Hi all,
I originally posted this in the book review section but, since it relates to broad tactical issues, I thought I'd also bring it up here.
I've just finished reading 'The Great War' by Les Carlyon. I really enjoyed this book, as I did 'Gallipoli'. Carlyon has a wonderful narrative style and a real ability to dig up interesting snippets from private documents to paint a picture of life for the 'common' soldier.
I was a bit confused during his description of Third Ypres though. Carlyon basically said that the method of attack for 1916 (long advances after a static barrage) didn't work - no arguments there. But he then goes on to say that the tactics for Menin Road, Polygon Wood and Broodseinde Risge in 1917 (limited advances behind a creeping barrage) were successful at taking ground but far too costly in terms of casualties. This is the first time I have heard this suggestion put forward (he implies that anyone who considers those 1917 battles as successful is plain wrong) but he doesn't suggest an alternative. If massed advances with distant objectives were a mistake, and well-planned but limited advances were also the wrong way to go, I'm not quite sure what Carlyon would like to have seen happen. Apart from waiting for the Germans to die of old age, there wasn't much of an alternative in 1917.
Thoughts?
Mat
Full Version: Western Front tactics in 1917
Mat,
I think it useful to remember that Les Carlyon primarily is a journalist, not a professional historian. Nor does he have any real understanding of military tactics and development and his comment appears to be based purely on the casualties incurred. Hence his inability to provide an alternative. He writes beautifully and his books are a great addition to the historiography of the Great War. If I have a disappointment with his work it is his readiness to accept some of the old myths as fact. His strength lies in his narrative style and his ability to bring the events and people to life that is joy to read. I think some of his assessemnts and comments diminishes the quality of his work.
Anyone with an understanding of the difficulties of the offensive on the Western Front would agree that the tactics used at Messines, Menin Road, Polygon Wood and Broodeseinde were a big improvement over earlier efforts. Unfortunately in even the best laid plans and tactics heavy casualties can occur. Carlyon is right to highlight the casualties were costly but IMHO his assessment is too harsh and is based on a lack of understanding of the difficulties of attacking strong defensive positions without flanks given the technology of the day.
Regards
Chris
I think it useful to remember that Les Carlyon primarily is a journalist, not a professional historian. Nor does he have any real understanding of military tactics and development and his comment appears to be based purely on the casualties incurred. Hence his inability to provide an alternative. He writes beautifully and his books are a great addition to the historiography of the Great War. If I have a disappointment with his work it is his readiness to accept some of the old myths as fact. His strength lies in his narrative style and his ability to bring the events and people to life that is joy to read. I think some of his assessemnts and comments diminishes the quality of his work.
Anyone with an understanding of the difficulties of the offensive on the Western Front would agree that the tactics used at Messines, Menin Road, Polygon Wood and Broodeseinde were a big improvement over earlier efforts. Unfortunately in even the best laid plans and tactics heavy casualties can occur. Carlyon is right to highlight the casualties were costly but IMHO his assessment is too harsh and is based on a lack of understanding of the difficulties of attacking strong defensive positions without flanks given the technology of the day.
Regards
Chris
It`s the Profit/Loss account question again. Did the gains from 3rd Ypres outweigh the cost? Most would, I imagine, say "No". It leads me to one of two conclusions. Either the battle should not have been fought or it was badly carried out. Either way, not good for the planners. Could it have been better done with "the difficulties of attacking strong defensive positions without flanks given the technology of the day."? I don`t know. What would you suggest, Crunchy?
Mat, I would like to pick up on the very interesting question you have posed. I posted on this issue, starting here:
http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=159954
I would like to give this some more thought and check some references again.
Robert
http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=159954
I would like to give this some more thought and check some references again.
Robert
Hi Phil,
Did the gains outweigh the the cost? No, I don't believe they did. Could it have been done better? I'm not sure. It is an interesting question that requires some thought. There are are two considerations: tactics and operations.
With regard to tactics, which is the thrust of Carlyon's criticism, I think it is important to understand the factors that influenced planning, the use of resources and the causes of the casualties.
At Menin Road, for example, Bean says that it had been anticipated that three obstacles would hamper the troops: "the debris of Glencourse Wood and the bogs at Nonne Boschen and along the Hannebeek" so these would have precluded the use of tanks. Boggy conditions were a problem for tanks in all of the valleys across the salient. The ground was also pitted with shell holes that would have impeded tanks. So while tanks could have assisted the infantry forward the conditions were not favourable for them as evidenced by the photo of a tank sunk in the bog at Nonne Boschen. It is important to note that in these three battles the Australians were not attacking through a quagmire. At Polygon Wood "The ground was dry, and the shell bursts raised a wall of dust and smoke which appeared almost solid" while at Broodeseinde "the ground was greasy but not drenched" following a light rain prior to the assault.
As to casualties, the Australians suffered heavily before the attacks at Menin Road and Broodeseinde got underway due to German barrages firing on the troops in the FUP which also had a knock on effect of the rear lines bunching up on the forward lines as both strove to get forward out of the barrage area before zero hour. This could have presented more compact targets for the Germans MG's. At Polygon Wood, the 5th Division had to contend with a successful German counter attack immediately south of them the day prior to the assault, which they participated in halting, and this had an impact on the attack itself. At Broodeseinde, the assaulting Australians were confronted by a German attack mounted at the same time and defeated that before moving on to capture their objectives. So is it fair to simply relate the casualties to the tactics adopted? I don't think so.
These factors and incidents fall into the category of what Clausewitz called "the friction of war" - battles aren't fought on level playing fields - and "friction" impacts on planning, the use of resources and results. So while it is very easy for Carlyon to criticise the tactics at these three battles based on the casualties, he appears to make no allowance for the "friction" that occurred. I can't offer a better solution regarding tactics at this time.
On the other hand, there can be no excuse for the abortive attacks on 12th October which were hastily planned without regard for the worsened weather and its effect on the battlefield with the result the troops were committed in quagmire conditions and ineffective protective fire.
Operationally, however, the choice of the salient has to be questioned. I have wondered whether or not, after the success at Messines, the centre of gravity of the attack could have been made NE along the ridge running from Messines through Gheluvelt to Passchendaele rather than pushing out across the Ypres salient and its destroyed drainage system. It's just a thought at this stage and one needs to understand the implications and factors of such an approach before making a judgement. Maybe others have a view on this.
regards
Chris
Did the gains outweigh the the cost? No, I don't believe they did. Could it have been done better? I'm not sure. It is an interesting question that requires some thought. There are are two considerations: tactics and operations.
With regard to tactics, which is the thrust of Carlyon's criticism, I think it is important to understand the factors that influenced planning, the use of resources and the causes of the casualties.
