Ladies and Gents,
once more I leech off your knowledge..............one day I may be able to help someone, who knows. But for now........
What was going on around Mametz on the first day of the battle? I know what happened a few days later, but I'm really confused about the first day.
All help appreciated
Thanks
Steve
Full Version: Mametz 1 July
Wow what a question. You really need to buy some books. Try Martin Middlebrooks 1st Dat of the Somme for a general starter. Battleground Europe series will offer some insight. Getting a basic library is vital. You really need the bigger picture first. All obvious stuff but its out there and the enjoyment is the discovery!!
Good luck.
You gotta start somewhere.
TT
Good luck.
You gotta start somewhere.
TT
TT,
thanks, yes no short cuts I s'pose. Just being lazy really..............I'll get reading
thanks, yes no short cuts I s'pose. Just being lazy really..............I'll get reading
It's fairly straightforward. This is an extract from my forthcoming article for the Long, Long Trail, called, amazingly enough, Mametz on 1 July 1916.
The village of Mametz lay behind the first German position, which in this area consisted of three principal fighting trench systems connected by many communication trenches. It was an exceptionally strong position to have to attack. The German front line ran approximately in parallel with the British, and was called (left to right) Bulgar Trench, Mametz Trench, Danube Trench and Kiel Trench; behind it and in front of Mametz was a second line that incorporated Cemetery Trench and a key machine gun post at the village cemetery. Well behind the village on higher ground ran the third line, Fritz Trench and Railway Alley.
The area fell within the boundary of the British XV Corps, under Lieutenant General Henry Horne. His force consisted of the 7th and 21st Divisions in the front lines, with 17th (Northern) Division in corps reserve some 2 miles behind. The field artillery of the Divisions was supplemented by the Corps Heavies of 3rd, 14th, 18th, 21st and 23rd Heavy Artillery Groups together with the French 6th Field Artillery Groupe. Facing them were just 6 battalions of the German 28th Reserve Division. The German artillery was strongly outnumbered in this sector.
Horne ordered 7th Division to clear the high ground along Willow Stream (which meant capturing the enemy's first and second trench lines and Mametz village in order to do so) and 21st Division to do the same on the west bank of the stream. However, Fricourt being considered much too strong a position to take by frontal assault, it would not be attacked at first but would be be "pinched out" once the attack of 7th Division (east of village) and 21st Division (west) had succeeded in pushing around its flanks. It was not believed that this would occur on the first day but arrangements were made to do so if things did go well. Should all develop in accordance with plan, the attacking force was to press on with 17th Division through Mametz Wood and on to take Bazentin le Petit, Longueval and Ginchy in the main German second position.
The preliminary bombardment in this sector was successful, the enemy artillery having been practically obliterated (see: what terrible myths have been wreaked about 1 July!!). At 7.22am, batteries of Stokes mortars opened fire and local commanders ordered the release of gas on the centre of the front facing Fricourt that was not initially being attacked. Four minutes later No 5 Battalion of the Special Brigade of Royal Engineers launched a discharge of smoke on the flanks of both Divisions.
At 7.28am a number of mines were blown under enemy positions: 178 Tunnelling Company RE blew three large mines under the Tambour at Fricourt (again, in the area where no attack was to go in), and one at Bulgar Point a strong work facing 91st Brigade of 7th Division. The latter position was completely destroyed. Four mines were blown in an already cratered area between Mametz and Fricourt.
The artillery bombardment here did not consist of prearranged and timed "lifts" onto distant targets, but was closer in style to a creeping barrage.
The infantry of 91st Brigade assembled not in their own front line but in the support trenches, to avoid casualties from enemy shellfire falling on the front line. A number of Russian saps had been dug or blown in across no man's land and gave extra cover to the attacking troops.
The job of 91st Brigade was to advance across the German front line (Bulgar Trench), past the second line (Cemetery Trench), capture the strongpoints in Mametz itself and push on past the deep Dantzig Alley communication trench and to take the third enemy line, Fritz Trench. 22nd Manchesters were assembled astride the Mametz-Montauban track and 1st South Staffords opposite the Bulgar Point strongpoint which was destroyed in the mine explosion just before zero. 2nd Queen's and 21st Manchesters were in close support behind the attacking battalions.
