"A GHQ note, issued by Chief of the General Staff Sir Launcelot Kiggell, on 8 May 1916 reminded the Divisions that the officers and men of the New Armies were as yet untried, and that the general quality of the army was not what it had been a year ago. The army could now only react to fixed orders and could not be expected to take appropriate tactical action at a local level. When attacking, infantry must do so in lines or waves, at least four lines deep." Taken from Chris Bakers The Long Long Trail

Looking at this statment it seems to be not accurate. Yes the new army units were generally inexpereinced however some were not without blooding 9th, 12th, 19th,21st had seen action at Loos the previous year and many had taken part in smaller actions, which whilst defensive in nature or small were still 'action'.

Whilst I admit that the regular divisions had been out since 1914 in many instances, if we take the Somme in isolation and as an attacking offensive, surely the new army divsions used had a certain amount of experience from Loos?

Did the structure of the regular and territorial divisions have more experienced soldiers in them come July 1916? Any division out since 1914 would have suffered high casualties surely?

comments please.

Arm

Perhaps Kiggell thought the plans for the advance should be standardized to suit those divisions he considered the slowest, least experienced. Though how they have been so inexperienced after 2 years training makes me wonder about the efficacy of that training. Certainly, members of 31 division considered themselves to have been largely unprepared for what they encountered on 1/7/16. Phil B

Phil,

I think he/it refers to want of shell and shot experience and in particualr moving in the advance under battle conditions. my arguement is that those that fought at Loos certainly had that!

Arm

I think the evidence is there to suggest that most had not seen any major offensive action, e.g. major battles. I also feel that the statement is talking about the troops in the line for the 1st July 1916. Yes certain Divisions had been around, for instance the 29th had been at Gallipoli, but most were untried and untested in major battles.

Look at what Rawlinson was considering with the 30th Division. He'd actually considered pulling them out of the line and replacing them with more experienced troops.

The divisions you mention didn't see any major offensive action on the 1st.

The 9th didn't see action on the first day and relieved the 30th Division on the 2nd.

The 19th were also in reserve on the first day awaiting to move towards Bapaume with the cavalry. They only moved up to the line in the afternoon.

The 12th relieved the battered 8th Division and attacked Ovillers on the 3rd July.

The 21st was also in reserve and did not take up positions around Fricourt until the 2nd.

Evidence also suggests that casualties were not high before the 1st july. Most war diaries will list maybe one or two per day, sometimes that was higher, but in the great scheme of things that was considered light.

My own Great Grandfathers battalion, the 8th Buffs also saw action at Loos on the 26th Sep 15. They were part of the ill fated 24th Division. Their casualties were so high that day that they did not see any offensive action until 1916. They spent most of their time around Ploegsteert Wood and only saw one trench raid in June of 1916, they then moved to the Somme.

On the 18th August 1916 they saw action around Guillemont and Delville Wood. Their experience there was better than Sep 15, but they still took heavy casualties and in the words of my own relative, he stated.

'Been in a carry on on the Guillemont Front. Never seen anything like it, it didn't last any more than half an hour, but the boys held on. Have been wounded in the foot and thigh...'

None of the divisions you mention have an easy time that summer, nor did any for that matter. Experience did count in certain cases, but then in most it didn't. The Somme just became a charnal house for all, German and Commonwealth.

Steve

I think the note reflects more on the mindset of many senior officers with Kigell being the example here.
Certainly a number of new army formations had 'offensive battle experience' for want of a better catch-all phrase. But probably should be remembered that these formations would have suffered fairly stiff casualties in their actions around Loos and the daily grind of warfare on the Western Front. Therefore, the need to train up drafts etc would, in all probability, have been given second place to the demands on their (i.e. the unit's) time for the essential but mundane/non infantry work of battle area preparation (logistics/road building/digging etc).
Having said that - it is my firm belief that the senior commanders did under-estimate the fighting qualities/level of intelligence of the new army formations (wide statement).

FINALLY - and this has been debated before.
In reading many unit accounts of battle, in-depth histories and (in WW2 period) the reports of psychologists, I would put forward the following relevant argument.

ON many occasions (not all by any means) soldiers/units who have experienced the true face of battle in all its horror are not necessarily the right men to launch into an all out assault. Both 51st Highland and 7th Armoured came to Normandy with (rightfully) high reputations.
However, their men felt disgruntled about being tossed into the fray again and were ALL TOO AWARE of what lay before them.

Is their merit to this argument in WW1 terms/evidence is surely out there to dismiss/reinforce this theory.

