad of references we all see things so clearly in 2006 and ponder why?
Cheers
G
Thank you for sharing the additional statistics- very interesting. I had started to research the issue and also identified that Cholera had been a source of concern by the British command long before 1918- admitted with their interest being the well being of their own troops...
Bill,
Gidday-mate, & thankyou for your additional interesting perspective.
My concern with your original quote “and that in Damascus, through sheer neglect by the AIF, Turks died in great numbers of cholera” is that it did not take into account, nor did it even mention some of the mitigating factors that had combined to cause these deaths. In fact by nominating the AIF, you failed to identify that most of the AIF were nowhere near Damascus. In fact our men were already quite worn out by the years of earlier campaigning and amny were in a very poor state — And we did not have as many men involved in the Meddigo campaign. Also I have read enough about Damascus in Sept 1918 to believe that it was a filthy shambles ripe for disease even before the ALH arrived to guard these ill prisoners.
Unfortunately, as I believe is the case it would appear a combination of inextricably linked factors caused what you might judge as neglect pointed at a single party. Some of which we have discussed…
I, irrespective of any sentimental leanings you my have identified for my forebears always TRY and look at all the possible influencing factors before apportioning blame. This website is filled with comments from people quick to apportion blame at the feet of the guilty. I am not sure that we will ever witness a war like the one that occurred almost one hundred years ago. Thankfully the world has changed and thousands of men would no longer be prepared to sacrifice themselves in a war like the one that occurred so many years ago.
And as with all wars I am not sure much is ever really learnt from pervious experiences. So the problem is that with the benefit of hindsight and a myriad of references we all see things so clearly in 2006 and ponder why?
Cheers
G
Geoff
All you say is well and good but can you tell me whereabouts on the Hebron Road was Idriess.
Well can you ...
Bill
All you say is well and good but can you tell me whereabouts on the Hebron Road was Idriess.
Well can you ...
Bill
Nope. Are you calling him a liar? Yes or no? Just answer the question….OK.
He was obviously on a very big hill watchin the ‘charge’ knowing that everything he wrote in DC would be viewed by later scholarly people in the 21st century as the truth, the whole truth & nuttin but the truth…Particularly by those who have a propensity to hero worship their boyhood heroes…to the point of well,,annoyance...
G
He was obviously on a very big hill watchin the ‘charge’ knowing that everything he wrote in DC would be viewed by later scholarly people in the 21st century as the truth, the whole truth & nuttin but the truth…Particularly by those who have a propensity to hero worship their boyhood heroes…to the point of well,,annoyance...
G
But he was there, we were not. As with most of the authors who were "there", he embellished/ added/ took an over all view based on what he had experienced/heard/learnt/ looked for.
We may have worked out the Hebron Road, but does that mean we dismiss him totally?
I am sorry, I agree with Geoff on this subject. From all I have read on the Light Horse in the Desert Campaign, they were:
A Appalled at the state of areas that they gained from the Turks. The level of human waste laying about was unbelievable to them.
B The Light Horse were compassionate towards their Turkish prisoners, often putting the weak up on their own horses while they walked and sharing their meagre rations and water with them.
C They felt sorry for the Turks, who were treated badly by their own command, and therefore the AIF soldiers helped in anyway they could.
There may have been exceptions to these occasionally, but to think that any of this was done on purpose or intentionally is beyond the pale.
The way I read it, is that the Light Horse were very good at what was expected of them, they made advances that outstripped the back up resources at that time and the prisoner numbers were beyond the forseen amount.
I read where Turkish prisoners were put in a compound, and the AIF were astounded at their lack of sanitation methods. They literally went to the toilet wherever the need was. The people in charge had men go in and show them how to make latrines etc.
Without getting too graphic, you can see what I mean.
Surely, all the above points to the AIF being as caring as they could within their means.
If there is proof that it was otherwise, I'd like to see it.
Regards
Kim
We may have worked out the Hebron Road, but does that mean we dismiss him totally?
I am sorry, I agree with Geoff on this subject. From all I have read on the Light Horse in the Desert Campaign, they were:
A Appalled at the state of areas that they gained from the Turks. The level of human waste laying about was unbelievable to them.
B The Light Horse were compassionate towards their Turkish prisoners, often putting the weak up on their own horses while they walked and sharing their meagre rations and water with them.
C They felt sorry for the Turks, who were treated badly by their own command, and therefore the AIF soldiers helped in anyway they could.
There may have been exceptions to these occasionally, but to think that any of this was done on purpose or intentionally is beyond the pale.
The way I read it, is that the Light Horse were very good at what was expected of them, they made advances that outstripped the back up resources at that time and the prisoner numbers were beyond the forseen amount.
I read where Turkish prisoners were put in a compound, and the AIF were astounded at their lack of sanitation methods. They literally went to the toilet wherever the need was. The people in charge had men go in and show them how to make latrines etc.
Without getting too graphic, you can see what I mean.
Surely, all the above points to the AIF being as caring as they could within their means.
If there is proof that it was otherwise, I'd like to see it.
Regards
Kim
Kim
G'day mate
Kim, all you say is true as a generality. However, the flaw in your logic is ascribing generality to particularity. Eg - Proposition: A: "Most Australians have blond hair and blue eyes." B: "I have black hair and brown eyes." A: "Well then you can't be an Australian."