91st Brigade moves into Mametz but gets into a stiff fight: the 22nd Manchesters and 1st South Staffords quickly crossed the narrow no man's land but came under fire from German machine guns in Dantzig Alley communication trench as they approached Cemetery Trench and the edge of the village. By 8am, the Staffords were well into the village ruins and the Manchesters were pressing on to Bucket Trench, having almost gained their objectives. However, German resistance began to stiffen, and the leading men were forced back on Cemetery Trench. At 9.30am the support battalions were ordered up to reinforce - with little effect. Divisional CO Major-General Herbert Watts ordered the artillery to re-bombard the area of Dantzig Alley and Fritz Trench, but it was not effective and did not even stop some German counter-attacks from Mametz itself. The effort was repeated at 12.25pm - the Corps having heard that Pommiers Redoubt had fallen in the attack on Montauban, and 91st Brigade having reported sight of enemy troops massing to counter attack from Dantzig Alley. This time the bombardment did the trick, although one enemy field gun firing at close range continued to cause trouble until its detachment were killed. Parties now bombed along Dantzig Alley and Bright Alley by 1.40pm. Parties of the South Staffords and 21st Manchesters were also able to reinforce those Staffords still on the edge of Mametz.
The job of 20th Brigade was to advance across the German front line (Mametz, Danube and Kiel Trench) and form a defensive flank facing Fricourt. The village itself was not being attacked; 21st Division was on the far side of it. 2nd Gordon Highlanders were to advance alongside the South Staffords of 91st Brigade and through the western half of Mametz. 9th Devons, across the Albert to Peronne road, were to advance in parallel with the road towards and through Hidden Wood.
20th Brigade suffers heavy losses, held up: the 2nd Gordons moved off towards the enemy front line but their left company ran into uncut barbed wire, hidden in a dip. Surrounded by unexploded British shells, many men fell to German machine gun fire from "The Shrine", an machine gun post at Mametz cemetery, as the wire was negotiated. Even so, the Gordons got as far as the second enemy position at Shrine Alley by 7.55am and maintained touch with the Staffords further along in Cemetery Trench. They were unable to progress from there and spent much effort in clearing dug outs of enemy. Across the road, the 9th Devons advanced from a line some 250 yards behind their own front trench, so badly had this been damaged by shellfire. They were hit by heavy machine gun fire from Fricourt Wood, the German suppirt trenches and from Mametz. At least half of their losses for the day were incurred before they had even reached Mansel Copse, just ahead of the front line. The survivors pressed on into the German front and support trenches, but by now all the battalion's officers had become casualties. As early as 7.40am the final company was ordered to advance but lost all its officers in crossing no man's land. The same thing happened to two companies of the 8th Devons when they were ordered to reinforce.
7th Division completes capture of Mametz: at 2.30pm, an attack was made by 21st Division on Fricourt. 7th Division organised a fresh attack to take advantage of it and assist the battalions now held up in Cemetery Trench, Shrine Alley and in the outskirts of Mametz. Two companies of 2nd Royal Warwicks and two of 8th Devons attacked at 3.30pm, after 30 minutes artillery support. It was enough for the German garrison of Mametz: 200 of them emerged with hands up before the new attack had even reached the old German front line. By just after 4pm, the whole of Mametz had fallen and within another hour the situation was quiet. 2nd Queens were consolidating Fritz Trench and South Staffords were in Bunny Alley by 7.30pm. 91st Brigade had suceeded in all its objectives. By that time, the roads up to the old German front line had been put in a reasonable state, and communication trenches were also being worked on. 7th Division reported that things were very quiet and that further advances towards Mametz Wood could be made if fresh troops could come up. But none did, and the moment - tragically - was lost. The whole of the new 7th Divisional front was wired that night, by parties from all three RE Companies and the pioneers of 24th Manchesters.
The losses of 7th Division on the day amounted to 3,380 officers and men.
Among my heroes of the day: 2/Lt John Potter of 1st South Staffords, recommended for a VC but got a DSO. Was mortally wounded not long afterwards.
Hope that helps
The village of Mametz lay behind the first German position, which in this area consisted of three principal fighting trench systems connected by many communication trenches. It was an exceptionally strong position to have to attack. The German front line ran approximately in parallel with the British, and was called (left to right) Bulgar Trench, Mametz Trench, Danube Trench and Kiel Trench; behind it and in front of Mametz was a second line that incorporated Cemetery Trench and a key machine gun post at the village cemetery. Well behind the village on higher ground ran the third line, Fritz Trench and Railway Alley.
