At the end of January the G.O.C. 39th Division decided to carry out two raids, each on a considerable scale; one to be executed by the 1st/1st Bn. Hertfordshire Regiment and the other by the 16th Rifle Brigade. The front to be raided by the latter appears to have been selected by the G.O.C. and included about five hundred yards of trench line mostly to the south of the Verlorenhoek - Potijze road and the German advanced post known as 'The Mound.' The latter was completely enclosed by a rhomboidal belt of low but thick wire, the base and two sides of the enclosure being each about seventy yards long and the front face about thirty five long and one hundred and fifty yards from our front line. A sap ran back from The Mound to the German front-line trench (Iberia Trench), which was some thirty yards in rear of The Mound enclosure and continued rearwards thence as a communication trench (Iberia Avenue) to the German support line (Iberia Support), a further fifty yards to the rear again.
The strength of the raiding party was originally ordered to be three companies, with Lewis gunners, approximately three hundred and thirty officers and men. As will be seen, this number was subsequently modified, but at the time it had considerable bearing on the movements of the Battalion.
It was decided that the raiding party should be taken out of the line for training, so, in order to effect this, Battalion H.Q. with 'A' and 'C' Companies relieved Bn. H.Q. and 'A' and 'C' Companies of the 11th Bn. Royal Sussex Regt. in the front line (left battalion - right brigade - Railway Wood sector), each battalion adopting 'B' and 'D' Companies of the other. How the remaining company of the raiding party was to be trained is not indicated in any orders from above.
After two days of this, however, Colonel Snepp, and his rather scratch pack, were relieved in the line by the 16th Sherwood Foresters and became battalion in support with H.Q. in the Convent, Ypres: he himself went to 'A' Camp - just west of Vlamertinghe - to train 'B' and 'D' Companies for their part in the raid, Major King being recalled from the VIIIth Corps School to command the battalion which might be called the "11th/16th Sussex Riflemen". This latter went into the front line (left battalion - Railway Wood Sector) on February 7th for another couple of nights, when it returned to billets in Ypres. Whilst in support here, operation orders for the raid were received, but on the 11th Higher Authority decided in its infinite wisdom to reduce the numbers of the raiding party to four officers and one hundred and twenty other ranks. In consequence on the 13th, one hundred and twenty other ranks returned to the battalion, releasing 'D' Company, 11th Bn. Royal Sussex, which returned to its unit, whilst the battalion with 'B' Company, 11th Royal Sussex, went into the front line. On this day Captain Kenward - to whom had been allocated important duties preliminary to the raid - was unfortunately wounded in Ypres. February 15th was Z Day.

Click to view attachmentmap

The object of the raid was to inflict losses on the enemy, secure prisoners and identifications, and to damage his trenches as much as possible.
For several days before Z Day preliminary work was done both by the Battalion and by the 16th Bn. Sherwood Foresters. This work included cutting seven gaps in our own wire (these were plugged at the enemy end with concertina wire to be removed after dark on Z Day), building ramps to facilitate egress from our own trenches and bridging ditches with duck-boards. There were also prolonged wire-cutting by the artillery and 'drill' barrages.
Colonel Snepp's orders were very complete and included every possible detail. The raiding-party was divided into three groups each of two waves. The centre group was to take The Mound and the sap leading to Iberia Trench; the right group was to enter Iberia Trench through a gap in the wire and to send on a small party to Eitel Fritz Farm - thirty yards , or so, in rear of Iberia Trench. The two flank groups were each to extend - outwards to the limit of the ovjective and inwards to join hands with the centre group. In addition special parties were detailed to protect the flanks. Seven other ranks of No.235 Field Company R.E. were attached carrying explosives with which to destroy enemy dug-outs and machine-gun emplacements. Lieutenant G.M. Robinson was the commander and the other officers were 2nd Lieutenants J.C. Maclehose, A. Wilson and H.E. Gordon; the strength of the party was one hundred and seventy all ranks inclusive of the Royal Engineers.
After dark on the 14th final preparations were to be made, concertinas removed from the gaps in our wire and tapes laid out for assembly in No Mans Land. At 10.40 p.m. hot tea and rum were issued at Dragoon Farm and by midnight assembly was to be complete in the front-line trenches. Zero hour was 12.25 a.m.
Assemblt on the tapes was to begin at -7, and at zero -4 the barrage was to fall on the line of The Mound. At zero +25 the withdrawal was to begin.