At Menin Road, for example, Bean says that it had been anticipated that three obstacles would hamper the troops: "the debris of Glencourse Wood and the bogs at Nonne Boschen and along the Hannebeek" so these would have precluded the use of tanks. Boggy conditions were a problem for tanks in all of the valleys across the salient. The ground was also pitted with shell holes that would have impeded tanks. So while tanks could have assisted the infantry forward the conditions were not favourable for them as evidenced by the photo of a tank sunk in the bog at Nonne Boschen. It is important to note that in these three battles the Australians were not attacking through a quagmire. At Polygon Wood "The ground was dry, and the shell bursts raised a wall of dust and smoke which appeared almost solid" while at Broodeseinde "the ground was greasy but not drenched" following a light rain prior to the assault.
As to casualties, the Australians suffered heavily before the attacks at Menin Road and Broodeseinde got underway due to German barrages firing on the troops in the FUP which also had a knock on effect of the rear lines bunching up on the forward lines as both strove to get forward out of the barrage area before zero hour. This could have presented more compact targets for the Germans MG's. At Polygon Wood, the 5th Division had to contend with a successful German counter attack immediately south of them the day prior to the assault, which they participated in halting, and this had an impact on the attack itself. At Broodeseinde, the assaulting Australians were confronted by a German attack mounted at the same time and defeated that before moving on to capture their objectives. So is it fair to simply relate the casualties to the tactics adopted? I don't think so.
These factors and incidents fall into the category of what Clausewitz called "the friction of war" - battles aren't fought on level playing fields - and "friction" impacts on planning, the use of resources and results. So while it is very easy for Carlyon to criticise the tactics at these three battles based on the casualties, he appears to make no allowance for the "friction" that occurred. I can't offer a better solution regarding tactics at this time.
On the other hand, there can be no excuse for the abortive attacks on 12th October which were hastily planned without regard for the worsened weather and its effect on the battlefield with the result the troops were committed in quagmire conditions and ineffective protective fire.
Operationally, however, the choice of the salient has to be questioned. I have wondered whether or not, after the success at Messines, the centre of gravity of the attack could have been made NE along the ridge running from Messines through Gheluvelt to Passchendaele rather than pushing out across the Ypres salient and its destroyed drainage system. It's just a thought at this stage and one needs to understand the implications and factors of such an approach before making a judgement. Maybe others have a view on this.
regards
Chris
Great post, Chris. I would like to post a view 
- with respect to the key question you have posed at the end of your post. May take a bit to get things together though.
Robert
- with respect to the key question you have posed at the end of your post. May take a bit to get things together though.Robert
Thanks Chris. So, once again, if I may, the old question - would 3rd Ypres have been better not fought at all?
Phil B
Phil B
If he is reading this, I imagine Jack Sheldon may have some interesting insight from the German perpective.
Goaded into action by Chris! As you might guess, I have devoted a lot of space in the forthcoming book to this question and it is addressed head-on by Peter Simkins in his Foreword. All I really want to say at this stage is that critics of the battle and the Allied generalship and tactics tend to lose sight of the fact that the German army was very badly hurt by Third Ypres, fixed in Flanders and prevented from operating freely elsewhere at a critical time. 'Bite and hold' tactics were costly, but the German generals never designed an effective counter to them. The weather and the winter bailed them out. General Hermann von Kuhl, chief of staff to Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht provides us in Der Weltkrieg the best summary of the significance of the Allied effort in Flanders from the German perspective:
'After the total collapse of the Russian offensive in July, the Russian army as a fighting force had fallen completely out of the picture. The Italian front was in complete tatters in October. Above all, the hitting power of the French, after the failure of the offensives on the Aisne and in Champagne, followed by the mutinies and internal disturbances was so greatly reduced that they urgently needed relief. The United States was still not in a position to do anything.
The one and only army capable of offensive action was that of the British. If they had broken off their offensive, the German army would have seized the initiative and attacked the Allies where they were weak. To that end it would have been possible to have withdrawn strong forces from the east after the collapse of the Russians. For these reasons the British had to go on attacking until the onset of winter ruled out a German counter-attack.
Today, now that we are fully aware about the critical situation in which the French army found itself during the summer of 1917, there can be absolutely no doubt that [original emphasis] through its tenacity, the British army bridged the crisis in France. The French army gained time to recover its strength; the German reserves were drawn towards Flanders. The sacrifices that the British made for the Entente were fully justified.'
The real criticism, of course, relates to the final six weeks of the campaign where 'bite and hold' was (due to the weather as much as anything) subject to the law of diminishing returns, but notice that Kuhl is quite definite. Despite the awful casualties, which stick in the throat to this day, the sacrifice 'was fully justified.'
Did the gains outweigh the costs? asks Chris. Kuhl certainly thought they did.
Jack
'After the total collapse of the Russian offensive in July, the Russian army as a fighting force had fallen completely out of the picture. The Italian front was in complete tatters in October. Above all, the hitting power of the French, after the failure of the offensives on the Aisne and in Champagne, followed by the mutinies and internal disturbances was so greatly reduced that they urgently needed relief. The United States was still not in a position to do anything.
The one and only army capable of offensive action was that of the British. If they had broken off their offensive, the German army would have seized the initiative and attacked the Allies where they were weak. To that end it would have been possible to have withdrawn strong forces from the east after the collapse of the Russians. For these reasons the British had to go on attacking until the onset of winter ruled out a German counter-attack.
Today, now that we are fully aware about the critical situation in which the French army found itself during the summer of 1917, there can be absolutely no doubt that [original emphasis] through its tenacity, the British army bridged the crisis in France. The French army gained time to recover its strength; the German reserves were drawn towards Flanders. The sacrifices that the British made for the Entente were fully justified.'
The real criticism, of course, relates to the final six weeks of the campaign where 'bite and hold' was (due to the weather as much as anything) subject to the law of diminishing returns, but notice that Kuhl is quite definite. Despite the awful casualties, which stick in the throat to this day, the sacrifice 'was fully justified.'
Did the gains outweigh the costs? asks Chris. Kuhl certainly thought they did.
Jack
Hello,
Crunchy's last paragraph also, I think, goes towards the oft raised question of Haig and his choice of Generals. The Messines action by 2nd Army under Plumer was effective. The transfer of the next to move to Gough and the 5th Army seems to me to be questionable. The lay of the land seems to have favoured a further attack on the Messines front while the lower ridge to the north (on the ground it is quite easy not to notice it) while perhaps more direct was not not, I think, a good idea.
This is an appropriate time to think about 3rd Ypres; further reading my change my simple opinion.
Old Tom
Crunchy's last paragraph also, I think, goes towards the oft raised question of Haig and his choice of Generals. The Messines action by 2nd Army under Plumer was effective. The transfer of the next to move to Gough and the 5th Army seems to me to be questionable. The lay of the land seems to have favoured a further attack on the Messines front while the lower ridge to the north (on the ground it is quite easy not to notice it) while perhaps more direct was not not, I think, a good idea.
This is an appropriate time to think about 3rd Ypres; further reading my change my simple opinion.