The area fell within the boundary of the British XV Corps, under Lieutenant General Henry Horne. His force consisted of the 7th and 21st Divisions in the front lines, with 17th (Northern) Division in corps reserve some 2 miles behind. The field artillery of the Divisions was supplemented by the Corps Heavies of 3rd, 14th, 18th, 21st and 23rd Heavy Artillery Groups together with the French 6th Field Artillery Groupe. Facing them were just 6 battalions of the German 28th Reserve Division. The German artillery was strongly outnumbered in this sector.
Horne ordered 7th Division to clear the high ground along Willow Stream (which meant capturing the enemy's first and second trench lines and Mametz village in order to do so) and 21st Division to do the same on the west bank of the stream. However, Fricourt being considered much too strong a position to take by frontal assault, it would not be attacked at first but would be be "pinched out" once the attack of 7th Division (east of village) and 21st Division (west) had succeeded in pushing around its flanks. It was not believed that this would occur on the first day but arrangements were made to do so if things did go well. Should all develop in accordance with plan, the attacking force was to press on with 17th Division through Mametz Wood and on to take Bazentin le Petit, Longueval and Ginchy in the main German second position.
The preliminary bombardment in this sector was successful, the enemy artillery having been practically obliterated (see: what terrible myths have been wreaked about 1 July!!). At 7.22am, batteries of Stokes mortars opened fire and local commanders ordered the release of gas on the centre of the front facing Fricourt that was not initially being attacked. Four minutes later No 5 Battalion of the Special Brigade of Royal Engineers launched a discharge of smoke on the flanks of both Divisions.
At 7.28am a number of mines were blown under enemy positions: 178 Tunnelling Company RE blew three large mines under the Tambour at Fricourt (again, in the area where no attack was to go in), and one at Bulgar Point a strong work facing 91st Brigade of 7th Division. The latter position was completely destroyed. Four mines were blown in an already cratered area between Mametz and Fricourt.
The artillery bombardment here did not consist of prearranged and timed "lifts" onto distant targets, but was closer in style to a creeping barrage.
The infantry of 91st Brigade assembled not in their own front line but in the support trenches, to avoid casualties from enemy shellfire falling on the front line. A number of Russian saps had been dug or blown in across no man's land and gave extra cover to the attacking troops.
The job of 91st Brigade was to advance across the German front line (Bulgar Trench), past the second line (Cemetery Trench), capture the strongpoints in Mametz itself and push on past the deep Dantzig Alley communication trench and to take the third enemy line, Fritz Trench. 22nd Manchesters were assembled astride the Mametz-Montauban track and 1st South Staffords opposite the Bulgar Point strongpoint which was destroyed in the mine explosion just before zero. 2nd Queen's and 21st Manchesters were in close support behind the attacking battalions.
91st Brigade moves into Mametz but gets into a stiff fight: the 22nd Manchesters and 1st South Staffords quickly crossed the narrow no man's land but came under fire from German machine guns in Dantzig Alley communication trench as they approached Cemetery Trench and the edge of the village. By 8am, the Staffords were well into the village ruins and the Manchesters were pressing on to Bucket Trench, having almost gained their objectives. However, German resistance began to stiffen, and the leading men were forced back on Cemetery Trench. At 9.30am the support battalions were ordered up to reinforce - with little effect. Divisional CO Major-General Herbert Watts ordered the artillery to re-bombard the area of Dantzig Alley and Fritz Trench, but it was not effective and did not even stop some German counter-attacks from Mametz itself. The effort was repeated at 12.25pm - the Corps having heard that Pommiers Redoubt had fallen in the attack on Montauban, and 91st Brigade having reported sight of enemy troops massing to counter attack from Dantzig Alley. This time the bombardment did the trick, although one enemy field gun firing at close range continued to cause trouble until its detachment were killed. Parties now bombed along Dantzig Alley and Bright Alley by 1.40pm. Parties of the South Staffords and 21st Manchesters were also able to reinforce those Staffords still on the edge of Mametz.