However, in your polemics you admit to making this error with the qualifier "Surely, all the above points to the AIF being as caring as they could within their means."
In other words, each case is individual and needs to be dealt with as such. Hence, despite an impassioned and sentimental plea, the generality of the plea does not necessarily cover Damascus.
Now I happen to agree with your qualifier and that is the crux of my argument - Allenby and Chauvel knew ahead of time the resources they would require on the worst case scenario. They already knew the problems of captivity for the Turks - heck they had three years experience. The fact that there was persistent cholera in Damascus as reported by Dominic is interesting but only germain in the lack of planning argument. They already knew what they were facing if the staff already had this information.
The captive Turks were not part of the free population of Damascus - they were placed into a compound and thus seperated from the general population. They were guarded by Australians who by their own admission that they lacked the resources to look after them.
LC Wilson indicates that he actually hijacked the medical staff set aside to look after Turks and reallocated those assets to service the wounded from the 3rd LHB. When that event happens, it is indicative of a breakdown in planning and staff work.
No where do I claim this as deliberate, just negligent. The consequences are the same as is the culpability. It was a massive cock up because no one planned for it - pure and simple. But that doesn't make it better, it just highlights incompetence.
I hope that makes my views a tad bit clearer.
Cheers
Bill
G'day mate
Kim, all you say is true as a generality. However, the flaw in your logic is ascribing generality to particularity. Eg - Proposition: A: "Most Australians have blond hair and blue eyes." B: "I have black hair and brown eyes." A: "Well then you can't be an Australian."
However, in your polemics you admit to making this error with the qualifier "Surely, all the above points to the AIF being as caring as they could within their means."
In other words, each case is individual and needs to be dealt with as such. Hence, despite an impassioned and sentimental plea, the generality of the plea does not necessarily cover Damascus.
Now I happen to agree with your qualifier and that is the crux of my argument - Allenby and Chauvel knew ahead of time the resources they would require on the worst case scenario. They already knew the problems of captivity for the Turks - heck they had three years experience. The fact that there was persistent cholera in Damascus as reported by Dominic is interesting but only germain in the lack of planning argument. They already knew what they were facing if the staff already had this information.
The captive Turks were not part of the free population of Damascus - they were placed into a compound and thus seperated from the general population. They were guarded by Australians who by their own admission that they lacked the resources to look after them.
LC Wilson indicates that he actually hijacked the medical staff set aside to look after Turks and reallocated those assets to service the wounded from the 3rd LHB. When that event happens, it is indicative of a breakdown in planning and staff work.
No where do I claim this as deliberate, just negligent. The consequences are the same as is the culpability. It was a massive cock up because no one planned for it - pure and simple. But that doesn't make it better, it just highlights incompetence.
I hope that makes my views a tad bit clearer.
Cheers
Bill
They had a theatre of war to win, with its limitations and problems, I'd say that the AIF did the best with what they had, and what they could do. Should they have had foresight to know that they would do so well, as to overrun and take so many prisoners, that they should have been better prepared. Who does that come down to. The British CO that didn't know how good the AIF was in this field, and therefore did not plan for it, or the CO of the Aus. Forces who knew how good his men were, but couldn't get rations for his men, let alone prisoners of war.
Look at the conditions in the Jordan Valley, the prompt decision at Beersheba. These guys were winging it, because of the speed and ability of the AIF to achieve their objectives. The pace of the advance was a suprise to the Command, even if they allowed for X amount of prisoners, the actual amount must have blown them away.
To say they were negligent, casts a grey cloud over a force that were known and appreciated for their compassion, when dealing with Turkish prisoners.
I would have to see a lot more documented evidence before I would call it negligent.
Overwhelmed, yes, negligent, no.
Regards
Kim
Look at the conditions in the Jordan Valley, the prompt decision at Beersheba. These guys were winging it, because of the speed and ability of the AIF to achieve their objectives. The pace of the advance was a suprise to the Command, even if they allowed for X amount of prisoners, the actual amount must have blown them away.
To say they were negligent, casts a grey cloud over a force that were known and appreciated for their compassion, when dealing with Turkish prisoners.
I would have to see a lot more documented evidence before I would call it negligent.
Overwhelmed, yes, negligent, no.
Regards
Kim
Kim
G'day mate
The 3rd LHB captured 10,000 prisoners at Jenin. How many do you think died from cholea? None.
Over 10,000 prisoners were captured in Damascus and yet they died in the hundreds of cholera.
The question you should be addressing Kim is why this happened. Forget my conclusions and just deal with the historical event.
Then ask yourself the next question: Why was Todd successful in bringing cholera under control at this stockade?
When you answer that to your own satisfaction let us know your conclusion and the logic that brings you there.
Cheers mate
Bill
G'day mate
The 3rd LHB captured 10,000 prisoners at Jenin. How many do you think died from cholea? None.
Over 10,000 prisoners were captured in Damascus and yet they died in the hundreds of cholera.
The question you should be addressing Kim is why this happened. Forget my conclusions and just deal with the historical event.
Then ask yourself the next question: Why was Todd successful in bringing cholera under control at this stockade?
When you answer that to your own satisfaction let us know your conclusion and the logic that brings you there.
Cheers mate
Bill
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