Des

The 38th (Welsh) Division went over to France early December 1915. Did a few trench raids etc. and suffered the usual front line attrition in its early days.

First big 'show' was the attack on Mametz Wood in early July 1916. In a few days fighting the Division suffered 14% (4000) of its entire casualty list for the whole of the war. It was not committed as an entire unit again until 31 July 1917 - first day of Third Ypres...so hardly a gentle reintroduction.

Bernard

Des has a big point here. Without trying not to detract that this is a WWI site and not WWII, but the 7th Armoured in Normandy also had what I consider a blase attitude. You only have to look at what happened on the 13th June 1944 at Villers Bocage to see this.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Villers-Bocage

Steve

I think if you're trying to draw a valid comparison, mentioning other wars is quite acceptable (especially when you are talking about the same nation's army).

Somewhat off topic: When I saw in the thread title column "New Army untried on the Somme" and in the adjacent last post author column "The Gunner's Dream", I could not suppress a grim smile. They go together so well...

Steve,

I did not feel the comments were directed for day one but in general for the battle, so I included those involved in the first few days.

Secondly, certainly you are right in most instances of deployment however 21st Division was in the line on 1st july, by 8.25am 64th brigade reported being across the German front line and near the Sunken road! and 50th brigade whilst not a 21st div bge was under command and in the line. 63rd and 62nd were also involved from day one.

regards
Arm

Arm,

Yep, missed that! It's my age! Although I thought they attacked from Fricourt, or are talking of another Sunken Road?

Steve

At July 1916 the men of 9th, 12th, 19th and 21st division would have felt their experiences at Loos may have qualified them as blooded. They were new army units but would have felt themselves more expereinced from Loos than other newer new army units who would go over the top with them. Whilst understanding they would not have seen as much service as the regulars.

My main point is that the phrase/comments seems to imply that the new army had not been used as yet in the war and gives an unfair representation IMO of the New army.

regards
Arm

oops , me this time, not reading the notes correctly! 9th KOYLI was in sunken road, obviously the reserve battn.

regards
Arm

Justin,

Thanks for that, again trying not to detract from the topic, The Gunners Dream, as you may know comes from this album by Pink Floyd:

The Gunner's Dream (Waters)

Floating down through the clouds
Memories come rushing up to meet me now.
In the space between the heavens
and in the corner of some foreign field
I had a dream.
I had a dream.
Good-bye Max.
Good-bye Ma.
After the service when you're walking slowly to the car
And the silver in her hair shines in the cold November air
You hear the tolling bell
And touch the silk in your lapel
And as the tear drops rise to meet the comfort of the band
You take her frail hand
And hold on to the dream.
A place to stay
"Oi! A real one ..."
Enough to eat
Somewhere old heroes shuffle safely down the street
Where you can speak out loud
About your doubts and fears
And what's more no-one ever disappears
You never hear their standard issue kicking in your door.
You can relax on both sides of the tracks
And maniacs don't blow holes in bandsmen by remote control
And everyone has recourse to the law
And no-one kills the children anymore.
And no one kills the children anymore.

Night after night
Going round and round my brain
His dream is driving me insane.
In the corner of some foreign field
The gunner sleeps tonight.
What's done is done.
We cannot just write off his final scene.
Take heed of his dream.
Take heed.

It's quite apt when you're talking about their experiences.

Steve

A small point to consider. You are right that the first service battalions took part at Loos but several of these battalions lost many officers and men, including the regular officers and NCOs that had been assigned to the battalion on its formation, not only at Loos but in the course of the attritional warfare that followed up to 1 July 1916.

Even a so-called "blooded" new army unit could be full of officers just arrived from the OTC and newly arrived reinforcements, untested and IMHO, in many cases, ill-prepared and ill-trained.

I was only going by the Official History which lists the 21st as being in reserve, but then that'll teach me to not look at other sources before posting!

I still think this was a general concern by the powers that be before the 1st July, but as Bernard points out units such as the 38th Welsh Division had a hell of a time and I feel experience meant nothing on the Somme.

Ernst Junger's own regiment was an experienced unit on the German side and his experiences at Guillemont in August of 1916 effectively saw his regiment wiped out.

http://www.juenger.org/biography_3.php

How can the best trained unit expect to operate as a cohesive unit if its been hit hard by artillery and machine gun fire?

Steve

But then surely the same could be said of the regular divisions, esp if they have seen more action, after all where did the new recruits for the regular battalions come from.