The job of 20th Brigade was to advance across the German front line (Mametz, Danube and Kiel Trench) and form a defensive flank facing Fricourt. The village itself was not being attacked; 21st Division was on the far side of it. 2nd Gordon Highlanders were to advance alongside the South Staffords of 91st Brigade and through the western half of Mametz. 9th Devons, across the Albert to Peronne road, were to advance in parallel with the road towards and through Hidden Wood.
20th Brigade suffers heavy losses, held up: the 2nd Gordons moved off towards the enemy front line but their left company ran into uncut barbed wire, hidden in a dip. Surrounded by unexploded British shells, many men fell to German machine gun fire from "The Shrine", an machine gun post at Mametz cemetery, as the wire was negotiated. Even so, the Gordons got as far as the second enemy position at Shrine Alley by 7.55am and maintained touch with the Staffords further along in Cemetery Trench. They were unable to progress from there and spent much effort in clearing dug outs of enemy. Across the road, the 9th Devons advanced from a line some 250 yards behind their own front trench, so badly had this been damaged by shellfire. They were hit by heavy machine gun fire from Fricourt Wood, the German suppirt trenches and from Mametz. At least half of their losses for the day were incurred before they had even reached Mansel Copse, just ahead of the front line. The survivors pressed on into the German front and support trenches, but by now all the battalion's officers had become casualties. As early as 7.40am the final company was ordered to advance but lost all its officers in crossing no man's land. The same thing happened to two companies of the 8th Devons when they were ordered to reinforce.
7th Division completes capture of Mametz: at 2.30pm, an attack was made by 21st Division on Fricourt. 7th Division organised a fresh attack to take advantage of it and assist the battalions now held up in Cemetery Trench, Shrine Alley and in the outskirts of Mametz. Two companies of 2nd Royal Warwicks and two of 8th Devons attacked at 3.30pm, after 30 minutes artillery support. It was enough for the German garrison of Mametz: 200 of them emerged with hands up before the new attack had even reached the old German front line. By just after 4pm, the whole of Mametz had fallen and within another hour the situation was quiet. 2nd Queens were consolidating Fritz Trench and South Staffords were in Bunny Alley by 7.30pm. 91st Brigade had suceeded in all its objectives. By that time, the roads up to the old German front line had been put in a reasonable state, and communication trenches were also being worked on. 7th Division reported that things were very quiet and that further advances towards Mametz Wood could be made if fresh troops could come up. But none did, and the moment - tragically - was lost. The whole of the new 7th Divisional front was wired that night, by parties from all three RE Companies and the pioneers of 24th Manchesters.
The losses of 7th Division on the day amounted to 3,380 officers and men.
Among my heroes of the day: 2/Lt John Potter of 1st South Staffords, recommended for a VC but got a DSO. Was mortally wounded not long afterwards.
Hope that helps
Chris,
many, many thanks
Steve
many, many thanks
Steve
QUOTE (Chris_Baker @ Apr 16 2008, 08:16 PM) 
It's fairly straightforward. This is an extract from my forthcoming article for the Long, Long Trail, called, amazingly enough, Mametz on 1 July 1916.
The village of Mametz lay behind the first German position, which in this area consisted of three principal fighting trench systems connected by many communication trenches. It was an exceptionally strong position to have to attack. The German front line ran approximately in parallel with the British, and was called (left to right) Bulgar Trench, Mametz Trench, Danube Trench and Kiel Trench; behind it and in front of Mametz was a second line that incorporated Cemetery Trench and a key machine gun post at the village cemetery. Well behind the village on higher ground ran the third line, Fritz Trench and Railway Alley.
The area fell within the boundary of the British XV Corps, under Lieutenant General Henry Horne. His force consisted of the 7th and 21st Divisions in the front lines, with 17th (Northern) Division in corps reserve some 2 miles behind. The field artillery of the Divisions was supplemented by the Corps Heavies of 3rd, 14th, 18th, 21st and 23rd Heavy Artillery Groups together with the French 6th Field Artillery Groupe. Facing them were just 6 battalions of the German 28th Reserve Division. The German artillery was strongly outnumbered in this sector.