Old Tom
QUOTE (Jack Sheldon @ Feb 13 2007, 05:22 PM) 
von Kuhl
'After the total collapse of the Russian offensive in July, the Russian army as a fighting force had fallen completely out of the picture. The Italian front was in complete tatters in October. Above all, the hitting power of the French, after the failure of the offensives on the Aisne and in Champagne, followed by the mutinies and internal disturbances was so greatly reduced that they urgently needed relief. The United States was still not in a position to do anything.
The one and only army capable of offensive action was that of the British. If they had broken off their offensive, the German army would have seized the initiative and attacked the Allies where they were weak. To that end it would have been possible to have withdrawn strong forces from the east after the collapse of the Russians. For these reasons the British had to go on attacking until the onset of winter ruled out a German counter-attack.
Today, now that we are fully aware about the critical situation in which the French army found itself during the summer of 1917, there can be absolutely no doubt that [original emphasis] through its tenacity, the British army bridged the crisis in France. The French army gained time to recover its strength; the German reserves were drawn towards Flanders. The sacrifices that the British made for the Entente were fully justified.'
'After the total collapse of the Russian offensive in July, the Russian army as a fighting force had fallen completely out of the picture. The Italian front was in complete tatters in October. Above all, the hitting power of the French, after the failure of the offensives on the Aisne and in Champagne, followed by the mutinies and internal disturbances was so greatly reduced that they urgently needed relief. The United States was still not in a position to do anything.
The one and only army capable of offensive action was that of the British. If they had broken off their offensive, the German army would have seized the initiative and attacked the Allies where they were weak. To that end it would have been possible to have withdrawn strong forces from the east after the collapse of the Russians. For these reasons the British had to go on attacking until the onset of winter ruled out a German counter-attack.
Today, now that we are fully aware about the critical situation in which the French army found itself during the summer of 1917, there can be absolutely no doubt that [original emphasis] through its tenacity, the British army bridged the crisis in France. The French army gained time to recover its strength; the German reserves were drawn towards Flanders. The sacrifices that the British made for the Entente were fully justified.'
Jack
Thank you for your posting.
May I seek clarification as to when von Kuhl recorded his comments? The reason why I ask is that post hoc rationalisations are often unreliable.
My understanding is that in spite of the catastrophic failure of the Kerensky (Galician) Offensive in July 1917, the German High Command could not treat the Eastern Front as secure (thereby permitting the transfer of Divisions for a major offensive in the West) at least until the October Revolution and arguably not until the Treaty of Brest Litovsk had been concluded.
If, as von Kuhl suggests, everything was as positive for the German Army on the different fronts save for the British Army during the Third Battle of Ypres then why did the German High Command not engage in a major offensive at that juncture precisely when the British ( as the only effective opponent) were locked in an attritional struggle on the Salient?
If von Kuhl's analysis is correct then surely the mire of Passchendaele was the German High Command's opportunity?
Regards
Mel
This is why I read the forum.
Thank you all ... all of you ... This is history at it's best.
Thank you all ... all of you ... This is history at it's best.
Jack mentioned von Kuhl's analysis of Third Ypres. I have previously quoted Ludendorff's view here:
http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=237002
I think these views are particularly relevant to the question that Jonathan posed re Germans learning more quickly than the British (see: http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...t&p=577907). I have not had a chance to respond to Jonathan's question in detail. Von Lossberg had played a role in helping to coordinate the German response in the latter part of the Somme offensive in 1916. In the context of Third Ypres, Rudolf Binding's observations about the effects that the British offensive, as described by von Kuhl and Ludendorff, had on von Lossberg are also very significant. The quote is here:
http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=362513
Robert
http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=237002
I think these views are particularly relevant to the question that Jonathan posed re Germans learning more quickly than the British (see: http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...t&p=577907). I have not had a chance to respond to Jonathan's question in detail. Von Lossberg had played a role in helping to coordinate the German response in the latter part of the Somme offensive in 1916. In the context of Third Ypres, Rudolf Binding's observations about the effects that the British offensive, as described by von Kuhl and Ludendorff, had on von Lossberg are also very significant. The quote is here:
http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=362513
Robert
QUOTE (Crunchy @ Feb 13 2007, 01:42 PM)
I have wondered whether or not, after the success at Messines, the centre of gravity of the attack could have been made NE along the ridge running from Messines through Gheluvelt to Passchendaele rather than pushing out across the Ypres salient and its destroyed drainage system.
Chris, I have edited a map of the Third Ypes campaign. Do the blue dotted lines represent what you described above?Click to view attachment
Robert
Mel
You raise an important point. I shall get back to you on this but, rather like Robert, I should like to marshal my thoughts a little before committing myself to a response. Watch this space.
Jack
You raise an important point. I shall get back to you on this but, rather like Robert, I should like to marshal my thoughts a little before committing myself to a response. Watch this space.
Jack
Jack,
Thank you for your post. Firstly, let me say that I am not a critic of the battle or of Allied generalship until. as you point out, the last six weeks of the battle when the weather turned foul and the battlefield became a quagmire.
You raise the important issue of strategic gains which I have ignored in my earlier post. My comment of the gains not being worth the cost relates to the losses endured for the ground gained but, as you correctly point out, other considerations need to be taken into account.
I have no doubt the Germans were badly hurt at 3rd Ypres and that the offensive maintained pressure on them. Most of the German accounts talk of the terrible effect it had on them. Nonetheless, the British were badly hurt as well. Depending on what sources one reads, the most commonly quoted figures indicate the British lost around 250,000 casualties to the German's roughly 200,000; so the British hurt was not inconsiderable and, arguably, was greater than the German. These losses influenced Lloyd George withholding critically needed reinforcements in early 1918.
Like Melpack, I am a suspicious of post war accounts by senior German officers which seek to explain away possible criticisms of their failure to do something.
Von Kuhl may well be right about the effect of 3rd Ypres on their inability to mount a counter offensive in the West but I can't see the logic of his argument.
Is he suggesting 3rd Ypres stopped the German's from withdrawing forces from the eastern front? His argument appears to be that because all of the other Allied forces posed no threat to the Germans, the Britiish had to continue the Ypres offensive until the onset of winter to stop a German counter offensive. This may be so, but if the rest of the Allies posed no threat to them why couldn't the German's withdraw the necessary forces from the east after the Russian failure in July and mount a strong counter offensive later in 1917? The 88 German divisions that were eventually engaged at 3rd Ypres represented about a third of the German Army, so the rest of the Allies, who according to von Kuhl were incapable of offensive action, were tying down two thirds of the German Army.
As MelPack points out I don't believe the German's were in a position at that time to say the Eastern Front was secure, nor did they know about the French mutinies. So these comments by Von Kuhl appear to be made with the benefit of hindsight and they smack of explaining away a lost opportunity, which they were unaware of, after the event. Had the British broken off the offensive in early October, I'm not convinced the Germans would neccessarily have been in a position to mount a major offensive elsewhere before winter set in. Also, we should not forget the British mounted an initially highly successful offensive at Cambrai in November which the Germans had to contend with, mounting a successful counter attack which recaptured much of the lost ground.
