Good stuff Harry.

Roop

Harry

G'day mate

"Abteilung Kraut"

You gotta love that name - plenty of chuckles over it.

Cheers

Bill

Harry

Lieutenant Edwin Arthur Eden was awarded an MC during the East African campaign (London Gazette #29639, dated 26th June 1916), coincidentally? it appears in the same Gazette as Capt. E. E. Froneman's (12th S.A. Infantry).

Lt. Edwin Arthur Eden, E.A. Vol. Arty.
(attd. 28th Ind. Mnt. By.).
Capt. Everil Edwin Froneman, 12th S.A. Infy.

I haven't managed to find a citation for his award and was wondering if, in your opinion, it was awarded for this action?

Steve

Steve
Thanks for that info - I hadn't seen it.

Both lads also get MiDs in LG #29648.

What interests me is that Lt Edwin Arthur Eden was from the East African Volunteer Artillery, & was not RA.

As Lt Eden is not mentioned again for gallant action in Graham's history I am pretty sure that both MCs were for the Rasthaus fight.

Please advise when you find the citations (& any other East African citations).

Harry

On 14 March 1st Division had arrived from Longido (see OH Sketches 22 & 23), four days behind Smuts’ tight schedule, & reached Moshi, where 1 KAR took six casualties when the South African Horse opened fire on them. 1 KAR retaliated with maxim fire until the sight of a couple of Union Jacks, & some verbal persuasion, halted the South African fire.

1st Division had failed to cut-off the German forces south of Kilima Njaro, having had problems with its mounted troops as it traversed the western slopes of the mountain.

In Moshi the divisional commander, Brigadier-General James M. Stewart, observed:
“Every house in Moshi, whether enemy or neutral, was looted by the South Africans & much wanton destruction occurred. New typewriters were smashed, every locked drawer was forced & their contents scattered. A party of the Royal Fusiliers, finding the railway safe resisted their efforts were found trying to blow it up with dynamite.”

Lt-Gen Smuts dismissed Brig-Gen Stewart from his command without enquiring too deeply into the reasons for 1st Division’s delay in arriving at Moshi. This was hard on Stewart, who was sound but cautious. (Stewart commanded in Aden for the remainder of the war.)

Smuts was new & impatient & he & his South African senior officers had not yet learned the realities of bush warfare, particularly the problems encountered whilst trying to coordinate wide flanking movements with columns advancing more directly.

Smuts also very justifiably dismissed Brig-Gen Malleson (he could not prevent Malleson’s promotion to Major-General which Tighe had requested) for “defective leadership in the field”, after his performance in the early stages of the Latema-Reata Nek battle.
Major-General Tighe was not dismissed but was recalled to India.

The following month a number of “dud” Indian Army Colonels & Lt-Colonels were also sent back to India. They had progressed through their military careers without either seeing serious action as commanders or training & preparing for such an event. They had only been sent to East Africa because Indian Army HQ was scraping the bottom of the barrel, due to its long list of priority commitments elsewhere.

(Lt-Col Jourdain, CO 2nd Loyal North Lancashires, wrote in his War Diary: “A good riddance to bad rubbish.”)

PERSONAL COMMENT:
Not all Indian Army officers & units in East Africa were incapable, & some were very capable (eg: the Mountain Batteries, Railway Companies & some infantry battalions). I believe that the Indian Army deserves more credit & historical attention for what it did achieve & for the sacrifices it made during the campaign.

On 17 March 1916 the East African Mounted Rifles, part of 1st Division, moved south from Moshi – “…every house had been rifled & gutted, everything destroyed…â€� - towards Kahe, but on 19 March the unit was stopped in thick bush by the Schutztruppe at Masai Kraal.

Brigadier-General S.H. Sheppard, commanding 2nd East African Brigade, sent the 129th Baluchis forward.

The EAMR historian wrote:

“Thereafter we sat tight, our advance squadron extended along the edge of the bush, firing on the enemy across the clearing and being fired on in return.
The E.A.M.R. had been told to hold this position so as to cover the' flank of the 3rd South African Infantry Brigade, which was forcing its way towards Kahe somewhere in the bush on our left. So we lay all that day, face to face with the enemy, exchanging occasional shots; until, in the afternoon, down our road there came trailing a long line of Indian soldiers, the 129th Baluchis.

At their head walked a Brigadier. "They say you have reported that you are in touch with the enemy," said he, with a touch of scepticism in his voice. " That is so," replied our C.O. "And where might this enemy be?" said the Brigadier, still inclined to be supercilious. "Pass right on down the path," said the C.O., " and you will find out." With which the infantry passed on, and at the very moment that they emerged into the clearing the Germans opened up a heavy fire and advanced to the attack.