Horne ordered 7th Division to clear the high ground along Willow Stream (which meant capturing the enemy's first and second trench lines and Mametz village in order to do so) and 21st Division to do the same on the west bank of the stream. However, Fricourt being considered much too strong a position to take by frontal assault, it would not be attacked at first but would be be "pinched out" once the attack of 7th Division (east of village) and 21st Division (west) had succeeded in pushing around its flanks. It was not believed that this would occur on the first day but arrangements were made to do so if things did go well. Should all develop in accordance with plan, the attacking force was to press on with 17th Division through Mametz Wood and on to take Bazentin le Petit, Longueval and Ginchy in the main German second position.
The preliminary bombardment in this sector was successful, the enemy artillery having been practically obliterated (see: what terrible myths have been wreaked about 1 July!!). At 7.22am, batteries of Stokes mortars opened fire and local commanders ordered the release of gas on the centre of the front facing Fricourt that was not initially being attacked. Four minutes later No 5 Battalion of the Special Brigade of Royal Engineers launched a discharge of smoke on the flanks of both Divisions.
At 7.28am a number of mines were blown under enemy positions: 178 Tunnelling Company RE blew three large mines under the Tambour at Fricourt (again, in the area where no attack was to go in), and one at Bulgar Point a strong work facing 91st Brigade of 7th Division. The latter position was completely destroyed. Four mines were blown in an already cratered area between Mametz and Fricourt.
The artillery bombardment here did not consist of prearranged and timed "lifts" onto distant targets, but was closer in style to a creeping barrage.
The infantry of 91st Brigade assembled not in their own front line but in the support trenches, to avoid casualties from enemy shellfire falling on the front line. A number of Russian saps had been dug or blown in across no man's land and gave extra cover to the attacking troops.
The job of 91st Brigade was to advance across the German front line (Bulgar Trench), past the second line (Cemetery Trench), capture the strongpoints in Mametz itself and push on past the deep Dantzig Alley communication trench and to take the third enemy line, Fritz Trench. 22nd Manchesters were assembled astride the Mametz-Montauban track and 1st South Staffords opposite the Bulgar Point strongpoint which was destroyed in the mine explosion just before zero. 2nd Queen's and 21st Manchesters were in close support behind the attacking battalions.
91st Brigade moves into Mametz but gets into a stiff fight: the 22nd Manchesters and 1st South Staffords quickly crossed the narrow no man's land but came under fire from German machine guns in Dantzig Alley communication trench as they approached Cemetery Trench and the edge of the village. By 8am, the Staffords were well into the village ruins and the Manchesters were pressing on to Bucket Trench, having almost gained their objectives. However, German resistance began to stiffen, and the leading men were forced back on Cemetery Trench. At 9.30am the support battalions were ordered up to reinforce - with little effect. Divisional CO Major-General Herbert Watts ordered the artillery to re-bombard the area of Dantzig Alley and Fritz Trench, but it was not effective and did not even stop some German counter-attacks from Mametz itself. The effort was repeated at 12.25pm - the Corps having heard that Pommiers Redoubt had fallen in the attack on Montauban, and 91st Brigade having reported sight of enemy troops massing to counter attack from Dantzig Alley. This time the bombardment did the trick, although one enemy field gun firing at close range continued to cause trouble until its detachment were killed. Parties now bombed along Dantzig Alley and Bright Alley by 1.40pm. Parties of the South Staffords and 21st Manchesters were also able to reinforce those Staffords still on the edge of Mametz.
The job of 20th Brigade was to advance across the German front line (Mametz, Danube and Kiel Trench) and form a defensive flank facing Fricourt. The village itself was not being attacked; 21st Division was on the far side of it. 2nd Gordon Highlanders were to advance alongside the South Staffords of 91st Brigade and through the western half of Mametz. 9th Devons, across the Albert to Peronne road, were to advance in parallel with the road towards and through Hidden Wood.
20th Brigade suffers heavy losses, held up: the 2nd Gordons moved off towards the enemy front line but their left company ran into uncut barbed wire, hidden in a dip. Surrounded by unexploded British shells, many men fell to German machine gun fire from "The Shrine", an machine gun post at Mametz cemetery, as the wire was negotiated. Even so, the Gordons got as far as the second enemy position at Shrine Alley by 7.55am and maintained touch with the Staffords further along in Cemetery Trench. They were unable to progress from there and spent much effort in clearing dug outs of enemy. Across the road, the 9th Devons advanced from a line some 250 yards behind their own front trench, so badly had this been damaged by shellfire. They were hit by heavy machine gun fire from Fricourt Wood, the German suppirt trenches and from Mametz. At least half of their losses for the day were incurred before they had even reached Mansel Copse, just ahead of the front line. The survivors pressed on into the German front and support trenches, but by now all the battalion's officers had become casualties. As early as 7.40am the final company was ordered to advance but lost all its officers in crossing no man's land. The same thing happened to two companies of the 8th Devons when they were ordered to reinforce.