Nonetheless, your point about the strategic gains deserves consideration. I'll need to do some research before commenting further.
Cheers
Chris
Thank you for your post. Firstly, let me say that I am not a critic of the battle or of Allied generalship until. as you point out, the last six weeks of the battle when the weather turned foul and the battlefield became a quagmire.
You raise the important issue of strategic gains which I have ignored in my earlier post. My comment of the gains not being worth the cost relates to the losses endured for the ground gained but, as you correctly point out, other considerations need to be taken into account.
I have no doubt the Germans were badly hurt at 3rd Ypres and that the offensive maintained pressure on them. Most of the German accounts talk of the terrible effect it had on them. Nonetheless, the British were badly hurt as well. Depending on what sources one reads, the most commonly quoted figures indicate the British lost around 250,000 casualties to the German's roughly 200,000; so the British hurt was not inconsiderable and, arguably, was greater than the German. These losses influenced Lloyd George withholding critically needed reinforcements in early 1918.
Like Melpack, I am a suspicious of post war accounts by senior German officers which seek to explain away possible criticisms of their failure to do something.
Von Kuhl may well be right about the effect of 3rd Ypres on their inability to mount a counter offensive in the West but I can't see the logic of his argument.
QUOTE
After the total collapse of the Russian offensive in July, the Russian army as a fighting force had fallen completely out of the picture. ... The one and only army capable of offensive action was that of the British. If they had broken off their offensive, the German army would have seized the initiative and attacked the Allies where they were weak. To that end it would have been possible to have withdrawn strong forces from the east after the collapse of the Russians. For these reasons the British had to go on attacking until the onset of winter ruled out a German counter-attack.
Is he suggesting 3rd Ypres stopped the German's from withdrawing forces from the eastern front? His argument appears to be that because all of the other Allied forces posed no threat to the Germans, the Britiish had to continue the Ypres offensive until the onset of winter to stop a German counter offensive. This may be so, but if the rest of the Allies posed no threat to them why couldn't the German's withdraw the necessary forces from the east after the Russian failure in July and mount a strong counter offensive later in 1917? The 88 German divisions that were eventually engaged at 3rd Ypres represented about a third of the German Army, so the rest of the Allies, who according to von Kuhl were incapable of offensive action, were tying down two thirds of the German Army.
As MelPack points out I don't believe the German's were in a position at that time to say the Eastern Front was secure, nor did they know about the French mutinies. So these comments by Von Kuhl appear to be made with the benefit of hindsight and they smack of explaining away a lost opportunity, which they were unaware of, after the event. Had the British broken off the offensive in early October, I'm not convinced the Germans would neccessarily have been in a position to mount a major offensive elsewhere before winter set in. Also, we should not forget the British mounted an initially highly successful offensive at Cambrai in November which the Germans had to contend with, mounting a successful counter attack which recaptured much of the lost ground.
Nonetheless, your point about the strategic gains deserves consideration. I'll need to do some research before commenting further.
Cheers
Chris
QUOTE (Phil_B @ Feb 14 2007, 01:37 AM)
So, once again, if I may, the old question - would 3rd Ypres have been better not fought at all?
Hi Phil,
I think it's too easy for us to look back in hindsight and say "Given what we now know the results were, it would have been better not fought at all". As I am sure you are aware, the issue is more complex than that.
There is merit in Haig's strategic objective of trying to open up a flank on the right of the German line. His immediate operational objective to secure the Passchendaele Ridge is sound, particularly as that whole ridge from Messines to Passchendaele dominates the ground for a considerable distance to the east. It provided a strong base for further offensives in 1918.
Also, IMO, the tactics developed for the battle (limited objectives - bite and hold) were sound and as Robert points out in his links above the German's didn't have an answer to them. They were successful. The problem came when Haig continued the battle in conditions that were unsuitable but, then again, Passchendaele Ridge was eventually captured through a limited objective approach under Currie, albiet at a frightful cost.
To my mind the questions are:
Where should the centre of gravity for the offensive have been? and
Should the offensive, as undertaken, have been halted once the rain set in in October?
I don't have an answer for the first and I am inclined to think pursuing the battle in the quagmire after Broodeseinde was a mistake.
Regards
Chris
QUOTE (Robert Dunlop @ Feb 14 2007, 08:23 AM)
Chris, I have edited a map of the Third Ypes campaign. Do the blue dotted lines represent what you described above?
Click to view attachment
Click to view attachment
Hello Robert,
Not really. The blue lines show an offensive that is far too narrow in its concept and which can be nipped off at the base.
By centre of gravity I am talking about a broader front offensive that is centred on the ridge. This would mean maintaining the frontage of the Ypres offensive but side slipping it south so that the offensive was astride the ridge. Thus Menin Road, Polygon Wood and Broodeseinde/Gravenstafel would be within the northern sector of the offensive rather than the southern sector. It would have to entail some attacks to secure the flanks of the offensive as occurred at 3rd Ypres.
It seems to me that at 3rd Ypres we were attacking out of a bowl and up onto the ridge from the sides of it whereas attacking astride the ridge may have been a better option. Just a thought at this stage. I need to do a lot more research and analysis.
Cheers
Chris
QUOTE (Crunchy @ Feb 14 2007, 04:25 AM)
By centre of gravity I am talking about a broader front offensive that is centred on the ridge. This would mean maintaining the frontage of the Ypres offensive but side slipping it south so that the offensive was astride the ridge. Thus Menin Road, Polygon Wood and Broodeseinde/Gravenstafel would be within the northern sector of the offensive rather than the southern sector.
Chris, thanks for the extra clarification. I have modified the map again in light of your comments. Firstly, I added the Lys River to the south. I believe this would have been the natural boundary that defined the southern-most limit of an attack. I base this on the major problems that the BEF had in crossing the Lys during their limited offensive prior to the German attacks in First Ypres. Second, I added the approximate positions (apologies for any major topographic errors - they will be mine alone) of the locations that you named. Then I widened the 'blue' objective lines. These don't really represent what you describe, particularly that the locations would be in the 'northern' rather than 'southern' sector of the attack. Therefore I added the 'purple' objective lines, limited by the Lys. Let me know what you think. Do I need to make a composite of the two colours to describe your proposal?Click to view attachment
Robert
Robert,
Many thanks for your maps. That is better, although the purple line would run due west from Passchendaele rather than cutting back down towards Ypres. Good point about the Lys, although I don't believe we have to follow the northern bank of the river to the depth on the map above. The objective is to secure the high ground. We have to be careful that we are not creating a deep salient that can be attacked from either side of the base.
Your map certainly shows some of the problems associated with attacking astride the ridge which highlights the difficulties the Great War generals had. Nonetheless I think it is worth considering this other approach. Are you able to model it?