The leading Company of the Baluchis was just in time to extend at the double, and with a counter-blast of rifle fire drove the Germans back into the bush.

The infantry had arrived in the nick of time to save the situation; for our mounted men would have stood a very poor chance in that dense bush against the determined attack which the enemy was in the act of delivering.

We were very glad to ride back along the trail, leaving further proceedings to the safe care of the foot soldiers who were swarming onwards past us in an interminable stream like safari ants.�

The EAMR historian writes:
“During that day an unfortunate & tragic accident occurred. An enemy patrol sneaked up on the far side of the river, & surprised a watering party of our men. There was a sudden burst of firing, a general scatter of men & animals & then silence. The roll was called, & nobody found missing from any of the squadrons.

Late in the evening it was discovered that Trooper N.M. Gibbs, the Colonel’s orderly, had not been seen since the watering party had been surprised.

It was full moon that night, & when the moon had risen, a small party went across the river to search for the missing man, but without success. It was not till the next day that his body was found under the bank of the river, where he had been shot down while bathing.”

Noel Gibbs was initially buried at Store, where the 2nd East African Brigade was digging-in, & later moved to Moshi CWGC Cemetery.

From the Official History:
“At Store the defences of the 2nd East African Brigade were strengthened, & a company of the 29th Punjabis was put out as outposts. In the evening the famous scout Pretorius brought warning that the enemy was massing for attack.

About 10 pm to the accompaniment of bugles & cheering, a violent German onslaught was launched on the outpost line, which Brig-Gen Sheppard at once reinforced with one & a half companies of 129 Baluch & details which brought the defences up to about the strength of a battalion, with three machine guns.

During the next two hours the Germans charged no less than five times across the cleared field of fire, 100 yards wide, one rush coming within ten yards of the line, in a manner which evoked admiration from the British troops; but each attempt was broken by the unshaken steadiness of the defence, & towards 1 am the enemy drew off.”

The British took 33 casualties & it is believed that the Schutztruppe lost over 70 men out of an attacking force of over 500. Both sides had underestimated the strength of their opponents.

This was a night of hard infantry fighting on both sides – junior leaders & machine gunners being immediately replaced as they were shot down, CSMs & CQMSs constantly supplying ammunition, water & supplies forward, & bearer parties risking their own safety as they evacuated casualties from the line.

The British artillery did not fire that night.

THE BATTLE ON THE LINE OF THE SOKO NASSAI RIVER

A brief outline of the battle was posted in:
http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=686836

British Scouts advised that the Schutztruppe was defending a river line east of Kahe.
This was assumed to be the Ruvu River which ran west from Lake Jipe.
The British artillery ranged on the Ruvu in anticipation.

In fact Abteilung Stemmerman was dug-in 1,000 yards to the north, along the north bank of the Soko Nassai River, east of where it joined the Defa (or Rau) River.

To the left Abteilung Bock defended the northwest approach to Kahe Station, & to the right Abteilung Schulz waited south of Rantzier Hill, covering the east bank of the Himo River. Kornatski’s reserve troops were positioned in Kahe village, just behind Stemmerman’s trenches.

Otto, Adler & Kraut were in position between Rasthaus & the North Pare Mountains, ready to block any move by the British 2nd Division from Taveta.

Harry

Would you care to expand?, sounds interesting.

Steve

Steve
Yes I will post some images.
I spent a couple of days on & around this battlefield & became very interested in it.
Normally you associate defence with the holding of dominating ground such as hills, but here the Schutztruppe effectively used low ground in front of a river.

This battle does not receive much attention from historians but, coming just after the set-piece encounter on Latema-Reata Nek, the Soko action established patterns for future actions by both sides.
It wasn't until the battle at Mahiwa - Nyangao in October 1917 (see Post: http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...t&p=782419) that so many troops on both sides confronted each other in one area.

Lt Eden & Captain Froneham
I tried to find their MC citations on LG but couldn't (the OC Mounted Infantry Coy George Atkinson's citation probably appears in the same supplement).
However Lt Eden gained a Bar to his MC in 1918, & he was still a member of the EA Vol Arty.
Capt Froneham transferred into the RFC.

Harry

Lt-Gen Smuts’ Chief Scout, Major Piet J. Pretorious, CMG, DSO & Bar, wrote:

“General von Lettow-Vorbeck ably extricated his forces in the Kilimanjaro area, & they straddled the railway-line all the way down to Kahe, about seven miles distant.

As they went a whole regiment of men pulled up the rails, taking away the fish-plates & bolts & sometimes dynamiting entire sections of the line. The bolts & fish-plates must have been thrown in the river, as we never discovered them; so in spite of our having captured it, the railway was of no use to us.