In what context do you say "ill-prepared and ill-trained". As formations or individuals. If so do you feel the training camps at home before 1916 were inadequate? Given the success of 36th, 18th, 21st and others (comparetivley) on 1st July 1916, and allowing for the positions they stromed etc, this would not bear this out, would it?

regards
Tubby

Arm - it has to be said that even Kigell makes that very point 'the quality of the army is not what it was etc'
Perhaps his quote/reference should be looked at in the overall context of the Battle itself.
It was to be (85% of it anyway) an all-British affair. Drawn up, implemented and purely in the hands of the British staff. Obviously they wanted success .. but does that sneaking feeling of 'back covering' grow in your mind the more you read such statements?
After all, the British 'new army' was officered by men who had never in their wildest dreams expected to command such awesome forces.
Perhaps the 'regualr' military mind feared the responsibility of command more than is thought?
End result - for the most part - a slow, drawnnnn outttt methodical, plodding, obvious, tedious battle plan.
Perhaps they should have given the citizen soldiers their 'head' - at least they would have stood a chance of beating the Germans in the race to the parapet?
I find myself sitting on the fence in respect to training - I've already stated that it is my belief that even with their basic training, the new armies could have been trusted to accomplish more in military terms than they were ...
But, as already stated, how much of that basic training had faded during the time when the demands on their time were more focussed on providing labour for the war machine's engineers and logisticians?

Wasn't the inexperience most marked in the Artillery, as opposed to the infantry? Due to lack of time on the front, lack of previous experience in 'big battles' and the lack of shells throughout 1915, many artillery units had yet to develop the skills required to be effective.

They failed to subdue the enemy artillery, machine guns, etc. and therefore the best trained infantry were doomed to failure.

Was the lack of effective, experienced leadership at the higher levels in the divisions also a contributory factor in forming Kiggell's view? Perhaps he thought that the senior divisional officers lacked the experience to command and control their forces effectively.

As always, more questions than answers.

I would be inclined to agree that he was making the point about inexperienced junior officers in the battalions and some inexperienced staff officers at most levels.

No matter how much training you have, nothing properly equips you for your first battle.

There is a point made in the Book, Somme The Death of a Generation, name of the author escaped me, about some of the artillery units being "amateurs" as they had little experience of firing their weapons and discipline was not all that it should have been.

Hello,

Wielding a very broad brush, its my opinion that the whole BEF, at that time, was 'untried'. The C in C had not been in post very long, Commander 4th Army had not commanded an army before and, I have read, none of the Corps Commanders had commanded their Corps in action. I don't know how much experience the CGS had at that time. Another broad brush - his time might have been better spent ensuring that his boss was better briefed when deciding the objectives for all the major stages of the campaign on the Somme in 1916.

Old Tom

At the divisional level and below there was a considerable variation of experience and, I suspect, some commanders were better than others.

Hello again,

Always was a careless typist, sorry! Old Tom should have been at the end.

Old, but not wiser, Tom

Tubby,

Noted your reply and I will respond in kind soonest.

All the best,

Knobbly

And yet, at the same time, giving assurance that "You`ll be able to light your pipes and stroll over - there won`t be a rat alive in the German trenches"? Phil B

Tubby - reply as promised. Sorry short lunch hour today and just finished writing, so apologise now for any errors.

But then surely the same could be said of the regular divisions, esp if they have seen more action, after all where did the new recruits for the regular battalions come from. Absolutely correct although I expect the regular army units may have had a moderately higher ratio of experienced regulars/reservists (officers and ORs) to volunteers compared to the new Service battalions and the slightest experience did count.

In what context do you say "ill-trained". If so do you feel the training camps at home before 1916 were inadequate? As individuals my general reflection on the position is that the men were ill-prepared and ill-trained at an individual level and at the formation level. There were of course exceptions. Looking at the training then my first observation is that their were not enough experienced instructors for the volumes of men joining the army, neither were their enough senior NCOs at battalion level to develop the training. I am sure they all spent their allotted week or three weeks etc at Musketry school, were instructed in bomb throwing etc but these were probably the only instances when recruits saw rifles or Mills grenades. I am sure we have all read of instances where men were given their own rifle virtually as they were boarding a boat for F&F. So I would conclude that there is argument that the men were ill-trained although they were very good at route marching or sticking hanging sandbags.