Regards
Chris
Many thanks for your maps. That is better, although the purple line would run due west from Passchendaele rather than cutting back down towards Ypres. Good point about the Lys, although I don't believe we have to follow the northern bank of the river to the depth on the map above. The objective is to secure the high ground. We have to be careful that we are not creating a deep salient that can be attacked from either side of the base.
Your map certainly shows some of the problems associated with attacking astride the ridge which highlights the difficulties the Great War generals had. Nonetheless I think it is worth considering this other approach. Are you able to model it?
Regards
Chris
Does this new salient promise to withstand the German 1918 onslaught any better than the actual one? Phil B
Phil, it might do, depending on the extent to which the British right flank extended beyond the ridge line. This could create more of a buffer zone that was observeable and therefore defended easily with artillery - precisely what the Germans achieved in their choice of defensive positions. There is still a lot to think about, however, in weighing up this option.
Chris, I will remodel as suggested. Next time I will add some letters/squares so that you can specify more easily what you think the zone of operations should be. It won't take long but I think it will have to wait until tonight.
Robert
Chris, I will remodel as suggested. Next time I will add some letters/squares so that you can specify more easily what you think the zone of operations should be. It won't take long but I think it will have to wait until tonight.
Robert
QUOTE (Robert Dunlop @ Feb 14 2007, 07:28 AM)
I added the Lys River to the south. I believe this would have been the natural boundary that defined the southern-most limit of an attack. I base this on the major problems that the BEF had in crossing the Lys during their limited offensive prior to the German attacks in First Ypres.
Click to view attachment
Robert
Click to view attachment
Robert
A tactical question, Robert. Stopping your advance at a river makes good sense if you wish to establish a defensive line. The British strategy, however, was always looking forward to the next advance. Wouldn`t stopping at a river make this more difficult, just as it makes an attack by the enemy more difficult? Phil B
Phil, typically the problem with a river, as I understand it, is that you will be forced to use it as a defensive line, whether you want to or not. The reflects the significant problems trying to attack across a river. At the very least it will slow troop movements. More seriously, it will funnel troops into crossing areas, typically bridges, which are then vulnerable to artillery. Furthermore it is hard to buildup a significant body of troops with sufficient support on the far side of the river to then advance again. Finally, logistics and resupply becomes problematic until the advance carries sufficient ground for the bridges and other crossing points to be clear of enemy artillery fire. Looking at the converse of the British coming down off the ridges and across the Lys, the German cavalry found it very hard to advance towards the BEF positions on the Gheluvelt ridge in 1914 because they were having to advance across the Lys. Their bridges and approach roads were shelled whenever they were used during the day.
There has to be an extremely good reason to want to cross a river as part of an attack.
Robert
There has to be an extremely good reason to want to cross a river as part of an attack.
Robert
QUOTE (Robert Dunlop @ Feb 14 2007, 12:13 PM)
Phil, typically the problem with a river, as I understand it, is that you will be forced to use it as a defensive line, whether you want to or not. Robert
Do you mean that an advance will normally stop at a river? Might it not be easier to cross a river at a run, so to speak, than by stopping at it and ensuring an opposed crossing attempt eventually? Phil B
Phil,
One of the vulnerabilities of a salient is its flanks at the base of the salient. By anchoring the flank on a riverline you strengthen its defence, and reduce its vulnerability, by adding an obstacle to any attack against that flank. An opposed assault river crossing is a more complex and difficult operation to undertake.
Cheers
Chris
One of the vulnerabilities of a salient is its flanks at the base of the salient. By anchoring the flank on a riverline you strengthen its defence, and reduce its vulnerability, by adding an obstacle to any attack against that flank. An opposed assault river crossing is a more complex and difficult operation to undertake.
Cheers
Chris
Just to add to Chris' point, a river is very easy to defend with small rearguards. Thus, if you are pursuing an enemy 'at a run', they are very likely to hold you up at a river. The BEF experienced this during the First Battle of the Marne, although the German rearguards were spread too thinly to fully cover the Marne river for example. It is also significant that many of the major battles in the last days of the war, after the rupture of the Hindenburg line, were across rivers such as the Sambre.
Robert
Robert
Having got my ducks in a row, I should like to return to some of the posts written earlier. From the outset I also want to stress that I mean absolutely no personal criticism when I say that some of the points made illustrate perfectly why it is that I and a few others are trying to place more information about the German army (in the broadest sense) at the disposal of everyone interested in Great War studies. The simple fact is that for decades the German case, for good or bad, has gone by default and, as a result, almost all the books and studies available to feed the debate are extraordinarily one-sided. Why this should be, I really do not know; it certainly does not apply to the Second World War.
Von Kuhl was writing in the late 1920s, but I do not accept that that invalidates his judgement about the significance of what the British army achieved in Flanders and equally I simply do not accept that the German army 'missed an opportunity' in late 1917. When I said that Third Ypres 'fixed' them in Flanders, I meant that it forced them to fight a campaign on ground not of their choosing. In other words they were drawn into a lengthy high-intensity battle which absorbed all the manpower, munitions and transport capacity which they had to spare (and, at times, more than they had to spare).
The German literature is packed with instances of what this meant in practice. Here follow a few selected examples. The list is by no means exhaustive. Oberst (later Generalmajor) Fritz von Lossberg parachuted in as chief of staff Fourth Army in the wake of Messines, describes at length in Meine Taetigkeit im Weltkriege 1914 - 1918 the efforts necessary to prepare to repel the forthcoming offensive and how the effort mortgaged everything else for the time it lasted.
The quantities of munitions consumed in the defensive battle were awesome. Crown Prince Rupprecht (army group commander) noted in his diary on 1 Aug 17, 'Yesterday the Fourth Army Artillery fired off the equivalent of 27 ammunition trainloads of shells.' This underlines the scale of the logisitic effort needed to support the defensive operations. Even if the ammunition and manpower could have been spirited up for a major offensive effort elsewhere, there simply was insufficient rolling stock or railway capacity to contemplate any such thing. On 5 Oct Fourth Army reported that it had fired off 30 trainloads on 4 Oct 17.
On 12 Aug 17, Rupprecht noted in his diary that a request by Second Army to launch an offensive near St Quentin with seven fresh divisions and an appropriate number of guns had to be turned down, 'General Ludendorff, who met General von Kuhl in Le Cateau today stated that it would not be possible to earmark that number of troops and stressed, rightly, that all offensive operations other than those absolutely necessary, must be curtailed.'
On 20 Aug 17, Rupprecht discussed the forthcoming six division attack near Riga with General Ludendorff. Ludendorff stated that in view of the recent events near Verdun (when the French captured Mort Homme), it would only be posible for the Riga attack to go ahead if Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht could manage the Flanders battle from within its own resources. Rupprecht, despite his concern at the previous very high loss rates, agreed to do his best.