For eight days I was away hidden in the bush, watching them ripping up the line, & ascertaining the enemy strength & disposition.”

Abteilung Bock had dug defensive positions just north of Kahe station (see OH Sketch 27).

Lt-Gen Smuts tasked Brig-Gen J.L. van Deventer with taking his four South African mounted regiments (the 1st, 2nd, 3rd & 4th South African Horse with Nos 2 & 4 Batteries, South African Field Artillery) on a right-flanking move to cross the Usambara Railway southeast of Kahe & prevent a withdrawal by the Schutztruppe (see OH Sketch 26). Van Deventer moved in the evening of 20 March.

1 King’s African Rifles had reconnoitered van Deventer’s route.

(3 King’s African Rifles were working on the eastern flank, securing locations in between Lake Jipe & Rasthaus.)

Brig-Gen Sheppard, the commander of 2nd East African Brigade, was temporarily given command of 1st Division (in place of the dismissed Stewart).

The 2nd South African Brigade (Infantry) containing 5th, 6th, 7th & 8th South African Infantry, was placed in 1st Division under Sheppard.

Once Smuts knew that van Deventer’s column was moving he ordered Sheppard to advance south on Kahe using the road east of the Defa River as his axis.

But just before reaching the raised north bank of the Soko (along the treeline, where the Schutztruppe trenches were) a cleared area formed a natural killing ground for the defenders.

From the Official History:
“Immediately in front (of the enemy’s position) was a belt of relatively open ground from 800 to 1,600 yards wide, covered by machine guns sited both frontally & on the nearer banks of the Soko Nassai on the right flank.”

The German trenches were facing the camera, concealed in the vegetation.

The palm trees are growing on the river bank, which is behind & a few feet below the level of the trenches.
The North Pare Mountains are in the background.

From the Official History:
“About 12.40 pm the leading troops debouched into the open grass-land, beyond which was dense undergrowth evidently fringing a river & strongly held.

This was totally unexpected, it having been assumed that the enemy was holding the right bank of the Ruvu.”

From the Official History:
“The attacking troops were thus confined in a narrowing tongue of ground bounded by rivers which were not only wider & deeper than was expected, but full of crocodiles.”

Nothing has changed. Crocodiles still snatch humans & animals in the Defa River.

This anti-crocodile cattle watering point has been constructed by villagers at Store.

The track in the foreground is 1st Division’s axis of advance.

The line of trees in the background marks the Defa River running north to the right.

The 2nd South African Infantry Brigade, commanded by Lt. Col. Taylor, advanced on the far side of the track, coming from right to left.

The 6th & 8th South African Infantry led, each deployed on a two-platoon frontage.
7th South African Infantry followed in support.

South African Casualties
On or adjacent to the ground in the image the 2nd South African Brigade lost these men killed in action or died of wounds:

6th South African Infantry

Company Quartermaster Sergeant Thomas Fitzgerald, Lieutenant Arthur Morton Goodall, Private Paul Berry King, Private William Arnold Selkirk Kinsey, Private William Edward Pate, Private Frank Spencer, Private (Signaller) Robert Millar Wylie.

8th South African Infantry

Lance Corporal George Henry Andrews, Private Joseph Barker, Private William Benecke, Private Frans Jacobus Fourie, Private George Fowler, Private Daniel Jones, Private John Smart Lyons, Private Herbert William McCarthy, Private James Meneely, Lance Corporal James Syme Morton, Private Harold Olsen, Private Clement Cliff Reed, Lieutenant Matthias Aitken Rodda, Private Charles Smith, Lance Corporal Walter Aubrey Smith, Private William Symons, Private Henry Richard Terry, Private Bernard Robert Louis Verbeek.

Those killed in action were first buried at Soko Nassai & those died of wounds were buried at Store. After the war all were moved to Moshi CWGC Cemetery.

NOTE
Some of the names differ slightly from the CWGC records, but I have used James Ambrose Brown’s “They Fought for King & Kaiser” as the authority, as his Appendix D re-prints a list from “The Nongquai”, the official South African Services Magazine, published on 1st March 1917.

The treeline marks the Soko River.

Stemmerman’s defence line crossed the Soko on the right of this image.

The 2nd East African Brigade, commanded by Lt. Col. J.A. Hannyngton, advanced towards this position but was halted by Stemmerman’s machine guns.

The 29th Punjabis led the advance, supported by the 129th Baluchis.

A section (two guns) of the 27th Mountain Battery followed the Baluchis in close support.