In what context do you say “ill-prepared”. As formations and individuals then yes the men were instructed with out-door dioramas of the location of German trenches, forward saps, wire, strong-points etc. Much good use was made of the RFC observation and photography. Yet I remain unconvinced that the men were given practical tactical instruction/exercise. We all know Rawly thought the men would be inadequate to comprehend battle tactics. (He was of course quite wrong. The ORs volunteers of these Service battalions were often extremely bright working class men, with occupations such as accountants, architects, school-masters etc.) Whether it is truth or myth concerning subalterns shot in the back by their own men, well I guess it is impossible to say it didn’t happen, but I am sure, whilst believing that many of these new subalterns were of the required standard to be officers leading men, that some were not and that some should not have been put in that position in the first place. So ill-prepared formations – I think it depended on many factors. Sometimes the answer will be “yes” and other times “not”.

As has already been mentioned – the training of the new artillery was woefully inadequate. Often with subalterns completely out of their depth leading gun crews and gunners who simply did not have the experience or the hours under their belts to be competent.

Given the success of 36th, 18th, 21st and others (comparativley) on 1st July 1916, and allowing for the positions they stormed etc, this would not bear this out, would it? I think I disagree. First of all what success? Lets take the 36th Ulster Dvn. Although this sounds harsh, it is not meant to be, but they did fail in all their objectives. The Division had in fact been poorly trained until Nugent took them over I think (and I would be happy for any 36 Div man to correct me). I believe they had high rates of various dismeanours whilst training in the UK. I do not know enough about Nugent but he was obviously some leader of men. I believe he was also lucky to have at least two very competent battalion COs amongst the first wave but I forget their names. The initial successes at the Schwaben and Thiepval were I believe, in large part due to the fact that the men had started off from a lying down position in NMLs. This meant they got to the German first line before the Germans had retaken their positions. It gave them a fighting chance and the men of the 36 Dvn showed just what could be achieved. Regrettably, due to the fact that counter-battery work had been minimal in this sector (ill-prepared by the Corps Commander and his MGRA!) the German guns behind Pozieres pounded NML so that the first wave could not be reinforced. As we know, after holding out for considerable time, the men of the 36 Div had to retire after enduring enfilade fire and heavy shelling. All in all, I would say the attack failed due to poor preparation at a formation level.

18 Div were very fortunate for two reasons. Firstly, they had Maxse, secondly, they had the benefit of the French 75s. The French 75s reduced German artillery work in this sector to virtually nil. Was it Maxse that dug the tunnels or pits out into NML so that as with the 36 Ulster Dvn the men were able to be in the German trenches before the Germans could react once the shelling stopped. Also Maxse was able to send his second wave immediately on the heels of the first wave, adding weight and momentum to his offensive. Despite this early success the 18 Div obtained no more than their first objective. I would say any successes were owed largely to Maxse understanding how to conduct an offensive on the WF and of course, the accurate counter-battery and preparation work of the experienced gun crews on the French 75s. To be honest, I doubt training back in Blighty had little to do with any successes the 18 Div are perceived to have had.

21st at Fricourt. Wasnt that decimated 10/West Yorks part of 21 Div? I don’t know much about 21 Div I am afraid. The troops did have the benefit of a creeping barrage so they only had 50 or 100 yds to move to the German first line when the barrage lifted. Also, I think again, the counter-battery preparation had silenced the German guns. There were also diversionary mines to confuse the Germans. I guess this is one example of where the division were blessed with artillery preparation from experienced gun teams rather than any training back in Blighty, which I assume would have been the same training conducted by the men at Gommecourt, Serre, Beaumont Hamel etc.

Apart from perceived success on the opening day of the Somme battle, the 36, 18 and 21 Divs also shared one other similarity. They all sustained high casualties. And this brings me on to my new thoughts concerning the learning curve or learning process. Learning for whom? This so-called blooding of the new battalions at the Somme didn’t, as far as I can see, do much for the learning process of the men of the Newfoundland Regiment at Beaumont Hamel, the 10 West Yorks etc. Not many of the men of those battalions learnt much on 1st July, neither did there training back in Blighty do them much good.

Nugent did kick out a number of officers who he regarded as over-age, unreliable and a few 'political appointees'.
With regards to high rates of misdemeanours ... aside from some issues with the Belfast Brigade which was sent 'on attachment' to, I think, ?4th Division? to 'tighten them up' , I would honestly say that I have read of very few misdemeanours. B the way, it is said that the Belfast boys would have been quite happy to stay with their new comrades but it was decided to bring them back into the Divisional family. Others may view this transfer as just a training exercise but I do believe it was a 'sort 'em out' episode.
There is a book out there on the subject of discipline in the irish divisions in WW1 ... which may either blow me out of the water (entirely possible!) or roughly agree with my view.
With regard to training - I think it would be fair to say that the 36th (as did all formations) did the best with what they had to hand. Former UVF men who 'could shoot the eye out of a crow with a Mauser or steyr' had to retrain with the SMLE and at first disliked the weapon.
However, I do think Kitchener's remark that they were the 'best new army formation' he had seen when he reviewed them at Seaforde should not be dismissed as mere hype.
Nugent was a very tough leader. The CO of 108 Brigade had to re-assure regulars of the 2nd Rifles when they were transferred into the Division about Nugent's personality.
It was explained that Nugent was not a man for extravagant praise in any circumstances - and was not up for chat for chat's sake.
He is said to have peeved quite a few of the 1st July survivors by telling them: "The Division has done well .. but it could have done better."
At least one soldier rememebered those words until his death: "Many of us thought him anything but a gentleman," he is recorded as saying.
Having said all that, there is no doubt that it was efficient, businesslike Nugent who truly moulded the formation into a (IMHO) one of the best Divs on Western Front.