I will not labour the point. The fact is that The German army did not 'miss an opportunity' during Third Ypres. It was all it could do to hold what it had and to deploy a few divisions to Italy and near Riga.
Jack
Von Kuhl was writing in the late 1920s, but I do not accept that that invalidates his judgement about the significance of what the British army achieved in Flanders and equally I simply do not accept that the German army 'missed an opportunity' in late 1917. When I said that Third Ypres 'fixed' them in Flanders, I meant that it forced them to fight a campaign on ground not of their choosing. In other words they were drawn into a lengthy high-intensity battle which absorbed all the manpower, munitions and transport capacity which they had to spare (and, at times, more than they had to spare).
The German literature is packed with instances of what this meant in practice. Here follow a few selected examples. The list is by no means exhaustive. Oberst (later Generalmajor) Fritz von Lossberg parachuted in as chief of staff Fourth Army in the wake of Messines, describes at length in Meine Taetigkeit im Weltkriege 1914 - 1918 the efforts necessary to prepare to repel the forthcoming offensive and how the effort mortgaged everything else for the time it lasted.
The quantities of munitions consumed in the defensive battle were awesome. Crown Prince Rupprecht (army group commander) noted in his diary on 1 Aug 17, 'Yesterday the Fourth Army Artillery fired off the equivalent of 27 ammunition trainloads of shells.' This underlines the scale of the logisitic effort needed to support the defensive operations. Even if the ammunition and manpower could have been spirited up for a major offensive effort elsewhere, there simply was insufficient rolling stock or railway capacity to contemplate any such thing. On 5 Oct Fourth Army reported that it had fired off 30 trainloads on 4 Oct 17.
On 12 Aug 17, Rupprecht noted in his diary that a request by Second Army to launch an offensive near St Quentin with seven fresh divisions and an appropriate number of guns had to be turned down, 'General Ludendorff, who met General von Kuhl in Le Cateau today stated that it would not be possible to earmark that number of troops and stressed, rightly, that all offensive operations other than those absolutely necessary, must be curtailed.'
On 20 Aug 17, Rupprecht discussed the forthcoming six division attack near Riga with General Ludendorff. Ludendorff stated that in view of the recent events near Verdun (when the French captured Mort Homme), it would only be posible for the Riga attack to go ahead if Army Group Crown Prince Rupprecht could manage the Flanders battle from within its own resources. Rupprecht, despite his concern at the previous very high loss rates, agreed to do his best.
I will not labour the point. The fact is that The German army did not 'miss an opportunity' during Third Ypres. It was all it could do to hold what it had and to deploy a few divisions to Italy and near Riga.
Jack
Hello Jack
Thank you for your posting.
In responding to your points, I believe that it would be useful to draw a distinction between the judgment of von Kuhl that you endorse and the premise upon which it is based.
In respect of the second limb, the diary entries that you have cited are quite telling. As per the entry of 20th August, the planned attack on Riga required Rupprecht’s assurance that the Army Group could manage the Flanders battle within its own resources. Although Riga did fall in September with little or no resistance, von Kuhl’s depiction that the Russian army had fallen completely out of the picture as a fighting force was clearly a product of hindsight rather than a contemporaneous judgment.
The same applies to the concerns that existed within the German High Command about the French success at Mort Homme which must have been compounded subsequently by their further success and use of innovative tactics at Malmaison in October. Contrary to von Kuhl’s comment, the French army was no longer in the critical condition that it had been in the aftermath of the failed Nivelles offensive.
I did not advance the proposition that Passchaendale was the ‘missed opportunity’ for the German army. I only suggested that was the inference that could be drawn from von Kuhl’s own blithe analysis.
In respect of the first limb, I do not dissent for one moment that Passchaendale drained the resources of the German army. The toll that was exacted on both parties was enormous. The lengthy quote from Luddendorf cited by Robert in one of his earlier posts confirms the same from the German perspective.
The issue remains was the German army capable of mounting a major offensive on the Western Front in 1917? In your own words Third Ypres forced it into a position where all it could do was to hold what it had. It is doubtful that the German Army possessed the resources to mount such an offensive until precisely the redeployment of the Divisions from the east had occurred for the final gamble of the 1918 Spring offensive.
That said, Passchaendale was either yet another battle of attrition or a vital, if costly, sacrifice to save the Entente. If it is the former then we come back to Phil’s balance sheet of costs weighed against gains. If it is the latter then the evidence and argument should be mustered to support the proposition.
I am inclined to the former rather than lending credence to von Kuhl’s hyperbole that ‘the sacrifices that the British made for the Entente were full justified’
Regards
Mel
Thank you for your posting.
In responding to your points, I believe that it would be useful to draw a distinction between the judgment of von Kuhl that you endorse and the premise upon which it is based.
In respect of the second limb, the diary entries that you have cited are quite telling. As per the entry of 20th August, the planned attack on Riga required Rupprecht’s assurance that the Army Group could manage the Flanders battle within its own resources. Although Riga did fall in September with little or no resistance, von Kuhl’s depiction that the Russian army had fallen completely out of the picture as a fighting force was clearly a product of hindsight rather than a contemporaneous judgment.
The same applies to the concerns that existed within the German High Command about the French success at Mort Homme which must have been compounded subsequently by their further success and use of innovative tactics at Malmaison in October. Contrary to von Kuhl’s comment, the French army was no longer in the critical condition that it had been in the aftermath of the failed Nivelles offensive.
I did not advance the proposition that Passchaendale was the ‘missed opportunity’ for the German army. I only suggested that was the inference that could be drawn from von Kuhl’s own blithe analysis.
In respect of the first limb, I do not dissent for one moment that Passchaendale drained the resources of the German army. The toll that was exacted on both parties was enormous. The lengthy quote from Luddendorf cited by Robert in one of his earlier posts confirms the same from the German perspective.
The issue remains was the German army capable of mounting a major offensive on the Western Front in 1917? In your own words Third Ypres forced it into a position where all it could do was to hold what it had. It is doubtful that the German Army possessed the resources to mount such an offensive until precisely the redeployment of the Divisions from the east had occurred for the final gamble of the 1918 Spring offensive.
That said, Passchaendale was either yet another battle of attrition or a vital, if costly, sacrifice to save the Entente. If it is the former then we come back to Phil’s balance sheet of costs weighed against gains. If it is the latter then the evidence and argument should be mustered to support the proposition.
I am inclined to the former rather than lending credence to von Kuhl’s hyperbole that ‘the sacrifices that the British made for the Entente were full justified’
Regards
Mel
Chris, I have deleted the purple lines and extended the left flank of the proposed attack to lie west of Passchendaele. The superimposed squares should make it easier to identify how you might want this modified if I have not understood correctly.
Click to view attachment
Robert
Click to view attachment
Robert
Chris, this next map assumes I have got the blue objective lines approximately right. It will only take a jiffy to correct them if not. Meanwhile, the approximate positions of the main German lines of defence are noted, though it should be recalled, as you know, that these 'lines' were not defended by lines of German defenders. In addition, I have added four red ellipses, labelled A, B, C and D. These represent key areas, the effects of which need to be understood in terms of the proposed battle plan.