In reserve were 25th Royal Fusiliers & 1 KAR, & also the 5th South African Infantry.

From the Official History:
“Heavy fire was at once opened by the Germans, against which, in spite of valiant efforts by the 29th Punjabis & the 8th South African Infantry, assisted by guns of the 27th Mountain Battery, brought up into the firing line, it was found impossible to cross the open ground.”

A double-company of 29th Punjabis then moved east (to the right of this picture) & crossed the Soko with difficulty, but when it turned south to regain the axis it was halted again by the extension of Stemmerman’s trenches east of the Soko. (See OH Sketch 27).

A company of 129th Baluchis then crossed the Soko to join the Punjabis but was itself halted when its machine gun jammed during a rush on the German trenches.

As Sheppard feared an enemy counter-attack he brought up from reserve the 25th Royal Fusiliers & the 5th South African Infantry, & he recalled the Punjabi & Baluchi companies back across the Soko. 1st Division was ordered to dig-in where it was.

(Abteilung Schulz was tasked with counter-attacking 1st Division on its left (eastern) flank, but Schulz’s men were so delayed by the thickness of the bush east of the Soko that the attempt was abandoned.)

British European casualties in 2nd East African Brigade:

On or adjacent to the ground in the image the 25th Royal Fusiliers had two men killed in action:
Lance Serjeant R. Ferguson and Lance Corporal A . Harrison.
The battalion also had 12 men wounded & 3 with “slight scratches”.

5th South African Infantry lost Private George Fleming killed in action.

The 29th Punjabis lost Lieutenant H.G.R.B. Scott killed in action.

The dead were buried at Soko Nassai & later moved to Moshi CWGC Cemetery.

The Soko river & the German trenches are marked by the line of trees on the horizon.

This is probably as far forward as the British Divisional tactical headquarters came. We are about 1500 yards from the Schutztruppe positions in the treeline.

Two British armoured cars provided fire support from the road which was the Divisional axis of advance. No doubt they attracted a lot of enemy fire.

Captain Harry Thomson Whybrow, Machine Gun Corps (Motors), died of wounds on 21 March. He would have been buried at Store & then moved to Moshi CWGC Cemetery after the war.

Total British casualties on 21 March 1916 were:

European: 24 killed in action & 144 wounded in action

Indian: 13 killed in action, 77 wounded in action & 3 missing in action.

(The total British casualty figure is only a dozen or so less than the Latema-Reata Nek casualty figure, yet this Soko River battle has only been of very limited interest to historians.)

British Artillery in action at Soko on 21st March 1916 was:

27th Mountain Battery – six 10-pdr guns, with mules. (Indian Army)
No 1 Battery South African Field Artillery – four 13-pdr Quick Firing guns, with mules & horses.
No 3 Battery South African Field Artillery - four 13-pdr Quick Firing guns, with mules & horses.
No 12 (Howitzer) Battery – two 5-inch Breech Loading howitzers, with mules. British Royal Garrison Artillery gunners from the Cape, South Africa.

Artillery casualties & expenditures:
27th Mountain Battery fired 292 rounds. 8 men & 6 mules were wounded in action.
Nos 1 & 3 SA Fd Batteries fired 399 rounds between them. No 1 Battery had 1 man slightly wounded.
No 12 (Howitzer) Battery came into action on the east of the road that was the Divisional axis (the other 3 batteries were on the west side apart from one section of the Mountain Battery that was also on the east side). No 12 Battery fired less than 50 rounds & took no casualties. Owing to lack of targets this battery was withdrawn at 1500 hours.

All guns of 27th Mountain Battery were deployed well forward with the infantry, & their shields were pock-marked with German bullet strikes.

1st Division Artillery Group War Diary notes:
“Owing to the thick bush the Forward Observation Officers of these (all the) batteries were unable to send back any important information.”

Later in the battle Stemmerman’s left hand (western) trenches were identified, just north of the Soko River bridge, & all the batteries except No 12 had their fire directed onto this target. This reduced the volume of hostile fire coming from these trenches.

At 1800 hours all the British guns came out of action & moved back to Store.

The Schutztruppe had a Konigsberg gun in action from a position south of the Ruvu River, & this gun ranged on the South African batteries, causing disruption but only one casualty.

From the Official History:
“The 129th Baluchis, with experience on the Western Front, made light of the enemy’s fire & progressed well through difficult bush until checked by wild bees. These, wrote an officer present “were everywhere, & so, shortly were the machine-gun ranks”.

The Brigadier’s comment is said to have been: “Bees have stopped them; I thought the Germans could not have”.

COMMENT
The above refers to the action at Masai Kraal two days previously (see Post # 568).