Aside from that, the synopsis of the 36th's attack is perfectly accurate in my view. They simply won the race to the parapet. Top class essay. Have a gold star.

Jonathan & Des,

excellent contributions. Thank you.

Hello,

I would agree that 18 Div had the advantage of having French artillery operating on their right on 1 July 1916 but I doubt they were 75mms.
It is recorded that a round from a heavy French piece destroyed a German artillery command post and that would have helped.

Old Tom

Mine is badly worded as I did not have time to re-read or correct in my haste to get something posted in reply, and I apologise to all.

Des - my only source for this is my memory of a talk given by an Irish historian on the Great War that I attended at Kent U last summer. I am sure he said that prior to Nugent taking over, the Division had been troublesome and actually gave figures of crimes of all nature committed to illustrate his point. I did take notes but could not find them when frantically searching this morning before leaving for work (as I knew I would be using this point), otherwise I would provide further details. Your findings might well be right.

Tom I expect your right. Almost certainly there would have been heavier artillery pieces used. I am sure the 75s were just the predominant artillery piece in the sector at the time, or rather I hope so or I have errored - not for the first time, but I think my sentiments are correct in that the experienced French artillery gave 18 Div a distinct advantage.

Jonathan - I think the book is 'Irish Regiments in the Great War - Discipline and Morale'.
Sadly I don't have it cos it costs a bleedin' fortune .. well £40!
However, forum member Rob Elliott provided these quotes from the book in another debate. I realise this is just a sample.
Don't get me wrong, I believe the Division (or certain units within it) had poor officers until Nugent cleared them out. I think you are correct to point that out in the context of the overall debate on the new armies issue.

Some facts regarding the sobrierty of Members of the 36th, in comparison of Courts Marshalls for drunkenness between Battalions of the Division and other Irish units.

1st October 1916 to 28th February 1918.Tried for drunkenness.Total courts martial offences in brackets.

REGULARS

1st Inniskilling Fusiliers - 15 [total offences for this period-63]
2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers-19 [93]

36th DIVISION

10th Inniskillings-4 [24]
14th Royal Irish Rifles -4 [18]
9th Royal irish rifles-9 [19]

The three Battalions combined compare with one battalion of regulars. With the 9th rifles supposedly being the most undisciplined of the 36th coming from the Industrial heart of West Belfast [Shankill Road].

Quote from the 'IRISH REGIMENTS IN THE GREAT WAR-DISCIPLINE AND MORALE'.
'A final point worth stressing in regard to courts martial figures is that battalions of the 36th [ULSTER] Division generally had fewer men tried by courts martial than their counterparts in the 16th [IRISH] Division'.

Jonathan, you describe the achievements on the British right flank of the July 1 offensive as 'perceived success'. Do you mean that these achievements were really failures? I don't think you mean that. As we have discussed before, the artillery support made a big difference, both in the build up to the assault in this sector, as well as on the day. It is not appropriate to say that the French were the key, though it is appropriate to acknowledge that French artillery played a role in supporting the British artillery, which was handled differently from their counterparts in other areas of the battlefield. Which brings me to my next point.

It was not, in my opinion, an infantry training issue (or lack thereof) that was significant on July 1. Even highly trained troops cannot sustain an advance into killing zones where machine guns are unsuppressed and enemy artillery is not subdued - whether the advance be conducted at the run, at the walk, in waves or in blobs.

Robert

And in the last paragraph there is a great deal of truth.

Robert - I meant by perceived success that very little was gained in the way of first day objectives as set by the authority of Haig. My comments are not meant to reflect badly in anyway on the PBI.

Re French artillery, I think I would have sooner been in 18 Div than say 29 Div.