Click to view attachment
A represents the region beyond the left flank of the British advance (the French were further over). Our attention should not be limited to the area encompassed by the ellipse but can encompass any issues that threaten that flank. For example, what influence would the Houthhulst Forest have on this flank?
B represents the area that would have to be captured by the British. What is this terrain like? Are there any key features that would favour the German defenders in retaining this area?
C represents the area that would remain in German hands. What role would the terrain play here? As with A, this last question should not be limited to the area covered by the ellipse but all of the terrain beyond this flank, particularly with respect to the location and operation of German artillery batteries on that flank.
The influence of D is probably not much different between what actually happened and what you are proposing.
I have visited these areas but have not studied them in detail. Unlike the Somme, where I have created terrain boards and walked quite a bit of the ground, it has not been possible to study the Salient as closely - yet. I would be very interested in any comments that our Belgian or other Pals could offer, especially those who live in this area and know the terrain well.
There are other operational issues that could be discussed but these can wait until you are comfortable with that the map represents the alternative plan. Even if the objective lines are not quite right, the 4 areas will still be roughly the same, and their significance will be unchanged.
Robert
Click to view attachment
A represents the region beyond the left flank of the British advance (the French were further over). Our attention should not be limited to the area encompassed by the ellipse but can encompass any issues that threaten that flank. For example, what influence would the Houthhulst Forest have on this flank?
B represents the area that would have to be captured by the British. What is this terrain like? Are there any key features that would favour the German defenders in retaining this area?
C represents the area that would remain in German hands. What role would the terrain play here? As with A, this last question should not be limited to the area covered by the ellipse but all of the terrain beyond this flank, particularly with respect to the location and operation of German artillery batteries on that flank.
The influence of D is probably not much different between what actually happened and what you are proposing.
I have visited these areas but have not studied them in detail. Unlike the Somme, where I have created terrain boards and walked quite a bit of the ground, it has not been possible to study the Salient as closely - yet. I would be very interested in any comments that our Belgian or other Pals could offer, especially those who live in this area and know the terrain well.
There are other operational issues that could be discussed but these can wait until you are comfortable with that the map represents the alternative plan. Even if the objective lines are not quite right, the 4 areas will still be roughly the same, and their significance will be unchanged.
Robert
Robert,
These maps are excellent and they represent the option I have been thinking of. I do like your suggestion of anchoring the base of the right flank along the Lys as far as the kink in the river, such that the blue line runs from roughly where it cuts the Menin Road in Square 6D to where the red line at the bottom of oval C cuts the kink in the Lys. This would probably need more troops if we are to retain the blue line through Squares 2E to 1A.
Unfortunately I do not know the land south of the ridge at all so i would welcome the thoughts of others who do. I would also welcome comments on this option to analyse its feasibility.
Thanks again Robert, your maps provide an excellent basis for further debate and consideration of the option.
Regards
Chris
These maps are excellent and they represent the option I have been thinking of. I do like your suggestion of anchoring the base of the right flank along the Lys as far as the kink in the river, such that the blue line runs from roughly where it cuts the Menin Road in Square 6D to where the red line at the bottom of oval C cuts the kink in the Lys. This would probably need more troops if we are to retain the blue line through Squares 2E to 1A.
Unfortunately I do not know the land south of the ridge at all so i would welcome the thoughts of others who do. I would also welcome comments on this option to analyse its feasibility.
Thanks again Robert, your maps provide an excellent basis for further debate and consideration of the option.
Regards
Chris
Hello
I've been looking at Volume 13 of Der Weltkrieg, and have done 3 quick scans and one stich to assist the debate, because they show dispositions and lines. Vol 13 also has the fran***** type calander of where German units are.
I happy to put more effort into the scanning and stitching if forum members say what they want, and higher resoultion if required, to make them of much better quality. Also magnify them too, this is a taste to aid Robert as I don't think he has 13 or 14.
We will need a skilled german speaker to translate the legends.
Situation 30 July 1917
31 July till 19 September 1917
Got Volume 14 too, if that is required, should I do a scan of both the contents and post - if so where Chris?
On a more personal note my grandfarther was involved in the attacks in Riga as a Stromtrooper and I had discusions about this, and his leave in Berlin (and Germany) in 1917. He said that the situation was near starvation all over Germany and that people were fed up, nothing to show from the defensive "victories". They also got ill after capturing stocks of mazipan, Riga being famous for it!
Scanner on Standby, is Master Jack warmed up too?
Regards
Mart
I've been looking at Volume 13 of Der Weltkrieg, and have done 3 quick scans and one stich to assist the debate, because they show dispositions and lines. Vol 13 also has the fran***** type calander of where German units are.
I happy to put more effort into the scanning and stitching if forum members say what they want, and higher resoultion if required, to make them of much better quality. Also magnify them too, this is a taste to aid Robert as I don't think he has 13 or 14.
We will need a skilled german speaker to translate the legends.
Situation 30 July 1917
31 July till 19 September 1917
Got Volume 14 too, if that is required, should I do a scan of both the contents and post - if so where Chris?
On a more personal note my grandfarther was involved in the attacks in Riga as a Stromtrooper and I had discusions about this, and his leave in Berlin (and Germany) in 1917. He said that the situation was near starvation all over Germany and that people were fed up, nothing to show from the defensive "victories". They also got ill after capturing stocks of mazipan, Riga being famous for it!
Scanner on Standby, is Master Jack warmed up too?
Regards
Mart
Hello Jack,
Thank you for your reply.
I applaud the work you are doing to bring the German perspective of the Great War to those of us who don't speak German. It is long overdue. One of my interests has been the German Wars of Unification and the development of the German Army from 1850 -1918. Alas, I am restricted to reading those few English works on the subject so I look forward to you being very productive.
In my earlier post to you: while my comment can be read that the German's missed an opportunity, they weren't meant to convey that. Hence it was poorly expressed and my apologies. I was meaning that von Kuhl's comments, IMHO, smacked of trying to explain away a possible criticism that they had missed a lost opportunity. Like you, I don't think the Germans did miss an opportunity; they were fully commited and your comments about the impact Ypres had on them are well and truly accepted. Ypres did did hurt them badly, as I said earlier. Jack, I think we agree on the impact that 3rd Ypres had on the German Army.
However, I don't understand the logic of von Kuhl's statement about why the British had to fight on at Ypres until the onset of winter. Your view that the Germans
Hope this clarifies the issue.
Regards
Chris
Thank you for your reply.
I applaud the work you are doing to bring the German perspective of the Great War to those of us who don't speak German. It is long overdue. One of my interests has been the German Wars of Unification and the development of the German Army from 1850 -1918. Alas, I am restricted to reading those few English works on the subject so I look forward to you being very productive.