The bees were very probably being farmed along the river bank in hives such as this.

The two men are walking north up what remains of the road that was the Divisional axis of advance.

They are approaching the point where the British artillery finally located Stemmerman’s trench line, & commenced shelling it.

Interested in the bees and hives - African bees are known to be very fierce. Tomorrow Chris is extracting our spring honey (ours are european bees apparently), so this caught my attention, aside from looking at the guns with the field artillery
Cheers
Shirley

Funnily "african bees" originated in Brazil as a hybrid of the african bee. The hybrid is the nasty blighter although I wouldnt want stinging by their natural ancestors.

Roop

The Schutztruppe paid a price for stopping the British advance on the Soko.

From “They Fought For King & Kaiser”:

Major Barr of the 6th South African Infantry wrote: “I found cartridges piled at the foot of a tall tree, enough to fill a mealie (corn) sack. The trunk of the tree was died red with the blood of brave men who had died so that their fellows could move back.”

Thirty feet up the tree was a machine-gun platform. At its foot was a breastwork for another, & a few yards to the side was a third.
“And could those three machine-guns spit out bullets!”

Von Lettow wrote:
“Our casualties unfortunately included three company commanders. Lt von Stosche & Freiherr Grothe died of their wounds. Captain Augar only became fit for duty again after a long time & with an artificial foot.”

A participant, Philip Sampson, wrote:
Hundreds of dead bodies were subsequently found buried in the enemy trenches & lying in the thick bush, while a big pile of field dressings on the banks of the Ruwu River told its significant tale.”

The action near Kahe Station

Follow-on from Post #577

Van Deventer’s mounted column rode under a full moon for 25 miles, rhinoceros providing the only contacts.
At dawn they searched unsuccessfully for crossings over the Pangani River & rode north (see OH Sketch 27).

Looking east across the Pangani Schutztruppe Askari were seen on Kahe Hill, 5,000 yards south of Kahe Station.

One squadron from the 1st South African Horse & another from the 3rd South African Horse were sent across the Pangani to seize the hill.
The river was deep, swollen & rapid & the swimming horses were swept downstream against overhanging trees, but the action was successful as the Schutztruppe withdrew as the horsemen approached the hill & occupied it at about 1100 hours.

Van Deventer sent six squadrons, supported by Nos 2 & 4 Batteries South African Field Artillery, northwards towards Kahe Station where they were opposed & slowed down by some of Bock’s troops west of the railway line. The Konigsberg gun joined in, firing at the mounted troops’ dust clouds.

Bock’s troops also counter-attacked Kahe Hill but the defence, now strengthened by the remainder of 3rd South African Horse, held firm, assisted by a Forward Observation Officer of No 2 Battery who swam the river.

As the South African Horse pushed north towards Kahe Station Abteilung Bock withdrew southeast along the railway line, blowing the railway bridge over the Ruvu River.

The Schutztruppe defended the southern bank of the river & waited for van Deventer’s assault.
But van Deventer chose not to move, & as he had left his two radio sets back at Moshi General Smuts could not contact him.

Meinertzhagen, who was with van Deventer all day, states that the South African General repeatedly stated that he did not wish to take too many casualties & preferred to “out-manoeuvre” Bock’s troops.

According to James Ambrose Brown in “They Fought For King & Kaiser”, a South African publication:
“His (van Deventer’s) men had looted houses, stores & shops in Kahe. Goods were scattered in the road & smashed in pointless destruction from one end of the village to the other.”

Meanwhile a mile or so away to the northeast the South African & Indian infantry of the 1st Division were fighting fiercely & taking heavy losses.
The 1st Division would have appreciated some effective support.

The opportunity to get the four South African mounted regiments behind Lettow’s forces in a blocking position, thus denying him the railway as an easy escape route, was there to be grasped, but it was allowed to fade away.

I am currently researching our local war memorial at St maxentius Church in Bradshaw (nr Bolton). Checking the names against the CWGC website, many of those commemorated had joined the Loyal N Lancs although I have not come across any who were KIA in East Africa.
However, the vicar has given me a whole pile of letters written to the church during the war and I am gradually working through them. One is from L/Cpl Richard Baines of 2nd LNL dated 23.07.15 who describes having been in BEA for ten months with the battalion and that they have had 4 fights, each time with slight losses but that "we don't fight as often as what they do in Europe" (!). He mentions that water is very scarce and he has had sickness three times.

Would you be able to tell me from this information, how he would have arrived in East Africa? Or any other information about him? There are two 'Baines' on the war memorial but neither of them is Richard so I assume he survived his sickness

If i come across any further letters from L/Cpl Baines with any interesting information, I will let you know.

Paul