On training, I agree with you that highly trained troops can do nothing against existing MG positions and enemy bombardment and I thought I had, in my own way, touched on that with my ending sentence. However I was tasked with agreeing or disagreeing with the comment that the comparative success (for want of a better expression in view if their high casualty figures) of 36, 21 and 18 Div was due, significantly, because of their training and preparation. I agree with this only to the extent of how they were led, and by whom they were led, and how training was conducted at the local level, not pre-embarkation training they received in the UK.

Regards,

Jon

Robert - I am sorry I also meant to say that, and I think we have discussed this before, the consideration given to counter-battery work, or rather the lack of consideration, building up to 1 July still leaves me speechless.

Des - many thanks for pointing this out. As you will be aware my intention was not to cast aspersion on the 36 Div but to use this example in good faith to help illustrate a point.

Regards,

Jon

Absolutely J - no problem on that score at all.
By the way, I was referring to Robert's last paragraph!

Except that if the instruction had been " Get across nomansland and into the German front line as quickly as possible - we`ll delegate particularly fast, lightly loaded men specifically to lead", the results could have been vastly different. Is that an infantry training issue? Well, partly, yes? Phil B

At a talk I attended given by Richard Holmes recently he emphasised that the troops went over heavily laden to reverse the trenches (digging a fire step that looked into the GERMAN lines rather than our own).

They took posts and wire to wire the new parapet etc. plus all the other bits and bobs they would need to repel what RH said was the determined counter attack that would soon come. Until that was done RH contended that the Germans would simply bomb down the trench from open ground as our holding troops would be largely below the level of the unadapted trench and unable to bring their fire to bear.

I recall John Terraine telling us that during the Somme battle (July - November 1916) he counted documentary evidence of over 300 local German counter attacks.

I'm not sure how this info balances against Phil B's option of 'fast lightly loaded men to lead'. How many and would it be enough is the question I guess?

Bernard

Withe benefit of hindsight, which option would you take, Bernard? I`d be for letting the fast guys get in quickly and the heavy gang follow as they could. The chances of getting trench reversal material across must be hugely increased if the MGs are silenced. Phil B

Hello,

A lot of interesting points. I wonder if I may expand a little on my broad brush view expressed above. It seems to be generally accepted that a major failure on the first day (and a few other times during the campaign) that the artillery were tasked to destroy targets beyond their capability. The basis of the 'bite and hold' versus 'breakthrough' discussions. The point is how many shells of what size due you need to deal with a given length of trench (a length that is doubled if you go for the first and second line trenches) and to destroy the enemy artillery behind his line. I would have thought that by that time the artillery staff should have been able to resolve that sort of question. But, as I said they were all either not trained as staff officers or grappling with much larger forces than had been envisaged pre-war.

These decisions were, I think, matters for the Corps HQs who should have been able, as a staff rather than command issue, to have ensured that the Commanders set achievable tasks. I read somewhere that when General Birch, Haig's artillery adviser arrived at the HQ he found that his staff did not know where all the available artillery was deployed, I suppose that must have been when the Somme offensive was being planned.

I have not come across any accounts of how the higher HQs conducted their business but there must have been considerable failures in artillery planning.

In the first half of 1916 a lot of officers had still a lot to learn.

Old Tom

Good words Tom.

Phil B - I wouldn't claim to be an expert but I reckon that once you're in an enemy trench its not the machine guns that you worry about but the Germans that (maybe) you can't see approaching the trench with a view to dropping a few bombs in. And, of course, you're below the level of the (unreversed) parapet and fairly helpless to that sort of attack.

I dare say the counter barrage from the Germans will play havoc with the heavily laden guys trundling across when the line of attack is now obvious.

No easy answers, and I'd hate to have been an attacker or even a General trying to outguess the enemy response.

Bernard

Knobbly,

Your comments are as usual well constructed. With in many instances valid conclusions. 18th div did have the advantage of French artillery. 36th did end up back at go, not necesserilly their fault mind!, and yes 21st div did suffer heavy casualties. Regardless they did gain some success, where regular divisions did not.

As for individual training, this was true also of the army in WW2. The German army was well equiped for a private to do a sergeants job and so on, the British army were not, so again I find myself agreeing with you, and perhaps this is what Kiggel was about.

My point is that the new army divisions did on the whole better then the regular or territorial divisions. The exception maybe some of the bantam divisions who incidently were very new to the front. It is noticable that 21st, 18th, 9th, 12th, were out in France for sometime. The bantam divs were not particualrly. (I am not just talking about 1st july here but the somme in general, 41st div under Lawford were involved in two attacks, new to the front and had some success in both battles)

Another factor especially for 21st, was that it had been baptised already and as a result on 1st July it had in its troops, 1st Lincolns and 1st East yorks, which had joined in nov 1915. Sent after the debacle of Loos, I am sure to stiffen them.