In my earlier post to you: while my comment can be read that the German's missed an opportunity, they weren't meant to convey that. Hence it was poorly expressed and my apologies. I was meaning that von Kuhl's comments, IMHO, smacked of trying to explain away a possible criticism that they had missed a lost opportunity. Like you, I don't think the Germans did miss an opportunity; they were fully commited and your comments about the impact Ypres had on them are well and truly accepted. Ypres did did hurt them badly, as I said earlier. Jack, I think we agree on the impact that 3rd Ypres had on the German Army.
However, I don't understand the logic of von Kuhl's statement about why the British had to fight on at Ypres until the onset of winter. Your view that the Germans
QUOTE
were drawn into a lengthy high-intensity battle which absorbed all the manpower, munitions and transport capacity which they had to spare (and, at times, more than they had to spare).
IMO is correct; but von Kuhl implies the opposite and further implies if the British had stopped their offensive earlier the Germans would have withdrawn troops from the east and attacked the Allies at a weak point. If 3rd Ypres had have been stopped when the battlefield turned to a quagmire (mid October - which is the earliest they did consider stopping) I suspect by that time the damage to the German Army had already been done. I am not convinced they would have been able to then take the initiative and mount a major offensive before winter set in. Hence my reason for questioning his statement.Hope this clarifies the issue.
Regards
Chris
Thanks Mart. Very helpful. I can make out some of the legend. The solid blue and red lines indicate the situation on the morning of 31st July. The dashed and dotted blue lines represent the approximate course of the German front line on the 15th and 16th August respectively (I think the numbers are right - the latter fits with the British offensive known as the Battle of Langemarck). The dashed green line is the approximate course of the main line of resistance at the end of the Battle of Flanders. I can't read the last one.
The second map illustrates a key issue that influenced the planning of Third Ypres, namely the German re-entrant between Ypres and Dixmuide, ie one of the factors to consider re area A.
I don't have volumes 13 and 14 - not many people do, so thank you very much for sharing this material. It would be great to have some higher quality scans, if that is not too much trouble. German artillery dispositions would be especially helpful. I know that the British perception of these played another role in their planning.
Robert
The second map illustrates a key issue that influenced the planning of Third Ypres, namely the German re-entrant between Ypres and Dixmuide, ie one of the factors to consider re area A.
I don't have volumes 13 and 14 - not many people do, so thank you very much for sharing this material. It would be great to have some higher quality scans, if that is not too much trouble. German artillery dispositions would be especially helpful. I know that the British perception of these played another role in their planning.
Robert
Hello Mart,
Many thanks for this. The lie of the German defences is very important to analysing this option.
Regards
Chris
Many thanks for this. The lie of the German defences is very important to analysing this option.
Regards
Chris
QUOTE (AndyHollinger @ Feb 13 2007, 08:46 PM)
This is why I read the forum.
Thank you all ... all of you ... This is history at it's best.
Thank you all ... all of you ... This is history at it's best.
Had to jump in and echo Andy's vews. Class thread.
Chris et al, this map is labelled Option 2. The second scenario of using the Lys River to define the far right flank is overlaid on the map that Mart kindly uploaded. I have noted a couple of key landmarks. The additional area of operational concern is now labelled 'E'.
Click to view attachment
Robert
Click to view attachment
Robert
I'm supposed to be going to work, but I've been sitting here transfixed fro 30 minutes reading this. As Andy and Andrew say - thanks. Classic work. 
Robert,
Excellent. let's go with that your last map (Hug the Lys). I have a full day tommorrow, so I will post some of the thoughts I had that led me to start thinking about this option over the weekend and we can then consider what other factors need to be considered.
Regards
chris
Excellent. let's go with that your last map (Hug the Lys). I have a full day tommorrow, so I will post some of the thoughts I had that led me to start thinking about this option over the weekend and we can then consider what other factors need to be considered.
Regards
chris
Hi
I'm scanning 5 maps and other things, wait a little please.
Regards
Mart
I'm scanning 5 maps and other things, wait a little please.
Regards
Mart
Chris, that would be great. I will start pulling together information from the original planning process, and piece together some pros and cons as well.
Mart, I am happy to wait a lot
.
Robert
Mart, I am happy to wait a lot
.Robert
Fine scholarship, gentlemen, and I am waiting (with baited breath) to read more
Once we have reached a natural conclusion; I would wish to explore another line.
If Haig allowed Plumer to attack from Messines northwards (rather than pass the baton to Gough and permit the attack from the Ypres area), could the objective of clearing the ridge have been achieved OR would such an action have been fatally open to counter attacks from the east?
Once we have reached a natural conclusion; I would wish to explore another line.
If Haig allowed Plumer to attack from Messines northwards (rather than pass the baton to Gough and permit the attack from the Ypres area), could the objective of clearing the ridge have been achieved OR would such an action have been fatally open to counter attacks from the east?
delta, we should try to include your question into the discussion now. It is a fundamental one that is just as pertinent for Chris' proposal.
Robert
Robert
Hello
First scanned map, orginally done at 300 dpi, it's original size is 14.5 meg, will email orginal to those who know that there inbox can take it. Can yours Robert? So bits can be enlarged.
Regards
Mart
First scanned map, orginally done at 300 dpi, it's original size is 14.5 meg, will email orginal to those who know that there inbox can take it. Can yours Robert? So bits can be enlarged.
Regards
Mart
QUOTE (Robert Dunlop @ Feb 15 2007, 02:32 PM)
delta, we should try to include your question into the discussion now. It is a fundamental one that is just as pertinent for Chris' proposal.
Robert - thank you
Stephen
Hello
Two more scans, artillery dispositions, Flanders is the first one and the other (with two sets) for comparison.
First file orginal is 300 dpi and 6,9 meg, second 7.6 meg, as before pm if you would like the orginal.
Second needs redoing
Regards
Mart
Two more scans, artillery dispositions, Flanders is the first one and the other (with two sets) for comparison.
First file orginal is 300 dpi and 6,9 meg, second 7.6 meg, as before pm if you would like the orginal.
Second needs redoing
Regards
Mart
Mart, the quality of the scans is superb. The last part of the legend refers to the furthest line up to which the enemy could advance without endangering the Belgian coastal ports. Interesting to note that this line passes east of Roulers.
Robert
Robert
Chris, I misplaced the Lys on my previous map. Thanks to Mart's latest version, I have been able to represent it more accurately. I have added the Ypres-Comines Canal and the towns on Comines and Menin, as well as Tourcoing. The general outline of the ridges has been transferred from the previous map too. I have altered the shape of the new salient - the precise shape does not matter too much at this stage. Area E has been relocated south of the Lys.
Apologies for the earlier mistake.
Click to view attachment
Robert
Apologies for the earlier mistake.
Click to view attachment
Robert
If everyone is ok, I would like to go back and delete some of the previous pics. This will free up space on the server. We only need a couple of maps for this discussion.
Robert
Robert
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