7th Division completes capture of Mametz: at 2.30pm, an attack was made by 21st Division on Fricourt. 7th Division organised a fresh attack to take advantage of it and assist the battalions now held up in Cemetery Trench, Shrine Alley and in the outskirts of Mametz. Two companies of 2nd Royal Warwicks and two of 8th Devons attacked at 3.30pm, after 30 minutes artillery support. It was enough for the German garrison of Mametz: 200 of them emerged with hands up before the new attack had even reached the old German front line. By just after 4pm, the whole of Mametz had fallen and within another hour the situation was quiet. 2nd Queens were consolidating Fritz Trench and South Staffords were in Bunny Alley by 7.30pm. 91st Brigade had suceeded in all its objectives. By that time, the roads up to the old German front line had been put in a reasonable state, and communication trenches were also being worked on. 7th Division reported that things were very quiet and that further advances towards Mametz Wood could be made if fresh troops could come up. But none did, and the moment - tragically - was lost. The whole of the new 7th Divisional front was wired that night, by parties from all three RE Companies and the pioneers of 24th Manchesters.
The losses of 7th Division on the day amounted to 3,380 officers and men.
Among my heroes of the day: 2/Lt John Potter of 1st South Staffords, recommended for a VC but got a DSO. Was mortally wounded not long afterwards.
Hope that helps
The village of Mametz lay behind the first German position, which in this area consisted of three principal fighting trench systems connected by many communication trenches. It was an exceptionally strong position to have to attack. The German front line ran approximately in parallel with the British, and was called (left to right) Bulgar Trench, Mametz Trench, Danube Trench and Kiel Trench; behind it and in front of Mametz was a second line that incorporated Cemetery Trench and a key machine gun post at the village cemetery. Well behind the village on higher ground ran the third line, Fritz Trench and Railway Alley.
The area fell within the boundary of the British XV Corps, under Lieutenant General Henry Horne. His force consisted of the 7th and 21st Divisions in the front lines, with 17th (Northern) Division in corps reserve some 2 miles behind. The field artillery of the Divisions was supplemented by the Corps Heavies of 3rd, 14th, 18th, 21st and 23rd Heavy Artillery Groups together with the French 6th Field Artillery Groupe. Facing them were just 6 battalions of the German 28th Reserve Division. The German artillery was strongly outnumbered in this sector.
Horne ordered 7th Division to clear the high ground along Willow Stream (which meant capturing the enemy's first and second trench lines and Mametz village in order to do so) and 21st Division to do the same on the west bank of the stream. However, Fricourt being considered much too strong a position to take by frontal assault, it would not be attacked at first but would be be "pinched out" once the attack of 7th Division (east of village) and 21st Division (west) had succeeded in pushing around its flanks. It was not believed that this would occur on the first day but arrangements were made to do so if things did go well. Should all develop in accordance with plan, the attacking force was to press on with 17th Division through Mametz Wood and on to take Bazentin le Petit, Longueval and Ginchy in the main German second position.
The preliminary bombardment in this sector was successful, the enemy artillery having been practically obliterated (see: what terrible myths have been wreaked about 1 July!!). At 7.22am, batteries of Stokes mortars opened fire and local commanders ordered the release of gas on the centre of the front facing Fricourt that was not initially being attacked. Four minutes later No 5 Battalion of the Special Brigade of Royal Engineers launched a discharge of smoke on the flanks of both Divisions.
At 7.28am a number of mines were blown under enemy positions: 178 Tunnelling Company RE blew three large mines under the Tambour at Fricourt (again, in the area where no attack was to go in), and one at Bulgar Point a strong work facing 91st Brigade of 7th Division. The latter position was completely destroyed. Four mines were blown in an already cratered area between Mametz and Fricourt.
The artillery bombardment here did not consist of prearranged and timed "lifts" onto distant targets, but was closer in style to a creeping barrage.