It had on 1st july just handed over command to Campbell, who was a regular, straight talking, calm thinking soldier, who coincidently believed that the plans for artillery etc on day one were wrong and that he could have done it better, if he had been given the chance. Its brigades were commanded by Rawling, who on 3rd July used initiative and abilty in the action at Shelter Wood. 64th bgde was commanded by Headlan who was to stay for just over two years and was a quietly competant commander. Campbell adopted a chain of command that devolved responsibility to his brigade commanders, as did 18th div.

21st had also been nursed back to health by Claude Jacob, who commanded after Loos and before Campbell. He seems to have installed not just soldierly qualties in the men but took a concern for their care.

What I think is that in many instances the older New Army divs had been baptised and had been in theatre long enough to get used to the conditions, they had exchanged some battalions to help stiffen the resolve and I think that whilst the regular divs had possibly more 'regular' officers and perhaps other ranks, it is not as marked as one would think.

Another concept perhaps is to consider the man in command. Were the men who commanded New Army divisions, the more recent risers to command, men who had won there spurs in 14/15 as colonels and brigade commanders, in comparision to regulars who were more senior officers. (I have not done any research on this as I write, so it may be bull) Certainly Maxse had been Brigade in 1914, Campbell had been Colonel 9th lancers. or perhaps it just comes down to a bit of luck who commanded. I think Maxse and Campbell were two of the best divisional commanders of the war.

Artillery, well Corps drove most of this I think so perhaps if its all about artillery then its down not to the divisions but the corps commander?

As for Success, well i guess that comes down to how you judge success, I would say not neceserilly taking some or all of their objectives but success in this instances as who achieved the most.

Not sure this has answered your comments, not lunch either, just tired!

regards
Tubby

Ps, picky I know but 10th W Yorks were 50th brigade, part of 17th div, however I will conceed that at the time they were attached to 21st div.

Actually to go back to the beginning and Kiggells words, it occurs to me that I am taking his words as to the new army divisions and not battalions on their own. Looking at 7th regular division on 1st July they contained,

8th devons
9th devons
20th Manchesters
21st Manchester
22nd Manchesters

Thats just under half of their compliment who were New Army men!

Kiggells actually says "reminded the Divisions that the officers and men of the New Armies were as yet untried, and that the general quality of the army was not what it had been a year ago." Whilst this would not necesserily true of all new army units, it does not always imply he meant divisions and not the thinning out of regular divisions by new army units.

regards
Arm

Lonnie – apologies I thought your point had moved to training, I probably need to go back to the beginning of the thread and read it all again. I would agree with you that the new army divisions were certainly no worse than the regular army divisions. Obviously both regular and service battalions were, at this stage (commencement of Somme) made up mainly of volunteers.

Also agree that the role of good command, preferably at Division level but also at Brigade and Battalion level, and sometimes company and platoon, was instrumental in any successes – certainly for some, such as the men of 18 Div, it was the difference between life and death and it could be described as luck in having the right Divisional commander, in the case of 18 Div, Maxse.

Also agree that artillery was down to Corps command and higher ie. C-in-C. The C-in-C had a duty to ensure that his Corps commanders knew what was expected of their artillery (MGRAs). Apparently very little was expected in the way of counter-battery work on the Somme.

I have seen this view put forward by Prior and Wilson. I disagree. Other battles in the campaign, as well as the likes of Cambrai, showed that 'hurricane' bombardments of sufficient intensity were quite adequate in enabling infantry to get forward and successfully take objectives, provided wire was cut or breached by tanks. The days-long preparatory bombardment aimed at knocking out trenches, strongpoints, etc was, in terms of the direct effect of artillery, neither here-nor-there in determining the outcome of the infantry advances on 1st July.

Prior and Wilson also make much of the weight of shells, comparing the Somme with Neuve Chapelle for example. Again, I think this is a red herring. The timing was much much more significant IMHO. Thus, the same weight of shells applied on day one (minus those needed to cut wire) as protective barrages that did not lift until the last moment could have made a big difference.

Robert

It was not the role of the C-in-C to dictate exactly how the bombardment was to proceed. The C-in-C did raise questions with Rawlinson. The latter originally recommended a longer bombardment. On 12th April 1916, Haig commented:

'As regards artillery preparation, the possibility of surprising the enemy and the effect on his morale both seem likely to be greater as a result of a comparatively short intensive bombardment immediately preceding the assault than if the bombardment is spread over a longer period. Your further consideration to this question is therefore desireable'.