So much for the preliminaries. The assembly in No Man's Land was accomplished without any trouble: the only incident was that some thirty of our shells fell on the objective six minutes before the barrage was due to fall. Although this does not appear to have influenced the movements of the raiders it may possibly have acted as a warning to the enemy. Punctually to time the leading waves of three groups advanced, but trouble began immediately. Moving forward through heavy rifle fire the parties reached the enemy wire, but the right party could find no gap opposite to it; moving to the left a small gap about a yard wide was found through which a sergeant led a small party which established a bombing-block at the place intended. At this time 2nd Lieutenant Wilson was wounded. The remainder of the party failed to get in, but the sergeants party engaged in a bombing fight with a party of the enemy, but after some fourteen minutes, it had exhausted its bombs and was forced to withdraw.
The centre group got into The Mound without difficulty, but the parties appear to have become split up, some men following the officer, Lieutenant G.M. Robinson, and others getting into the German Trench but too far to the right. Failing to gain touch with the flanks, the group withfrwew on receiving the signal to withdraw; Lieutenant Robinson was wounded on the way back but was assisted by a Rifleman.
The left group made straight for the German wire but when thrre-quarters of the way across 2nd Lieutenant Maclehose was mortally wounded. Without their officer the remainder carried on, but only two small parties found a gap in the wire and these, after a bombing fight, also withdrew on the rocket-signal.
So the raid had been a failure, but it is difficult to see what more the Battalion could have done in the face of the un-cut wire. In his report the Brigadier of the 177th Brigade suggests that prolonged wire-cutting and bombardment of such a narrow front of attack had given ample warning to the enemy who had patched up the gaps in his wire as they were cut by us; this would appear to be the correct solution.
Bo identifications were secured and only some ten or a dozen Germans accounted for; againsdt the casualties of the raiders amounted to thirty per cent of the strength engaged. 2nd Lieutenant Maclehose and eight other ranks were killed: Lieutenant Robinson, 2nd Lieutenants Wilson and Gordon (the latter subsequently died of his wounds) abd fourty-two other ranks were wounded and seven men were missing.
On the 16th the Battalion was withdrawn into support at the Convent, Ypres, and on the 26th was moved into yet another public institution of Ypres - the Infantry Barracks.


Andy

James Colin Maclehose, taken from his memorial book.

Great account as usual. How you gonna pack all this wonderful stuff in!!?
Editing will be a delightful chore ... NOT
Best wishes
Des

PS I thought it was 'my' Mound!

Hi Des,
Theres a lot more to this should you want it, Action of Machine guns, action of trench mortars, artillery barrage, forming up positions etc etc. As the former posts mentioned it was a well planned raid, so there is all sorts of paperwork covering it, unfortunately though unsuccessful.

Andy

Andy,

Thanks for posting this, I read it with great interest. The Mound was also one of the positions from where phosgene gas was released in august 1916, inflicting a large number of casulaties on soldiers of the Hampshire regiment. Many of them buried at Potyze Chateau. I drive by the position every day on my way to work, but I have never really been able to identify it as a mound. Interesting thing to notice are all the all barbed wire stakes fencing of the field where once was no men's land. They can't have moved much from their original places!

regards,

Bert

Hi Bert,
If you would like the War Diary and the Regimental account with the maps etc of the raid and more detail let me know and I will e-mail it over to you.

Andy

Andy,
Hey Marine, it shows that you don't mess with the Rifles, to include the 17th London.
Pete

Andy & Bert,

I know that this Topic is almost 2 years old, but I have just come across it searching if ever "Eitel Fritz Farm" had been mention on the Forum. (Doing some research on an action undertaken there on 13 March 1916, so not related to the one you are describing.) But I remembered that being there last Thursday I took a couple of pics of Eitel Fritz Farm, and one of them (see attached) I must have taken at the very spot where The Mound was. And if I look at my maps this must have been at the back or immediately behind Aeroplane Cemetery.
This pic was taken in the back corner of Aeroplane Cemetery, direction Southeast. In the middle is a pool with pollard trees. Behind them (from the photographer's point of view) is post-war Eitel Fritz Farm. The pre-war farm was left of the trees.
If there still is something resembling a Mound, I don't know. Certainly not visible on a modern IGN map.

Aurel

Aurel,
Many thanks for the photograph, always good to see the area.

Andy