The infantry of 91st Brigade assembled not in their own front line but in the support trenches, to avoid casualties from enemy shellfire falling on the front line. A number of Russian saps had been dug or blown in across no man's land and gave extra cover to the attacking troops.
The job of 91st Brigade was to advance across the German front line (Bulgar Trench), past the second line (Cemetery Trench), capture the strongpoints in Mametz itself and push on past the deep Dantzig Alley communication trench and to take the third enemy line, Fritz Trench. 22nd Manchesters were assembled astride the Mametz-Montauban track and 1st South Staffords opposite the Bulgar Point strongpoint which was destroyed in the mine explosion just before zero. 2nd Queen's and 21st Manchesters were in close support behind the attacking battalions.
91st Brigade moves into Mametz but gets into a stiff fight: the 22nd Manchesters and 1st South Staffords quickly crossed the narrow no man's land but came under fire from German machine guns in Dantzig Alley communication trench as they approached Cemetery Trench and the edge of the village. By 8am, the Staffords were well into the village ruins and the Manchesters were pressing on to Bucket Trench, having almost gained their objectives. However, German resistance began to stiffen, and the leading men were forced back on Cemetery Trench. At 9.30am the support battalions were ordered up to reinforce - with little effect. Divisional CO Major-General Herbert Watts ordered the artillery to re-bombard the area of Dantzig Alley and Fritz Trench, but it was not effective and did not even stop some German counter-attacks from Mametz itself. The effort was repeated at 12.25pm - the Corps having heard that Pommiers Redoubt had fallen in the attack on Montauban, and 91st Brigade having reported sight of enemy troops massing to counter attack from Dantzig Alley. This time the bombardment did the trick, although one enemy field gun firing at close range continued to cause trouble until its detachment were killed. Parties now bombed along Dantzig Alley and Bright Alley by 1.40pm. Parties of the South Staffords and 21st Manchesters were also able to reinforce those Staffords still on the edge of Mametz.
The job of 20th Brigade was to advance across the German front line (Mametz, Danube and Kiel Trench) and form a defensive flank facing Fricourt. The village itself was not being attacked; 21st Division was on the far side of it. 2nd Gordon Highlanders were to advance alongside the South Staffords of 91st Brigade and through the western half of Mametz. 9th Devons, across the Albert to Peronne road, were to advance in parallel with the road towards and through Hidden Wood.
20th Brigade suffers heavy losses, held up: the 2nd Gordons moved off towards the enemy front line but their left company ran into uncut barbed wire, hidden in a dip. Surrounded by unexploded British shells, many men fell to German machine gun fire from "The Shrine", an machine gun post at Mametz cemetery, as the wire was negotiated. Even so, the Gordons got as far as the second enemy position at Shrine Alley by 7.55am and maintained touch with the Staffords further along in Cemetery Trench. They were unable to progress from there and spent much effort in clearing dug outs of enemy. Across the road, the 9th Devons advanced from a line some 250 yards behind their own front trench, so badly had this been damaged by shellfire. They were hit by heavy machine gun fire from Fricourt Wood, the German suppirt trenches and from Mametz. At least half of their losses for the day were incurred before they had even reached Mansel Copse, just ahead of the front line. The survivors pressed on into the German front and support trenches, but by now all the battalion's officers had become casualties. As early as 7.40am the final company was ordered to advance but lost all its officers in crossing no man's land. The same thing happened to two companies of the 8th Devons when they were ordered to reinforce.
7th Division completes capture of Mametz: at 2.30pm, an attack was made by 21st Division on Fricourt. 7th Division organised a fresh attack to take advantage of it and assist the battalions now held up in Cemetery Trench, Shrine Alley and in the outskirts of Mametz. Two companies of 2nd Royal Warwicks and two of 8th Devons attacked at 3.30pm, after 30 minutes artillery support. It was enough for the German garrison of Mametz: 200 of them emerged with hands up before the new attack had even reached the old German front line. By just after 4pm, the whole of Mametz had fallen and within another hour the situation was quiet. 2nd Queens were consolidating Fritz Trench and South Staffords were in Bunny Alley by 7.30pm. 91st Brigade had suceeded in all its objectives. By that time, the roads up to the old German front line had been put in a reasonable state, and communication trenches were also being worked on. 7th Division reported that things were very quiet and that further advances towards Mametz Wood could be made if fresh troops could come up. But none did, and the moment - tragically - was lost. The whole of the new 7th Divisional front was wired that night, by parties from all three RE Companies and the pioneers of 24th Manchesters.