Haig understood the importance of the hurricane bombardment. Rawlinson replied (19th April):

'As regards the actual length of bombardment preceding the assault, this must depend on the following factors:-

a. Action of the French
b. The amount of ammunition available when offensive operations begin
c. The length of time the gun detachments can work at high pressure without danger of breaking down.

As regards b. and c. we must bear in mind that the preliminary bombardment is only the first phase of two to three weeks sustained operations. I propose to go into this matter more fully before deciding the actual length of the bombardment.'

It was Haig's job as C-in-C to ensure that Rawlinson knew how much extra artillery he would have control over, as well as the ammunition supply. Haig provided this information, for example in the reply of 27th May he noted 'the allotment in ammunition for the Fourth Army includes preliminary operations, bombardment, day of assault, and 13 days subsequent fighting'.

Rawlinson decided on a longer bombardment. The Army issued the 'Artillery programme of preliminary bombardment' on 5th June, 1916. It was the Army's responsibility to identify the broad tasks and the timetable. The tasks were:

"Bombardment - Trench system, fortified localities and strong points, OPs and Machine Gun emplacements, water supply, etc.
Bombardment - billets.
Shelling of - Communications, approaches, railways, working parties, etc with the object of preventing replenishment of ammunition, food and water.
Counter Battery work [my emphasis]
Wire cutting...
Smoke barrages...
P bombs and candles...
Flammenwerfer...
Gas..."

Fourth Army specified counter battery work as a task. It was to be 'very active' on U, V, W, X, Y and Z Days, with the additional instruction that on Z Day there would be 'concentration of gas shells on hostile gun positions before the assault'. The General Instructions for counter-battery work were:

'Special batteries detailed for the destruction of hostile artillery personnel and material and the neutralization of fire in conjunction with aircraft.'

Very clear, but general, instructions - as you would expect from an Army command.

Simpson noted in his book 'Directing Operations' that the Fourth Army plan followed months of discussions and planning within the corps and divisions. The latter did contribute fire plans, which centred on the tasks for divisional artillery. Counter-battery work typically fell outside the scope of divisions. At the Army conference on 16th April, Rawlinson noted 'counter-battery work is becoming more and more important'.

I have not seen the details of all corps artillery plans. Those that I have seen all include reference to the counter-battery task. For example, XIII Corps assigned 29th HAG (4 batteries of 60 pounders, 1 battery of 4.7" guns, and 1 battery of 4.5" guns) to counter-battery work. No doubt these guns were 'very active' throughout the timetable, and reported as such. No doubt they fired gas shells on Z Day too. And reported same. So the instructions were carried out. The question that I cannot answer is what did GOCRAs base their allocations on? What experiences, and other information, were used when making their decisions?

Two issues therefore stand out. There was no clear consensus about how long an artillery bombardment should be continued. Second, there was no clear consensus on what constituted counter-battery work. The root causes of these issues do not lie with the inability of highest level commanders to specify that CB was needed.

Robert

In the past, I have presented the thesis that the success of commanders like Maxse on the British right, as well as the success of their French neighbours to the south, was highly dependent on what happened to the north, for example around Thiepval and further north at Gommecourt. The significant British build-up and attacks, which failed, caused the Germans to focus most of their attention in these areas. The area around Thiepval was very important as a lynchpin in the German defence of the ridge. Gommecourt was an obvious salient. Divisional, corps and even army commanders were not responsible for the plan that facilitated the success in the south by focusing attention elsewhere. Even if you regard the British 'success' on the right as minor, it must be seen in the context of the very significant French advance that took place on the shoulder of the British right flank. Writers too often ignore this achievement, which is not to say that the British losses should be ignored.

Robert

Robert - this is where we differ. If Haig had not concerned himself as closely as he did with Rawlinson's plan and had not insisted on changes to the overall plan of attack as I believe he did (I know your opinion differs), I might sympathise with your view. From my reading it appears clear that no direct instructions were given concerning counter-battery work other than some effort should be made.

To quote Hart in his writing on the counter battery work he states "One corps allocated only derisory numbers of shells - as few as six in one case - to deal with target batteries. There was no overall understanding of the absolute necessity for pinpoint accuracy in counter battery fire ..."

My reading suggests that roughly 50% of the casualties on 1 July were caused by German shelling. That is just under 30,000 casualties. The Corps commanders must take their share of the blame that the German guns were able to inflict such heavy losses but IMHO the buck stops with Haig.

Regards,

Jon