The losses of 7th Division on the day amounted to 3,380 officers and men.
Among my heroes of the day: 2/Lt John Potter of 1st South Staffords, recommended for a VC but got a DSO. Was mortally wounded not long afterwards.
Hope that helps
Chris
I am a bit confused here and have highlighted my concerns. According to Andrew Robertshaw in Somme 1 July 1916: Tragedy and Triumph (p. 67) 50th Brigade:
To the south of 63rd Brigade, and facing the three mines in the position called 'The Tambour' in front of Fricourt, was 50th Brigade, which was attached to the 21st Division from 17th (Northern) Division. Here two companies of the 7th East Yorkshires attacked with the intention of passing to the north of the mine craters, while another battalion of the brigade masked the village.
I appreciate that you're mainly concerned with an analysis of Mametz, but what was the situation at Fricourt on 1 July? Both versions of events seem to contradict each other. Your feedback would be most welcome in the interests of 'demystification' please.
Regards
Al
Happy to clarify.
50th Brigade was under command of 21st Division for the attack.
There was no frontal attack on the Tambour. 10th West Yorks and 7th East Yorks went to the north of it; 7th Yorkshire faced it but without assaulting. A German machine gun post in the Tambour, firing in enfilade across the 10th West Yorks and 7th East Yorks, plus another in Fricourt itself, caused the damage to those battalions.
50th Brigade was under command of 21st Division for the attack.
There was no frontal attack on the Tambour. 10th West Yorks and 7th East Yorks went to the north of it; 7th Yorkshire faced it but without assaulting. A German machine gun post in the Tambour, firing in enfilade across the 10th West Yorks and 7th East Yorks, plus another in Fricourt itself, caused the damage to those battalions.
Many story's came out of the first day of the Battle of the Somme, and one of the famouse ones took place here in front of Mametz. Capt D L Martin had made a clay model of the area he and his men had to attack over, because of the Tambour Saliant and Bulgar Point the front lines bent back toward the S/West, which meant that the 9th Devons, followed by the 8th would be attacking towards Fricourt on a 310-320 degree angle which ment that the German held town of Mametz was facing there right flank. Correctly he argued that there would be a hidden machine gun in the church yard, called the shrine, under the crucifix, and that if it was not destroyed it would murder his men, it did so, and it did the same to the 8th Devons. They captured there objective's but at a terrable cost. Later they collected up there dead and buried them in the trench they started from, erecting a sign "The Devonshires held this trench, the Devonshires hold it still" They still hold it today!! You can see the remains of the trench at the bach wall running into the Devonshire CWGC there. Capt martin was killed by the gun he correctly said was there, also killed was the poet Lt Noel Hodgson, who forsaw his death and wrote.
I, that on my familiar hill
saw with uncomprehending eye's
A 100 of thy sunsets spill
Their flesh and saguine sacrifice
Ere the Sun swings his noonday sword
Must say goodbye to all this
By all delights that I shall miss
help me to die, oh lord.
It is a interesting area around here, as you can easily work out using IGN map 2408E where all the starting points for the British attack are., and you can stand on them! Not far is where Capt W P Nevill 8th East Surrys had his men kick footballs as they went over the top. Where sasson won his military medal and where he watched the attack on the 1.7.16, he wrote, "before my eyes was a vision of hell!" The place Inky Bill was killed, and where the 38th (Welch) attacked! The Loop where the first tanks were brought up for the first tank attack, the list goes on and on.
I, that on my familiar hill
saw with uncomprehending eye's
A 100 of thy sunsets spill
Their flesh and saguine sacrifice
Ere the Sun swings his noonday sword
Must say goodbye to all this
By all delights that I shall miss
help me to die, oh lord.
It is a interesting area around here, as you can easily work out using IGN map 2408E where all the starting points for the British attack are., and you can stand on them! Not far is where Capt W P Nevill 8th East Surrys had his men kick footballs as they went over the top. Where sasson won his military medal and where he watched the attack on the 1.7.16, he wrote, "before my eyes was a vision of hell!" The place Inky Bill was killed, and where the 38th (Welch) attacked! The Loop where the first tanks were brought up for the first tank attack, the list goes on and on.
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